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Abstract
Accession to the European Community in 1986 profoundly changed the 
foreign policy of democratic Spain. Since then the international and regional 
contexts have changed, new actors have emerged, and the entire formulation 
o f foreign policy has evolved substantially. EC/EU membership has been the 
framework of this transformation, but it has also often been the very cause of 
some of the most substantial changes. This thesis analyses the transformation 
of Spanish foreign policy through a case study of policy towards Morocco, 
arguably the most complicated bilateral partner for any Spanish democratic 
government.
The thesis uses the concept of Europeanisation, defined as the process of 
foreign policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation 
pressures and the new opportunities generated by the European integration 
process. It focuses on four areas of the policy towards Morocco: fisheries, 
economic exchanges, immigration and territorial issues. The analysis shows 
that four themes o f Europeanisation have been important, but in an 
asymmetrical way in each area. Thus, 1) the balance between new instruments 
and new constraints has been most influential in areas where there is an EC 
competence, such as fisheries or trade; 2) changes in identity and re-definition 
o f interests have been very relevant in economic and commercial issues and in 
immigration, but almost non-existent in relation to territorial issues or 
fisheries; 3) changes in decision-making have been crucial in fisheries, a 
common policy, but also in immigration, which is still in the hands of member 
states; and 4) Europeanisation through the domestic context has been 
witnessed in new policy areas (development co-operation, immigration 
control) but not in traditional issues (Western Sahara, fisheries).
The conclusion explains this variation in the impact in each issue area as the 
result of several factors: the weight of previous decisions and the historical 
background, the institutional set-up at European level, the ability o f domestic 
and bureaucratic actors to exploit the new opportunities and the changes in 
external factors such as the regional context. These findings are helpful both
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in understanding Spanish policy towards Morocco and in characterising the 
phenomenon of the Europeanisation of a foreign policy.
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Introduction
The border between Morocco and Spain sits on one of the world’s deepest 
rifts in terms of wealth. Africa, the poorest continent, meets the prosperous 
European Union in the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, the waters of the 
Strait of Gibraltar and those between the Canaries and the Sahara. Placed on 
the periphery of their own continents, Spain and Morocco have a long 
common history, with numerous similarities and a common heritage, but also 
a tradition of conflicts and rivalry that dates back several centuries.
Morocco occupies a very special position amongst Spain’s bilateral partners. 
It is at the same time a neighbour and a former colony, an economic 
competitor and a natural market for the Spanish economy, a cultural ‘cousin’ 
and a representative of a different civilisation, a territorial threat and a military 
partner. The similarities between Spain and Morocco are almost as striking as 
the differences. Spain and Morocco have Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, a 
geography marked by the presence of mountains in most of the territory, the 
shared cultural heritage of Al-Andalus,1 similar weather conditions, hundreds 
of years of common history. But one is a former colonial power and the other 
was a protectorate, a consolidated western democracy and a traditional Islamic 
state, a developed economy and a third world country. Given this context, it 
is hardly surprising that the Spanish policy towards its southern neighbour is 
full of contrasts.
Morocco is a prime bilateral partner; it enjoys, at least in theory, some 
privileges reserved only to the closest of Spain’s friends: high level summits 
involving ministers, heads of government and heads of state,, a very close 
relationship between the two crowns, the first foreign visit of Spain’s elected 
prime ministers and most foreign ministers since 1982. It is, at the same time, 
the country with which Spain has had the most threatening bilateral crises in 
its recent history, from the war fought in the first third of the 20th century (the 
last Spanish unilateral international armed conflict so far) to the 2002 crisis
1 Al-Andalus is the Arab name that designates the Iberian territories under Islamic rule 
between 711 and 1492.
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over the sovereignty of Parsley Island (.Perejil), via such tense episodes as the 
military campaign in the Tarfaya region (1956-58) or the 1975 Green March 
on the Western Sahara.
Morocco has been a constant worry for Spain’s policy-makers, and it 
remained a permanent priority for a foreign policy in transformation. The 
main changes in Spanish democratic foreign policy happened in the ten years 
that followed the death of the dictator, Francisco Franco. Those were the years 
in which the foreign policy of a country fallen into international isolation 
because of Franco’s ambiguous role in the Second World War was 
transformed into the policy of a democratic state, with a clear vocation of 
becoming a ‘normal’ player in the European arena, a member of the main 
west European Organisations and an active member of the international 
community. The period between 1975 and 1986 has attracted a great deal of 
attention from scholars as the years of transformation of Spanish foreign 
policy.
In 1986, with Spain’s accession to the European Communities, this first 
transformation was completed. But the evolution of the policy did not stop. 
The prospect of EC membership required the adaptation of many of Spain’s 
policies, and foreign policy would not be an exception. The impact of 
membership would still be felt after accession: indeed, this impact has been 
one of the main sources of transformation of Spanish foreign policy since 
then.
This thesis deals with one particular aspect of the transformation of Spanish 
foreign policy: the impact of EC/EU membership on the policy towards 
Morocco. Spanish policy towards Morocco between 1986 and 2002 presents 
aspects of both continuity and change. It has witnessed important landmarks 
in bilateral relations like the signature of a Treaty of Friendship, Good 
Neighbourliness and Co-operation in 1991, but also a fully fledged crisis in
2001-2002. There are some puzzles which are specific to Spanish policy 
towards Morocco: why have some parts of it changed so much, and others so 
little? Why have the changes gone in different directions, sometimes towards
18
Spanish policy towards Morocco Introduction
the consolidation of a better partnership, at other times towards an increase in 
bilateral tensions?
The answers to these questions need to include a large number of factors, 
some of them related to Spain’s domestic policies and its economy, some 
related to Morocco’s internal evolution and its foreign policy, others having to 
do with the international context; and general socioeconomic and 
demographic trends also need to be taken into account (to understand, for 
example, the importance of migration). In this study the focus is on analysing 
the impact of EC/EU as the explanation for change -  and also, sometimes, for 
stability - in Spanish policy towards Morocco.
This focus gives a new vision of Spanish policy towards Morocco, in which 
very different aspects of the policy that are beyond the scope of what 
traditionally has been considered foreign policy, such as fisheries or 
immigration policy, are included in the analysis and put in relation with the 
whole of the policy. The contradictions that appear when we compare the 
Spanish executive’s strategies in those technical areas are highlighted in this 
study.
This focus on the contradictions of Spanish policy challenges a myth that took 
shape amongst diplomats and scholars in the years before accession: there 
could be a European solution to Spain’s Moroccan problem. As this thesis 
highlights in its conclusion, such a solution will only be available if Spain 
resolves its dilemmas in relation to Morocco. Otherwise, the practice of 
uploading contradictory policies in the different areas to the EU does not 
result in a solution of contradictions at the Spanish level, but in the emergence 
of an equally contradictory European foreign policy.
Another goal of this thesis is to make a contribution to the study of European 
foreign policy. This contribution comes in two areas. First, the research 
outlines some aspects that are useful for the analysis of European Union 
policy towards Morocco. These include, of course, a better understanding of 
the role that Spain plays within this system. But they also include some
19
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observations about the role that France, and in particular the Franco-Spanish 
disagreements play in the making of European policy towards Morocco. And 
the effects of contradictory strands within the EC policy towards Morocco: 
some co-operative and openly friendly, some threatening and clearly negative 
for Moroccan interests. Finally, the conclusions of this study underline the 
importance of the existence of two small territories, Ceuta and Melilla, which 
are frilly integrated in the EU and yet claimed by Morocco, although both 
sides seem to ignore, for the moment, this problem.
The second area of contribution to the study of European foreign policy is the 
application of the concept of Europeanisation of a foreign policy -  that is, the 
process of foreign policy change at the national level originated by the 
adaptation pressures and the new opportunities generated by the European 
integration process - not to the ensemble of a foreign policy or to the 
bureaucratic and decision-making structures of this policy, but to a concrete 
policy towards one country. This application has its limits in terms of 
explaining change, as is acknowledged in the conclusions, but it also offers 
interesting analytical insights. The importance of considering both a top-down 
and a bottom-up dimension of the relationship between national policy and 
European policy, rather than staying only with one of the two, is clear from 
the conclusions of the thesis. The present study also shows that the concept of 
Europeanisation should be applied not only once membership is a fact, but 
also in the period before it actually takes place. And it highlights the 
importance of studying foreign policy with a comprehensive approach that 
includes other dimensions (immigration, agriculture, fisheries) than those 
classically associated with it (defence, development co-operation).
The text that follows is organised in seven chapters. Chapter One is devoted to 
the conceptual framework, and in particular to defining the concept of 
Europeanisation and its limits, as well as setting the agenda that has guided 
the research for this thesis. Chapter Two outlines the historical background of 
the Spanish-Moroccan relationship, as well as a contextualisation of the 
bilateral relationship in the regional context of the western Mediterranean. It
20
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ends with a summary of Spain’s main interests in Morocco, and a general 
overview of its Moroccan policy.
The following four chapters are the result of four specific studies in some of 
the most relevant areas of Spanish policy towards Morocco. Chapter Three is 
devoted to the fisheries dossier, and in particular to the negotiation of fisheries 
agreements that allowed Spanish boats to work in Moroccan waters, and the 
relevance of that issue in the bilateral relationship. Chapter Four deals with 
economic and commercial relations, including the conflictual issue of 
Moroccan agricultural exports to the EC/EU. In this chapter the dual role of 
Spain, at the same time a competitor for Moroccan producers and an advocate 
of Moroccan interests within the EU, is the object of a particular attention. 
Chapter Five analyses the migration question, which became prominent after 
1986 and was by 2002 one of the most controversial issues in the bilateral 
relationship. Finally, Chapter Six covers the controversial territorial disputes 
between Spain and Morocco. Three issues are analysed in detail: the question 
of sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish policy towards the conflict in 
Western Sahara and the Parsley Island incident of July 2002.
Chapter Seven contains the Conclusions. Firstly the findings of the four cases 
discussed in the previous chapters are brought together and analysed as a 
whole. Secondly, the findings are put in a wider context in order to establish 
the limits of the explanatory power of the Europeanisation thesis. Finally, 
some conclusions are drawn about Spain’s policy towards Morocco, the EU’s 
policy towards Morocco and the application of the concept of Europeanisation 
to the study of foreign policy.
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Chapter 1: The theoretical starting-point
The accession of Spain to the European Communities on 1 January 1986 is 
often regarded as the final step of the long process of ‘normalisation’ of the 
foreign relations of Spain after almost forty years of isolation under General 
Franco’s dictatorship (Menendez del Valle 1989: 747; Aldecoa 1994: 166; 
Barbe 1999: 20).2 During the ten years that followed the death of the dictator 
in November 1975, Spanish foreign policy had changed in substance and 
process and had attained its main objective of Spain becoming a respected 
member of the international community in general, and of the select club of 
western European democracies in particular. However, new factors for change 
have emerged since, and the evolution of Spanish foreign policy in the last 16 
years has been considerable as a result of both internal and external 
tendencies. This chapter tries to identify the main tendencies of change, 
articulates a research plan and justifies the selection of the policy towards 
Morocco to illustrate the transformation of Spanish foreign policy.
1.1 The new context 
A changing foreign policy environment
The international context that saw Spanish accession to the EC in 1986 has 
evolved beyond recognition since then. Whereas historical events of great 
relevance - from the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
system to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 
2001 - have changed the geo-strategic environment, longer term processes are 
transforming the task of foreign policy makers across the planet. In particular 
the process of globalisation has been identified by many in the social sciences 
as crucial. Three main features characterise this process: increased and 
instantaneous contacts between locations world-wide; social interactions 
embedded in global networks; and local circumstances being shaped by events
2 Two other events in the same year were also important: the recognition of Israel, which 
almost completed (only Albania was left) the process of establishing diplomatic links with 
those countries with which the Franco regime could not or would not maintain links; and the 
referendum that confirmed Spanish membership in NATO, which some authors saw as the 
most relevant event of that year (Grasa 1989: 111).
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taking place in distant locations (Giddens 1990: 60; Axtmann 1998: 2,5). 
Every field of social, political and economic life has been affected in a 
particular manner.
In politics some authors talk about the emergence of global politics: political 
activity and power, according to them, extend beyond the borders of the state 
in an unprecedented manner, political decisions and action in one area of the 
world have almost immediate effects in the whole planet, and decision makers 
are linked through almost instant communications systems and networks of 
decision-making (Held, MacGrew et al. 1999: 49). The emergence of global 
politics would result in the consolidation of global governance, a new 
configuration of politics at world scale including both formal inter­
governmental institutions and organisations, and non-governmental 
transnational actors such as multinational companies, non-governmental 
organisations or transnational social movements (Held, MacGrew et al. 1999: 
50-51).
The practice of foreign policy has changed dramatically in this new context, 
becoming increasingly complex. Foreign policy makers face the ‘challenges 
of the new diplomacy’ (Gonzalez 1999), which can be summarised in three 
main difficulties: i) The growing importance of the domestic linkage: on the 
one hand, the action (or inaction) of the state in the international sphere has a 
bigger effect on people’s everyday life in a world where the international 
environment penetrates constantly the societies; on the other hand, the access 
to international information of a vast majority of the population through mass 
media has granted those media a growing input in the definition of a state’s 
foreign policy agenda, ii) The international environment is more and more 
complex: this international complexity is hard to manage as new actors (both 
state and non-state) enter the international arena, and new finks are established 
between issues, that cannot be separately dealt with any more. ‘Policy making 
in the international arena may well be termed the “management of 
uncertainty” [...]’ (Webb 1994: 17). iii) Thirdly, the communications 
revolution faces foreign policy makers with a hardly manageable amount of
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information. The difficulty consists no longer in simply obtaining information, 
but mainly in managing it (Webb 1994; Held, MacGrew et al. 1999: 53-58).
Foreign policy makers in every national capital need to adapt to the new 
circumstances. Instruments that were useful in the past are often not available, 
not acceptable or not efficient any more. Concepts that used to be narrowly 
defined, such as that of security, have evolved and changed their meaning;3 
others that were always under scrutiny, like ‘national interest’, remain hard to 
comprehend. To the complex ‘two-level game’ (Putnam 1988) between 
domestic and international pressures, we must add the difficulty of managing 
an area which lies in between, often called ‘intermestic’ (Bloomfield 1982). 
This area is growing in size and blurring the borders between the two 
traditional constituencies of foreign policy (Hill 2003: 51-52).
We call intermestic issues those traditionally being within the domestic 
sphere, and which progressively hold a growing number of international 
components and repercussions4. The growth of the intermestic area challenges 
narrow definitions of foreign policy focusing only on the traditional areas of 
concern in international relations: issues of war and peace, diplomacy 
amongst nations and foreign trade. ‘The sum of official external relations 
conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’, 
as Christopher Hill defines foreign policy (Hill 2003: 3), includes a growing 
number of issues that range from respect for patents and intellectual property 
to the way a state treats alleged war criminals.
Across the world states’ foreign policy making machineries need to adapt in 
order to face the challenge. Improving the technical base (for instance, 
upgrading information management systems) and implementing 
administrative reforms have not been a sufficient response, in particular in 
times of budgetary constraints in most countries. We have witnessed in many
3 This change has been acknowledged in International Relations theory, where the 
Copenhagen School has led the discussion on the meanings of security and their 
consequences, but also, to a limited extent, in political discourse.
4 This definition is largely based on that used by the Center for Inter-American Studies and 
Programs of the Institute Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
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countries, in particular in the industrialised world, two other tendencies: 1) the 
internationalisation of large parts of the government, which has resulted in the 
growth in the number of governmental actors internationally active; and 2) the 
search for multilateral solutions to domestic and international problems that 
any single state, including the most powerful ones, finds increasingly difficult 
to handle.
The first tendency, which is a direct result of the blurring of the 
domestic/foreign border, has changed the balance of actors involved in foreign 
policy. Within national executives, ministers with technical responsibilities in 
areas such as industry or home affairs have tried, and often managed, to 
secure a larger role in the definition of foreign policy. Prime ministers need to 
pay more attention to international issues that are of direct relevance to their 
electorate, and become arbiters of the competing views inside the cabinet 
about issues of foreign policy. Executives themselves have seen their 
relatively privileged position in the decision-making process for foreign 
policy slowly challenged by the emergence of new actors with interests in the 
international sphere: the judiciary power,5 local and regional authorities, 
economic lobby groups, etc.
The tendency to seek multilateral solutions as a response to globalisation can 
be explained in relatively simple terms, especially if we compare this to 
international political economy. States seek to minimise the costs of 
governance when trying to respond to external challenges. If we agree that 
‘ [international policies have lower costs of governance than domestic 
policies’ (Ikenberry 1986:61) and that ‘[sjtates are more likely to seek 
international regime arrangements when they cannot control their 
environments effectively’ (Ikenberry 1986: 61-62), then we can understand 
why states should agree to pool part of their sovereignty in economic areas in 
order to be in a better competitive position (Ikenberry 1986; Smith 1994).
5 See for example the effects on British-Chilean, Belgian-Israeli and Spanish-Argentinian 
relations o f the attempts in the late 1990s and early 2000s by European national judiciary 
powers to process/extradite foreign political leaders accused o f crimes against humanity.
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Co-operation within the framework of the European Community, where 
sovereignty has been pooled on an unprecedented scale, has been analysed in 
similar terms by authors who ‘assume the European Community to be an 
international framework constructed by the nation-state for the completion of 
its own domestic policy objectives’ (Milward 1994:20). The opportunities and 
constraints of the situation of international economic interdependence can be 
better managed jointly, which explains the state’s ‘choice for Europe’ 
(Moravcsik 1998).
We could consider integration in Europe to be a conscious choice, a response 
by nation-states to the new difficulties foreign policy makers are faced with. 
In the context of the EC, these difficulties started to be managed jointly in the 
fields where there was a common policy, like trade, fisheries or agriculture. 
This joint management extended further with the creation of European 
Political Co-operation (EPC) and later on the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). ‘EPC is an exercise in coalition-building aimed at enhancing 
the member governments’ influence in international affairs’ (de La Serre 
quoted in Bulmer 1991: 77-78), ‘[i]t is not a product of the combined 
pressures, but an attempt to modify structures domestically and/or 
internationally with the aim of creating a constellation where foreign policy 
and domestic order can return to a mutually reinforcing circle’(Waever 1994: 
242-243). From this point of view, and in the words of a politician, ‘European 
Union is the solution and not the problem’ (Gonzalez 1999).
But we could also argue that European integration is not an answer to 
globalisation, and it rather ‘might have had an important effect in promoting 
new globalization.’ (Ross 1998: 174). In a global context, European 
integration is just one expression of a general trend towards regionalism, 
which is one of the features of political globalisation (Held, MacGrew et al. 
1999: 74-77). European integration is thus not always contributing to the 
rescue of nation-state, but it can be a constraint and a catalyst for change in 
the global context. After all, the challenges and adaptations of national foreign 
policies inside the EU are of a much bigger scope than those faced by non­
member states (Manners and Whitman 2000: 261-266).
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Foreign policy in a European context
All the changes that we have outlined above were powerfully conditioned in 
the case of Spanish foreign policy by the fact that Spain was a member of the 
EC/EU. The Spanish executive and other main Spanish actors entered in 1986 
a uniquely sophisticated system of decision-making, in constant evolution. As 
a result, the European context and its effects on national policies were 
different in each period of time. There are however some general 
characteristics of the decision-making within the EC/EU that apply to the 
whole period and need to be borne in mind for the study of its impact on 
national policies.
The first characteristic is this fluid nature of a system in the making, in which 
the actors involved have both substantive objectives and institutional 
preferences. ‘They may accept particular policy outcomes because of their 
institutional consequences and may even reject policy outcomes that would 
favour their substantive policy interests because they do not wish to accept the 
institutional implications’ (Wallace 1996: 38). In this system the main 
principles of decision-making are not homogeneous: several methods of 
taking decisions have emerged throughout the years. Those methods give 
different weights to each institutional actor and establish different rules to 
determine the role of each of them in the adoption of a final outcome.
At the heart of this system lie two institutions: the Council, both an 
institutional actor itself and the sum of the member states’ governments, and 
the European Commission; they play a fundamental role in each of the 
methods of decision. Helen Wallace (1996) describes three methods that were 
developed during the history of European integration: the Monnet method of 
partnership, the Gaullist method of negotiation and the co-option method 
adopted with the Single European A ct.
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The partnership method was the first to emerge: it creates a systematic 
partnership between member states, the economic actors affected by the issue 
at stake and the European civil servants, who develop the collective agenda. 
The relationship between the Council and Commission lies at the heart of the 
system, and the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
have a limited role, although time has proved that the latter can be a decisive 
actor. The second method, which emerged from the ‘Luxemburg 
Compromise’, placed intergovernmental bargaining within the Council at the 
heart of the system, limiting the role of the Commission and leaving the ECJ 
as the most integrationist force. The Single European Act changed the system 
again as it introduced a new dynamism in the EC that made QMV a much 
more widespread system of decision-making in the Council, and at the same 
time it opened the door to a wider participation of both socio-economic 
interests and the European Parliament; this co-option method brings back into 
balance the relationship between Council and Commission. The three methods 
compete openly, most visibly since the Maastricht Treaty, in different policy 
areas. (Wallace 1996: 42-57)
The differences between policy-making procedures in the policy areas, a 
second remarkable characteristic of the EC/EU system, are not a novelty of 
Maastricht. A segmentation of policy-making among issue areas had started in 
the 1970s, as the Commission’s directorates developed distinct organisational 
cultures and policy networks involving public and private actors emerged 
around the different policy areas (agriculture, social policy, competition). But 
the institutional structure that was bom with the Treaty on European Union, 
based on three ‘pillars’, represented a further step in this segmentation. 
Whereas in the first pillar (the three European Communities) the three 
methods mentioned above compete, and the role of the Council and the 
member states is limited by the numerous actors involved, the second pillar 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy -  CFSP, and European Security and 
Defence Policy -  ESDP) and the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) 
preserve a considerably larger role for the Council and the European Council, 
exclude the ECJ and the European Parliament to a large extent and limit the 
use of QMV to exceptional cases.
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A third remarkable feature of the European Union is its complexity as a 
foreign policy system in which national foreign policies operate. Both realist 
and liberal intergovemmentalist authors have argued that there is no 
autonomous EU policy that has an impact on the international environment, 
downplaying the actual capacity of the European Union as such to impinge on 
the international sphere beyond the sum of national foreign policies. If this is 
the case, general theories of inter-state negotiations and alliances (according 
to the realists) or of international regimes (according to liberal 
intergovemmentalists) should be applied, instead of looking for a new 
theoretical framework (Pijpers 1991; Moravcsik 1993; Rosecrance 1998).
Many of the academics that study the external activities of the EC/EU do not, 
however, share the intergovemmentalist point of view. To them, there is more 
to the EC/EU external relations than the sum of national foreign policies. The 
question is to establish whether or not the EC/EU has two cmcial features 
when it acts in the international arena: ‘presence’ and ‘actomess’. The idea of 
presence is related to visibility and weight: the EC/EU is visible in 
international fora, and a European voice has been influent from the CSCE to 
the WTO negotiations. The idea of ‘actomess’ is linked to that of autonomy: 
if the EC/EU is not sovereign like a state, how can we decide whether or not it 
is an independent actor in international relations? Hill answers this question 
by testing Sjostedt’s attributes of an international actor against EC/EU. His 
conclusion is that both presence and actomess are characteristics which can be 
observed in the EC/EU. But its international presence does not stand in a 
completely autonomous manner: it is associated with a wider western 
European presence; and its actomess is not as complete as that of a state. 
(Sjosted 1977; Allen and Smith 1991; Hill 1993; Ginsberg 1999)
Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler show in their work (Bretherton and 
Vogler 1999) that the EU possesses five fundamental ‘requisites for 
actomess’: shared commitment to a set of values and principles; the ability to 
identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies; the capacity 
effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system; the
29
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 1
availability of, and capacity to use, policy instruments; and the legitimacy of 
decision processes. (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 37-38) The EU can 
therefore be considered a global actor, whose actomess is socially constructed 
in a continuing process.
We therefore need a new, more comprehensive approach to the foreign policy 
of the EU. This is reflected by the increasing use of the expression European 
foreign policy (Hill 1996; Smith 1998; White 1999) or European foreign 
policy system (Smith 2003b). The idea of a European foreign policy includes 
the second pillar (CFSP and ESDP), but also the policies of the first pillar and 
the third pillar which impinge directly on the EU international environment. 
At the same time, the member states still have their own foreign policies, in 
principle autonomous but necessarily relevant to the common policy. Those 
policies are also taken into account when European foreign policy is studied.
European foreign policy has been defined as ‘a system of international 
relations, a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly 
common, and partly separate, international actions.’ (Hill and Wallace 1996: 
5) Defining EFP as a system of international relations, and not simply as the 
foreign policy of an international actor, has important analytical 
consequences. Firstly, in many cases we find difficulties in directly applying 
to its study the same foreign policy analysis tools that we use for states; 
secondly, the study of the foreign policies of the member states cannot be 
undertaken any longer without taking into account their role inside this 
system; thirdly, we have to bring into the picture not only the common 
actions, but also those conducted unilaterally, or those conducted in other joint 
frameworks (like NATO or the G8); finally, the agency-structure dichotomy 
will not only operate between the system (i.e. EFP as a whole) and its external 
environment, but also within the system.
This latter point probably needs further explanation. The agency-structure 
model applied within EFP ‘focuses attention on the two-way relationship 
between opportunities provided for by EFP structures and the extent to which 
the EU has agency’ (Ginsberg 1999: 433). The analysis of EFP can thus be
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conducted from the ‘European’ point of view, but also from the national point 
of view, and both approaches will offer useful analytical insights as long as 
we are aware of the interplay between both levels. This interplay happens in 
two directions, from states to European actors, norms and practices and the 
other way round.
Ole Waever stresses the need to face the challenge of dealing with the 
‘simultaneity of unitness at the state level and at the EC level’ (Waever 1994: 
247). Waever and Ginsberg (1999) are unsatisfied with the oscillation 
between one level and the other, or with the simple doubling of the level of 
analysis which ‘produces an unsettled dualism, with both state and EC levels 
studied as if they were the unit. The procedure is in practice that only one 
level at a time is foreign policy and the other is part of the environment.’ 
(Waever 1994: 248). Instead, we should be able to study ‘the simultaneity, the 
interplay, the contest and the differentiation’ between the two levels (Waever 
1994: 248; Ginsberg 1999: 435) .
Thus, the study of European foreign policy decision-making as the simple 
result of bargaining amongst the executives of the member states is not 
satisfactory. The idea that the formation of preferences at national level 
‘precedes bargaining, which in turn precedes delegation’ (Moravcsik 1995: 
613) to a set of supranational institutions that serve the goals of the state 
executives seems to us an excessive simplification of the system. A liberal 
intergovemmentalist account of the EU internal processes considers 
preferences -  defined as ‘an ordered and weighted set of values placed on 
future substantive outcomes’ -  to be exogenous to a specific international 
political environment, including the EU (Moravcsik 1998: 24).
We conceive the decision making process in European foreign policy to be 
more similar to the multi-level governance model, which considers that 
‘decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather 
than monopolised by state executives’ (Marks, Hooghe et al. 1996: 346). State 
executives are important actors, but not the only ones: supranational 
institutions, as well as national and transnational non-governmental actors,
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participate directly in the decision-making process, and shape each others’ 
perceptions, impinging on the formation of their preferences. This interaction 
is closely linked to the idea of Europeanisation that we will examine further in 
this chapter. The study of European foreign policy provides us with numerous 
examples in which the analysis of bargaining amongst member states does not 
offer a full account of the EU decisions, and even in those cases where 
conflicting national preferences prevent a coherent policy from arising, like 
that of Western Sahara, the study of actors other than the national executives 
and of processes other than bargaining within the EU Council reveals 
interesting nuances and alternative interpretations of decisions (Vaquer i 
Fanes 2004).
Internal sources of foreign policy change
The evolution of Spanish foreign policy since 1986 has been partly driven by 
changes in the international context and membership in the EU, but also by 
some internal dynamics related to the political evolution of the country. By 
1986 the new democratic decision making regime had established its main 
basic features, and before the end of the 1980s the last steps towards full 
normalisation had been undertaken. Relatively little attention has been given 
to the transformations of Spanish foreign policy making after that period by 
FPA scholars (Molina 2002: 177-179), probably because of the general 
impression that, unlike its content, the decision-making process of Spanish 
foreign policy remained relatively unaltered during the democratisation 
process or afterwards (Powell 2000: 449).
One first source of change is the alteration in relative weights between the 
actors of Spanish foreign policy. The centre of power has remained in the 
executive, but within it, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been losing 
importance in the formulation of foreign policy. This is not only due to the 
general international tendencies outlined above (growing internationalisation 
of other ministries, increased power of the prime minister), that were fully 
reflected in the Spanish case, but also to the considerable lack of human and
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financial resources which it has been systematically suffering year after year.6 
That loss of influence has been partly compensated by its competence for co­
ordination of European integration policy, which in other countries (France, 
United Kingdom, Italy) is attached to specific departments or to the prime 
minister’s office (Molina 2002: 175).
The Spanish Congress and Senate have played a relatively modest role in 
foreign policy despite their constitutional competence in the area. ‘The 
reasons for this are to be found in the limited experience of democracy, the 
majoritarian nature of the relations between the government and parliament 
(Cortes) in Spain, and the decreased politicisation of international affairs after 
the controversial referendum on NATO’ (Molina and Rodrigo 2002). 
However they have retained an important role as the most visible arena for 
direct confrontation between the parties, and in particular between the centre- 
right Partido Popular/PP and the centre-left Partido Socialista Obrero 
Espanol/PSOE. The substitution of the latter by the former in government in 
1996 has been one of the main sources of change in foreign policy in the 
period that we are studying. The change did not come immediately after the 
substitution in power, but it was felt progressively in most areas of foreign 
policy, from very concrete bilateral relations (Cuba, Morocco,Venezuela) to 
the general balance in the Atlanticist vs. Europeanist tendencies of Spanish 
foreign policy.
The rise of the regional dimension in foreign policy is another phenomenon 
that has transformed Spanish foreign policy since the mid-1980s. It was 
reflected in the emergence of the Comunidades Autonomas (regions) as actors 
with their own policies of development co-operation, lobbying at European 
level and cross-border and interregional links. Another feature of the rise of 
the regional dimension is the extent to which regionally-organised interests, 
with the help of local and regional authorities and political representatives in
6 In September 2001 Spain had representations to 194 countries, was a member of 30 
international organisations and was the 6th foreign investor in the world. However, its 
diplomatic service consisted of only 697 diplomats, 3 less than in 1975. By contrast Sweden 
had around 1500 diplomats, the Netherlands about 1000 and Italy 934 (El Mundo, 11 
September 2001)
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Madrid and the European Parliament, have managed to impinge very directly 
on the central government’s foreign policy.
Another group of actors that have gained influence are non-governmental 
actors. Some of them, in particular lobby groups linked to concrete economic 
interests (business owners associations, agricultural organisations, fishermen 
guilds), became active in foreign policy issues during the negotiations for 
Spanish accession to the EC and retained a high capacity to influence not only 
policy makers at all levels but also, crucially, the mass media and public 
opinion. In times of high political rivalry (like in the 1995-1996 pre-election 
period) and after the PP government started to emphasise the defence of 
‘Spanish interests’ some of the lobbies, in particular those linked to 
agriculture and fisheries, found a largely receptive environment to their 
demands (Alaminos 2001).
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also emerged in the last 18 
years as a player in Spanish foreign policy making, albeit a not very 
influential one. Parallel to the growth of their numbers, their activities, their 
budgets and their membership, NGOs have started to lead some campaigns in 
order to influence Spanish foreign policy, and in particular development co­
operation policy. Even when those campaigns were most successful in 
attracting support and actions from the civil society (like the campaign for the
0.7 per cent target of GNP spent in ODA in 1994-1995), their impact on the 
central government’s policy was hardly felt.7 NGOs play an important role in 
the implementation of development co-operation policy, as they execute a 
considerable part of the budget in their projects; at the same time many of 
their activities depend largely on public funding. This places them in an
o
awkward position when it comes to criticising the government’s policy.
7 The campaign did have, however, a large impact on local and regional authorities, whose 
international co-operation budgets grew significantly as a result of social pressure (Aguirre 
and Rey 2001: 200).
8 As Intermon-Oxfam, one of the largest NGOs, was bitterly reminded in 2001, when the 
Spanish government’s allocation for its strategy was 30% lower than expected. This happened 
after Intermon-Oxfam had singled itself out as the NGO most critical of the government’s 
policies (El Pals, 8 May 2001).
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The emergence of a large number of actors and organised interests that 
participate in the decision-making process in one way or another is by no 
means an exclusive characteristic of foreign policy. For almost 30 years now 
public policy analysts have been studying the networks of actors that shape a 
policy. The study of foreign policy networks in different areas of Spanish 
foreign policy -  from the prosecution of genocide and other crimes against 
humanity to very specific fisheries negotiations -  will give us a good 
illustration of its transformation in the last 15 years.
As we have seen, we can find the causes for changes in the way in which 
Spanish foreign policy is conducted in the global transformations, in the 
process of European integration that Spain entered fully in 1986 and in 
internal political dynamics. We have chosen to focus this thesis on the second 
group of causes, although the rest will necessarily be taken into consideration.
1.2 The impact of EC/EU membership
Accession to the European Community in 1986 was a crucial event for 
Spanish foreign policy. ‘The qualitative changes implied by this event in 
Spain’s international position are of such a scale that they will be, in fact, the 
origin of all the other transformations of Spain’s foreign policy’ (Aldecoa 
1994: 166). We have framed our study of the impact of EC/EU membership 
on Spanish foreign policy within the literature referring to Europeanisation. 
This concept, which has been used in public policy analysis since the late 
1980s, needs some adaptation in order to be applicable to foreign policy.
Europeanisation and foreign policy
Europeanisation is most commonly understood within the broad field of 
political science as ‘the penetration of the European dimension into the 
national arena’ (Gamble 2001: l).9 It is used to describe ‘the impact,
9 We are not dealing here with the historical meaning, referring to the export of cultural norms 
and patterns by European empires, or with a cultural phenomenon within Europe, whereby 
norms, ideas, identities and patterns of behaviour become diffused throughout Europe. For a 
discussion of those and other meanings see Featherstone 2003.
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convergence or response of actors and institutions in relation to the European 
Union’ (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001). Commonly quoted as the first 
operational definition of Europeanisation is the view that it is ‘an incremental 
process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech 1994:69).
We prefer not to identify Europeanisation with convergence, harmonisation or 
even with European integration. It has been pointed out that convergence and 
harmonisation can be the result of Europeanisation, but divergence may result 
as well (Heritier and Knill 2001; Radaelli 2001; Boerzel 2002). Nor do we see 
the value of using Europeanisation to designate European integration (Bulmer 
and Lequesne 2002: 16): the term ‘has little value if it merely repeats an 
existing notion’ (Featherstone 2003: 3), and this use seems to us to be more 
confusing than helpful.
In the study of EU-member states relationships, the term Europeanisation has 
often been used to illustrate a ‘top-down’ approach (Bulmer and Lequesne 
2002), placing the stress on national adaptation and on the idea of 
‘downloading’ from the EU level (Howell 2002). Claudio Radaelli defines 
Europeanisation as: ‘Processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which 
are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures 
and public policies’ (Radaelli 2001: 2).10
The top-down approach was in part a reaction to the focus on ‘up-loading’ 
national preferences as the main explanatory factor for the EU- member state 
relationship; the dominating debate was for a long time the one on ‘how to 
explain the dynamics and the outcome of the European integration 
process’(Boerzel 2002: 574). The bottom-up approach does not preclude the
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existence of effects on member states, but it interprets those effects as positive 
for the main national actors, the executives, that take advantage of their 
participation in the EC/EU system ‘to “cut slack”, that is, to loosen domestic 
binding constraints’(Moravcsik 1994a: 2).
But the ‘the language of dependent and independent variables’(Olsen 1996:
271) does not fit Europeanisation: we do not feel that there is a need to choose
between the two approaches outlined above. Bulmer and Burch suggest that
the top-down notion of Europeanisation, which they term ‘reception’, needs to
be complemented by another dimension, ‘projection’:
European integration is not just ‘out there’ as some kind of 
independent variable; it is itself to a significant degree the product of 
member governments’ wishes. Given that the European Union has its 
own organisational logic, it is necessary for national political actors 
(...) to accommodate some of that logic if the opportunities afforded 
by the EU are to be exploited.(Bulmer and Burch 2001: 4)
The interactive nature of the relationship between the EU and its member 
states (Bulmer and Lequesne 2002: 20) should, in our opinion, be taken into 
account when studying Europeanisation. We will conceptualise 
Europeanisation as a ‘process of structural change’ (Featherstone 2003: 3) that 
will include both dimensions, reception and projection.
What exactly is Europeanised? Studies on Europeanisation focus sometimes 
on policy areas, and study matters like policy communities, decision-making 
structures or legislative and political output (for instance: Ladrech 1994; 
Meny, Muller et al. 1996; Morisse-Schilbach 1999; Tonra 1999). More often, 
we come across studies that focus on institutions and institutional settings (for 
example: Saba 1996; Sanchez da Costa Pereira 1996; Wessels and Rometsch 
1996; Egberg 2000; Bulmer and Burch 2001).11 Burch and Bulmer suggest 
that ‘if national political life consists of politics, polity and policy, it is likely
10 Originally in Italics.
11 Featherstone, in a comprehensive study of all articles about Europeanisation contained in 
the Social Sciences Citation Index, found that most studies referred to either policy and policy 
process (33.3% of the articles, plus another 16.7% devoted to foreign relations) or to 
institutions and political actors and structures (Featherstone 2003: 6).
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that all three of these domains are affected by Europeanisation.’(Bulmer and 
Burch 2001: 3)
Studying the Europeanisation of national politics would mean focusing on 
parties, interest groups and public opinion. The study of Europeanisation of a 
national polity would start with constitutional and legal dimensions to include 
more specific aspects of how governments handle European policy. Finally, 
the study of the Europeanisation of a policy is probably the most difficult 
because of the complexity of isolating an ‘EU-effect’ in most cases (Bulmer 
and Lequesne 2002: 18). Where competence has been transferred to the EU 
level, like in the case of trade or agriculture, the study of both dimensions of 
Europeanisation, reception and projection, seems easier to justify than in the 
case of shared competence. However, we agree with Torreblanca and Smith 
that there is a case for studying the Europeanisation of foreign policy, despite 
the fact that this policy remains, by and large, in national governments’ hands 
(Smith 2000; Torreblanca 2001: 3-4).
Studies on the Europeanisation of a foreign policy, mostly conducted by 
scholars who are familiar with FPA, are relatively common in the literature. 
Specific theoretical approaches dealing with the study of Europeanisation of a 
foreign policy, however, are rarer. Ben Tonra, in his study about Danish and 
Irish Foreign Policies, adopts a constructivist approach defining 
Europeanisation as ‘(. • •) a transformation in the way in which national foreign 
policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined 
and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations 
arising from a complex system of collective European policy making.’(Tonra 
2000: 229). Michael Smith (1998) and Jose Ignacio Torreblanca (2001) adapt 
to the particular features of foreign policy the neo-institutional approach to 
Europeanisation, as a process by which European integration, acting as an 
independent variable, results in adaptation at the member state level; this 
adaptation will vary according to the ‘goodness of fit’ of domestic institutions 
and trigger changes (Torreblanca 2001: 4, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 1998).
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We will define the Europeanisation of a foreign policy as the process o f 
foreign policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation 
pressures and the new opportunities generated by the European integration 
process. From this definition we want to underline three aspects:
1. Europeanisation is defined as a process: there will be changes that can be 
observed, and a final outcome of the transformation, a ‘Europeanised’ 
policy. The result of the process is, according to Radaelli’s definition (see 
above), the construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of rules, 
procedures, styles, norms and, we add, the adoption of policy decisions.
2. Europeanisation is seen as having two main dimensions: reception and 
projection. Both aspects are included in the definition, because we consider 
them to be complementary aspects of the same phenomenon.
3. In studying the Europeanisation of foreign policies as defined, we could 
focus on three main aspects. One is the particular aspects of the process of 
European integration, and more concretely of European foreign policy, 
which cause changes in national foreign policy structures. The second 
aspect would be the study of the ‘Europeanised’ policy, and the 
establishment of specific indicators of change (Smith 2000: 614). The third 
aspect is the question of variation, i.e. ‘why similar pressures produce 
different results in different countries or, within the same countries, why 
there is variation across different time-periods.’(Torreblanca 2001: 4). In 
this thesis we are proposing a research agenda which mainly focuses on the 
second of these aspects.
The limits of Europeanisation
The first risk we run when we define Europeanisation is that of ‘conceptual 
stretching’, of extending the meaning of the term to a point where it has no 
meaning left (Sartori 1970: 1034-35). We should avoid attributing any policy 
change that we observe to a vague idea of ‘Europeanisation’. Thus, it will be
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crucial to establish the limits of the concept. As we saw in the first part of this 
chapter, the foreign policies of EU member states are exposed to a number of 
processes independent of European integration. And, if we are to understand 
the impact of EU membership, we must be able to separate what is a result of 
Europeanisation from what is the result of other processes (like the emergence 
of global politics, domestic changes or the end of bi-polarity).
We can find in comparative politics and public policy analysis literature 
warnings about the risk of overestimating the role of Europeanisation and 
forgetting other phenomena (Ladrech 1994: 71; Johansson 1999: 172-173; 
Goetz 2000: 215-223; Hix and Goetz 2000: 1-3; Radaelli 2001:3-4). 
‘European integration as a source of change cannot be considered in isolation 
from other (potential) sources of domestic institutional and political 
change.’(Hix and Goetz 2000: 3)
The limits of what can be attributed to Europeanisation can be outlined in 
three directions: a) Qualitatively, assessing the magnitude and the quality of 
the changes observed to see whether there has been a substantial (as opposed 
to just formal) change; b) Causally, trying to establish the causal link between 
European integration and the changes observed; that is analysing the ways in 
which the supposed ‘cause’ (the European Union’s polity, politics and/or 
policy) has produced the observed effect; and c) Comparatively, testing -  as 
suggested by Goetz -  the explanatory power of Europeanisation against that 
of other parallel processes (globalisation, domestic change) (Goetz 2000: 221- 
223).
a) The qualitative benchmark: the relevance o f change 
Assessing how relevant changes due to Europeanisation have been is 
particularly important in terms of bureaucratic adaptations and institutional 
change. How to measure whether adaptations have been just formal or deeply 
substantial? How to decide if a change affects the ‘core’ of decision-making 
or just its ‘periphery’?
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Goetz is correct when he says that ‘what is core or peripheral, or systemic and 
non-systemic change may appear the result of fairly arbitrary decisions by 
researchers’(Goetz 2000: 221). However the study of Europeanisation of a 
foreign policy, if it is to go beyond mere enumeration of changes, needs to 
include certain criteria in order to discriminate changes which are particularly 
relevant, areas where Europeanisation has had a bigger impact than in others, 
innovations which play a crucial role. For this task we will rely on the 
literature on foreign policy change, and in particular we will use the typology 
suggested by Charles F. Hermann (1990) that establishes four types of 
change: adjustment, programme, problem/goal and international orientation
1 *7changes. Testmg the question of relevance has a double discriminating 
effect: i) it helps us establish in what areas Europeanisation matters and in 
what areas it does not and ii) it prevents us from highlighting any change just 
because it is related to European integration, even though it may be negligible 
for the general picture.
b)The causal benchmark: Europeanisation as a cause
It is tempting to keep the study of Europeanisation at the level of the 
substantive content of change, i.e. the final outcome of Europeanisation, and 
to forget about the way in which this change has actually operated. This 
‘missing link’ (Goetz 2000:222) between pressure (or incentive) for change 
and actual change (administrative adaptation, policy shift) is exactly the 
causal link which would allow us to argue that Europeanisation actually is the 
source of the observed effects.
Featherstone and Radaelli suggest that the ‘contours of Europeanization’ 
should be established by asking six questions: 1) Who promotes it? 2) Why? 3) 
Howl 4) When and under which conditions1 5) What are the effects? and 6) 
Where are they to be observed? (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003: 334) The 
first four questions seem to us particularly relevant to the analysis of the 
causal process that links the EU features with the changes observed.
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The question of who brings us to ask questions about the actors that act as 
carriers of Europeanisation, not only at the EU level but also in the member 
states. By asking why Europeanisation is promoted we face the question of 
interests, identities and beliefs defined in a manner that leads to action in 
favour of Europeanisation (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003: 335).
The question of how also brings us closer to establishing a causal link. How 
do innovative factors actually reach the national decision-making structures? 
Is change coming from a vertical top-down approach from the central 
institutions towards nation-states via institutional settings? Is it learnt or 
transmitted via socialisation in a horizontal way, from the other countries? Or 
is it coming from other parts of the national administration which have been 
further Europeanised via functional spill-over?
We know from past research in Europeanisation that change has tended to 
come in a gradual and cumulative way, rather than in a sudden, radical way 
(Goetz 2000: 223). The question of time is thus important. When did the 
changes occur? In what order did the events and changes happen? Which 
changes followed what events? What are the conditions that favoured 
Europeanisation? How long did it take for change to actually occur and to 
consolidate?
c) The comparative benchmark: contrasting phenomena 
Studying change in foreign policy with Europeanisation as a single variable 
can provide us with an insight which can be useful both better to understand 
foreign policies of member states and to know more about European foreign 
policy in general. However, this study would be distorted if we did not check 
the impact of Europeanisation against other developments which may affect 
foreign policy at the same time as Europeanisation. Undertaking this exercise 
will prevent us from indulging in the temptation of attributing any observed 
change to Europeanisation.
12 The exact meaning o f these categories according to Hermann is detailed in chapter 7,
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As we saw in the first part of this chapter, the foreign policies of EU member 
states are subject to a number of pressures and incentives for change which act 
at the same time as Europeanisation, sometimes in similar directions, 
sometimes in completely opposite ones. Some of those factors are closely 
related to European integration, or affected by it, yet they retain a separate 
explanatory power, and should not be merged under the big label of 
Europeanisation. We have tried to break down the wide international and 
domestic trends presented in the first section of this chapter into more 
concrete factors that we can use in establishing the limits of Europeanisation.
The international sphere
• Whether or not we consider that European integration is one of the 
expressions of the emergence of global politics, we will need in any case 
to separate the effects which are general to the whole world and those 
which are specific to the context of the European Union.
• The end of bi-polarity brought a very significant change to the equation in 
which foreign policy makers situated their own countries. Changes in the 
international system and in the relative positions that EU member states 
occupy in it are powerful factors that influence foreign policy.13
• The European international context is characterised by a high degree of 
institutionalisation. If the European Union is at the centre of the net of 
institutions across the continent, it is also true that other institutions and 
regimes are also important in the foreign policy of the EU member states 
(NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE, UN), and their effect on national 
foreign policies should not be underestimated or simply confused with the 
effects of membership in the EU.
• Finally, when we are studying a foreign policy, and in particular when we 
study a part of a foreign policy directed towards one concrete country or 
region, developments in the target area are of utmost importance to
section 7.1.
13 In states like France or Germany this has required considerable adaptation. See Aggestam 
2000; Blunden 2000.
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understand policy changes. In the case of this thesis, this includes events in 
Morocco, the Maghreb and the whole Arab World.
The domestic sphere
• Differences in national policy-making styles have remained significant, 
conclude many studies on Europeanisation, despite the pressures towards 
convergence (Harmsen 1999. 105-106; Goetz 2000:216-217; Bulmer and 
Burch 2001; Boerzel 2002). Indeed, in some cases a process of re­
nationalisation and a reinforcement of the distinctive national 
characteristics has taken place as a result of Europeanisation (Johansson 
1999: 173). In this context Europeanisation can at times be just a trigger or 
a catalyst for change rather than its major driving force, and even, in some 
cases, an alibi or a justification for the same traditional ways of doing 
things.
• The administrations of some European Union member states have 
undergone extensive reform projects, and this has been also true for their 
foreign ministries. Those reforms and new ways of organising the work 
may have had a larger impact on the making of foreign policy than 
Europeanisation itself. Thus we will want to study reform and 
reorganisation in foreign policy-making from the angle of domestic 
bureaucratic change before we assess the impact of membership in the EU. 
The same goes for other administrative changes like budgetary 
cuts/increases or parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms.
• Some countries have been through important processes of political change 
and transition which have occurred at the same time as Europeanisation 
(and often in a related way). This includes for instance democratisation 
processes or institutional crises.
• Changes in the domestic sphere can also be the result of party politics, 
political events or public opinion pressures. The domestic political arena 
generates a number of pressures and demands on foreign policy makers. It 
will be crucial to understand those pressures and to be able to separate 
them from the effects of European integration.
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• The changes in policy communities and the appearance/disappearance or 
increase/decrease in influence of some pressure groups can sometimes 
explain changes in foreign policy better than the European factor. 
However, it should be noted that changes in the relative weight of pressure 
groups can at times be the very expression of Europeanisation 
(Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 13).
1.3 The research agenda
Europeanisation of a foreign policy is the process of foreign policy change at 
the national level originated by the adaptation pressures and the new 
opportunities generated by the European integration process. This process has 
two dimensions: reception, i.e. the adaptations to accommodate the pressure 
for change that result from the structures and decisions of the European 
Union, and projection, i.e. the changes undertaken by governments to exploit 
the new opportunities offered by the EU. To analyse those changes we need to 
establish a research agenda. This research agenda is focused on a concrete 
area of study: the impact of EC/EU membership on a policy towards a third 
country.14 We need to set the questions that we will need to address across our 
study of this policy. The common framework will consist of four major 
themes that we consider to be at least potentially relevant in the study of 
Europeanisation of one member state’s policy towards a third country.
Theme 1: new constraints and the search for new 
instruments
When will states seek to upload one concrete area of their foreign policy to 
the European level? When will they try to preserve another area as a chasse 
gardeel A crude intergovemmentalist account would argue that states will opt 
for Europeanisation when the new opportunities provided by collective action 
are larger than the new constraints to individual action. After all, it all reverts 
to the idea of costs and benefits: is the cost of transferring a certain degree of 
competence compensated by the benefits of collective action?
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This is a first framework for an analysis of Europeanisation. We will have to 
try to reconstruct the cost-benefit reasoning of the decision-makers when 
opting for/against European solutions to their foreign policy problems. On one 
hand, we will explore the new constraints, on the other, the new instruments 
provided by the common framework, and eventually draw up some sort of 
‘balance-sheet’ (Bulmer, George et al. 1992: 251).
The analysis of the constraints has to do with two levels. There is the formal, 
legal level of transferred competencies. In some areas, as in the case of 
common policies trade, agriculture or fisheries, the national governments have 
no competence to separately negotiate some of the external aspects of those 
policies, which directly affect their relations with other countries. Lacking the 
competence, a national government will only be able to influence the common 
policy in an indirect manner through multi-lateral negotiations within the 
Council, at times under the threat of being eventually outnumbered in a vote.
There is a second level of constraints that is informal. This level includes for 
instance the strong pressure to reach agreements and to avoid independent 
action and discordant voices in areas which are dealt with jointly. This is 
crucial for the credibility of European foreign policy in the eyes of third 
countries, but also for internal cohesion matters and in order to consolidate a 
basis, an acquis, upon which future policy can build. This second level of 
constraints includes also other aspects like the fact that European involvement 
in one’s formerly ‘private domain’ may result in pressures to shift policy, to 
share privileged information, or to increase transparency.
The analysis of instruments can be conducted at two levels. The first level is 
the study of how effective European instruments (policies, directives, 
sanctions, common actions, strategies, etc.) are in comparison to national 
instruments. Are they more effective? Do they complement satisfactorily and 
interact without problems with the foreign policy actions of the member state?
14 A third country, as is conventional in EC/EU jargon, means a non-EU member state.
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This study of effectiveness brings in the idea of ‘politics of scale’, and 
accounts for the ‘benefits of collective over unilateral European foreign policy 
action in that members may conduct joint foreign policy actions at lower costs 
and risks than when they act on their own.’(Ginsberg 1999:438)
The other level of analysis is to see how successful a member state has been in 
using the available European instruments and shaping EU policy and 
structures in its own interest. It is not enough to state that the instruments exist 
or are available: we must analyse how far a government has been able to 
influence the relevant decision-making bodies (Commission, Council) in its 
own interest.
Theme 2: identity, interests and preference formation
So far it seems that we take the countries’ interest as given once they enter the 
EFP decision-making process. This is not our view: interests can evolve, and 
this very evolution might be an effect of Europeanisation.
‘The EU consists of a system of principles, rules and procedures which might 
have socializing effects on actors exposed to these norms. Socialization then 
means the process by which actors internalize the norms which then influence 
how they see themselves and what they perceive as their interests’ (Risse and 
Wiener 1999: 778). A constructivist research agenda for European integration 
in general, but also for European foreign policy, should include three 
important dimensions: rules and norms, political community and identity 
formation and discourses, communicative action and the role of ideas 
(Christensen, Jorgensen et al. 1999).15 We think that those three dimensions 
should at least be considered when we study the Europeanisation of a foreign 
policy.
We will assume that member states do not have objective national interests 
that exist before the process of integration and remain unaltered in the
15 Liberal institutionalist (regime) accounts of European integration also stress the importance 
of rules, norms, principles and procedures that make a significant difference to state 
behaviour (Chalmers 2000:5).
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process. It is not enough just to state that ‘member states have different 
interests in the world’ (Stavridis 1997:113) and it may well not be the case 
that there always is such thing as ‘a set of underlying national objectives 
independent of any particular international negotiation’ (Moravcsik 1998:3). 
Considering interests as given in the international context (even though one 
may well be aware of their formation process in the internal sphere) does not 
take into consideration the effects of socialisation in the EU framework, or the 
fact that ‘national interest is a complex matter, because as much as it is a 
factor causing external action, it is at the same time a justifier of that policy’ 
(Lasagna 1996: 49). No country violates its own interests, but definitions of 
interests can change during a negotiation (Putnam 1988: 155), and even more 
in a framework of constant interaction and permanent socialisation as that of 
the European Union.
What are the stated interests of the foreign policy that we are studying? Have 
they changed during the process of Europeanisation? Have new interests been 
defined, or old interests been left out of the policy-makers preferences? Has 
there been a clash between the particular interest and the common interest, or 
with the particular interest of another country?
Interests are formulated in the framework of the international identity of a 
state (Wendt 1992: 398), and indeed the question of identity is the second big 
component here. Identity, defined as a ‘relatively stable, role-specific 
understanding and expectations about self (Wendt 1992: 397), is not self 
defined but socially constructed through interaction in the international 
sphere, in a similar way as personal identities are socially constructed through 
interaction in the social sphere (Berger 1966).
Participation in the common framework of European foreign policy has an 
effect on the external identity of member states; it has even been argued that 
in some cases it can contribute to the search for a national identity (Hill 
1983:199). National identities are defined or re-defined in the context of EFP, 
even if it is just for the purpose of stressing the differences with the other 
member states’ external identities.
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The questions for our study of Europeanisation will then be: Has the identity 
of the state in relation to the studied area of foreign policy changed because of 
its membership in the EU? What is the new identity? What are the effects of 
this change in identity in interest definition and preference formation?
Theme 3: policy-making
The use of the term Europeanisation has often been applied in studies that 
focus exclusively on administrative changes resulting from EU membership. 
Although we have opted for a wider conception of Europeanisation in this 
thesis, the administrative dimension of Europeanisation remains crucial, since 
administrative interaction and socialisation might be important transmission 
belts of the changes that occur in national policies.
The first step in the study of how the European institutional set up matters for 
the formulation of a foreign policy is the analysis of the organisational 
dimension. This is the focus of attention of many studies on Europeanisation, 
and the administrative adaptation of foreign ministries to the new challenges 
of EPC/CFSP is present in most studies dealing with Europeanisation of 
foreign policies (Saba 1996; Sanchez da Costa Pereira 1996; Tonra 1999; 
Forster 2000: 48-53). For the purpose of studying the foreign policy of a 
member state towards a third state, however, the whole study of adaptations of 
the foreign policy machinery to European foreign policy may not be very 
revealing.
It is important to study the effects of the EU structure, in its three pillars, on 
national policy making. Some areas of foreign policy are dealt with in the 
context of the European Community, that is, in pillar one.16 This means on the 
one hand that the Commission (and in some cases the Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice) has an important role in those policies: interacting 
with the Commission, not just with other member states, will be an important 
part of the policies. On the other hand, it means that in many cases -  those
16 The clearest examples are trade, agriculture and fisheries.
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where QMV is applicable -  the states have a weaker negotiating position vis- 
a-vis their partners as they do not have the right to veto Council decisions. 
This also means that within the national governments the ministries 
representing national views in Brussels will often not be the ministries of 
foreign affairs, but other ministries competent in the areas. Thus, ministries 
not specialised in foreign affairs (agriculture, interior, environment) can gain 
influence over external policies via Brussels.
The second pillar of the EU has preserved a preferential role for foreign 
affairs ministers, and most decisions, in particular the most influential ones, 
are still taken by consensus. This does not mean that the second pillar has not 
generated pressures for adaptation. The organisation of the discussions and the 
main geographical divisions, the issues on which governments need to have a 
position, and the implementation of the common positions and actions have 
required a considerable amount of administrative adaptations in the member 
states.
The third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, preserves a privileged role for the 
national executives, and within them, interior ministers, who have thus gained 
specific weight in defining their countries external policies. In the third pillar, 
specialised ministers have again -  like in some first pillar areas -  have 
managed to be in charge of co-operation in areas that have a crucial influence 
in external relations. The examples of the fight against international terrorism 
or immigration and asylum policy are perhaps the clearest examples.
The consequential questions for our study will then be: Has the national 
administrative set-up for the policy studied changed as a result of 
Europeanisation? Have parts of the administration had a significant impact in 
this policy area via the EU? Has this caused bureaucratic rivalries? Has this 
affected co-ordination, coherence or efficiency of the policy? Have there been 
instances of incoherence between EU actions and national actions?
The socialisation of foreign policy makers has often been pointed to as an 
important transmission belt of Europeanisation. The first expression of this
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socialisation was the ‘European reflex’: national decision makers
automatically think of the collective dimension of a problem and of other 
member states’ views of it (de Schoutheete 1980:118). Permanent interaction 
is an important source of socialisation, as are the rules, formal and informal, 
that have been developed in the different EU decision frameworks, and the 
acquis politique, i.e. the weight of past common decisions in the area of 
EPC/CFSP. The study of the socialisation of decision makers can help us to 
establish the way in which Europeanisation has operated.
In terms of results, we have to ask questions such as: how has the common 
framework affected the way in which national decision makers take 
decisions? How has it shaped the foreign policy agenda and timing? Has it 
modified their perceptions of problems, their definitions, and the possible 
solutions that they have considered?
In terms of process, we will want to know: How did socialisation operate? 
When has it been relevant and when has it been irrelevant? Are the effects of 
socialisation more visible on one group of decision makers than on another 
(politicians vs. bureaucrats, one ministry vs. another, senior officials vs. desk 
officials)? Does this have effects on the decisions finally made?
Theme 4: Europeanisation and the domestic context
The first three themes that we have suggested for the study of 
Europeanisation, and in particular the third one, are clearly focused on the 
national executive of the country studied. But Europeanisation may also affect 
national politics through actors other than the central government. For 
instance, Hill and Wallace argue that national parliaments have lost their 
capacity to monitor foreign policy - a policy area which in itself was never 
easy for them to follow - with the emergence of European foreign policy (Hill 
and Wallace 1996:6). We need to verify whether or not that is true for the 
country that we are studying.
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We also need to study other actors such as political parties and lobby groups. 
National political parties interact on a very regular basis with their 
counterparts in other member countries, in particular within the European 
Parliament. We need to explore if there have been shifts in the political 
parties’ positions towards the studied policy which can be attributed to their 
increasing Europeanisation. Political lobbies can also be relevant, and their 
capacity to influence foreign policy can be modified by Europeanisation. For 
instance, we should analyse if a certain kind of interest group (large firms, 
agriculture lobbies, NGOs), having co-operated, often successfully, in order to 
defend their common interest in Brussels, has also gained weight in the 
national arena thanks to Europeanisation.
Finally it is important to see how Europeanisation has affected the role of 
public opinion in foreign policy-making. This can be either through affecting 
public perceptions of foreign policy as a result of membership in the EC/EU, 
or by affecting the relationship between government and public opinion. 
William Wallace identified the following functions of EPC for the 
participating states: adding influence in multilateral fora and in bilateral 
relations with other countries or blocs; enhancing prestige and international 
image (think for instance of the presidencies); an alibi for inaction; a means 
for deflecting external pressure; and a cover for shifts in national foreign 
policy. (Wallace 1983: 9-10, 13-14) Hill adds the possible use as a card for 
other political bargains, its relevance as a factor which encourages and 
catalyses a country’s role in the world and its external identity, and its 
functionality in as much as it results in less domestic accountability to both 
public opinion and parliaments (Hill 1983:199-201; Hill and Wallace 1996).
Some of those functions are directly related to the relationship between 
government and public opinion, which is thus likely to be affected by 
Europeanisation. The fact that decisions are taken behind closed doors in a 
negotiating table in Brussels allows member states’ executives to use its 
results as an alibi for inaction, an excuse for unpopular foreign policy 
positions or a legitimising factor. In those cases, the effect of Europeanisation 
will be comparatively easier to identify than in the cases in which a change in
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perceptions and preferences amongst the general public is due to EU 
membership. That does not mean that this possibility should be neglected. For 
example, opinion leaders in many European countries reacted to the EU 
failure to avoid the violent crises that erupted after the breakdown of 
Yugoslavia by putting pressure on their national governments to create more 
efficient mechanisms. The idea of a collective European responsibility had 
taken root to some extent in the public opinion of the member countries.
These, then, are the four themes that have guided our study of Spanish policy 
towards Morocco and the impact of EC/EU membership on this policy. As 
suggested in the previous section, the findings on the four themes need to be 
checked against the qualitative, causal and comparative benchmarks in order 
to be sure that the changes observed in policy can be attributed to 
Europeanisation. This thesis conducts such an analysis in relation to Spanish 
policy towards Morocco, but before proceeding to present the results of the 
research, it is necessary to justify briefly the choice of topic.
1.4 The study of Spanish policy towards Morocco 
The choice of the case study
Relations with Morocco have been a key element for Spanish foreign policy 
since Moroccan independence in 1956. The relationship with Morocco 
includes most areas of Spanish foreign relations: from territorial claims to the 
fight against international drug traffic, from promotion of the Spanish 
language to Euro-African infrastructure projects. No other bilateral 
relationship, not even those with other direct neighbours like Portugal and 
France, nor those with other former colonies like Cuba or Equatorial Guinea, 
has been as complex.
This has resulted in the policy towards Morocco having served at times as a 
sort of laboratory of Spanish foreign policy, where some new ways of taking 
decisions and new actors have appeared. But this same policy has been on 
other occasions the remnant of the oldest diplomatic and military traditions in 
Spanish foreign policy. This is one reason that makes the study of Spanish
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policy towards Morocco interesting: there are elements of change and 
innovation, and elements of continuity. This could be a good puzzle to start 
with: why have some elements changed so much, and others so little?
Since 1986 many actors have played a role in Spanish policy towards 
Morocco; as a matter of fact, the only significant player in Spanish foreign 
policy that has played almost no role at all in the relation with Morocco so far
1 7has been the judiciary. The Crown, Armed Forces, Cortes (Parliament), 
Comunidades Autonomas (regional authorities), political parties, economic 
lobbies, NGOs, have all been active in topics that affect relations with 
Morocco. Even Spanish public opinion, which seldom shows interest in 
foreign policy, has remained relatively attentive to the development of the 
bilateral relationship.
Within the central executive many different departments have been involved 
by virtue of the large number of areas that are involved. The Spanish embassy 
in Rabat contains representatives of almost all ministerial departments, a sign 
of the variety of issues that are relevant in the relationship. The fact that so 
many areas are included, and not just those traditionally considered to be the 
domain of foreign policy, is interesting. An important element of theoretical 
concern of this thesis is to try to establish the links between all those areas and 
to assess the impact of specific policies (migration, fisheries, promotion of 
investments) on the whole of the bilateral relationship. We take a broad 
definition of foreign policy and try to understand the links between the areas 
of external activity.
Methodology
Precisely because Spanish policy towards Morocco includes so many areas, 
the problem with studying it is more one of choice (where to concentrate the 
research?) than of access to information. In this thesis we have opted for
17 Since the late 1990s the judiciary has played an important role in relations with some Latin 
American countries (Chile, Argentina, Guatemala) because of its indictments of former 
leaders and members o f dictatorial governments.
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identifying the main areas of activity of Spanish policy in relation to Morocco 
and choosing four of them for an in-depth study.
Because of the particular importance of the relationship between those areas 
which are not foreign policy in its most restrictive sense, and the traditional, 
‘high-politics’ relations, we have chosen issues which represent very different 
areas of activity. Thus, one chapter is devoted to fisheries, another covers 
commercial and economic relations, another chapter studies the issue of 
immigration, and one deals with the core of high-politics issues: the post­
colonial and territorial disputes, including the issues of Ceuta and Melilla and 
the Western Sahara.
The advantage of this approach is that we can analyse in more depth the key 
areas of Spanish foreign policy and its evolution. The main drawback is that 
this thesis will not provide a complete picture of Spanish policy towards 
Morocco. At least six crucial areas have been left out: military co-operation, 
development aid, cultural issues, the fight against drugs and other illegal 
smuggling, technical co-operation (including joint infrastructure projects), and 
democratisation and human rights. All of them have played a certain role in 
Spanish policy towards Morocco at some point in time. None of them, 
however, has been active in all the period with an intensity that is comparable 
to the four areas we have chosen. For this same reason, it would be difficult to 
study their evolution and, in particular, the role of Europeanisation on that 
evolution, which we think can be done with the four case studies as they all 
deal with issues that existed on the bilateral agenda long before Spanish 
accession to the EC and remained high on the list of bilateral priorities 
throughout the entire period. Therefore, we believe that the theoretical 
purpose of this thesis is better served by a detailed analysis of those four 
areas.
The research strategy in each of the case studies has been guided by the 
theoretical approach outlined in this first chapter. We have conducted the 
research in the same order in which the cases are presented in this thesis, i.e.
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fisheries was the first case (Chapter 3), followed by economic and commercial 
relations (Chapter 4), immigration (Chapter 5) and territorial and post-colonial 
matters (Chapter 6). In each of the chapters we have provided some specific 
background on the issues, that complements the more general background 
provided in Chapter 2. After this we have followed the evolution of Spanish 
policy in that area as far as it was directly concerning the relationship with 
Morocco.
The four themes of Europeanisation outlined in this chapter are the base for 
our analysis of the effects of EC/EU membership on each of the four policy 
areas. Not every theme has had the same effect on each of the areas. The 
analysis of the reasons for that variation is the starting point for the last 
chapter, Chapter 7, in which we bring together the findings of the four case 
studies and draw the general conclusions of this thesis.
As for methodology, some choices had to be made. First, we have opted for 
explanations that privilege decision-making and, to a lesser extent, systemic 
explanations of change. In that sense we do not intend to contribute to the 
literature on mutual perceptions and misperceptions, an area in which the 
Spanish-Moroccan relationship is particularly rich, given its history, the recent 
memory of violent incidents in the 20th century, a cultural and religious 
divide, a growing economic gap and divergent understandings of historical 
events. This sort of explanation dominates the existing literature in Spanish 
and French. Important as these questions are, there is an important 
contribution to be made by focusing on the concrete way and circumstances in 
which decisions are made, an approach that complements socio- 
psychological, historical and cultural explanations. This focus also allows us 
to relate the study of this very special bilateral relationship to the findings of 
the discipline of International Relations, addressing one of the weaknesses 
that we have detected in the literature about Spanish foreign policy in general 
and more specifically about Spanish policy towards Morocco.
Secondly, as this chapter makes clear, amongst the several possible reasons 
for change of Spanish policy towards Morocco the focus here is on the key
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dimension of the impact of EC/EU membership. The research does not deal 
with this phenomenon to the exclusion of other topics, but the theoretical 
focus that guides the research and analysis of the evidence obtained is the 
study of Europeanisation. This will give some clear direction to the thesis, 
allowing it to move beyond pure description.
A total of 36 interviews have been conducted during the research for this 
thesis. All interviewees have agreed in having their names mentioned (a 
complete list in available in the sources section at the end of this thesis), but 
because not all of them were ready to be directly quoted in the text, we have 
decided not to quote any interviewee in the thesis text, not even of those who 
agreed to speak ‘on the record’. For this reason interviews have not been used 
as evidence, but as a source of access to information and interpretations of the 
facts.
This also explains our choice of interviewees. Rather than establishing a list of 
people by categories, and trying to come up with a representative selection of 
interviewees, we have sought to talk to people that could shed some light in 
the points of the research in which access to documents proved elusive. A 
combination of primary and secondary written materials, all of them listed in 
the Sources section, has been the basis for the references in this thesis.
One difficult decision has been where to draw the temporary limits to the 
research. Given the focus on Europeanisation, 1986 looked like a relatively 
obvious choice. The problem of providing the adequate background to 
understand the analysis has been solved with the inclusion of a whole chapter, 
Chapter 2, devoted to the historical perspective and to the general framework 
in which Spanish policy towards Morocco evolved.
The decision to end the study at the end of 2002 is a less obvious one, in 
particular with the perspective of the events that followed. The main reason 
for that choice was operational: it seemed unwise to conduct an open-ended 
research. Moreover, in virtually all the fields of Spanish policy towards 
Morocco 2002 contains important landmarks, and above all the bilateral crisis
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that peaked in July 2002 marked a turning point. Events in 2003 and 2004 
have shown that other moments could have been chosen as the end of the 
study period, in particular the 11 March 2004 Madrid bomb blasts and the 
Spanish March 2004 legislative election, in which the Socialist party came 
back to power. But then again other events in the future, such as the Barcelona 
+ 10 Euromediterranean summit, scheduled for November 2005, could be 
even more significant.
Our choice has been to stick to end 2002 as the closing date for our study. The 
main drawback for this is that it does not allow us to capture to what extent a 
change of party in power has been a decisive factor in bilateral relations. Also 
important events such as the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca or the 
2003-04 Iraq crises have been left out of the thesis. We hope that those 
operational difficulties have not affected the validity of the conclusions of this 
thesis.
1.5 Conclusion
In a global context of changes and new challenges to foreign policy makers, 
and in Spain’s new condition as an EC member state, Spanish foreign policy 
has changed considerably since 1986. The transformation is the result of 
events and processes of a global scale, of the impact of EC/EU membership 
and of internal sources of change. Arguably the second issue, the impact of 
EC/EU membership, has been the main motor for change in Spanish foreign 
policy in the last 15 years.
The study of the impact of EC/EU membership on Spanish foreign policy is 
centred on the idea of Europeanisation, defined as the process o f foreign 
policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation pressures and 
the new opportunities generated by the European integration process. It is not 
enough to define Europeanisation; we need to establish the limits of the 
phenomenon in order to be able to distinguish those changes that are a result 
of Europeanisation from those that are not. These limits can be established in
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three directions: qualitatively, assessing the magnitude and the quality of the 
changes that the policy has experienced; causally, tracing the causal links 
between EC/EU membership and the changes observed; and comparatively, 
contrasting those changes not only with patterns of Europeanisation, but also 
with other phenomena in both the domestic and the international arenas.
Having defined Europeanisation and established its limits makes possible a 
research agenda for the study of the Europeanisation of the foreign policy of 
an EC/EU member state towards a third (non-member) country. This research 
agenda has four main themes: the new constraints on national foreign policy­
makers contrasted with the access to new instruments; the possible re­
definition of identity, interests and preference formation; the changes in the 
policy-making process and in the decision-making structures and procedures; 
and the impact of EC/EU in the domestic context and its influence on the 
policy.
The issue of policy towards Morocco constitutes a good example of the 
transformation, but also of the elements of continuity, of Spanish foreign 
policy. This policy affects numerous areas of activity, many of them not 
always identified as traditional foreign policy. Those areas include issues that 
are nowadays the competence of the EC, whereas other areas are dealt with 
within different structures in the EU. Morocco is, moreover, a privileged 
partner not only for Spain but also for the EU and some other member states.
For all these reasons, the study of Spanish policy towards Morocco represents 
an opportunity to illustrate important aspects of the transformation of Spanish 
foreign policy. The case study throws light on some basic features of Spain’s 
foreign policy since 1986 as well as being revealing in its own terms. The 
choice of Europeanisation as the main theoretical focus means that some of 
the conclusions of this thesis may apply to the general problem of the 
Europeanisation of national foreign policies.
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Chapter 2: The Spanish-Moroccan relationship
In 1986, when Spain became a member of the European Community, 
Morocco had been independent for 30 years. Relations between the newly 
independent country and Spain were never easy, partly because of the legacy 
of the past, both remote (links between both sides of the Strait have been 
intense for centuries) and recent (Spain was a colonial power in Morocco until 
1956). After the worst bilateral crisis initiated by the Green March in 1975, 
normalising the relationship was a hard task for the first Spanish democratic 
governments.
History is not, however, the only factor which weighs heavily on the bilateral 
relationship. The international and regional context within which this 
relationship unfolds must be taken into account: the Cold War, the 
transformations of both the EC/EU and the Arab World, the new geo-strategic 
equation in the Mediterranean, all affected this difficult neighbourliness. 
Another factor to consider is the specific interests that link both countries: 
since this is a thesis about Spanish foreign policy, we have focused on 
Spanish, rather than Moroccan, interests.
This chapter outlines the main features of the context in which bilateral 
relations between Spain and Morocco took place, before examining the 
Spanish policy itself in the following chapters. First, we briefly study the 
legacy of history and introduce some basic facts about Spanish colonisation 
and especially its de-colonisation of northwest Africa. The chapter moves on 
to survey the evolution of the regional context in the western Mediterranean, 
in order to put the bilateral relationship in the framework of regional 
dynamics. It concludes by examining the place that Morocco occupies within 
Spanish foreign policy, including the traditional and new Spanish interests in 
that country and its position within the scale of priorities of Spanish foreign 
policy.
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2.1 The legacy of history 
Colonialism and de-colonisation
Links between northwest Africa and the Iberian Peninsula can be traced back 
to pre-Roman times, and include several periods of intense interaction. The 
800 year-long Arab and Berber presence in the Peninsula followed by a 500 
year-long Iberian presence in Northern Africa constitute an important 
historical background to contemporary Spanish - Moroccan relations. 
However, the presence of Morocco as an issue for Spanish foreign policy 
makers in contemporary times can be dated quite precisely to a particular 
event: the 1859-1860 Spanish-Moroccan war.
The Iberian kingdoms had been present in Northern Africa since the 15th 
century in a number of enclaves; Spain had managed to retain a presence in 
Ceuta and Melilla until the 19th century but their situation was not 
consolidated.18 On 22 October 1859, after repeated attacks by tribesmen on 
Spanish garrison towns in Northern Africa, the Spanish Congress declared 
war on the Sultanate. The 1859-60 war started with some initial Spanish 
victories and ended - under English pressure for a settlement - without major 
territorial changes. The war provoked nationalist enthusiasm on both the 
Spanish and the Moroccan sides (Sevilla Andres 1960; Laroui 1994: 183). No 
more expeditions took place in Morocco itself during the years of European 
imperialist expansion, and the limited Spanish colonising efforts were directed 
in the 1880s towards the Western Sahara, just across the sea from the Canary 
Islands.
The end of the Spanish empire after the 1898 defeat by the United States in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines liberated military assets and troops, and
18 Ceuta (Sabta in Arabic) was taken by the Portuguese in 1415, came under Spanish rule 
when the two crowns were in the hands of Phillip II of Spain, and chose to remain loyal to the 
Spanish crown when Portugal regained independence in 1640. Melilla (Mililla in Arabic) was 
taken in 1497 by a Spanish expedition, and has remained Spanish ever since.
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fuelled demands for a new colonial adventure in Morocco which would take 
place in the first quarter of the 20th century. But English and French dislike of 
the idea of a single power mastering both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar,19 
internal unrest, lack of resources and military defeats hindered the capacity of 
Spain to expand and consolidate its presence in North Africa. The Algeciras 
international conference of 1906 acknowledged the Spanish role in Morocco, 
formalised in 1912 with the creation of the Spanish Protectorate20, which 
included North Morocco and a smaller territory in the south. France occupied 
the central part, the largest, richest, most densely populated one, and home to 
the Sultan.
The Spanish presence in Morocco was the clearest expression of the 
oscillation between co-operation and rivalry that characterised both countries’ 
Mediterranean and African policies (Palomares Lerma 1994: 57). Whereas 
Spain had been the instrument in the hands of other imperial powers to avoid 
French hegemony in Morocco, it soon came to depend militarily on France to 
control the territory. In 1925, after 4 years of war in the Rif region against 
rebels led by Abdelkrim, Spain and France started a military co-operation 
which allowed for a pacification of both protectorates, marking the start of a 
relatively peaceful period of ‘dependent colonialism’(Gillespie 2000: 12- 
13).21 In 1934 Spanish colonisation in northwest Africa was completed with 
the occupation of the rest of the Western Sahara and the enclave of Sidi Ifiii, 
on the Atlantic Coast, that had been only partly colonised since 1860.
Two years later came the Spanish Civil War, which started with a failed coup 
based in Morocco. General Francisco Franco used not only Spanish soldiers 
stationed in Africa and the Canaries, but also between 60,000 and 90,000 
Rifean mercenaries, who fought on his side on the Peninsula. Four months
19 Often, however, Germany and Britain supported Spain’s aspirations in Morocco against 
France, fearing French presence in the Southern part of the Strait (Balfour 1997: 199-201).
20 In legal terms, there was a French Protectorate in Morocco, but the responsibility for the 
administration of part of it was delegated to Spain. This is what we refer two when we talk 
about the ‘Spanish Protectorate’.
21 Abdelkrim’s rebellion seriously endangered the Spanish presence in northern Morocco with 
a number of Rifean victories. When Abdelkrim’s actions affected the French part of the 
Protectorate, France decided to intervene. Henceforth the Spanish presence in northern Africa 
remained partly dependent on French military support.
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after Franco’s victory in Spain the Second World War (WWII) started. The 
initial victories of the Axis were seen by some of the Spanish fascists as an 
opportunity to occupy territories controlled by the allies (Gibraltar, Oran and 
Morocco), but apart from a brief occupation of Tangiers in 1940, Spain was 
never able to take advantage of the situation.
The end of WWII meant international isolation for the Franco regime. 
Excluded from the newly-created United Nations until 1955 and severely 
marginalised in the western European context because of its former links with 
the Axis powers, the country looked for new allies in the international context. 
The Arab countries were an important target for Francoist diplomacy. Thus, 
the rhetoric of ‘traditional friendship’ with the Arab World dating back to the 
times of Al-Andalus was put in place, and every effort was made to please the 
Arab monarchies, including the adoption of a strong pro-Palestinian stance.22 
To a large extent, Spain conditioned its action in the protectorate to a new 
interest: the friendship with Arab monarchies (Moha 1992). The regime tried 
to present the Spanish presence in Morocco as temporary and not as a colonial 
rule. Thus Spain sustained Sultan Mohammed V in his challenge to France in 
1953, opened Radio Tetuan to Moroccan nationalists and even went as far as 
supporting Moroccan nationalist guerrillas.
The return of the Sultan in 1956 and the sudden decision of France to 
withdraw from Morocco and Tunisia in order to concentrate on keeping 
Algeria left Spain ‘no option but to follow suit’(Powell 1995:22). The French 
protectorate ended in March 1956, and a month later the northern part of the 
Spanish protectorate became part of the newly independent Morocco. This 
was not the end of the challenges to Spain: Moroccan nationalists attacked 
Spanish positions in Sidi Ifni and in Western Sahara, forcing Spain to accept 
French military help and to relinquish the Southern part of the Protectorate, 
around the city of Tarfaya, in 1958, after a two-year war. The Spanish 
colonisation of Morocco and its mainly military nature meant that the
22 Israel’s refusal to recognise Franco’s dictatorship as the legitimate government o f Spain 
because o f its past links with Nazi Germany made the pro-Palestinian attitude an even more 
obvious choice.
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penetration in the deeper structures of the country had been limited; its hasty 
de-colonisation left very few traces of the Spanish presence in that country, 
and the opportunity of establishing a privileged link between the two countries 
was overlooked.
Far from accepting its new borders, independent Morocco soon adopted a 
nationalist doctrine which demanded a substantial enlargement of its borders 
to include the remaining north African territories in Spanish hands (Sidi Ifni, 
Western Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla), and French administered Mauritania and 
Eastern Algeria. At the same time, just after the withdrawal from the 
southern part of the Protectorate, Spain elevated Sidi Ifni and Western Sahara 
to the status of provinces. In the 1960s the Spanish government increased the 
efforts to colonise and exploit the Western Sahara, just as de-colonisation 
became more and more generally accepted in the world arena.24
In the 1960s and 1970s relations between Spain and Morocco remained 
difficult. The Moroccan regime maintained its claims, but downplayed them 
in moments of weakness or regional isolation (Hernando de Larramendi 1997: 
356-357). It succeeded however in dealing on a bilateral basis with the Sidi 
Ifni question. As a result, in 1969 Spain withdrew from Sidi Ifni and Morocco 
gained sovereignty over it after an agreement which granted access to 
Moroccan waters to the Spanish fishing fleet under very generous conditions.
The Moroccan regime was not so successful in imposing its view in the two 
other areas of its interest. Spain never accepted any negotiation over Ceuta, 
Melilla and the lesser enclaves, which were considered to be an integral part 
of Spanish territory. Western Sahara had the status of a colony, but Spain
23 In particular the nationalist party Istiqlal pressured the King to put into practice the 
irredentist ideas of Allal al-Fasi, who envisaged a Greater Morocco that would encompass an 
important part of Northwest Africa that had had some sort of links to the Sultanate in the past: 
Mauritania, Western Sahara, Sidi Ifni, the Spanish enclaves, northwest Mali and a substantial 
portion of Algerian Sahara.
Moves in favour of and against decolonisation in Northern Africa were not only a 
consequence of changing international realities, but also of a power struggle between factions 
within the regime. While the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, led by Fernando Maria Castiella, 
was in favour o f decolonising soon, a pro-colonial lobby represented in the government by
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refused to discuss its sovereignty with Morocco on a bilateral basis and chose 
to deal with it in a multilateral framework which would include not only the 
local population (whose right to self-determination should be preserved), but 
also the United Nations and the adjacent countries, Algeria and Mauritania.
In 1970 Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania came close to an agreement on the 
Western Sahara issue, but this never materialised and by 1973 confrontation 
was almost inevitable. Morocco increased pressure on Spain (mainly by 
enlarging its exclusive fisheries area, capturing dozens of fishing vessels and 
re-activating the claim to Ceuta and Melilla in the UN), looked for diplomatic 
support elsewhere (with very limited success: half a dozen countries, mainly 
Moslem), and brought the question to the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague. In The Hague Moroccans and Mauritanians looked for recognition of 
their respective historical right to the territory of Western Sahara, which both 
saw as an integral part of their national territory separated by colonial rulers. 
They opposed Spain’s intention to apply the principle of self-determination 
and advocated the principle of territorial integrity instead.
The Court’s opinion was that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had sovereignty 
links in the past that would justify a right to the territory, despite the existence 
of some historical ties, and thus it advocated the self-determination of the 
local population as defended by Spain and Algeria. King Hassan II took the 
initiative after the defeat on the legal front and announced the organisation of 
a peaceful march to recover Western Sahara. The ‘Green March’ took place a 
month later, in November 1975, during the long agony of General Franco 
which paralysed Spain. About 350,000 Moroccans marched across the border 
thus forcing negotiations on Spain. Both the Spanish internal context and the
n r
international situation favoured Moroccan ambitions, and m a matter of days 
Morocco and Mauritania succeeded in convincing Spain to transfer its 
administering responsibilities to a temporary joint administration by Morocco,
Luis Carrero Blanco (deputy prime minister from 1967) advocated a much longer time period 
(Powell 1995:24-26; Gillespie 2000: 17-21).
25 Charles Powell points to the growing isolation of the Spanish regime, the worrying 
Portuguese example (less than a year before unrest over a disastrous colonial policy brought
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Mauritania and the Western Saharan tribal assembly, known as Yamaa. 
Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation of the territory followed, and after 
them, a long war in the desert.
A troubled neighbourliness: the years of transition
Analysts of Spanish foreign policy often point to the Green March and the 
signature of the Treaty of Madrid (10 November 1975) as the most difficult 
international challenge faced by Spain since 1939 (Mesa Garrido 2001:175). It 
was very unfortunate indeed for Spanish policy-makers that such a situation 
happened during an acute crisis of the Franco regime, when the dictator was 
dying and the political machinery was completely paralysed by the resulting 
uncertainty. Franco eventually died ten days after the signature of the Treaty 
of Madrid, on 20 November 1975, opening the space for a historical change in 
Spanish politics.
Initially, some elements loyal to the dictatorial regime attempted liberalisation 
without true reform, a move that failed in foreign policy as it did in the 
internal sphere. Thus, the only significant progress at the time was the 
upgrading of the agreements with the USA to a Treaty of Friendship and Co­
operation. The main goals of the first government after Franco, the 
universalisation of diplomatic relations and the support of European 
democracies, were not achieved until a new government, clearly committed to 
reforms, assumed power under the leadership of Adolfo Suarez from June 
1976 (Aldecoa 1994: 160-161). For that weak first government, the troubled 
situation in northwest Africa was of low priority.
In February 1976 the Spanish army abandoned Western Sahara following the 
Madrid Agreement. Morocco occupied most of the country militarily leaving 
the poor and deserted southern third to Mauritania. That same month the 
Polisario Front26 proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
about the fall of the dictatorship), the support of the USA and France for King Hassan II, and 
their fear of another revolution in the Iberian peninsula (Powell 1995: 29).
26 The Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberation de Saqia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro) is 
the Sahrawi liberation movement bom in the anti-colonial fight against Spain. It was 
constituted on 10 May 1973.
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with Algerian support. Algeria recognised the new state a month later, and 
Morocco retaliated by breaking diplomatic relations with Algeria 
immediately. An unstable regional system of alliances was established, in 
which Morocco and Algeria drew Libya and Mauritania to their respective 
positions until the late 1980s (Grimaud 1988: 89). In the first period Spain 
found herself in a position very close to Morocco because of the Madrid 
Agreement of 1975, and the first concern was to find a more balanced position 
(Hernando de Larramendi and Nunez Villaverde 1996: 59-60).
Spanish foreign policy during the Suarez administration was more and more 
focused on Europe and the re-definition Spain’s role in the world, in particular 
in terms of alignment, and Spain lacked any strategy in the Maghreb. As a 
result Madrid often found itself responding to hostile initiatives by Algeria, 
the Polisario Front or Morocco. Instead of looking for a more stable situation, 
Spanish diplomacy tried to take advantage of the Moroccan-Algerian rivalry, 
forgetting the risks that instability in the region could bring. The Suarez 
government started a policy of ‘equilibrium’, opposing any hegemony in the 
Maghreb which would threaten Spanish interests in the area (and in particular, 
the enclaves and the Canary Islands). Every action towards Morocco was to 
be followed by a similar action towards Algeria as a proof of neutrality. Far 
from reinforcing the Spanish position, this attitude exposed the government to 
permanent pressures and black-mailing by Spain’s two southern neighbours, 
and at the same time discredited Spanish initiatives in the area. Every action 
by Spain favouring one of the parties would be perceived in the other capital 
as treason (Hernando de Larramendi and Nunez Villaverde 1996: 60; 
Gillespie 2000: 30-32).
The contending parties had two powerful tools to pressure Spain: territorial 
claims and fisheries. Morocco would activate its claim to Ceuta and Melilla as 
a means of pressuring Spain, as it had indeed done before. Algeria supported a 
movement for the independence of the Canary Islands, claiming its 
‘Africanness’ and looking for support in Africa in order to get the Canary
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Islands on the UN de-colonisation agenda.27 Both Morocco and Polisario 
captured Spanish fishing vessels as a measure to put pressure on Spanish 
authorities.
The inefficient policy of ‘equilibrium’ was replaced by a clear pro-Moroccan 
stance of Suarez’s successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, in 1981. In his first 
speech as prime minister, Calvo Sotelo stated clearly that the relationship with 
the Kingdom of Morocco was the priority for Spain.28 That was seen with 
great hope by the Moroccans (Hernando de Larramendi 1997: 403), and with 
logical suspicion by the Algerians, who were also concerned about the 
Spanish decision to enter NATO, given the links between Algeria and the 
Soviet Union.
It is important to note that during those years of transition the Western Sahara 
question was the key factor to explain not only the relations between Spain 
and Morocco and Algeria, but also Moroccan foreign policy and intra- 
Maghreb dynamics. After the Green March, the Western Saharan issue helped 
the Moroccan monarchy to consolidate its internal position, and was the main 
question in both domestic and international affairs (Damis 1987). Inter- 
Maghreb dynamics, conditioned since the late 1960s by Algerian-Moroccan 
rivalry, started focusing on the Western Sahara question in the early 1970s 
and remained in this state until the late 1980s. It was difficult for Spain, the 
former colonial power, not to fall into these conflicting dynamics, and the 
policies of first equilibrium and then alignment did not help to overcome such 
vulnerability.
27 The movement, known as MPAIAC, never got any significant support in the islands, and 
was based in Algiers, where its leader, Antonio Cubillo, found the kind of support for a 
liberation movement in which the Algerian regime was specialising at the time. Algeria never 
convinced enough African countries to raise the question in the Organisation for African 
Unity, and after an assassination attempt on Cubillo in Algiers in April 1978, the Canarian 
question was slowly forgotten as Spanish-Algerian relations improved (Gillespie 2000: 80-85; 
Marquina 2000: 515-517).
28 The whole speech can be found in del Arenal and Aldecoa 1986: 225-227.
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Towards a new approach
On 28 October 1982, the Spanish Workers Socialist Party (PSOE) won the 
parliamentary election. This victory was viewed with great concern in Rabat, 
given the open pro-Sahrawi stance of the party and the good relations between 
some of the socialist leaders and the Algerian National Liberation Front 
(FLN). For its part, Algeria hoped that the Socialist victory would put an end 
to the pro-Moroccan shift witnessed under the Calvo Sotelo government 
(Moran 1990: 78). The Socialists had complained vigorously against the 
signature of the Madrid Agreement and demanded its revocation. Their 
election manifesto in 1977 advocated a policy which would favour Algeria 
instead of Morocco, and the Socialist leaders, particularly Felipe Gonzalez 
and Alfonso Guerra, had often been in Algiers in the late 1970s. But during 
the 1982 election campaign, when victory seemed possible for the first time, 
the Socialists had started moderating their discourse and making some 
gestures in order to reassure the Moroccans (Moran 1990: 78; Hernando de 
Larramendi 1997: 405-408).
Morocco was not convinced by those gestures, and in November 1982 joint 
Moroccan-American manoeuvres in A1 Hoceima, close to the Spanish 
Mediterranean coast, served to prove the determination of the Moroccans and 
to warn the new Spanish government of the Reagan administration’s dislike of 
the Socialist views on Spanish-American relations.
The new Socialist government downplayed some of its former claims, and 
started a policy which was much more pragmatic than their previous 
declarations had anticipated. Continuity, reliability and stability in foreign 
policy were prioritised, and former ideological positions on NATO and 
Western Sahara were soon dropped. The Polisario Front never got official 
Spanish support and the SADR was not recognised. Even the revocation of the 
Madrid Agreements, so strongly advocated in the preceding years, was 
completely discarded in favour of maintaining the official position of 
recognising the Moroccan administration, if not Moroccan sovereignty, over 
Western Sahara, despite strong Algerian pressure (Moran 1990: 83).
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As early as December 1982 Fernando Moran, the foreign minister, made his 
first official visit to Rabat. Four months later Felipe Gonzalez, the prime 
minister, also chose Morocco for his first official trip. The clear goal was to 
create a new climate of confidence and to put an end to Moroccan suspicion 
of the Socialists’ intentions. The moment was also favourable in Morocco for 
a ‘detente’: after serious defeats on the war fronts in the second half of the 
1970s, aggravated in 1979 by the Mauritanian decision to withdraw from 
Western Sahara, the new, American-inspired, strategy of building walls in the 
desert had started bearing fruit from the early 1980s: by 1983 the Moroccan 
positions were relatively consolidated.
Moreover, the completed colonisation (in 1981 there were 4 Moroccans, 
including civilians and military personnel, per local in the Western Sahara), 
newly-achieved security and economic success of the region allowed the 
regime to think that a referendum could be won (del Pino 1983a: 126-127). In 
1981, in order to regain the diplomatic initiative, the King of Morocco 
accepted the referendum that the Sahrawis and Algerians had so long been 
asking for, although the conditions were never agreed upon. The new 
Moroccan position limited one of the main sources of conflict, not least since 
Rabat was interested in improving relations with Madrid in a moment of 
difficult relations with another Socialist administration, Francis Mitterrand’s, 
in Paris (Hernando de Larramendi 1997: 411).
The Spanish socialist government, which had made full integration in western 
Europe (and in particular in the EC) an absolute priority of its foreign policy, 
wanted to change the problematic nature of Spain’s relations with the 
Maghreb countries. Thus a new, global approach to the region was to be put 
into place. This global policy towards the Maghreb was theoretically outlined 
during 1983, but it took several years to develop completely. Felipe
29 I have translated politica global as ‘global policy’. However, the reader should note that, 
whereas in English the use of global in this context would suggest ‘relating to the whole 
world’, in Spanish it is used in its second meaning: ‘relating to or embracing the whole of 
something, or of a group of things’, i.e. closer to the meaning of ‘holistic’ (definitions from 
Oxford’s Compact English Dictionary, Second Edition, 2000).
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Gonzalez, the Socialist Prime Minister, described the new attitude with the
following words:
Spain is engaged in a global policy, not a policy of 
balance; a policy of collaboration, not confrontation, 
and one of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries (OID 1983: 501).
The global approach, which nonetheless takes account of the singularities of 
each of the Maghreb countries, has a double objective: the defence and 
promotion of Spanish security, economic and cultural interests in the area 
(territory, security, fisheries, energy supplies) and the promotion of economic 
prosperity and political and social stability in the region, to result in a 
prosperous, stable and integrated Maghreb (Moratinos 1991).
The new mood in relations with Morocco bore its first fruit in the 1983 
fisheries agreement, the first stable and lasting agreement achieved in years, 
which brought relative stability to the Spanish fleet. The traditional use of 
fisheries as a means of pressuring Spain could thus be partly avoided, with a 
proper agreement with Morocco in place and no access to the sea by the 
Polisario.
Algeria was not forgotten: Alfonso Guerra, the deputy prime minister, 
travelled to Algiers in March 1983, the same month Gonzalez went to Rabat, 
and two months later the Spanish King and Queen visited Algeria. But if the 
Algerian-backed claim for a de-colonisation of the Canary Islands was almost 
forgotten by the time the Socialists came to power, the Socialists’ decisions to 
maintain the Madrid Agreements and to keep Spain in NATO disappointed 
the Algerian government. A bitter dispute over the terms governing the 
provision of Algerian gas to Spain was elevated by the Algerian regime to a 
political question, and troubled commercial relations until an agreement was 
reached in 1985 (Marquina 2000: 535-537). ETA, the terrorist organisation, 
had found shelter and training in Algeria since the mid 1970s, but it was not 
until France started a policy of collaboration with Spain in fighting terrorism
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in 1983-85 that Algeria became an important ETA sanctuary, a new source of 
bitter disagreement with Spain (Gillespie 2000: 85-86).30
The global policy put in place by the Socialists only gave limited fruits in its 
first years, but set the path for a new way to design Spanish policy towards the 
Maghreb, and towards Morocco in particular. The fruits would only come 
years later, and not before the whole relationship was completely modified by 
the decision of the Ten to accept Spain and Portugal as EC members from 
1986.
The legacy of 30 years of relations with independent Morocco is, as we have 
seen in this first section, complex and very relevant. In the ten years since 
Franco’s death, the democratic governments of Spain did not manage to 
overcome the poisoned heritage left by colonialism and a troubled bilateral 
relationship. They did however establish the new basis for a more stable 
relationship with the southern neighbour. But complicated dossiers like 
fisheries or the Western Sahara, mutual suspicion between both sides of the 
Straits of Gibraltar, and important cultural and sociological elements for 
conflict are the heritage of those difficult 30 years.
2.2 A new context
The next section looks at the regional context that had an important effect on 
the bilateral relationship and on Spanish policy. We undertake that task in 
three parts: firstly comes the strategic context of the western Mediterranean 
during the Cold War period; second is the evolution of the EC/EU and its 
relations with Morocco; finally, attention turns to the regional context in the 
Maghreb and the Arab World at large.
30 This attitude was rectified some years later: in 1987 the Algerian regime tried to persuade 
ETA members to declare a ceasefire, and supported the negotiations between the Spanish 
government and the terrorist group. As those negotiations failed, ETA members where 
expelled from Algeria: the last group left in May 1989 (Marquina 2000: 538-539).
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The western Mediterranean and the Cold War
The de-colonisation of Morocco, the Western Sahara crisis, the Spanish 
transition, all took part in a global context deeply influenced by the Cold War. 
Like many other regions across the world, the Mediterranean became an area 
of competition and rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
although lacking a specific policy for the Maghreb, the superpowers always 
included that area in their Mediterranean policy, and their actions were 
inspired by political and strategic definitions of a global nature (Elliot Zoppo 
1983: 85-86).
Tensions arising from the colonial past in the region constituted a fertile 
ground for Soviet ambitions in the area, and conflicts like the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, the liberation wars (particularly in Algeria) or the Western Sahara 
were seen in Moscow as opportunities for a change in the status quo, a status 
quo of which the United States became an advocate. American policy in the 
Mediterranean had a double objective: on the one hand, avoiding Soviet 
expansion in the area; on the other, preventing any local or regional tension 
from escalating into a fully fledged conflict which would offer the Soviet 
Union opportunities for involvement.
The Truman doctrine in the late 1940s and the 1950s was the start of 
American involvement in the region. The United States pressured their 
European allies to include Turkey, Greece and Portugal in NATO. Because 
Franco’s Spain in NATO was totally unacceptable to the European allies, the 
USA established a bilateral agreement which ensured the presence of 
American troops in the vicinity of the Strait of Gibraltar. Some friendly Arab 
regimes, like Morocco or Libya, were also included in the American strategy. 
The United States thus became ‘the last guarantor of the security of the 
Mediterranean countries of Europe, Spain, Israel, and the Arab countries of a 
pro-western tendency’ (Elliot Zoppo 1983: 92).
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Morocco remained a loyal ally to the USA during the Cold War, and so did 
Spain. Therefore, Spanish-Moroccan tensions during the process of de­
colonisation never acquired an East-West dimension, and the logic of bilateral 
relationships prevailed. The USA had agreements and bases both in 
Morocco31 and in Spain, and considered the region around the Strait a friendly 
and stable area, of great strategic value to ensure communication and transport 
from the North Atlantic to vital areas like the Persian Gulf or Israel.
The Western Saharan dispute was thus a worrying situation for the United 
States. Algeria had important links with the Soviet Union, and tensions in the 
area threatened the whole stability of northwest Africa. In the absence of 
direct Soviet involvement, the greatest fear in Washington was the 
possibility that a Moroccan defeat against Polisario could foster the fall of 
Hassan IPs friendly regime (Elliot Zoppo 1983: 103). In the wider global 
context, the crisis in the Middle East, the Portuguese revolution and, later on, 
the Iranian revolution, increased the interest of the USA in a stable Morocco 
(Urruela 1995: 109). This explains American support of Morocco, including 
technical help in implementing the eventually successful strategy of the belts 
of walls (Cistero Bahima and Freixes Sanjuan 1987).33
American support was complemented by another close ally of the Moroccan 
regime: France. France not only gave diplomatic support, including -  
crucially -  from its permanent seat at the UN, and provided the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian armies with weapons, but even intervened in the war with troops 
between November 1977 and June 1978 supporting the Mauritanian
31 Four military airports were built during the Second World War and remained open to the 
United States until 1963. Limited access to military facilities was offered again from 1982.
32 The USSR had strong economic links with Morocco in areas such as fisheries and 
phosphates, and was the first buyer o f Moroccan citrus fruit. This probably explains 
Moscow’s lack o f enthusiasm in supporting the Polisario.
33 The strategy consisted of building belts of protected walls around some strategic areas to 
avoid Polisario’s activities and attacks. Successive belts encompassed more and more 
territory until the building of the last one, that nowadays constitutes the border between the 
Polisario controlled and the Morocco controlled areas, and leaves no access to the sea, cities 
or mineral resources to the Polisario Front
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government.34 After the Mauritanian withdrawal from the war France adopted 
a more balanced attitude and recognised the right of the Western Saharans to 
self-determination, but still remained the main ally of Morocco in this issue.
However, both France and the United States tried to avoid being in the first 
line of the diplomatic battle against the recognition of the SADR. The most 
outspoken allies of Morocco were the conservative regimes in Africa (Zaire, 
Senegal) or the Arab countries (like the Gulf monarchies), whereas the leftist 
regimes of Africa (Angola, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, etc.) and the Arab League 
(Algeria, Libya, PDR of Yemen, Syria) were the first to recognise the SADR. 
On the whole, the Western Sahara question had always much more of a 
regional dimension than a Cold War one (Osterud 1989), and it was only in 
Africa that the dispute acquired a bigger scope. The changing alliances in the 
Maghreb evolved around Algerian-Moroccan rivalry, not according to East- 
West lines.
Spain had also been since the mid-1950s a close ally to the United States. The 
Americans had in Franco’s Spain a friendly ally that -  despite its pro-Arab 
rhetoric and its non-recognition of Israel -  allowed them to use the bases 
during the Middle Eastern conflicts. But when the dictator died, the neutralist 
tendencies -  which had been present in the opposition to the dictatorship -  
became evident during the Suarez presidency and when the Socialists came to 
power.
When the Calvo Sotelo administration decided that Spain should join NATO, 
and especially after the Socialist government confirmed membership with a 
referendum in 1986, months after Spain’s accession to the EC, it became clear 
that Spain (even with a Socialist government) was a reliable ally. Thus, the 
USA had no interest in taking sides in any Spanish-Moroccan dispute. The 
improvement of relations between Spain and Morocco during the consecutive 
socialist administrations, the easing of tensions in the Maghreb itself, and
34 The kidnapping o f French citizens by the Polisario in Mauritania served as the excuse for 
an intervention to protect the iron mines and to preserve the failing pro-French Mauritanian 
regime, which fell to a military coup one month after the French withdrawal.
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eventually the end of the Cold War and of the fear of an escalation of a 
conflict contributed to consolidate the western Mediterranean as a region of 
relative stability.
The northern shore: integration and exclusion
When the Cold War ended and the overwhelming presence of the superpowers 
in the Mediterranean started to decline, a new international actor was ready to 
play a new, crucial role in the region: the European Communities (EC), soon 
to become the European Union (EU). The role of the EC in the Mediterranean 
had been growing since its creation, partly following a decline in the role of 
the European powers (particularly Britain and France), mainly as a reflection 
of its growing presence in the international arena. The late 1980s and the start 
of the 1990s witnessed a major shift in the European role in the region.
The EC was created in 1957, only a year after Morocco’s independence. At 
that time, the Kingdom was heavily dependent on France in economic terms: 
60% of its exports went there (de la Fuente Casamar 1989: 77). The special 
situation of Morocco (and Tunisia) in relation to France was taken into 
consideration by the Rome Treaty in a protocol and a declaration which 
constituted the basis of a close association to the EC built upon the
o r
preferential agreements that Morocco already had with France. Thus, the 
initial relationship between Morocco and the newly created Community was 
strongly mediated by France and the previously existing links.
In 1963 Morocco officially requested to start negotiations for an association 
agreement, which started in July 1965. In March 1969 an association 
agreement between Morocco and the EC was signed. The agreement was seen 
more positively on the European side than in Morocco, where critical voices 
argued that the agreement left the Moroccan economy at the mercy of the 
Europeans, and in a disadvantageous position in respect to other competitors,
35 ‘Protocol relative to goods originating or coming from some countries that benefit from a 
particular import regime in one of the Member States’ and ‘Declaration o f intent with a view 
to the association to the EC of the independent countries belonging to the French Franc zone.’
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mainly Spain and the eastern Mediterranean countries (de la Fuente Casamar 
1989: 82-83).
The strong Moroccan dependency on France was thus gradually substituted by 
a dependency on the EC as a whole. In 1972 the EC heads of state and 
government decided to launch a new, comprehensive Mediterranean policy. 
This included a new generation of agreements which would include not only 
trade concessions but also industrial co-operation, a chapter on migrant work 
forces and financial aid, although in very modest proportion compared with 
the bilateral assistance provided by some member states, the superpowers or 
the Gulf states (Tovias 1996: 11). Morocco signed a new agreement in 1976 
following those lines, and its implementation started in September 1978.
The agreement placed Morocco in a relatively privileged position in the EC 
pyramid of foreign partners, although some of the drawbacks of the first 
agreement (particularly as far as agriculture was concerned) were hardly 
altered. But the context changed rapidly in the European side from the early 
1980s. The so-called Global Mediterranean Policy, which included relations 
with Morocco, was affected by the application until 1986 of the concessions 
negotiated by the EC in the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations, the 
enlargement to Greece in 1981, the improvements offered to ACP countries in 
the 1980 and 1985 renewals of the 1975 Lome convention, and the accession 
of Spain and Portugal (Tovias 1996: 12).
Since the signature of the Association Agreement in 1976, and in the light of 
the rapidly changing circumstances in Spain, Morocco was fully aware that 
the possibility of an accession to the EC by Spain should be taken into 
account in its dealings with the EC. If relationships were always structured in 
bilateral frameworks (Morocco-EC, Morocco-Spain, Spain-EC), there was a 
hidden trilateral game in which the third party, absent from the negotiation 
table, was nonetheless felt inasmuch as the decisions adopted would affect it. 
This ‘Spanish factor’ (de la Fuente Casamar 1989: 87) in the relations 
between Morocco and the EC became the predominant theme of those 
relations in the 1980s.
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The agriculture and the fisheries chapters were especially sensitive. In 
November 1985 negotiations between Morocco and the EC started in order to 
adapt the 1976 Agreement to the imminent Iberian enlargement. Morocco 
wanted improved access for some agricultural products (citrus, tomatoes, 
olive oil) in order to be better placed to compete with Spanish and Portuguese 
exports. Such improvement was not reached, and only minor compensations 
in the industry, research and new technologies fields were achieved. After 
Spanish accession in 1986, the fisheries negotiations became the most difficult 
issue between Morocco and the EC since the start of their relations. The talks 
started in July 1986, but it was not until February 1988 that an agreement was 
reached after bitter negotiations, strong pressures from both sides and a lot of 
tension.36
In 1987, Morocco applied formally for EC membership. Only three months 
later the EC Council of Ministers turned the application down, arguing that 
the Community was only open to European countries.37 The surprising 
Moroccan application has often been explained as a reaction to the 
considerable damage that the Iberian enlargement had caused to Moroccan 
relations with the EC. This might be an explanation for the timing of the 
official application,38 but not necessarily for the ultimate meaning of the 
application itself: the Moroccan candidature is ‘a long term objective that 
becomes in the short term a political negotiation tool’ (El Houdaigui 
2003:129). Nonetheless, by 1988 Morocco could be considered in global 
terms one of the (if not the) non-member states most closely linked with the 
EC.
Events in Central and Eastern Europe would soon challenge this position. The 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the renewed European interest in what was 
happening in the former Soviet bloc concentrated a big share of the
36 See Chapters Three and Four for more detail on those issues.
37 Art. 237 of the Rome Treaty was unambiguous in that point: ‘any European state’ can ask 
for membership. Morocco is not a European state.
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international efforts of an increasingly cohesive EC. The Single European Act 
had paved the way for the Single Market, to be achieved in 1992. At the same 
time, a political union was being discussed, the events to the East being its 
main cohesive force. As Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Yugoslavia or the 
Soviet Union started to be more and more present in the discussions of the 
Twelve, Morocco and, in general, the whole Mediterranean region became 
less and less of a priority for the European Community.
The southern shore: opportunities and tensions
At the same time that Spain and Portugal entered the EC, and the EC agreed 
to implement the Single Market, the situation in the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean started to change. Tension had peaked in 1983 and 1984, with 
two opposed alliances emerging: Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania on one side, 
Morocco and Libya on the other.39 Those years coincided with the first 
Spanish attempts to build a global policy, which avoided siding with Morocco 
or Algeria and placed stability in the Maghreb at the top of Spanish interests 
in the area. Because of the coincidence with a conflictual situation in the 
Maghreb, during its first years the new Spanish policy had only limited 
success.
But the second half of the 1980s saw important changes in the area. Morocco 
and Algeria’s economies were unable to sustain the permanent drain of 
resources towards the war in Western Sahara, and started a process of detente 
in 1987 which coincided with the reduction of tension between Tunisia and 
Libya. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the old foes 
(Algeria and Morocco, Tunisia and Libya) opened the door to a process that 
led to the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union. Less than two years later, on
38 The application of 1987 was not a complete novelty: the will to become a member of the 
EC had been first declared by King Hassan II on the occasion o f the Fointainebleau European 
summit in 1984.
39 Morocco and Libya signed the Treaty of Arab-African Unity in Uxda (Morocco) on 14 
August 1984. The main interest behind the Treaty of Uxda was not related to Spain, but to 
non-intervention in the wars that the two signatories were fighting in the Sahara: Western 
Sahara and Chad.
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17 February 1989, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia signed in Marrakesh the treaty which created the Arab Maghreb 
Union. The Maghreb countries had finally created a climate of co-operation 
on the southern shore, for the first time since de-colonisation.
Changes also took place in the domestic arenas. Progressive economic 
liberalisation was accompanied by a political change towards pluralism. 
External shocks, as in the case of Libya,40 or internal events, as in the case of 
Algeria,41 as well as an acute economic crisis affecting all countries in the 
region,42 triggered change. Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania also started the 
processes of transformation of both their economies and their political 
systems.
The year 1989 signalled a particularly favourable environment in the western 
Mediterranean, with growing co-operation in the south and the quick 
disappearance of a Soviet threat. In this context, Spain, Italy and France 
started to design new multilateral initiatives towards the region that reserved 
an important role for the newly bom Arab Maghreb Union. Now that inter­
state confrontations and rivalries seemed to be less relevant, a new security 
agenda emerged. The main European concerns in relation to the Maghreb 
were, according to the Spanish foreign minister at the time, the periodical 
outbreaks of social violence in the forms of riots, resulting from a deep 
economic crisis; the increasing presence of Islamic fundamentalism; and 
growing migration towards EC countries (Baixeras 1996: 150). For about two 
years the members of the newly bom Union would start agreeing positions on 
their meetings with the EC and promises of a closer integration were 
repeatedly made (Martin Munoz and Nunez Villaverde 1995).
40 Mainly, the US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on 14-15 April 1986.
41 In October 1988, after long weeks of strike, riots took place in the capital to protest against 
the government’s economic policy. After a first repressive reaction (imposing the state of 
siege), the government undertook a constitutional reform which allowed for multipartidism 
and competitive elections.
42 The recession of the early 1980s hit badly the Moroccan and Tunisian economies, whereas 
the lower prices of oil and gas from the second half of the 1980s had devastating effects on 
the Libyan and especially the Algerian economies (Talha 1996).
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This favourable environment would, however, not last very long. By the end 
of 1989, the attention and efforts of the EC were focusing almost exclusively 
on events in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the situation in the 
Maghreb itself and in the Mediterranean changed rapidly.
Libya faced international outrage as evidence pointed to its secret services in a 
series of terrorist acts in the late 1980s, which led the UN Security Council to 
impose a military and air embargo on it in 1992. In Algeria, the cautious 
reform that started in 1988 brought growing pressure for more liberalisation. 
In the economic front, reforms were applied slowly and with very few results. 
In the political front, the first free municipal elections brought an Islamist 
victory, as did the 1991 general election, which was cancelled by the Algerian 
authorities after the first round, as they realised the magnitude of the 
fundamentalist success. The country entered a spiral of repression until 
Mohammed Boudiaf, the president, was killed in 1992. At that point the 
country was heading towards civil war.
Tensions in the Arab World were by no means exclusively confined to its 
westernmost part. In the East, the late 1980s were the years of the first 
Palestine ‘Intifada’, whilst war in Lebanon seemed impossible to stop. Further 
east, the end of hostilities between Iran and Iraq was soon to be followed by a 
new crisis, involving again Iraq and its smaller neighbour, Kuwait. The start 
of the decade of the 1990s was marked in the entire Arab World by the 
international reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The Gulf War confirmed the United States as the only world power that could 
decisively influence events in the Middle East, now that the USSR was in 
deep crisis. The Arab members of the winning coalition against the Baghdad 
regime were rewarded with an enhanced influence and generous support (in 
the cases of Egypt or Morocco) or forgiveness (in the case of Syria) from the 
USA. The new climate of relations between Syria and the USA allowed a 
settlement to be finally implemented in Lebanon and cleared the way for a
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new Peace Process involving Israel and its Arab neighbours, including the 
Palestinians.43
But the Gulf War also sent some worrying signs to Europe, in particular in 
relation to its effects in the western Mediterranean. Saddam Hussein’s acts in 
the Gulf were met with open approval and even applause by some Maghreb 
governments, and especially by their societies44 In Morocco, the only 
government in the area which participated in the anti-Iraqi coalition, public 
opinion and the opposition protested loudly against the King’s decision to 
send 1,500 troops to Kuwait. Severely struck by economic crisis, and 
suffering from the worst distribution of income in the Maghreb, the Kingdom 
had experienced strikes and riots in December 1990, and the new wave of 
popular protests after the Gulf War provoked worries in Europe that the 
stability of Morocco could not be taken for granted {The Economist, 30 March 
1991).
The Gulf War and its consequences in the Maghreb area proved clearly that 
no event in the Gulf or eastern Mediterranean is without its effect for western 
Mediterranean and Spanish security. At the same time, Spain displayed its 
total alignment with the western bloc, even though this alignment was 
complemented with some balancing measures in order to regain Arab 
friendship (Grasa 1991).45 The Gulf War put the imperatives of security in 
relation with the Arab countries at the core of Spain’s foreign agenda. The 
need for a formula which permitted the involvement of other European 
countries in the protection of Spanish security interests became a basic 
concern for Spanish foreign action. At the same time the Twelve realised that,
43 The Spanish policy of balancing Arab friendship with good relations with Israel was 
‘rewarded’ with the choice of Madrid to host the conference which in 1991 started the Peace 
Process.
44 Not only Mauritanian and Libyan governments proved openly pro-Iraqi, but Tunisia and 
Algeria had ambiguous positions. Public opinion in all the countries was totally favorable to 
Saddam Hussein and showed it in the streets of all the Maghreban capitals (Abu Warda 
1994).
45 The foreign affairs minister, Mr. Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, undertook a visit to all five 
Maghreb countries during the war in order to explain clearly the Spanish position and to avoid 
any negative development in the area.
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while events in the Mediterranean were a threat, they were also an opportunity 
and a challenge comparable to that emerging in the East.
2.3 Spanish interest in Morocco: continuity and change
The events that took place in the Arab world, the Maghreb and Morocco in the 
early 1990s put security back into focus in the analysis of Spanish interests in 
Morocco. Those interests have changed throughout time and have been 
defined variably during the Franco regime, the transition to democracy, and 
the Socialist governments. However, there has been a core of ‘traditional 
interests’ that have been present to a greater or lesser extent since the mid 
1970s, and which later on were complemented by other new (or newly 
defined) interests.
Traditional interests
Almost every account of Spanish interests in Morocco starts with territorial 
matters, and more concretely with the question of Ceuta, Melilla and the 
smaller Spanish enclaves in North Africa. Morocco has claimed them as part 
of its territory since independence,46 the claim being more or less loud in 
different periods according to the state of the Spanish-Moroccan relationship 
(Hernando de Larramendi 1997: 356-357). Although the claim has been 
nearly frozen at times, it has never been dropped. Unlike its other territories 
on African soil, the enclaves were never considered by Spain to be a colony or 
part of the Protectorate, and historical and juridical arguments have been used 
to dismiss the Moroccan claim 47 Indeed, officially Spain does not consider 
the status of Ceuta and Melilla to be a subject of discussion with Morocco.
46 Actually, the sultans of Morocco have tried to gain sovereignty over the enclaves ever since 
the Portuguese conquest of Ceuta in the XV century (Rezette 1976).
47 The main arguments of both sides are summarised in del Pino 1983, pages 291-193. See 
also Chapter Six of this thesis.
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Nevertheless, the Moroccan government, and in particular King Hassan II, 
kept the issue on the agenda and the status of the two cities has been in the 
background of Spanish-Moroccan negotiations. Morocco has taken advantage 
of every international (changes in sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao, 
disagreements over Gibraltar) or local event (inter-communal tensions, 
approval of autonomy statutes) to raise the subject (Gold 2000: chapter one). 
The possibility of a violent attack or of some new version of the Green March 
on the two cities has been in the mind of Spanish military planners (Fisas 
1985: 143-150; Alonso Baquer 1988: chapter IX), and indeed the two towns 
host numerous troops.48 The Spanish army has been reorganised since the mid 
1980s to face a potential threat from the South, as both military planners and 
public opinion identify Morocco as the most likely external aggressor (Fisas 
1985: 169-179; del Campo 1995: 77). The prevention of violent conflict with 
Morocco has become an important objective of Spanish foreign policy 
makers.
Fisheries, or rather the protection of fishing ‘rights’, have probably been, 
after territorial disputes, the second most pervasive Spanish interest in 
Morocco ever since the 1767 treaty between Spain and Morocco included 
privileged fishing rights for Spanish vessels in Moroccan waters. They have 
indeed often been directly linked to the territorial question: every territorial 
concession made by Spain to Morocco in the last century was accompanied by 
Moroccan concessions in fisheries. The Canarian-Saharan fishing bank, just 
off the Moroccan coast, is one of the richest fishing areas in the Atlantic. 
Hardly exploited by Moroccan, Saharan or Mauritanian fishermen for a long 
time, it became an ideal target for the relatively large Spanish fishing fleet. 
Between 1985 and 1995 catches in the Central-Eastern Atlantic made up 27- 
30% of total Spanish catches (Eurostat 1996).
The importance of fisheries in the Spanish economy is relatively small and 
has been declining steadily since 1975 (Suarez Casado 1997). However, 
fishing in Moroccan waters has been of crucial importance to a high seas fleet
48 Around 10,000 in 1995 down from about 20,000 in 1991, adding up to 7-11% of the whole
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which saw many of its fishing areas closed after the extension of Exclusive 
Economic Zones to 200 miles off their coasts by most Atlantic countries in the 
1970s, and to the traditional small fishing boats of the regions neighbouring 
Morocco, Andalusia and the Canary Islands, and of some ports of Galicia, 
three regions that all suffer from high unemployment rates (Osuna 1997; 
Macias Gonzalez 1997). Indeed, some fishing ports depended almost 
exclusively on the fisheries agreements with Morocco, which made any 
reduction in catches potentially devastating in terms of socio-economic 
impacts in some areas, already quite poor.
In trade terms, for a long time Morocco has been for Spain much more a 
competitor in EC markets than a significant trading partner. Morocco is, like 
Spain, an important producer of certain agricultural products like oranges and 
tomatoes, for which there is a high demand in the EC. Spain did far better in 
the EC even before the accession, and from 1986 increased steadily its exports 
while Morocco saw its own freeze, and even diminish (Bataller Martin and 
Jordan Galduf 1996). Spanish exports to Morocco never reached 1.5% of its 
total exports, even though they have consistently outnumbered imports. Spain 
is an important trading partner for Morocco, but Morocco is still a relatively 
modest market for Spain (see Table 2.1 below). Nonetheless, the trade 
between the two countries has been growing steadily: between 1993 and 2000 
Moroccan exports to Spain grew at an average yearly rate of 18.3%, and 
Spanish exports to Morocco grew an average of 13.1% per year.49
Spanish army (von Hippel 1996).
4 My own calculation from data of the Institute Nacional de Estadistica, INEBase: Comercio 
Exterior in http://www.ine.es.
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Table 2.1 Main buyers of exports from Spain and Morocco (2000)
Spain Morocco
Country Share % Rank Country Share % Rank
France 19.4 1 France 33.5 1
Germany 12.4 2 Spain 13.0 2
Italy 8.8 3 United Kingdom 9.6 3
United Kingdom 8.3 4 Italy 7.1 4
Morocco 1.1 10 Germany 5.0 5
Sources: for Spain: author’s calculations from data included in INE 2003 Comercio Exterior: 
Series Mensuales del Boletin Mensual de Estadistica in http://www.ine.es; for Morocco: 
author’s calculations from Office des Changes 2003 Statistiques du Commerce Exterieur in 
http://www.oc.gov.ma.
As we see, this first set of traditional Spanish interests in Morocco, which 
ranked high on the agenda in the early 1980s, brought about conflictual 
relations with Morocco and tended to define the relations between Moroccan 
interests and Spanish interests as a zero sum game. Accordingly, conflict and 
distrust seem destined to remain characteristic features of the Spanish- 
Moroccan relationship.
Looking for a buffer of common interests
The ‘global approach’ to the Maghreb that started in the early 1980s and was 
consolidated after EC accession re-defined Spanish interests in Morocco in 
very different terms. The new approach to defining Spanish interests in 
Morocco was quite consciously elaborated in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. ‘Spain advocates a politically stable, economically prosperous and 
socially developed Maghreb’ (Moratinos 1991). The keyword as far as 
Morocco was regarded was the buffer (colchon) o f common interest that was 
to be created in order to avoid that any disagreement between the two 
countries ended up in a bilateral crisis. The focus would be on a number of 
Spanish interests that coincide with or complement Moroccan interests.
86
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 2
As a result of its integration in the EC and NATO, Spain has consolidated its 
position in the West European bloc of economically prosperous and politically 
stable states. Military aggression can be quite satisfactorily deterred by 
membership in the most powerful military alliance in the world, but new 
threats to security have been identified. Spain finds itself on the very limit 
between one of the richest areas in the world, Western Europe, and the poorest 
continent on the planet, Africa. The comparison of basic indicators between 
Spain and Morocco illustrates this tension: Spanish per capita income is five 
times bigger than Moroccan, enrolment in primary schools is 20 percent 
higher in Spain, and more than 60 percent higher for secondary schools, and 
the poverty rate is 4 times higher in Morocco (World Bank 2000).
Spain’s per capita GNI is 12.6 times larger than that of Morocco (5.5 if we 
take into account Purchase Power Parity). The tendency over time is not 
reduction of the disparities, but an increase (see Figure 2.1 below). According 
to World Bank data, in 1970 Spain’s per capita GNP was only 4 times that of 
Morocco. That same year Spain had the 13th largest absolute GNP in the 
world, and Morocco the 53rd; in 2000 Spain had climbed to the 10th position 
while Morocco had fallen to the 55th (More 2003). The Moroccan/Spanish 
border therefore represents one of the most acute contrasts in wealth in the 
world (see Table 2.2 below).
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Figure 2.1 Evolution of the income gap between Spain and Morocco 
(1970-2000)
15 i
The vertical axis represents the number o f times that Spain’s per capita income is larger than 
M orocco’s
Source: Inigo More (2003) from World Bank data.
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Table 2.2 World ranking of economic gap between neighbours (2000)
GNI per capita GNI per capita PPP
Border Gap* Border Gap*
Hong Kong China 29,1 Saudi Arabia Yemen 14,8
Norway Russia 20,3 South Africa Mozambique 9,5
Oman Yemen 18,0 Namibia Zambia 8,5
Israel Syria 16,7 Algeria Niger 6,7
Macao China 16,4 Algeria Mali 6,4
Saudi Arabia Yemen 15,7 Hong Kong China 6,1
South Africa Mozambique 13,8 Israel Syria 5,6
Finland Russia 13,7 Spain Morocco 5,5
Spain Morocco 12,6 Israel Egypt 5,1
Israel Palestine 12,4 Argentina Bolivia 4,9
Israel Egypt 10,9 Russia Mongolia 4,8
Algeria Niger 9,6 Swaziland Mozambique 4,7
* Number o f times that the average per capita income is larger in the richest side o f  the 
border compared to the poorest side.
Source: Inigo More (2003) from World Bank data.
Learning from their European neighbours’ experience first and, from the 
1990s, and later as a result o f the increase in immigration to Spain itself, 
Spanish policy-makers became increasingly concerned with the migration of 
Moroccan and other African workers to Spain. Demographic growth and poor 
economic performance south of the Mediterranean made Spain fear an 
increasing flow of migrants from Morocco. A long term settlement of this 
question would only be possible with an increase in prosperity and an 
improvement of economic prospects in Morocco. Thus, the success of 
Moroccan economy is in the interest of Spain. This success might not only 
stop the flow of migrants, but also avoid dangerous social outbreaks like those 
witnessed in Morocco in 1984 and in 1990, reduce the population’s interest in
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participating in irregular activities such as producing and smuggling illegal 
drugs across the Strait of Gibraltar and, still according to the analysis of 
Spanish policy-makers, reduce the likelihood of a rise in violent Islamic 
fundamentalism.
Moroccan prosperity would also favour Spanish economic interests. From the 
second half of the 1980s, Morocco was seen more and more as a potential 
market for the Spanish industry. By the mid-1990s Spain had become the 
second provider of Moroccan imports (8,6% in 1996) and the second buyer of 
its products (9,9% of Moroccan exports went to Spain) (Economia Exterior 
1997). The Moroccan market is geographically close and offers some good 
export opportunities to Spanish manufacturing firms of all dimensions. 
Clothing (35% of Moroccan exports to Spain), basically manufactured for 
Spanish firms in Morocco, and fisheries products (28.5% of Moroccan 
exports) are the main Spanish imports, showing areas of economic 
complementarity. Another such area is phosphates: the Spanish chemical 
industry imports 80% of the phosphates it needs from Morocco.
Morocco also offers investment opportunities to a Spanish economy in 
expansion. Encouraged by favourable government measures and economic 
liberalisation in Morocco, Spanish entrepreneurs started to invest significantly 
more from 1988, reaching a peak in 1992 (Economia Exterior 1997). 
According to Moroccan official sources, in the 1986-2001 period Spain was 
the fifth largest foreign investor in Morocco, with 6.4% of the total investment 
(see Table 2.3 below). Some sectors of Moroccan economy have offered 
interesting investment opportunities to Spanish businesses, including industry, 
banking, fisheries and telecommunications.
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Table 2.3 Total foreign investment and private loans in Morocco from 
1986 to 2001 by country of origin (in Million Dirhams)
Country Investm ent % of total 
investment
France 45,661 39.5
USA 9,151 7.9
Portugal 8,156 7.1
Netherlands 7,668 6.6
Spain 7,429 6.4
United Kingdom 5,705 4.9
Switzerland 4,161 3.6
Germany 3,771 3.3
Sweden 3,691 3.2
Saudi Arabia 2,792 1.8
U.A.E. 2,127 1.8
Italy 1,026 0.9
Other 14,152 12.3
Total 115,490 100.0
Source: Moroccan Office des Changes, author's calculations
The data above show Spain as the 6th largest investor in Morocco. They are 
based on the data of the Moroccan ‘Office des Changes’. Those data have two 
disadvantages: they only record the part of the investments that have gone 
through bank transactions (for example, they ignore the debt of a Moroccan 
firm bought by a foreign company, and which technically is part of the 
investment) and they include private loans and Foreign Direct Investment in 
the same category. To address the second shortcoming we can use UNCTAD 
data, based on ‘Office des Changes’ records but including Foreign Direct 
Investment only, which place Spain in the 5th position for the 1996 -  2002 
period.
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Table 2.4 Foreign Direct Investments flows into Morocco (1996-2002) (in 
Million Dirhams)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total
96-02
France 917 1446 1609 3706 1577 27689 2222 39166
Portugal 640 9 132 5024 827 1405 237 8274
United
States 83 2963 250 1017 350 699 380 5742
Spain 149 479 491 2055 570 954 390 5088
Netherlands 221 252 288 3193 172 199 239 4564
Source: UNCTAD (2004) FDI Profile: Morocco WID Country Profiles Num. 84
However, in the Spanish literature and press there is a unanimous claim that 
Spain is the second investor in Morocco since the mid-1990s, a claim which 
also informs political actions and declarations. According to an internal 
survey by theChamber of Commerce, Trade and Navigation of Barcelona 
(Cambra 2004) Spanish companies invested 2,400 M€ between 1996 and 
2003, and if those actual investment we add the compromises acquired, they 
reach 5,000 M€. The difference between those data and Moroccan sources are 
explained by the differences in the recording system, the temporary gap 
between recording agencies (in particular, between the Moroccan ‘Office des 
Changes’ and the Spanish Ministry of Economy) , the exchange rates applied, 
etc. Moreover, some significant Spanish investments are not recorded for 
several reasons, including political (for example, investors in agriculture and 
fisheries have tried to keep the lowest possible profile) and legal reasons (the 
amount of illegal transactions is significant). Once all this is taken into 
account, Spain can be considered the second largest investor in Morocco.
Another Spanish interest is the construction of important infrastructures 
across the Strait of Gibraltar. The most relevant has been a gas pipeline 
running from the Algerian gas fields in the Sahara across Morocco and the 
Strait to Cordoba (Spain), where it links with the whole Iberian gas 
distribution system. Others include interconnection of the electric grids, and
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the plan for a fixed land link between the Peninsula and North Africa which 
would connect Europe and Africa by a tunnel.
No official account of the Spanish interest in the Maghreb in general or in 
Morocco in particular omits a reference to the socio-cultural interest of Spain 
in the area. This includes the promotion of Spanish language through Spanish 
schools and cultural centres, although the main instrument for spreading 
Spanish in northern Morocco remains Spanish TV. Of greater political 
importance may be the need to overcome the centuries-old negative 
perceptions between the societies on both sides of the Strait. In particular, 
negative stereotypes about Morocco have been detected in the Spanish 
population and elite not only in relation to international politics and security 
threats, but also to the Moroccan immigrants living in Spain (del Campo 
1995; Diez Nicolas 1999). Co-operation to overcome such prejudices, which 
hinder the development of a fruitful relationship, is a common goal of both 
countries.
Morocco, the Maghreb, the Mediterranean
Morocco has ranked high on the Spanish foreign policy agenda ever since the 
1970s. Geographical and historical factors, and the above-stated interests, 
have justified the efforts and attention paid by Spanish diplomacy and 
governments to the southern neighbour. As mentioned before, it is not just a 
coincidence that the first official trips abroad of both Felipe Gonzalez and 
Jose Maria Aznar when they became prime ministers were to Rabat. But what 
place does Morocco exactly occupy in that agenda, and what are the 
competing priority areas?
The first Spanish democratic governments had as their main foreign policy 
objectives the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Communist 
countries, Israel and Mexico and progressive admission to the select club of 
Western European democracies (Aldecoa 1994). However, events in the 
Maghreb and in particular the consequences of the Green March of 1975
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made it clear that Spain could not simply forget about the Arab countries. 
Morocco and the Maghreb in general became uncomfortable items on an 
external agenda that was mainly orientated towards the North.
It was not until Spain had entered the European Community and re-affirmed 
its membership in NATO by means of a referendum that Spanish policy­
makers re-defined the priorities of Spanish foreign policy. By 1989 Spain had 
consolidated its participation in the EC and in European Political Co­
operation with its first presidency and had re-designed its security policy in a 
NATO framework, with new and different defence relations with the USA 
(Ortega 1995:1989). Both adaptations were relatively smooth, helped by the 
absence of any major crisis which would create a conflict between Spain’s 
interest in the Arab world (or Latin America) and the will of the majority of 
EC member states (Barbe 1996). Europe would remain the first concern, but 
Spanish policy makers were paying growing attention to the other two 
‘permanent priorities’(Westendorp 1996) of Spanish foreign policy: Latin 
America and the Arab world.
The first major challenge to that view of Spain’s interest came with the 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the second half of 1989, just after 
the first Spanish presidency. Europe’s attention turned eastwards, and events 
in the centre and east of the continent became the main priority in the 
Twelve’s foreign agenda. The orientation of the EC towards the east 
represented both a threat to and an opportunity for Spain. The events in the 
Mediterranean proved that security was far from consolidated, and the nature 
of the new threats (from economic inequalities to social destabilisation or the 
rise of hostile regimes) was such that they could hardly be tackled without the 
support of the whole EC.
At the same time, the Mediterranean provided an ‘historical opportunity for 
diplomatic expansion and the exercise of a regional leadership.’ (Estevez 
Payeras 2001: 223). The Spanish Mediterranean policy, a more
comprehensive concept which, particularly since the Gulf War, linked 
traditionally bilateral matters to other global concerns from the Persian Gulf to
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Mauritania, was bom as ‘a reaction in face of changes in the European 
scenario’ (Barbe 1992:72). Success in consolidating a friendly relationship 
with Morocco was an unavoidable challenge that had to be faced if Spanish 
leadership (or at least co-leadership) in the Euro-Mediterranean context was to 
consolidate. Important milestones of the Spanish policy in the area like the 
Madrid Conference in 1991, which started the Middle East Peace Process, and 
the Barcelona Conference in 1995, where the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
was launched, would hardly have been compatible with open enmity with the 
most immediate Arab neighbour of Spain.
As the 1990s advanced, the relationship with Morocco became more fluid, 
and Spanish policy makers developed a new view of the country. Despite 
bilateral disagreements and conflicting interest, Morocco was seen as a 
country of political stability in an area of growing Islamic fundamentalist 
threat. Its economy was regarded as a natural target for Spanish exports, 
investments and industrial expansion. The clearest expression of the new 
importance of Morocco for Spanish foreign policy was the signature in 1991 
of the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation. 
With the signature of that treaty the relationship with Morocco was elevated 
to the highest level attained by a non-EC country. The treaty provided for 
yearly summits and a continuous political dialogue to complement the 
growing economic links. Its signature confirmed the relationship with the 
southern neighbour as a key area of Spanish foreign policy.
It is however important to note that the signature of the Treaty was decided in 
December 1990, during a visit by Felipe Gonzalez to Rabat, in the middle of 
the worst crisis between Morocco and its main partner, France, since 1956.50 
Morocco has traditionally privileged the bilateral relationship with France -  a 
relationship that remains its most valued bilateral link. But it has opened two 
other bilateral tiers, which it has played in order to compensate for its 
dependency on Paris. One tier is the transatlantic link: Morocco has actively
50 The crisis was caused by a growing criticism in France o f the situation o f non-respect for 
human rights in Morocco, and aggravated by some incidents like the publication o f Notre ami
95
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 2
sought to reinforce its alliance with the United States. The other one is the 
south European tier. In it Spain occupies the most important position but, 
given the problematic nature of its relations with Morocco, Portugal and Italy 
have also played a growing role as easier partners. Portugal has played on a 
smaller scale a similar role in relation to Spain that Spain plays in relation to 
France: when relations have become difficult, Rabat has turned to a smaller, 
but friendlier, partner (Spain instead of France in 1990-1992, Portugal instead 
of Spain after 1993) (El Houdai'gui 2003: 124-125).
Spanish objectives in Morocco coincide by and large with those of its three 
allies, France, the USA and Portugal. However, in some cases a zero sum 
game is in place, and the Moroccan regime has made it clear that Spanish 
governments should not take the influence of their country in Morocco for 
granted. In economic terms Spain is behind France both in trade and 
investment and the United States and Portugal are also important investors, 
playing a growing role in the Moroccan economy.
2.4 Conclusions
As we have seen in this chapter, Morocco has been and remains a crucial 
bilateral partner for Spain. The legacy of history overshadows the relationship 
with some difficult issues, such as the Western Sahara conflict or the 
territorial claims. Geographical proximity and historical and cultural links 
have been less significant than the negative heritage of centuries of either 
mutual ignorance or conflict, followed by the whole colonial and post-colonial 
experience. Since the fall of the last Arab kingdom on the Peninsula in the 
15th century, relationships between the two sides of the Strait have mostly 
been characterised by conflict, suspicion and tensions. It is important to bear 
in mind that heritage when we analyse contemporary Spanish-Moroccan 
relationships, and when we consider the options open to Spanish policy 
makers in relation to Morocco.
le Roi by Gilles Perrault, very critical o f King Hassan n , and some pro-Sahrawi gestures by 
Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the then President of the Republic.
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Ever since Moroccan independence in 1956 Spanish-Moroccan relations have 
been better understood in a bilateral and, to a certain extent, regional context, 
than in a global one. This is particularly true as far as the Cold War is 
concerned. The bipolar dynamics of world politics could hardly explain most 
of the developments of Spanish-Moroccan relations in the 1970s and the 
1980s. Regional factors have been more influential. This thesis focuses on the 
EC/EU and its effects on Spanish policy, but this is not the only context which 
we need to consider. Morocco-EC relations date back to the very start of the 
Community itself, and have generated an acquis that has to be taken into 
account. Also, the very role of the EC in the Mediterranean has been evolving, 
with the progressive consolidation of a Euro-Mediterranean space which 
frames the Spanish-Moroccan relationship. A second regional dimension to be 
taken into account is the Arab world at large and more concretely the 
Maghreb. Both are crucial to Spanish foreign policy, and the policy towards 
Morocco is certainly influenced by events in that context.
The historical background and the global and regional context constitute the 
framework of Spanish policy towards Morocco. But its substance is mainly 
determined by Spanish interests in Morocco. Traditionally Spanish interests in 
Morocco were defined in a way that was likely to put them in confrontation 
with Morocco’s stated foreign policy objectives. Thus, territorial matters, 
fisheries rights or bitter trade competition for the EC markets would often lead 
to bilateral disagreements. From the 1980s Spanish interests in Morocco were 
re-defined in order to find a buffer of joint interest with the southern 
neighbour. New opportunities for co-operation were found in fields like 
security, investment, development co-operation or infrastructures.
The numerous and crucial Spanish interests in Morocco explain why relations 
with Morocco have been accorded a high priority, one of the most intensive 
and certainly the most conflictual of all Spanish bilateral relations. The 
success in maintaining good relations with the southern neighbour is not only 
a condition for securing Spain’s interests in that country, but also for allowing 
it to play an important role in the Euro-Mediterranean context and to develop
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a credible policy towards the Maghreb, the Arab World and the 
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean being one of the three main spheres of 
Spain’s international influence, its successes or failures in the area will 
condition its capacity to play a prominent role in world affairs.
Spanish policy towards Morocco has a very important historical dimension. It 
is, moreover, heavily loaded with particular interests. It is subject to specific 
bilateral dynamics consolidated over years of intensive interaction. In that 
context we may wonder whether or not the EC/EU has mattered in the making 
of this policy at all, as opposed to just being a simple part of the external 
environment. We will also need to see which initiatives have been undertaken 
because of domestic Spanish motivations, which were bom in the bilateral 
dynamics, and which were a response to regional trends. The following 
chapters will address these questions in detail.
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Chapter 3: Fisheries (Dis)Agreements
The area where the Atlantic Ocean meets North Africa contains some of the 
richest fishing banks in the world. Those waters were exploited for centuries 
by Spanish fishermen; when Morocco became independent the exercise of its 
sovereignty over part of those waters started one of the most controversial 
issues between the two countries. Between 1956 and 2001 the Spanish- 
Moroccan bilateral agenda accorded a prominent place to the extremely 
sensitive and conflictual issue of fisheries, namely the possibility for Spanish 
fishermen to operate in Moroccan waters. In those 45 years two events have 
had a formidable impact on the issue: the first was the Moroccan occupation 
of Western Sahara (and its fishing grounds) in 1975; the second was the 
accession of Spain to the EC. This second impact is the subject of this chapter.
The main topic dealt with in this chapter is the negotiation of agreements 
between the EC and Morocco by virtue of which the EC fleet could work in 
Moroccan waters under certain conditions in exchange for a direct financial 
compensation to Morocco. There were four main rounds of negotiations 
leading to agreements in 1988, 1992 and 1995, and to a break up of talks and 
the restructuring of the mainly Spanish fleet that worked in Moroccan waters 
in 2001. Those rounds of negotiations serve as an illustration of the results of 
Europeanisation on Spanish relations with Morocco in a very sensitive area, 
which ranked high in the regional politics in Galicia, Andalusia and the 
Canary Islands and also at the national level.
3.1 The Common Fisheries Policy and Spanish 
interests
Fisheries policy is one of the most closely integrated policies in the European 
Community. Spanish accession to the EC in 1986 completely transformed the 
normative environment and decision-making climate in Spain. Fisheries, 
including the negotiation of international fishing agreements, are an exclusive 
competence of the EC. Negotiations with Morocco in that field have been
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conducted by the European Commission under a mandate from the Council. 
This does not mean that the political debate and all relevant decisions were 
taken in Brussels. A complex decision-making process involving regional, 
national and European-wide actors, both public and private, has developed, a 
system in which policy-making takes place in different locations (Lequesne 
2001). The interaction between an external factor (Morocco) and the different 
locations where decisions are taken compounds a complex net of 
relationships.
The Common Fisheries Policy
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was bom in 1970 as the EC dealt with 
the British, Danish, Irish and Norwegian applications, and was fully 
developed by 1983 with four areas of operation: structures, markets, 
conservation and international fisheries relations (Holden 1994). The EC 
Treaty provided for an exclusive Community competence over the external 
dimension of the policies included in the treaties (such as fisheries), in fields 
like the signature of international agreements and relations with third 
countries or international organisations.51 This competence was developed by 
a Council resolution on 3 November 1976 authorising the Commission to 
negotiate fisheries agreements with third countries.
The accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 had a major impact on the 
Common Fisheries Policy. On the one hand, the number of fishermen in the 
EC practically doubled, fleet tonnage increased by 65 per cent and production 
by 45 per cent, putting an additional stress on structural policy. On the other 
hand, the Iberian states had a tradition of fishing in distant waters. This caused 
anxiety in other member states, which resulted in long transition periods 
before free access to all EC waters was granted, and forced the European 
Commission to become a lot more involved in agreements with third 
countries, almost as an issue of compensation for the newcomers’ reduced 
access to European waters (Lequesne 2000).
51 Articles 228 to 231 of the EC Treaty. For a detailed study the legal base o f the EC activity 
in the field of international fisheries agreements see Carrera Hernandez 1995.
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A first important feature of CFP is its growing technical complexity. The 
markets policy, with detailed and complex regulations similar to those used in 
the Common Agriculture Policy, is one of the sources of complexity. To this 
should be added the sophisticated scientific arguments involved in the 
conservation policy. Finally, the structural policy with its efforts to find ways 
first to increase, and later to reduce fishing capacity adds more technical 
nuances. This complexity has also penetrated the area of international 
agreements, making it relatively inaccessible to non-specialists. As a result 
fisheries administrations at both EC and national levels can claim an 
irreplaceable expertise in order to avoid interference from other parts of the 
administration.
A second remarkable characteristic is the fact that different aspects of CFP 
have objectives which contradict one another. For instance, conservation 
policy can go against objectives like the reduction of the deficit in supplies of 
most species of fish or the preservation of jobs. Lately, as has happened with 
the Common Agricultural Policy, some voices claim that this lack of 
coherence is even more acute when CFP outcomes are compared with the 
objectives of some other EC policies, such as development co-operation. 
However, this point only started to be acknowledged by CFP policy makers 
(Commission, some member states’ fisheries administrations) from the late 
1990s. At the same time, the geographical concentration of fishing activities 
in certain areas has given the policy a strong regional development 
perspective.
A third aspect of CFP to be taken into account is the high politicisation of 
CFP, particularly in relation to its relatively low significance, both in terms of 
participation in GNP and of overall employment. Fragmentation of the sector 
both amongst and within member states has prevented the creation of a strong 
European lobby and fishermen and ship owners have often opted for intensive 
pressure at national levels to ensure their government’s support as opposed to 
lobbying the Commission jointly (Nielsen 1994; Lequesne 2000). The fishing 
sector views the European Commission officials in charge of the CFP with 
deep suspicion, as unelected bureaucrats who need to be kept in check by
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national governments, whereas the Community Officials ‘see themselves as 
the guardians of expertise to the face of governments which are under 
clientelist pressure from fishermen’ (Holden 1994: 1; Nielsen 1994: 38-40; 
Lequesne 2000: 354).
A last relevant general characteristic is the fact that the CFP has generated 
some perverse effects that burden its future steps heavily. One of them is the 
growth of the EC fleet caused by the adoption in the 1970s of a structural 
policy which encouraged the construction and modernisation of vessels 
(Holden 1994). More efficient fishing techniques allowed for a growth in 
catches that led to disastrous over-fishing, and the collapse of some of the 
stocks. Another perverse effect is the practice of using structural funds to 
placate the fisheries sector every time a significant reform takes place, so that 
fishermen demand financial compensations for any kind of reform (Lequesne 
2000).
In the context of CFP Spain has a particular role. It is by far the member state 
which has most people directly employed in the sector, it has one of the 
largest fishing capacities in the EU and it accounts for 29 per cent of the 
tonnage of the EU fleet (European Commission 2001: 69). Its long tradition of 
fishing in distant waters and the poor records of compliance with agreements 
by its fleet have gained a bad reputation for Spanish fishermen both within 
and outside the EU. This explains, for instance, the restrictive transition 
period to which it was subject after accession up until 1996. To this should be 
added the failure to reduce fishing capacity, since the Spanish fisheries 
sector has often opted instead for modernisation of vessels and expansive 
policies in new areas (Garza Gil, Iglesias Malvido et al. 1996).
52 The number of boats and the total tonnage were reduced considerably since accession, but 
the actual fishing capacity grew due to the effects o f largely EC funded 
modemisation.(Maliniak 2001)
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Brussels as a location of policy-making
Chapter 3
The main arena where decisions for negotiations with third countries are taken 
at the European level is the EU Council, which amongst other crucial 
functions issues the negotiation mandates to the Commission, approves its 
modifications and ratifies the final outcome. Those acts, which are the 
responsibility of the Council, are first drafted by the Commission, which 
engages in a process of internal and external consultations until it presents a 
proposal that has to be endorsed by the Commissioners and sent to the 
Council.
In the Council the text is examined by the external fisheries policy working 
party and sent to COREPER. The resulting proposal is then sent for 
consultation to the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions. At the end of the procedure, the text is 
discussed by the Council of Fisheries Ministers who will either adopt or reject 
it after a qualified majority vote. In some cases, such as the conclusion of 
agreements having important financial implications or EC accession to 
international fisheries conventions, the Parliament’s assent is needed.
In the case of negotiations with Morocco, despite some attempts to get other 
member states interested in fishing in those waters by reserving some quota to 
them in the first EC/Morocco agreement, only two countries ever showed a 
strong interest: Spain and Portugal. Even then, for Portugal fishing in 
Moroccan waters was always of secondary importance, amounting to less 
than five per cent of total Portuguese catch. In principle, therefore, negotiating 
in Brussels was considered difficult by Spanish officials, finding themselves 
facing 11 (and later 14) other countries, mostly with no interest in the 
agreement with Morocco.
53 Portuguese fishing in Morocco was very specific: after the 1995 agreement around 90% of 
the catch was one species only, the Silver Scabbard Fish, that the Moroccan fleet was not 
capturing. Only two ports, Sesimbra and Fuseta, accounted for almost all the activity in 
Moroccan waters.
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However, as often happens within the EU system, countries would have 
interests in other areas of the CFP, be it other bilateral agreements or the 
structural, markets or conservation policies. Very few would want to directly 
antagonise Spain over an issue where they did not have much to win or lose. It 
would not be accurate to say that no member country had any objection to the 
way in which the EC negotiated with Morocco. For example, once the 1995 
EC-Morocco agreement expired in 1999 some member countries, aware of the 
Spanish fleet’s failure to find new alternatives, started perceiving the 
agreement with Morocco as a hidden form of structural aid; others, including 
Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom, were more and more critical of 
fisheries agreements which contributed to the depletion of the resources of 
developing countries instead of helping them to exploit those resources for 
their own profit. However, none of them used those arguments in the talks 
about the negotiation mandate with Morocco: Spain could talk about 
unemployment and regional crisis, arguments to which the EC tends to be 
quite sensitive, and attached a high political weight to the negotiation.54 
Moreover, some member states were very interested in the expensive and far 
less profitable agreements with North Atlantic countries and territories (like 
Greenland), and did not want those called into question.
The European Commission represents the Community in the international 
scene in fisheries matters; it is responsible for the negotiation of fisheries 
agreements with third countries as well as taking part in international fisheries 
organisations on behalf of the Community. It is, moreover, an important actor 
in the CFP in general due to its high level of expertise. For all those reasons in 
the negotiations with Morocco the Commission remained at the centre of the 
process, as the one directly in charge of negotiations. All the actors involved 
tried to gain direct access to it. By far the strongest interaction was with the 
Spanish central government, which at the end of the day was the one which 
largely determined the extent of concessions during negotiations (Jones 
2000:144).
54 By contrast some of those arguments that had been silenced in the Morocco negotiations 
appeared in other cases, most notably in the negotiation of the agreement with Mauritania in 
2001 .
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Caught between the tough Moroccan positions and the intransigence of 
Spanish government, the Commission was criticised by Spanish officials for 
not only not defending Spanish interests as its own, but even trying to mediate 
between Spain and Morocco (Jones 2000:148). Within the Commission, the 
commissioners responsible for fisheries have been directly involved in the 
negotiations of the agreements, not only the officials of the DG responsible 
for fisheries (DG XTV and later on DG Fisheries), particularly as those 
negotiations became more and more politicised. Thus Commissioners Manuel 
Marin, Emma Bonino and Franz Fischler became the EC points of reference 
for the negotiations.
Other actors have also tried to lobby the Commission directly, in particular the 
regional governments of the affected areas and the representatives of the 
associated ship owners and fishermen. This was particularly true in the 
negotiations in 1995 and 2000-2001, when regional governments were most 
active and have at times helped the rather divided representatives of the 
fishing industry (ship owners, fishermen local associations, trade union 
officials) to co-ordinate their positions and access the Commission. 
Sometimes this was seen by regional governments as even more efficient than 
lobbying the Spanish central government (Jones 2000: 167).
The European Parliament is not a central actor in the CFP, and it never had a 
crucial role in the negotiations with Morocco, but it actively monitors the 
negotiations and defends the ‘interests of the sector* through its consultations 
and, crucially, the eventual ratification of the agreements. In accordance with 
articles 37 and 300 of the EC Treaty, the Parliament’s assent is needed to 
conclude or amend agreements having important financial implications, such 
as the ones with Morocco. Spanish MEPs have been particularly active in the 
fisheries sub-committee, which in 1994 became a full committee under the 
presidencies of Miguel Arias Canete (who had become Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries by the time of the 2000 negotiations), Carmen Fraga 
Estevez (the daughter of the president of Galicia and later Secretary General 
for Maritime Fisheries in Madrid) and Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, all
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three of them members of the Spanish Popular Party. MEPs have been a target 
of lobbying activities, and the best organised interest groups (like the Galician 
ship owners) have been quite successful in getting support for their positions 
from the Parliament (Jones 2000: 160; Lequesne 2000: 355). The Parliament 
has defended the importance of the agreements for the EU fleet, using quite 
strong terms towards Moroccan positions in line with the Spanish official 
discourse.
The national arena in Spain
The central actor in the process of establishing the Spanish position in 
fisheries negotiations was by far the central government. Two other groups of 
actors were however also relevant: the regional governments of Andalusia 
(Junta de Andaluda), Galicia (Xunta de Galicia) and the Canary Islands 
(Gobiemo de Canarias) and the representatives of the Spanish fishing 
industry operating in Moroccan and Western Saharan waters. Moreover, given 
the high media profile of the negotiations and the degree of politicisation of 
the issue, the media, the parliament and the political parties also intervened in 
shaping the Spanish fisheries policy with Morocco.
Despite the fact that the day to day management of maritime fisheries is less 
and less in the hands of the Spanish central government due to the double 
effect of Europeanisation and decentralisation, Spanish central governments 
and the central administration remained key actors in the negotiations with 
Morocco. It was the central government that defined and defended the 
Spanish position at the Council, followed the negotiations, pressured for 
linkages with other policies to be adopted in order to get a better deal in the 
fisheries dossier, maintained permanent contacts with the Commission and, 
implicitly made the concessions and marked the boundaries of what was and 
what was not acceptable during the negotiations. It had in its hand the 
possibility to establish some tacit compensatory measures to attract Moroccan 
goodwill and the ability to hint at negative bilateral repercussions for tough 
Moroccan stances.
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The way in which fisheries negotiations with Morocco were conducted (or 
rather, since 1986, prepared and followed) within the Spanish government 
changed over time, and Europeanisation is one of the main explanations. 
International fisheries agreements, and in particular those negotiated with 
Morocco, were largely considered in the late 1970s and the 1980s as a matter 
of bilateral foreign relations, a responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. It was the Minister of Foreign Affairs that defended the 1977 
agreement in the Parliament, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs again who 
signed the 1983 agreement in Rabat, after negotiations which had mainly been 
conducted by the Spanish ambassador in Morocco, and who again defended it 
before of the Parliament (El Pais, 1 July 1983; DSCD 1978; DSCD 1983). 
After accession the focus has been on the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food. Successive heads from that ministry have responded to Parliament, 
negotiated with the sector and in general been held responsible for Spanish 
positions in the Spanish political arena.
The question of fisheries agreements has been treated since accession to the 
EC more and more as a policy on its own, relatively detached from the rest of 
relations with Morocco in terms of policy-making, despite the obvious 
linkages with foreign policy overall. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
become less directly involved, although it has followed every negotiation in 
detail. The administrative unit responsible for maritime fisheries within the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Secretaria General de Pesca Maritima (SGPM), 
plays a crucial role at the centre of the issue network of actors that has 
emerged in each negotiation linking public with private, and regional with 
national and European players.
As is the case with the fisheries administrations of other member states and of 
many Spanish regions, many officials from SGPM have direct links with the 
fisheries industry, and all of them keep a very close contact with the 
representatives of the fishing organisations. Despite the presence of diplomats 
in the SGPM, it is not characterised by having a global vision of international 
issues, and its officials pride themselves rather on having a very detailed
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knowledge of the interests of the fishing industry. Commission negotiators 
meet regularly with officials from the SGPM, who therefore have the 
representation of the ‘Spanish position* in international fisheries negotiations.
The process of decentralisation, which in Spain often ran in parallel with that 
of Europeanisation for a number of policies, meant that most of the day to day 
fisheries management is now in the hand of the regional governments (Garza 
Gil, Iglesias Malvido et al. 1996: 254). This places them in permanent contact 
with the fishing sector and their concerns. The Galician administration and 
some Galician politicians have strong links to the sector, on which some 
coastal areas are extremely dependent, and have been actively lobbying the 
European and well as the central Spanish authorities in the negotiations for 
international fisheries agreements, including of course those with Morocco 
(Lequesne 2000: 352). The authorities of Andalusia were slower to organise 
their lobbying activities, but in the negotiations for the 1995 agreement and 
the failed 2000-2001 negotiations they took a very active role in following the 
negotiations and identifying opportunities for lobbying. The Spanish central 
government never allowed the regional authorities to become directly 
involved in the negotiations, although they were associated with the 
consultations (Jones 2000: 162-164).
If initially the Canary Islands representatives were the most critical of the 
government’s stance in the negotiations for an agreement with Morocco, the 
Galician authorities were very outspoken in the 1992 and 1995 agreement 
negotiations, and the Junta de Andalucia was particularly critical in 2000- 
2001. One reason for that is the unequal impact that the successive agreements 
had on the regions: the failure of the last negotiations, for instance, hit the 
Andalusian fishermen particularly hard, since they were the least able to find 
any viable alternative to fishing in Moroccan waters. Another part of the 
explanation is the political affiliations: in the early 1990s, the Socialist central 
government had greater difficulties with Partido Popular-govemed Galicia, 
and the contrary was true for the Aznar government facing the socialist 
government in Andalusia in 2000-2001.
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The question of partisan affiliation is important beyond the regional 
dimension: the negotiations of fisheries agreements with Morocco have 
always had a high profile in Spanish press and parliamentary debates. In this 
context, the fisheries interest groups are able to get their message accross as 
criticism of a supposedly weak position from the government in the press, and 
in the national and regional parliaments. Their claims are reproduced by the 
Spanish media in a largely uncritical manner, and the mobilisation of 
fishermen gets wide coverage in the country. In this context blaming 
Morocco, and even sometimes blaming ‘Brussels’ have been common, and 
very few voices in Spain have advocated arguments in favour of generosity 
with Morocco or concerns about the depletion of the stocks.
Finally the fisheries associations in Spain had an important role in the 
negotiations with Morocco. These associations include three types of actors: i) 
the fishermen guilds, united in provincial and regional associations and a sole 
national federation (the Federation National de Cofradias de Pescadores), 
represent mainly the interest of coastal fishing of a traditional sort; ii) the ship 
owners, organised in specialised and/or local associations organised in three 
large federations (Federation National de Armadores de Buques de Pesca- 
FNABP, Federation Espanola de Organizaciones Pesqueras- FEOPE, 
Organization National de Asociaciones Pesqueras-ONAPE): some of the 
associations have more resources and better political contacts than the 
federations themselves, and all of them represent the interest of the industrial 
high seas fleet; and iii) the trade unions, which are relatively weak and largely 
confined to the industrial fleet. Fishermen guilds and trade unions have been 
efficient at organising protests and boycotts, including the blockade of ports to 
Moroccan products, which have put pressure on Spanish governments in times 
of negotiations. The ship owners associations have established privileged 
links with the decision-making centres (SGPM, regional administrations, 
European Parliament) in order to promote their interest.
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3.2 Fishing in Moroccan Grounds 
Fisheries negotiations before accession
The rich fishing grounds off North West Africa had been continuously 
exploited by Spanish fishermen, especially from Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands, since the late Middle Ages. In some areas fishing and the 
transformation of its produce became the only viable economic activity for a 
large part of the population. Thus, the question of fishing rights for Spanish 
vessels arose as soon as Morocco became independent in 1956. The history of 
the first years was one of Morocco progressively extending its territorial 
waters in accordance with the general trend in international law, and Spain not 
recognising the successive extensions. At the same time, Spain modernised its 
fleet and increased considerably the pressure on fishing grounds with the 
creation of a modem refrigerator fleet and the growing captures of some 
species, particularly cephalopod (squid, octopus and cuttlefish). With 
expanding internal demand and. a progressive exhaustion of resources 
elsewhere, the Spanish fishing fleet became more and more interested in the 
Atlantic waters off North Africa.
For Morocco, in the words of its current king, ‘the signature of agreements 
with Spain has often been linked to the settlement of conflicts related to the 
achievement of territorial integrity’ (Alaoui 1994: 70). In 1969 the Spanish 
withdrawal from Ifni created the conditions for a deal, which was known as 
the Fez agreement. This agreement granted access to the nationals of both 
parts to the other’s jurisdictional waters under certain conditions affecting 
ships, their ownership, the crews and the fishing methods. The agreement 
should have lasted for ten years, but it was terminated by mutual agreement 
by the end of 1972.
The opportunity for a new agreement came when the agreement ratifying the 
Spanish acquiescence to the Moroccan and Mauritanian annexation of
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Western Sahara was signed in Madrid in 1975.55 In a protocol to the 
agreement, generous conditions were granted to the Spanish fleet in terms of 
access to Moroccan, Western Saharan and Mauritanian waters. The protocol 
gave access to the Western Saharan waters to 800 ships, for free in the first 
five years and on a paying basis for another fifteen years, and to the Moroccan 
waters to another 800 boats (of which 600 in the Atlantic) for fifteen years, 
after paying a fee (DSCD 1978: 489-499).
The generous deal, signed under very special circumstances, would not be 
upheld by Rabat for very long. It had been signed, like the Fez agreement, as a 
compensation for a Spanish territorial concession, and as soon as the new 
situation was consolidated, Morocco started exerting pressure for a better 
deal. Negotiations were re-opened with the first Spanish democratic 
government and an agreement was finally reached in 1977. The 1977 
agreement signals a new phase in fisheries negotiations. Morocco showed for 
the first time a genuine interest in developing its own fishing industry and 
exploiting its own resources. Even though other objectives were also taken 
into account by Moroccan negotiators (the recognition of Moroccan 
jurisdiction over Western Saharan waters or the transit of Moroccan citrus 
fruit through Spanish territory), the Moroccans did not treat fishing rights as a 
bargaining tool that was only interesting for Spain, but as a resource of 
potential importance for Morocco itself.
Despite severe criticism from the Opposition and heated debates in the Cortes, 
both because of the fishing conditions and because of the risk of an implicit 
recognition of Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara,56 the Spanish 
government managed to obtain the ratification of the agreement in February 
1978 (DSCD 1978). This was not the case in Morocco, where the agreement 
was not ratified. Thus, instability remained the rule. Successive temporary
cn
fishing deals were costly to Spain and did not stop the average of 120 to 140
55 See Chapter Two, section 2.1.
56 The agreement used the formula ‘Waters South of Cape Nun', as a euphemism for Western 
Saharan waters -which start only a few kilometres south o f Cape Nun (BOCG 1978). See also 
Chapter Six, section 6.1.
57 In 37 months Morocco received under the terms o f temporary deals 10 times the sum it 
would have got had the agreement been ratified.(Gillespie 2000: 191)
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arrests per year (DSCD 1983: 4156).58 The Polisario Front retaliated against 
the Spanish ratification of the Treaty with attacks against Spanish boats 
fishing off West Saharan coasts, often taking hostages. In the worst incident, 
in November 1978, seven Spanish fishermen were killed. Taking hostages as 
a measure to pressure the Spanish government yielded some fruit, like the 
sending of a party representative to a Polisario conference or the meeting of 
Prime Minister Suarez with the Polisario leader during his visit to Algiers in 
spring 1980. Morocco, in turn, retaliated with the establishment of an 
Exclusive Economic Zone o f200 miles in 1981.59
The situation only started to improve when a new centre-right government 
under Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo took power in Spain and announced a new 
approach to relations with Morocco, which was to become Spain’s privileged 
partner. Under that government negotiations for a fisheries agreement 
advanced quickly but the fruits would only come with a new, Socialist 
administration in power. The negotiations ended with the signature on 19 
August 1983 in Rabat of a Co-operation Agreement about Marine Fisheries 
with the Kingdom of Morocco.60 The agreement was the first one to be signed 
and ratified by both countries since 1969, and the first one to last for the 
whole period foreseen. The agreement was similar to the one reached in 1977: 
it provided for Spanish access to Moroccan and Western Saharan waters on 
payment of a fee by both the ship owners and the Spanish government, and for 
Spanish co-operation and assistance in developing the Moroccan fishing 
sector.
The 1983 agreement kept the distinction between waters North and South of 
Cape Nun, as euphemism for Moroccan and Western Saharan waters 
(Annexes I and II). The 1983 agreement did not include the measures to 
‘Moroccanise’ the Spanish fleet like that signed in 1977, but it included in
58 Captures of Spanish vessels were the result of illegal practices by Spanish fishermen, and 
by no means uncommon: in 1982 Spanish vessels were captured by Morocco (112), France 
(22), Portugal (20), USA, Ireland, United Kingdom, Algeria and Congo- Brazzaville. 
However, both captures and liberations tended to coincide with political events in the 
Moroccan case (Ballesteros 1998: 258).
59 If this move was in accordance with a general trend amongst coastal countries, it is 
significant that it happened just after the signature o f a joint communique between Spain and 
the Polisario front which implied tacit governmental recognition (Gillespie 2000: 48).
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exchange very large financial compensation (arts. 7, 9 and 10 and Annex HI). 
It was signed for four years, with a 10% yearly reduction of the maximum 
catch (Annex I), and provided for a revision of the terms in case Spain entered 
the EC before the agreement expired (art. 16). It started a period of relatively 
calm relations between Spain and Morocco, particularly in fisheries terms, 
and the only main trouble in the pre-accession period was an attack in 1985 by 
the Polisario front on a fishing boat, the Junquito, and on the Spanish patrol 
boat that went to its aid. It also allowed for an expansion of the Moroccan 
fishing sector.61
Accession to the EC and the first EC/Morocco agreements
Spanish accession to the EC completely changed the context of Spanish- 
Moroccan fisheries negotiations. Whereas both Spain and Portugal had 
bilateral fisheries agreements with Morocco, the EC had none. Article 167 of 
the Spanish and Portuguese Accession Act provided for the management of 
the agreements between Spain and third countries to be reserved to the 
Community, respecting the terms of the agreements until a new agreement,
f/ythis time signed by the EC, could be achieved. In practice, during the 
transition period that management consisted simply of the presence of an EC 
representative in the joint follow-up committee (Juste Ruiz 1988). Other 
member states, which had ensured extremely tough conditions of access to 
their waters to Iberian fleets, mostly saw the signature of an agreement with 
Morocco as a question of fairness, and also as a good way to reduce pressure 
on Community waters.
The negotiations had a difficult start: the 1983 agreement was due to expire on 
31 December 1987 and, no agreement having been reached by the deadline, 
Morocco declared a ‘fishing out’: all EC vessels (711 Spanish and 25
60 Boletin Oficial del Estado. Num. 243, 11 October 1983.
61 Morocco's total fish catch increased by 75 per cent between 1980 and 1988 to 550,000 
tonnes. Over the same period,the value of exports multiplied eightfold to 260 MUSS
(Financial Times.l March 1990).
62 A similar provision existed for Portugal in article 354 of the same Act. Morocco agreed 
with the EC to maintain the same regime for 1987, when a new Agreement would be 
negotiated (Official Journal o f the EC L 232 , 19 August 1987)
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Portuguese vessels) fishing in Moroccan waters would have to remain in port 
until a new agreement was reached (El Pais, 2 January 1988). The Canary 
Islands and Andalusia were severely hit, and the European Commission 
announced 3 MECU compensation for one month, taking into consideration 
the economic and social circumstances of the fishermen affected, despite the 
fear amongst Commission officials and some member countries that a high 
level of payments would provide Spain with an incentive to maintain its tough 
stand (Financial Times, 15 January 1988). This created an important 
precedent for future EC-Morocco negotiations, and indeed, as we will see, it is 
one of the reasons why the effect of EC membership was at times a hardening 
of Spanish negotiating positions, at the expense of the bilateral relationship 
with Morocco.
During January and February 1988 the negotiations came under increased 
tension as Spanish fishermen started acting in the Southern port of AJgeciras, 
the main entry for Moroccan products to the EC, first against fishing products 
and eventually against the whole sea traffic for 24 hours. Those actions were 
to become familiar in future negotiations. Fishermen were not the only ones to 
put pressure on Madrid’s government: the main opposition party, AJianza 
Popular, and the press, were very critical of the failure to reach a satisfactory 
agreement.
As a result of the growing internal pressure, Spanish officials and politicians 
also put pressure on the European Commission to be as tough as possible with 
Morocco in order to obtain a deal that would favour Spanish interests, using 
all available instruments including trade concessions, loans and financial 
transfers (El Pais, 14 January 1988). This was resented amongst EC officials 
and caused considerable friction between Madrid and Brussels (Financial 
Times, 15 January 1988).
Agreement came in late February as the result of four factors. First, the 
pressure caused by the exclusion from Moroccan waters of the Spanish fleet 
made the Spanish government more inclined to lower its demands. Second, 
the EC made substantial concessions in terms of reduction of catch, 
particularly cephalopod (the most lucrative species), better market access for
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Moroccan canned sardines (at the expense of the southern EC countries, 
particularly Portugal) and financial compensation to Morocco. Third, the 
negotiation was developed in a global context that linked concessions with 
other EC-Morocco agreements which were crucial for the North African 
country: one financial and two commercial protocols to the 1976 Morocco-EC 
Co-operation Agreement, which compensated the North African country for
£  *5
Iberian enlargement. And fourth, Spam made bilateral concessions to 
Morocco: the application of the EC/Morocco trade protocol to Ceuta and 
Melilla (despite the fact that these cities were not a part of the customs union), 
the promise of a new Co-operation Agreement and the compromise to allow 
the transit of Moroccan products through Spanish soil without restrictions.64
The EC - Kingdom of Morocco Fisheries Agreement65 was signed on 25 
February 1988, and it was to last for four years. It did not limit the number of 
ships, but the total gross register of all the EC boats fishing in Moroccan 
waters: 97,400 Tons. This was about 20% more than the 1983 bilateral 
agreement, but it included boats from all other EC member states. The main 
losses for the Spanish fleet came from the 20% reduction by the end of the 
period in cephalopod catch, the possibility for Morocco to change by 5% the 
quantities according to the size of fishing stocks and the needs of its own 
industry, and the fishing pauses of one month per year to allow the stocks to 
regenerate. Spain could only maintain the size of its fleet as long as it did not 
interfere with the development of a Moroccan fishing industry. The EC would 
have to pay about Ecu 70 million to develop the Moroccan fishing fleet, 
services and port equipment and joint ventures.
Politically, the agreement had two important implications. On the one hand, it 
constituted a far more ambitious fisheries agreement than any that had been
63 The linkage between these elements of the package deal is clearly shown by the fact that 
the European Parliament considered them at the same session as the fisheries agreement, 
approving the protocols and giving its positive opinion on the agreement (Juste Ruiz 1988: 
747). The Development and Cooperation Committee defined the agreement as a ‘political 
fisheries agreement’ (European Parliament -Ecos o f the Session, 13-17 June 1988).
64 The transit was a juridical obligation for Spain, but it was used as a means of putting 
pressure on Morocco and also with protectionist goals, particularly in some agricultural 
products like citrus fruit. {El Pais, 26 February 1988). The final agreement (Boletin Oficial 
del Estado num. 92, 16 April 1988) was signed in Rabat on 31 March 1988, only a month 
after die new fisheries agreement entered into force.
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signed before. It was clearly linked to the global context of EC-Morocco 
relations and signalled a tendency towards closer association not only in 
fisheries but also in other fields. Implicitly, this compensated for the cold 
reception of the Moroccan application for membership in 1987 and showed 
the growing interest by the EC in improving its relations with North Africa.
On the other hand, the agreement implicitly recognised Moroccan rule over 
Western Saharan waters, which were included in the agreement. The 
expression used in article one was ‘waters under the sovereignty or 
jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco’, which is quite ambiguous. 
However, a clearer indication is to be found in Protocol number one. 
Although the North/ South division of fishing areas is established in parallel 
30° 40’N, quite distant (about 300 km.) from the Morocco - Western Sahara 
border, all fishing activities in the Southern areas are marked with a double 
asterisk which is an indication that ‘between parallel 30° 40’N and parallel 28° 
44’ N those fishing activities can not be developed*. Therefore, the whole 
Saharan-Canarian bank was reserved to the Moroccan fleet, and the only 
waters in the Southern areas which were open to the EC fleet were those of 
the Western Sahara which start very close to parallel 28° 40’ N.66
The agreement was respected without major problems except for a short crisis 
in March 1990, when Morocco decided a tenfold increase of the fines on 
foreign vessels operating illegally in its waters in an attempt to stop European 
over-fishing. The measure affected particularly the small Spanish boats, 
whose activities were a lot easier to control than those of the large vessels in
c n
the high seas , and caused widespread protest m southern Spam. Negotiations 
for a new agreement started months before the expiration of the 1988 one on 
29 February 1992. But unforeseen difficulties came in January 1992 when the
65 Official Journal o f the EC L 181/1, 12 July 1988.
66The Moroccan side counted this as a victory and Foreign Minister Abdelafif Filali infuriated 
the European Commission by declaring that the agreement recognised Moroccan sovereignty 
over Western Saharan waters (El Pals, 25 January 1988). The question of the implicit 
recognition of Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara made Commission officials very 
uncomfortable and sparked considerable debate in the European Parliament. For a discussion 
of the question see chapter 6, section 6.1, and Juste Ruiz 1988: 752-755.
67 Important parts of the Spanish coastal fleet depended to a large extent on fishing illegally 
for their survival, betting on their chances and incurring in corruption practices when they
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European Parliament failed to approve a financial package worth Ecu 463 
million in loans because of Moroccan human rights abuse and its non- 
compliance with the United Nations Peace Plan for Western Sahara.68 
Morocco called into question the fisheries agreement and asked for a 
substantial reduction in EU catches, the agreement was extended and 
negotiations became even tougher. From that moment onwards, like in 1988, 
the EC negotiated under the additional pressure of time and the threat of a 
‘fishing out*.
The agreement69 came on 15 May 1992, only two weeks after the end of the 
extension. This agreement was essentially very similar to the one signed four 
years before. Increased Moroccan pressure succeeded in achieving better 
conditions in terms of financial compensation, control and preservation of the 
fishing grounds and of presence of Moroccans in the crews of the boats 
fishing in Moroccan waters. Another significant victory from the Moroccan 
point of view was the improvement of the conditions for market access to 
canned sardines. The agreement was signed for four years, with a clause for a 
mid-term revision.
The negotiation of the first two EC/Morocco agreements is a good illustration 
of the changes that operated in Spanish policy towards Morocco after 
accession. The balance between constraints and new instruments, the first of 
the themes of this thesis, changed considerably: Spain lost the capacity to 
conduct an autonomous policy but gained crucial advantages from being an 
EC member in terms of bargaining power as well as becoming more able to 
deflect the pressure exerted by Morocco on the Spanish fleet thanks to 
generous EC funding. The other theme that stands out when we analyse those 
two negotiation processes is the change in the policy-making structures
were aprehended, with the knowledge o f government officials and public opinion o f both 
sides.
68 If the main technical reason for the failure was the lack of quorum, the political relevance 
of the vote should not be overlooked: in the same sessions all other protocols put to a vote 
(Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel) were approved except that of Syria.
The vote came after two years of critical resolutions with Morocco approved by the 
Parliament and contributed to an international crisis of legitimacy of the Moroccan regime for 
its human rights record. See Official Journal o f the EC C 39, 17 January 1992 and El 
Houdaigui 2003: 264-266.
69 Official Journal o f the EC  L 407 , 31 December 1992
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largely resulting from the characteristics of the Common Fisheries Policy, 
with an increase in the role that the technical structures of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food played. But the elements of continuity are 
also obvious in the other two themes of our study: neither the identity nor the 
definition of Spanish interests in the fisheries issue changed substantially, nor 
did the public opinion or domestic politics show clear signs of and impact of 
EC membership other than the government’s use of the EC competence as an 
alibi to justify the painful consequences of the agreement for a part of the 
fishing fleet. The negotiations for new agreements in 1995 and 2000-2001 
would confirm this tendency.
A solution to a major crisis
In the early 1990s the ever growing pressure on the Moroccan fishing grounds 
started to threaten the whole abundance in fish in the area, which suffered 
from severe over-fishing. In 1994, faced with the evidence of the growing 
scarcity of fish,70 the Moroccan government requested a revision of the 
agreement which would involve tighter control of the EC fleet activities and a 
substantial reduction of catches. About 200 licences from European boats 
were withdrawn. This was considered unacceptable by Spain, whose 
government pressured the European Commission from May 1994 not to make 
any concessions (Jones 2000:140). After five months negotiating, the 
Commission and Morocco agreed to shorten the agreement by one year (until 
May 1995), but keeping the same conditions.71
In March 1995 the European Commission and Morocco started new 
negotiations, which would be of an unprecedented toughness and create 
enough tension in the entire Morocco - EU relationship to be described as a 
bilateral crisis (Damis 1998b). Fisheries negotiations became a hot topic in the
70 Moroccan officials have repeatedly pointed to over-fishing as the main reason for 
Moroccan pressure for a new deal. Evidence of over-fishing seems established, but other
factors like increased foreign competition (from Mauritania with its high subsidies, and 
Western African countries like Senegal or Ivory Coast, benefiting from the 1994 devaluation 
of the CFA Franc) or the failure of the Moroccan industry seemed to have been at least as 
important in the minds of policy makers in Rabat (White 1997: 318-324).
71 Official Journal o f the EC L 111 ,4  April 1996.
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press and public opinion of both Spain and Morocco, making it difficult for 
their governments to lower their demands.
The two negotiating sides started with very distant positions, and for most of 
the first months, ‘in place of meaningful negotiations, there was a dialogue of 
the deaf (Damis 1998b: 66). The Moroccan position was very tough: many 
political actors, not just with interests in fisheries, were convinced that no 
agreement would be much better than a bad agreement for Morocco. In fact, it 
would probably have been much harder to reach an agreement if the question 
of fisheries had been the only aspect of the EU/Morocco relationship.
Four studies have focused in detail on the negotiations for the 1995 Fisheries 
Agreement: those of Gregory White (White 1997), John Damis (Damis 
1998b), Rachel Jones (Jones 2000) and Rachid el Houdai'gui (El Houdaigui 
2003: 244-257). Their analyses of the negotiations and our own findings allow 
us to establish five main factors that set the context in which the negotiations 
took part, and that help us to understand its final outcome.
The first factor is the Moroccan domestic context: fisheries had become a very 
profitable activity, employing 155,000 people and representing over 15% of 
Moroccan exports, but a large part of the resource was exploited by foreigners 
(White 1997). The fishing lobbies had grown in power and were, for the first 
time and exceptionally in Morocco, closely associated with the negotiations; 
their views were largely shared not only by fisheries officials and technicians, 
but also by the press, political parties and public opinion. In the end, the 
signature was a political decision of King Hassan II that took into 
consideration the strategic importance of relations with the EU (El Houdaigui 
2003: 255-256). A second factor was Spain’s internal situation: the Socialist 
government was in a weak political situation and in the middle of an 
economic crisis with high levels of unemployment. An estimated 28,000 jobs 
depended on fisheries in Moroccan waters in the relatively poor regions of 
Galicia, the Canaries and Andalusia. The fisheries organisations succeeded in 
getting a high media profile and put pressure on the government with actions 
like blocking the access of Moroccan products to the EU via the southern 
Spanish ports, and got sympathy from opposition parties and the press.
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The fisheries context in Europe was also important. The year 1995 had started 
with a bitter fisheries dispute between Spain and Canada over fishing in the 
Northern Atlantic: Spain resented the lack of ‘solidarity’ of some other EU 
member states, particularly Great Britain, and was not satisfied with the final 
deal. The lesson was to work intensively to keep all the EU countries 
committed to Spanish interests and to put unrelenting pressure on the 
Commission to make sure that the Spanish point of view prevailed. The 
negotiation of an association agreement in parallel with that of the fisheries 
agreement was the fourth factor: Morocco wanted to use concessions in the 
fisheries negotiations to get better conditions. Finally, there was a strategic 
factor: the civil war in Algeria and instability throughout the Maghreb had 
been a crucial concern to EU governments since the beginning of the decade. 
Morocco could play the ‘stability card’ (White 1997: 325) to get a better deal 
in the fisheries agreement. The run up to the Euro-Mediterranean conference 
put pressure on both sides: Israel and Tunisia signed association agreements, 
which put increased pressure on Morocco to make concessions to achieve an 
agreement quickly; and the EU wanted to avoid demonstrations by fishermen 
during the Barcelona Conference in November 1995.
The negotiations were long and difficult, with social pressure in Spain and a 
renewed opposition to the agreement in Morocco. Moroccan attempts to break 
European solidarity with Spain’s intransigent views failed, and the Union was 
cohesive along the negotiations, despite Spanish complaints about the 
Commission’s ‘soft’ positions. Eventually, the Commission succeeded in 
linking the issue of fisheries with the association agreement and on 10 
November 1995, only 16 days before the opening of the Barcelona 
Conference, a deal on both issues was achieved.
The ‘Agreement on Relations in the Sea Fisheries Sector between the
79European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco’ was 
considerably more generous to Morocco than the previous ones, but went 
along similar lines. Most of Morocco’s main concerns were reflected in the 
agreement: the reduction of the total tonnage of the EC vessels in Moroccan
72 Official Journal o f the EC L 306,19 December 1995.
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waters, more generous financial compensation, improved access for Moroccan 
canned sardines to the EC, longer resting periods, the provision for a 
restructuring of the EC fleet. The Moroccan demand that all fish caught in 
Moroccan waters should be landed in Moroccan ports was only very partially 
satisfied (30% of the cephalopod, short of 100% of all species initially 
demanded by Morocco). The Moroccans also failed to limit the agreement to 
three years, and the final agreement was signed for four years, and did not 
include any specific mention of the fact that the agreement would be non- 
renewable.
From the Spanish government’s point of view the agreement was very 
welcome as a solution to a burning social problem. The new conditions were 
tougher than Spain would have liked, but faced with the possibility of a 
complete lack of agreement, the final outcome could only be considered 
positive. It left four more years to restructure the fishing fleet with generous 
EC subventions. If Spain and the EC can be considered to have played to their 
advantage the card of the association agreement negotiations, and Morocco 
could at least claim to have achieved considerably better conditions, the clear 
loser of the negotiation was, as Gregory White puts it, ‘the fish’ (White 1997: 
314): the 1995 Agreement did little to stop the irresponsible depletion of the 
Moroccan waters despite the lip service paid to ecological concerns.
After the tough negotiations came a period of relatively stable relations, 
compared with the previous years. The Spanish government and the European 
Commission supported the gradual conversion of the fleet, which took place 
asymmetrically and at a very slow pace. As a result, when the agreement 
expired in 1999, thousands of Spanish fishermen were still dependent on 
Moroccan fishing grounds. The main difference this time was that the 
negative effects were not spread widely across three regions (Andalusia, 
Canary Islands and Galicia), but mainly concentrated in a dozen ports in these 
regions where fishermen had been unable to find alternatives in terms of 
either fishing elsewhere or directly changing their economic activities. This
73 A Spanish Member of the European Parliament complained that in the 1994-1999 period 
Spain only used 44% of the funds allocated to the EC initiative PESCA, which was
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made the problem very visible and, therefore, it soon acquired a high media 
profile; politically, the negotiations became, once more, a highly sensitive 
issue.
The end of a long story
In November 1999 the European fleet had to leave Moroccan waters because 
the 1995 agreement expired, and the EC provided Spain with the necessary 
funds to pay the fishermen while looking for a solution. Morocco made no 
offer and refused to enter into direct negotiations for a new agreement, 
claiming that the agreement had been negative for its interests and that the EU 
had not respected it (.Europolitique, 17 November, 1999). In September 2000 
the Moroccan side agreed to start negotiations just after an official visit by 
King Mohammed VI to Spain, in which generous co-operation agreements 
were signed,74 and after the agreement on a negotation mandate for the 
European Commission on the renewal of the agriculture chapter of the 
association agreement. Although the initial Moroccan demands were 
considered unacceptable by Spanish and EU negotiators, they welcomed the 
new Moroccan disposition to negotiate, and a certain optimism emerged. But 
the position of the Spainsh government hardly moved in the following 
months, and after the visit of EC Fisheries Commissioner Franz Fischler to 
Rabat in late February 2001, disappointment set in again on the EC side when 
they realised that Morocco would not accept the Spanish demands (Mar num. 
391, February 2001).
Meanwhile, the European Commission and the Spanish government had been 
preparing for the worst, and were slowly trying to convince the sector of the 
need of a painful conversion of the fleet. The negotiation of the vital 
agricultural chapter of the association agreement was due to start during the 
same period. However, after the bitter experience of 1995, the government of
specifically designed to encourage diversification in areas highly dependant on fisheries 
(EFE, 4 May 2001).
4 In particular an increase of Euro 105 Million in support o f investment in Morocco (Mar 
num. 386, September 2000). Those concessions were part o f the global policy towards 
Morocco but implicitly linked to the interest in opening fisheries negotiations.
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Morocco refused from the start any linkage between both negotiations, and 
talks on agriculture did not actually take off until the end of the fisheries ones. 
In the European side there was also the feeling that better deals involving only 
agricultural products could be achieved if negotiations were not linked to the 
fisheries issue.
On 26 March 2001, European Commission negotiators made a last offer to 
Morocco with a one month deadline. The Moroccan response did not meet 
European (and in particular Spanish) expectations, and in the Fisheries 
Council meeting of 25 April 2001 the member states decided not to make any 
further offer. In the following days some hopes that an agreement of some sort 
could still be achieved were expressed by ministers in Portugal (EFE, 25 April 
2001) and France (El Pais, 3 May 2001), but Spain, the European 
Commission and most member states made it clear that there would be no 
other agreement with Morocco and that the reconversion of the fleet should 
start immediately.
In view of the Moroccan position, in the last days before the final decision the 
Spanish government was against any new concession to the Moroccans. The 
main reason was the fear of creating a precedent for all other countries that 
had, or might sign in the future, fisheries agreements with the EC (Mauritania, 
Tunisia, Angola, etc.); this would endanger the whole system of international 
fisheries agreements, very profitable for the Spanish fleet. At the same time, a 
large amount of the boats affected by the failure of the agreement would have 
to be dismantled anyway, with or without agreement, as they were old, non­
competitive and often failed to meet minimum safety requirements.76 Doing 
this after the failure meant that more generous help would be at hand, and 
Moroccan intransigence could be blamed for the social impact. The Spanish 
government refused to explore Moroccan offers for partial agreements that
75 The Moroccan Minister of Fisheries, in a letter to Commissioner Fischler, reminded the EU 
of the concessions already made by Morocco and confirmed the offer presented on 22 March 
2001, without any new modifications. Letter o f the Minister o f Marine Fisheries o f the 
Kingdom of Morocco to Commissioner Franz Fischler, Rabat, 23 April 2001 (unpublished).
76 During the negotiations, estimates put the amount of vessels that were anyway not 
competitive, and would need to be dissembled in case of a failure, at 75% (El Pais, 9 
December 2000). Eventually, however, one year after die end o f negotiations only 37.3% of
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would mostly benefit the traditional fleet and made it clear that only an 
agreement for all sections of the fleet was acceptable.
The fishing sector and the regional authorities had been in contact with the 
government through an ad-hoc committee, the Comision Espedfica 
Marruecos. That committee served as a legitimisation tool for the decisions of 
the Spanish executive, and gave the government the chair in the only location 
where all affected actors met, deflecting the possibility of an organised 
reaction against the government.77 It was also the place where the principle of 
‘solidarity* was institutionalised, meaning that a partial agreement to defend 
the most vulnerable sections of the fleet (the coastal fleet) was not an 
acceptable option, and that all interests should be defended with the same 
intensity. The extraordinary cohesion achieved by the government was only 
broken once it became clear that the alternative to a partial agreement was no 
agreement at all. Only then did some of the most directly affected sectors start 
their protests in Andalusia, which were in no case as organised, far-reaching 
or widespread as those of 1995.
The government was keen to capitalise politically on the frustration over the 
lack of agreement. On the same day in which the Fisheries Ministers 
announced the end of negotiations, Prime Minister Aznar declared in a radio 
interview that ‘no one can think (...) that this will not have consequences for 
the relationship between Spain and Morocco and between Morocco and the 
European Union’ (El Pais, 26 April 2001). The Spanish and Moroccan press 
interpreted those declarations as a threat to Morocco, and in fact they 
signalled the beginning of a period of tense bilateral relations which ended six
7Rmonths later in the withdrawal of the Moroccan Ambassador to Madrid. The 
crisis that followed (October 2001- January 2003) started to cool down when 
King Mohammed VI allowed some Galician boats to work in Moroccan 
waters for a limited period to help them overcome the disastrous effects of the
the boats had stopped completely their activity after the lack of agreement (El Correo 
Gallego, 9 July 2002).
77 The same model, with similar functions, had been adopted by the Andalusian government 
during the 1995 negotiations, and was put in place again for the 2000-2001 negotiations. It 
was known as ‘Grupo de Trabajo Andaluz para el Acuerdo con Marruecos’.
78 See chapter 6, section 6.3.
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sinking of an oil tanker in Galician waters in November 2002. This gesture 
signalled the beginning of the end of the bilateral crisis, and was the last 
episode of high relevance of fisheries in Spanish-Moroccan relations.
Fisheries negotiations have been a key factor in Spanish-Moroccan relations 
from the very independence of Morocco. They were linked throughout the 
years to other aspects of the bilateral relationship. Spanish accession to the 
European Community raised hopes that fisheries would be disentangled from 
the rest of connections between both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar. Instead, 
new linkages appeared. It now looks as if fisheries will no longer be a crucial 
dossier in Spanish-Moroccan or EC-Moroccan relationships, as most of the 
Spanish fleet that worked in Morocco is either re-converted or working in 
other waters, and the Moroccan fishing industry is successsfully exploiting its 
own waters. It thus may be the best time to look back and see what the exact 
effects of Europeanisation have been on the whole of the fisheries 
negotiations with Morocco.
3.3 The impact of EC membership
This third section of the chapter analyses the impact of EC/EU membership 
on Spanish fisheries policy towards Morocco. First, it focuses on the impact 
of Europeanisation in terms of governmental objectives and the way in which 
EC/EU membership has helped to achieve them. Secondly, it discusses the 
political outcome in general terms, trying to untangle the question of whose 
interests were best preserved in the negotiations and the agreements with 
Morocco. Finally, the section outlines the most significant changes in policy­
making derived from membership. Those three questions relate directly to the 
first three of the four themes of Europeanisation identified in chapter one.
The balance sheet
In the years preceding accession, there were in Spain two main expectations in 
relation to the effects that the Europeanisation of fisheries policy would have 
on the fisheries negotiations with Morocco. The first was an argument about
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the power relationship: a much larger and richer EC would have a lot more 
bargaining power in front of an extremely dependent (particularly in trade 
terms) Morocco. The second expectation had to do with the role that fisheries 
had played in the whole of the Spanish-Moroccan relationship before 
accession: with the transfer of competence to the EC, Morocco would not be 
able to use the fisheries card any more to put pressure on Spain in relation to 
other political issues. Both expectations fall within the first theme of our 
thesis, the balance sheet between new constraints and new instruments.
For the first expectation, we have found that, as long at the Spanish position 
has been clearly in favour of an agreement and it has been able to convince its 
partners and the EC institutions of its necessity, the EC has proved able to 
deploy its political and economic weight to force Morocco to agree to deals 
that were, from the strictly fisheries point of view, quite detrimental to 
Moroccan interests. The pro-Western Moroccan elite had to face criticism in 
their country for their concessions in fisheries, which they saw as almost an 
inevitable price to pay for good relations with the European Union. The 
clearest example of the way in which the EU could force a deal in this way is 
the negotiations for the 1995 agreement (White 1997; Damis 1998b).
But not everyone in Spain would agree that this first argument is valid. The 
interviews, the parliamentary minutes and the press declarations contain 
numerous examples of a permanent double complaint: Spain had to struggle to 
convince 11/14 partners unaware of the importance of an agreement, being 
only a twelfth/fifteenth of the Council but accounting for 90 per cent of the
70affected fleet; and the Commission was not negotiating with all the ‘zeal* 
that the ‘vital’ Spanish interest required (DSCD 1988: 8863). Some EC 
officials tended to ‘mix’ concerns about the future of fisheries with other 
considerations in areas like development co-operation, thus weakening the 
European Commission’ position.
79 For an example of this arguments see the intervention of Mr. Diaz Aguilar, an opposition 
Member of Parliament, in the debate about the 1992 agreement. (DSCD 1992)
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According to our findings, however, and despite the recent changes in the 
attitudes of some actors of the Common Fisheries Policy, including the 
Commission and some states (United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark), against 
the current policy of agreements with developmg countries, the Commission 
and the other member states have largely supported the Spanish positions, in 
spite of the many concerns that Spain’s fisheries record raises in the 
Community. The eventual failure of the negotiations had more to do with the 
Spanish refusal to agree to a partial or an unfavourable deal than with 
lukewarm support for Spanish arguments at the EC level.
What about the second expectation? Did fisheries matter less to bilateral
Spanish-Moroccan relationships after Spain entered the European
Community? Certainly, as we have seen in the first section of this chapter,
Morocco used the question of fisheries to put pressure on the Spanish
government not only during the negotiations for agreements, but also through
the detention of fishing boats. They used the threat of excluding Spanish
vessels from their waters as a means of putting extra pressure on the Spanish
government because of its social impacts. This pressure became a lot less
relevant when EC funds became available to the fishermen affected by the
‘fishing outs’; as a result, the Spanish government had a more comfortable
negotiation position. It was also the generous sums of money spent by the EC
that allowed for a relatively peaceful end to the possibility to fish in Moroccan
waters in 2001, paying for the decommissioning of a large part of the
traditional fleet and the restructuring or relocation of the rest. The EC funds,
however, also had a negative effect in that they were used right until the very
81failure of the 2001 negotiations to modernise and build new ships instead of
89using them to help the fishermen change activity.
80 The idea, strongly supported by the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark and 
contained in the Commission’s Green Paper on the future o f CFP, is that agreements with 
developing countries should not contribute to the depletion of their resources by EC ships, but 
rather to die development of their own capacity to exploit them twinned with access to EC 
market in order to favour their economic development. (European Commission 2001: 21-22)
81 For instance, when the negotations were about to fail, 40 small ships, only able to operate in 
nearby Moroccan waters, were being built in Andalusia. (Andalucia 2001)
82 This has been a Spanish attitude throughout the years in the CFP that has attracted 
widespread criticism (Maliniak 2001)
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Nevertheless, as the detailed observation of the negotiations and the way in 
which the deals were obtained shows, the bilateral factor never really 
disappeared. This was as clear in 1988, when the fisheries agreement was 
made possible, amongst other things, by Spanish concessions in the field of 
transit of Moroccan goods through Spain, and it continued to be evident 12 
years later, when the visit of King Mohammed VI to Spain, and the granting 
of substantial bilateral aid to Morocco, paved the way for the opening of 
negotiations that the Moroccans had repeatedly stated would never again take 
place. Indeed, the members of the Aznar government, including the prime 
minister himself, made this linkage very clear when they hinted at the 
negative consequences that the lack of a fisheries agreement in April 2001 
would have on bilateral relations.
Moreover, similar linkages to those that existed between fisheries and other 
aspects of Spanish policy towards Morocco appeared in the EC/EU-Morocco 
relationship. Fisheries have stood out as one of the most contentious issues in 
the generally good relationship, and have been at times the best Moroccan 
bargaining tool to obtain concessions from the EC/EU (in terms of trade or 
financial aid, as the Moroccan negotiators tried to do in 1988 and 1995) or to 
protect their political stances in such issues as Western Sahara or European 
criticism of Morocco’s poor human rights record84. If Spain was at times able 
to convince the Commission to link the fisheries issue to other subject areas to 
obtain better deals, some linkages actually went against the Spanish fishing 
interest. Probably the best example is the trouble caused in January 1992 to 
fisheries negotiators by the failure of the European Parliament to approve the 
Fourth Financial Protocol because of Moroccan lack of co-operation with the
o r
UN Peace Plan for Western Sahara and its lack of respect for human nghts.
As we see, it is hard to make a simple statement about whether 
Europeanisation has been detrimental or positive to the Spanish position in 
relation to the right of its nationals to fish in Moroccan waters. It did, in any
83 See above, section 3.2.
84 This does not mean that Morocco did not have its own legitimate interest in exploiting its 
own fishing banks as a means of achieving economic development.
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case, profoundly alter both the instruments at hand for the Spanish 
government and the capacity to act unilaterally. Also, importantly enough, the 
Common Fisheries Policy has enabled a relatively painless transition towards 
a future where fisheries will not be at the centre of the political agenda of 
Spanish-Moroccan relations.
Whose interest?
Crucial to the whole negotiations of the fisheries agreements has been the 
question of defining interests, since interests have been at the centre of all 
political discussion concerning this matter: the interests of the fishing sector, 
the Spanish national interest, the European Union interest. As we shall see, 
there have been deliberate efforts to shape the definition of those interests to 
the benefit of some actors. Those questions fall within the second theme of 
this thesis, identity and the redefinition o f interests.
By and large, the interest of the ship owners and fishermen that worked in 
Moroccan waters have been fiercely defended by both Spanish and European 
Union politicians and civil servants at a high financial cost in terms of EC 
budget, EC/Moroccan and Spanish/Moroccan relations and ecological 
equilibrium. If concerns about the lack of alternatives in certain regions can 
explain the defence of the ability of a part of the traditional (coastal) fleet to 
continue their activity in Morocco, the general cost-benefit analysis and the 
context of EC and Spanish policies towards Morocco seem to challenge the 
logic of this definition of interest.
A triple identification between interests that were, in our view, distinct 
operated successfully. First, the interest of large ship owners that conduct very 
profitable activities like the fishing of cephalopod or crayfish were merged 
with and identified in the political and public debate as the same as those of 
the fishermen who, due to the modest dimensions and low capacity of their 
ships, were left with no alternatives if fishing in Moroccan and Saharan waters 
was restricted. The interests of the ‘fishing sector* were presented as a bloc,
85 See above, note 85.
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and deliberate attempts to disentangle them and address the needs of the less 
favoured failed. The creation of negotiating tables chaired by the 
administration and bringing together representatives of all the affected groups 
and administrations (specific commission of the 2000-2001 negotiations, 
Andalusian working group in 1995 and 2000-2001) was particularly 
instrumental for this purpose.
The second step was the direct identification between the interest of the 
fishing sector and the Spanish national interest. A successful mobilisation of 
the public opinion and the press with some spectacular protest actions (like 
blocking the southern Spanish ports) combined with the partisan use of the 
issue as a tool for debilitating governments at regional and national levels 
explain this identification. The disproportionate weight of the ‘technical’ 
sectors of fisheries administration and of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food compared to other ministries, in particular Foreign Affairs, 
may also have contributed to that. Spain was subject to Moroccan pressure 
partly because of the high importance attached to short term fisheries 
priorities, which weighed a lot more than longer term strategic considerations.
Thirdly, Spanish officials worked hard to establish an identification between 
the Spanish interest and the EC interest. This was crucial to ensure the 
necessary mandate from the Council and to compel the European Commission 
to negotiate toughly in favour of Spanish interests. The permanent complaints 
about bad Commission negotiators and their lack of enthusiasm put 
unrelenting pressure on them. In the Council and the Commission, moreover, 
the idea that the agreement with Morocco had to be obtained at almost any 
cost was crucial to ensure that compensation in other fields (like the financial 
protocols accorded just before the the signature of the 1988 agreement, or the 
association agreement in 1995) would be available as a bargaining tool.
As long as these three identifications could be maintained, there was a 
synergy which guaranteed sufficient pressure and compensations to obtain a 
deal with Morocco. But when the situation was brought to a limit by Spanish 
intransigence in front of Morocco’s firm position in 2000-2001, the system
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showed its perverse effects: the amount requested by Morocco endangered the 
interest of the industrial fleet elsewhere in Africa by creating a bad precedent; 
the EU was not ready to use linkages or pressures in other areas; and the 
possibility of a partial agreement for the traditional fleet and a small part of 
the industrial one was refused without negotiating the possible conditions. As 
a result, the most vulnerable actors, the traditional fishermen concentrated in a 
dozen ports of Galicia, Portugal, Andalusia and the Canaries suffered the 
worst consequences of the break-up of negotiations.
This analysis of interest sheds some light on which of the four themes of 
Europeanisation were most present in the case of Spanish fisheries policy in 
relation to Morocco. The ultimate definition of interests remained largely 
unchallenged, and only some rhetorical adjustments were made in order to 
ensure the objective of maximising the catch at the lowest possible cost, 
irrespective of the effects that this policy had on the relationship with 
Morocco. The second theme of this thesis, identity and the definition of 
interest, is therefore of relatively little relevance in the fisheries sector. As we 
have seen, changes were considerably more evident in the first theme, the 
balance between constraints and interests. The next section shows that the 
third theme, decision making, is by contrast one of great relevance in the case 
of fisheries.
Multi-level decision making
One area in which the impact of accession to the EC has been deeply felt is 
that of decision making, the third of the themes of Europeanisation. The EC 
exclusive competence to sign international fisheries agreements has been an 
element that has fundamentally altered the way in which that aspect of 
Spanish relations with Morocco has been treated. Instead of the relatively 
centralised process led by diplomats in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and in the Spanish Embassy in Rabat, which was characteristic of the 
negotiations of the 1983 agreement between Spain and Morocco, the EC/EU- 
Morocco negotiations of 1988, 1992, 1995 and 2001 have been the result of 
an increasingly complex multi-level network of actors of varying types
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(governmental, private), specialisation (diplomacy, technical issues, party 
politics, etc.) and geographical scope (regional, national, European).86
In the Spanish context, the fisheries administration of the central government 
at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food maintained a crucial role 
despite the transfer of competence to both Europe and the regions, as it was 
the sole actor that defined the Spanish national position in negotiations, and 
had the most decisive influence in fixing and modifying the EC/EU position. 
This was possible because of the lack of a model for the participation of the 
Comunidades Autonomas in EU decision-making that matches their 
competence (Molina 2000: 121-126). Aware of the Spanish executive’s 
weight in the EU Council, Spanish fisheries associations targeted the central 
administration for their lobbying activities, and kept almost permanent contact 
with it. The Spanish government had privileged access to information from 
both the people most directly affected by the negotiations and the top 
negotiators at the EU level. Crucially, it negotiated in Brussels the amounts of 
the EC/EU funds to compensate those negatively affected by negotiations, and 
administered the distribution of the funds. This is, therefore, a clear case of 
how Europeanisation results at times in a strengthening of the nation-state.
The other effect that Europeanisation had in this context was the 
reinforcement of the fisheries administration and more generally of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in Madrid and the DG Fisheries in 
Brussels, with respect to other parts of the administration dealing with 
external policy and that were in charge of most aspects of relations with 
Morocco, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though the latter 
was closely associated with all negotiations, the definition of the Spanish 
position and its main alterations were decided upon by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. This was also the ministry in charge of defending the Spanish 
position at the Fisheries Council meetings where the EC position was fixed. It 
has its own seconded officials in the Permanent Representation in Brussels 
and in the Embassy in Rabat, closely co-ordinated with the heads of both
86 Incidentally, this growth in complexity has not only been a feature of the European side: 
Morocco also witnessed a similar process, albeit on a much lesser scale. See El Houdaigui
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institutions but nonetheless reporting directly to the Ministry of Agriculture in 
Madrid.
The complexity of the issue network that emerged around every negotiation 
was further complicated by the existence of direct links between actors that 
were not a part of the central decision-making core, that includes the Spanish 
central government and the European Commission. A dense network of 
relations linked fisheries associations, regional governments, political parties, 
members of the regional, Spanish and European Parliaments, journalists, etc. 
to those two actors in the core, but also amongst themselves. Such a rich net 
of actors is exceptional in the generally centralised domain of Spanish foreign 
policy.
This plurality was not confined to the definition of the negotiating position 
and its modifications. It also affected the bilateral negotiations. There were 
two parallel axes of interaction. There was a formal negotiation led in 
Morocco by the government -and in the most difficult cases, as in the last 
weeks of the 1995 negotiations, by the royal counsellors -  and on the 
European side by the Commission. This negotiation included technical and 
political issues. In parallel there was a bilateral axis between the palace in 
Rabat and the Spanish government, which conducted a mainly political game. 
King Hassan 13 expressed it in the following words: ‘TTiis treaty is, 
unfortunately, a treaty between Morocco and Europe. But on the political 
scene, the conflict is between two countries. Between Morocco and Spain’.87
On occasions there were even more contacts at play. For instance, in the 1995 
negotiations Rachid el Houdaigui identified links between the Spanish 
socialist party (PSOE) and its Moroccan counterpart (UFSP), between the two 
national confederations of businessmen (CEOE and CGEM), between the 
Moroccan fisheries sector and Commissioner Emma Bonnino, and between 
another member state (France) and Morocco (El Houdaigui 2003:
2003:244-256.
87 Interview of King Hassan II on TV 5 Europe, in September 1995. Quoted in El Houdaigui 
2003:254.
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248,250,253,256). The decision making process had completely changed 
since the early 1980s as a direct result of Europeanisation, resulting in a 
complex multi-level policy network.
3.4 Conclusions
Let us now address one fundamental question in our study presented in the 
first chapter of our study: the issue of change and continuity. The study of 
Spanish fisheries relations with Morocco between the early 1980s and 2002 
reveals a considerable degree of continuity in the main goals of the 
government and in particular a remarkable stabilty in the understanding of 
Spanish policy makers of the role of fisheries within the evolving bilateral 
relationship between Morocco and Spain. This stability is to a large extent the 
result of an internal political situation that favoured, as we have seen, the 
direct adoption of the views of fisheries organisations by the central 
administration.
However, the EC also played a role as a stabiliser insofar as the large amounts 
of EC funds allowed the Spanish government to adopt a harder line in the 
fisheries issues that it could have maintained otherwise. For example, 
Morocco used the exclusion of EC (in fact, mostly Spanish) fishermen to put 
additional pressure on the European side, aware of the devastating effects that 
this had not only on the lives of fishermen themselves, but also of the rest of 
the transforming industry and the ensemble of the regional economies of some 
coastal areas. EC subsidies made this situation remarkably more bearable, but 
this allowed the Spanish administration to be less compromising. Indeed, the 
EC funds originally intended to serve as a means to restructure the fleet and 
reduce the amount of fishermen depending on the agreements with Morocco, 
were used in some cases to modernise the fleet, thus resulting in more 
pressure on the fishery and more tension with Morocco. All this had an 
obvious negative effect on the bilateral relationship.
Despite this stabilising effect over Spanish policy, the contribution of EC 
membership to change has also been remarkable. Of the four themes proposed
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in the first chapter, we have seen that the first one, the balance between new 
constraints and the search for new instruments, is very relevant in the case of 
fisheries negotiations. The exclusive EC competence imposed on the Spanish 
executive a major constraint as it could not deal directly with an issue that, by 
and large, affected Spain far more than any other member state. This meant 
that it had to work to keep both the interest, support and solidarity of the other 
member states and the ‘loyalty’ of the European Commission. This was 
achieved quite successfully: trends that could have militated against Spanish 
interests never became too prominent. Those were for example the priority 
given in France to keeping good relations with Morocco; the opposition of 
Germany, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom to perpetuate a system of 
largely uncompensated depletion of the African fisheries resources, 
institutionalised by EU agreements; or the Portuguese preference for 
agreements limited to preserving the traditional fleet. There was no open 
questioning of what was basically a Spanish definition of the EU interest in 
fishery relations with Morocco.
In terms of instruments, we have seen how the most relevant instrument made 
available was the generous funds provided by the EC both to compensate for 
the agreements and to balance the negative consequences of the periods of 
biological pauses, ‘fishing-off periods, and eventually the conversion of a 
significant part of the fleet. The larger negotiating weight of the EC in 
comparison to Spain’s alone was clearly felt, in particular when it could offer 
linkages with other areas, such as financial protocols (e.g. in 1988) or 
commercial advantages (e.g. in 1995).
As far as the second theme, identity and interest, is concerned, there is no 
clear evidence that membership of the EC/EU has affected Spain’s identity or 
its definition of interests to a significant extent. By and large the main interest 
has not been questioned: maximising the fishing opportunities for the Spanish 
fleet minimising its economic (and political) cost. But in 2000-2001, when the 
Moroccan demands where too high, in particular in the most lucrative species 
caught by the industrial fleet, and the level of compensation threatened with
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creating a precedent that could endanger the achievement of profitable 
agreements elsewhere in Africa, the interest was re-defined. And in that 
occasion the EC/EU provided both a cover and the economic means to deal 
with the consequences.
The third theme, changes in policy-making, has been the subject of a 
substantial part of our research. The Common Fisheries Policy has a number 
of features that have impinged upon Spanish fisheries policy and also that 
have affected the relative weights of the different sections of the central 
administration when deciding about fisheries negotiations with Morocco. The 
actor that benefited most from this change, the General Secretariat for 
Maritime Fisheries at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, has 
very close links with the fisheries sector and it prides itself on being its most 
ardent defender. A multi-level network of links has provided the 
representatives of the fishing organisations with multiple opportunities to 
exert their influence, and have successfully convinced other ‘allies’ (regional 
governments, press, MEPs) to work in their favour.
Beyond the already interesting effects on governance and decision-making, 
we believe that all those changes have affected the final policy outcome by 
contributing to a tougher position in favour of the interest of a relatively small 
minority of people, at a relatively high cost in terms of good relations with 
Morocco. Only a part of this minority was very vulnerable and without 
alternative ways of living: the hundreds of low skilled fishermen working in 
the 144 boats that were destroyed after 2001, who had to face the start of an
n o
uncertain new professional life. The industrial fleet could soon find other
O Q
areas to work profitably once Morocco became closed to them.
88 With an average age of 46 (and 27.2% of them being between 50 and 54), only 8% of all 
the fishermen that took part in the Spanish retraining program had ever worked on land. A 
quarter of them had no formal education whatsoever and 72% had not even finished their 
primary education (Mar, June 2002).
About 20% of the boats that were fishing in Morocco could start working in waters of other 
countries like Mauritania, Brazil, Namibia, Peru, Chile, Guinea or Angola. Those were 
obviously large, industrial ships that can sail long distances (Faro de Vigo, 9 July 2002).
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As with the second theme, the fourth, that of the Europeanisation of domestic 
actors, does not seem to us to be very relevant with the exception of an issue 
that is largely connected with the point just made. In effect, the 
Europeanisation of fisheries organisations has not resulted in stable, 
permanent transeuropean organisations, that could be stronger than national 
ones. But it has brought about an awareness of the EC mechanisms and the 
creation of new means of access to policy-makers. This, combined with the 
consolidation of a relatively closed policy community (Rhodes and Marsh 
1992) around the fisheries issues, has allowed for a bigger impact in the 
negotiating process.
Spanish public opinion, parties and media have not changed their perceptions 
of the fishery relations with Morocco as a result of Europeanisation, as far as 
we could observe. The fact that negotiations with Morocco were conducted by 
the EC could have served as an alibi for the government when it needed to 
justify the negative effects of the agreements on the fishing sector. Indeed, 
that might have been particularly tempting as officials, parliamentarians and 
lobbyists complained about the lack of enthusiasm of the Commission and of 
other member states. But the political debate went along other lines: since 
criticism from the opposition was often that the government was not strong 
enough to impose its will in Brussels, blaming the European Commission 
could have been perceived as a sign of weakness within the EC/EU.90 The 
Spanish government preferred to blame Moroccan intransigence instead. But 
EC pressure (and money) did serve as alibis to restructure an obsolete, non­
competitive part of the fleet, which resisted any changes despite the 
unsustainability of their activity from the economic and ecological, let alone 
political, points of view.
90 The clearest example of this is die mutual accusations that the Popular Party and the 
Socialist Party exchanged in the parliamentary debates during the 2000-2001 negotiations, in 
which each party pointed at the other’s supposedly weak position in Brussels: the PP 
considered that the Gonzalez administration had obtained a bad agreement in 1995, which
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Fisheries has been an important topic in the relations between Spain and 
Morocco for a very long time. It was perceived as a source of constant 
bilateral tensions. However, months after the official end of the 2000-2001 
negotiations, and when the question was supposed to be no longer weighing 
on bilateral relations, the deepest bilateral crisis since the Green March took 
place.91 This should make us re-consider the role that fisheries played in the 
relationship. Morocco made a political use of it for other issues, in particular 
of territorial nature, but also as a sort of loud-speaker for its unease with 
Spanish policy. Fishermen often felt the victims of bilateral ups and downs, 
and their understanding was probably largely correct: fisheries were in the 
uncomfortable role of serving as an escape valve for general bilateral tensions. 
In the absence of such a valve, tensions rose to their worst levels between the 
summer of 2001 and that of 2002. And it is interesting to note that King 
Mohammed VI took fishery issues for the gesture of goodwill that signalled 
the beginning of the end of the crisis in autumn 2003.
made it harder to obtain a new one; the PSOE considered that the PP was to blame for the 
difficulties of the ongoing negotiations. See DSCD 2000.
91 See chapter 6, section 6.3, for a full account of the crisis.
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Chapter 4: Economic and commercial relations
The relationship between Spain and Morocco in economic terms is strongly 
conditioned by geographical factors. On the one hand, Spain is the natural 
access point of Moroccan products to Europe and the obvious link between the 
North African country and the rich core of Europe. On the other hand, the 
similar latitudes and weather conditions of both countries mean that 
competition in agricultural products, particularly fruits and vegetables, for the
09rich European market is fierce. Madrid has viewed Morocco in economic 
terms both as a threat and as an opportunity. The same has been true for Rabat 
vis-a-vis Spain. Spanish governments have acted within the EC/EU sometimes 
as an advocate of Moroccan interests, and on other occasions as the worst 
enemy of Moroccan aspirations. This chapter will analyse this dual character 
and the specific impact of EC membership.
4.1 Pre-accession and the first years of membership: 
Morocco as the competitor
For most of the 1980s relations between Spain and Morocco in economic terms 
were strongly influenced by the accession negotiations and then Spain’s 
accession to the European Community, and by the deliberate attempts of 
Spanish foreign policy-makers to weave a net of common economic interests 
between the two countries that would contribute to improving bilateral 
relations. Spanish policy was not homogeneous, and indeed the policy 
objectives in the negotiations with, and later within, the European Community 
seemed to bear little relation to the declared objectives of bilateral relations 
with Morocco. In fact, those two areas were handled almost as if they were 
disconnected, and this created a contradictory effect: just as the Spanish 
government started launching a series of bilateral initiatives to improve trade 
and economic relations with Morocco, Spanish accession was seen in the 
North-African country as the worst threat to its exports and, consequently, to
92 Both Morocco and Spain can sell their products in the winter period when northern European 
producers are out of the markets and prices are high. This is crucial: ‘the main component 
explaining price variation in fruits and vegetables production is timing’ (Noguera Mendez 
1 9 9 6 : 67).
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its economic development. It was a paradoxical policy, bilaterally friendly, but 
multilaterally almost openly hostile.
This section analyses those two trends. Spanish literature on policy towards 
Morocco tends to focus only on the official line from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; however a survey of the press of the time, the Moroccan literature on 
the 1980s, and the official activity of those years shows clearly the importance 
of the ‘Spanish factor’ in the relations between Morocco and the European 
Community, and how the effects this had in turn impact on bilateral relations.
The Common Agricultural Policy, Spain and Morocco before 
accession
Before Spain’s accession to the EC in 1986, agricultural exports to the 
Community were crucial to the economies of both Morocco and Spain. Their 
ability to export to the Ten was limited by the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). The CAP is not only the policy that has always attracted the largest 
allocation of the EC budget, but also one which has a policy making process 
that is unique within the EC system. Like the Common Fisheries Policy, the 
complexity of the regulations has secured a ‘high political entry barrier into the 
policy community’ (Grant 1997: 148). The first years of its functioning served 
to consolidate a central set of actors, which successfully established a sort of 
oligopoly that dominated the policy. Those actors were the Agriculture 
Council, the member states (and in particular Germany and France), the 
powerful agricultural lobbies associated in COPA (Comite des Organisations 
Professionnelles Agricoles), and DG VI, the agriculture directorate-general.
Within the Commission DG I, the directorate-general for external affairs, 
conducted trade negotiations for all areas except agricultural trade (Grant 
1997). At the EC level agriculture has developed a dynamic of its own and this 
favours the fact that, despite the existence of co-ordination mechanisms, the 
national ministries responsible for agriculture have a greater degree of 
autonomy than other ministries when it comes to European affairs. For all
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those reasons, and despite the huge importance that decisions taken in the 
framework of the CAP have in third countries and in the relations between 
them and the EU, decisions made about agriculture and agricultural trade 
remain relatively isolated from foreign policy considerations at large. This 
characteristic, which as we will see later also has consequences on the national 
level, determines to a large extent the state of relations of the EC/EU and the 
Mediterranean countries.
Morocco’s independence in 1956 did not put an end to the dependency of its 
economy on the former metropolis, France. The colonial economy in Morocco 
shaped a productive structure based on exports from the primary sector 
(mining, phosphates, citrus fruit, wine, canned sardines) oriented to the French 
market, and heavily dependent on imports from France (Oualalou 1981:2-4). 
Morocco continued with those traditional exports and imports to/from France, 
and extended them to other EC member states, thanks to the preferential 
treatment granted since the signature of the Treaty of Rome and reinforced by 
the Association Agreement (1969) and its reviewed version (1976).
In face of an ever growing demand in the EC, specialising in fruits and 
vegetables seemed to Morocco, as to most Mediterranean countries, a good 
strategy that would yield good value, by creating numerous jobs and ensuring 
valuable revenues in hard currency to pay for the high investments needed in 
such areas as irrigation. International organisations, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development in particular, supported those projects in 
Morocco and other countries (Drevet 1986 : 156-157; Pomfret 1987). But from 
the second half of the 1960s Morocco started to feel the competition from other 
Mediterranean countries, and in particular Spain and Israel, for some of its 
most significant exports. As an example, Morocco’s share of EC citrus fruit 
imports decreased from 19.6% in 1965-66 to 11.5% in 1974-75, compared to a 
positive trend for both Israel (9.9% to 17.4%) and Spain (54.3% to 61.8%). At 
the same time, imports from the EC grew constantly throughout the 1970s, to 
the point that a growing trade deficit emerged (Oualalou 1981).
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Morocco had low production costs and enjoyed excellent access conditions,93 
but its inefficient market organisation and high transportation costs outweighed 
the advantages. High transportation costs were a direct consequence of the 
Spanish attitude, closing its territory to the transit of Moroccan products, which 
forced the producers to use less efficient maritime routes. Spain, despite the 
comparatively restrictive conditions of access to the EC market, performed a 
lot better from the 1970s, to the point that just before enlargement it enjoyed a 
share of the EC fruit and vegetable market comparable to that of Italy, and 
about 25% larger than that of the rest of the Mediterranean non-member states 
put together (Drevet 1986: 154). In this context, the Mediterranean 
enlargements of the 1980s, and in particular Spanish accession, became a 
major concern for Morocco and dominated the Morocco -  EC relations agenda 
from the start of the decade (Oualalou 1981: 1,5; Pomfret 1987).
93 The Mediterranean policy and the agreements signed with the EC granted important 
reductions in tariffs on Morocco’s agricultural exports o f fruits and vegetables, although those 
exports were also subject to restrictions in terms o f calendar, price and amount (quotas).
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Table 4.1 Trends in total agricultural exports from selected 
Mediterranean countries (1961-2000) (in 1000 US$)
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Source: Author’s graph from FAO data. FAOSTAT Database, 2002. http://apps.fao.org
Moroccan officials and politicians expressed their concerns clearly to their 
European partners, with growing intensity as the negotiations between Spain 
and the EC proceeded. Fearing marginalisation in the EC’s preference system, 
the Moroccan authorities asked the EC for an upgrading of its status in relation 
to the EC, a strategy which culminated in an official application for 
membership in 1987. In the words of the director of the Moroccan Office for 
the Commercialisation of Exports, Abdalah Lahlu, ‘the enlargement of the 
EEC is a sign of the danger that threatens the future of our (Moroccan) citrus 
fruit on the European market’ and ‘Spain is preparing already for its future
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European position and opts for a greater marginalisation of its competitors’ (Le 
Matin, 4 April 1985).
In the years that preceded enlargement the EC Commissioner responsible for 
the Mediterranean, Claude Cheysson (a former French minister of foreign 
affairs) championed, with British and German support, the position that the 
question of the repercussions of the Iberian enlargement for the Mediterranean 
non-member countries should be addressed before enlargement took place,94 
assuming that Spain would use its position as a member country to secure its 
access to the EC market and to exclude non-EC competitors from it (Tovias 
1995: 101). Commissioner Cheysson accepted some of the arguments in the 
Moroccan press pointing to Spain as being responsible for possible future 
social conflicts in Morocco. He declared that ‘Spain, who aspires to a great 
Arab policy, will not want to be the cause of or responsible for the 
destabilisation of Morocco’, to the dismay of Spanish diplomats, who saw it as 
a Moroccan strategy to revive bilateral conflicts (El Pais, 18 May 1985).
The Spanish executive, which at the time was focusing on accession 
negotiations, tried to avoid entering into a direct confrontation with the EC 
authorities or with France on the question of third countries’ products access to 
the EC. The French government had two good reasons to worry about Spanish 
accession in that field: on the one hand, Spanish producers competed directly 
with French farmers in Languedoc, who were very actively opposing any 
concession; on the other hand, France championed the interest of the southern 
Mediterranean countries (and of Morocco in particular) within the EC. The 
Commission and some very influential member states wanted a new 
commercial policy towards the Mediterranean third countries to compensate 
for the costs of enlargement.95 That policy should be agreed with them before
94 In a visit to Rabat in 9-11 May 1985 he declared: ‘It is important that all this be decided 
before the accession of Spain, so that when it takes place, Spanish responsibility will be at 
stake. Spain can cause an alteration of the current balance in the EC- Southern Mediterranean 
countries relations.’ (El Pais, 10 May 1985)
95 If the Europe of the Ten needed to import 12% of its tomatoes, 20% of its fruits and fresh 
vegetables, 6% of its wine, 20% of its olive oil and 55% of its citrus fruit, the Twelve would 
only need to import 10% of their citrus fruit, be self-sufficient in tomatoes, and have a 10% 
surplus of wine, fruits and fresh vegetables and olive oil (Khader 1991: 132).
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enlargement. Moreover France wanted to impose long transitional periods for 
Spanish exports of fruits and vegetables to the rest of the EC.
Contacts between the Mediterranean non-members and the EC over the 
consequences of enlargement started in 1983, but the Commission did not get a 
mandate to negotiate the compensatory measures with Mediterranean third 
countries until November 1985, two months before Spanish accession. The 
long delay has been largely attributed to Italy, which benefited from it because 
it preferred to talk about trade concessions once Spain and Portugal (who were 
likely to be on the same side when trying to minimise trade concessions to the 
Mediterranean non-member states) had become members. Italy, like Spain, 
wanted to link the negotiations on trade concessions with those of the Second 
Financial Protocols attached to the Co-operation and Free Trade Agreements 
with those countries, scheduled for mid-1986. Spain supported the Italian 
position from outside, convinced like the Italians that the burden of 
compensating the Mediterranean non-member states should be shared by all 
EC members, and not only the southern member states (Tovias 1995: 101).
The fear of invasion of EC markets by Spanish fruits and vegetables led to a 
ten-year transitional period for that sector after long and tense negotiations in 
which French and Spanish interests were quite directly opposed.96 The Italian 
and Spanish delaying tactics to avoid a decision on the Mediterranean policy 
worked only partially. In October 1985 an agreement on the adoption of a new 
commercial policy for the Mediterranean was reached. French Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Roland Dumas, declared that, if the agreement was kept, ‘the French 
parliamentary ratification process of the treaty of accession could follow its 
course’ {El Pais, 27 October 1985). In fact, Mr. Dumas made it clear that a 
satisfactory resolution of the Mediterranean question was a basic condition for 
enlargement, and this strong French stance eventually convinced the Italians, 
who were the main advocates of enlargement.
96 Articles 131 to 156 of the Accession Treaty establish a four-year period under the same 
access conditions as before accession, followed by a six-year period o f progressive dismantling 
of tariffs and quotas. By the fourth year Spanish fruits and vegetables would be at the same 
level of EC preference as the Moroccan ones (Tamames 1986: 202-203).
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The combination of the agreement on the new commercial policy for the 
Mediterranean and the transitional periods for Spanish products was very 
negative for Spanish fruit and vegetable producers, because it broke a basic 
principle of the Community, EC preference. The situation of the third countries 
would not change in the first phase of the integration of the Spanish sector into 
the CAP, which meant that for some products, like citrus fruit, the tariffs paid 
by Spanish exporters would be considerably higher than those paid by 
Morocco and others. After that phase (4 years) the EC would examine the
07evolution of the exports of the Mediterranean non-EC countries, and if those 
countries had not managed to keep their traditional flows, the reference prices 
of several products would be modified, in parallel with the prices that Spanish 
products would enjoy at that moment, until the end of the transitional period 
(1996).
In the delicate situation of the pre-accession negotiations, Spanish Foreign 
Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez declared that ‘We have no interest in 
giving the impression that Spain is blocking the negotiation, because we do not 
want to harm the interests of the Maghreb’ (El Pais, 27 October 1985). The 
reaction of the Spanish public opinion and press was not so moderate, and saw 
the agreement as giving Spain as a member state treatment inferior to that 
given to a ‘former colony’ (Drevet 1986: 186). However, the fact that the 
agreements still needed to be re-negotiated with the Mediterranean third 
countries -  which would happen in 1986 - was a partial success of the Italian 
(and Spanish) delaying techniques.
The first years of membership
The tough positions of the Moroccans and the support they got from France 
and the European Commission accentuated in Spain a perception that was 
already widespread: the southern Mediterranean countries were, in economic
97 As an extra guarantee that Spain could not easily modify this agreement, the procedure to 
decide about this subject would be negative QMV, i.e. the measure proposed by the 
Commission could only be blocked with a qualified majority against it, and not, as it is usually
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terms, competitors for the same market, and this competition was almost a zero 
sum game, where every privilege granted in market access would give a 
potentially crucial advantage to the other side. In the mid-1980s the producers 
of some of the most affected products, and in particular the Valencian orange 
and tangerine producers, started diffusing in the Spanish media the image of 
the invasion of Moroccan products in European market that should be
no
contamed to save Spanish producers.
The representation of the interests of Spanish agricultural producers is not 
centralised in one single organisation, as has been the case to a large extent at 
EC level. It is divided between three big national federations (ASAJA, COAG 
and UP A) that in turn represent regional and professional associations. After a 
period of mobilisation during accession negotiations, and despite being 
fragmented, the farmers managed to keep quite direct contact with the Ministry 
of Agriculture and with the regional authorities, and to get favourable (and 
often openly nationalist) coverage from the press in their claims. Regional 
governments became adamant defenders of the interests of the agricultural 
sector, as was for instance the case of the Valencian government (Generalitat 
Valenciana) supporting the orange and tangerine producers’ positions in the 
late 1980s and the Andalusian government {Junta de Andaluda) with the 
tomato producers in the late 1990s. As with the fisheries’ negotiations, there 
was no powerful lobby in Spain to defend the interests of Morocco, or at least 
the need for a good relationship, that could be compared to the agricultural 
lobbies.
In the first two years of membership the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, under 
strong pressure from the producers, tried to redress two situations it perceived 
as deeply unfair for Spain: the fact that Spanish products, despite accession, 
had a treatment which was worse than that of some non-member countries (in 
particular Morocco); and the level of protection of Mediterranean products 
within the CAP, which for historical reasons was considerably lower than that
the case, without a qualified majority in favour. In other words, Italy, Greece and Spain 
together could not block it.
98 The Spanish citrus fruit sector, concentrated in the Valencia region, is an important part not 
only of Spanish agricultural economy but also of the world trade in fresh fruits. It accounts for 
40% of world exports of oranges and tangerines (Pool and del Campo Gomis 2000).
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of continental products (Gardner 1996). This placed Spain in the position of 
trying both to improve the treatment of its own producers and to block any 
attempt to improve access for the products of the Mediterranean non-member 
countries (Tovias 1995). As the most negatively affected country, Morocco 
viewed this Spanish position as the confirmation of its fears before 
enlargement.
For almost seven months in 1986 Spain blocked the adoption of the new EC 
Mediterranean Policy, which had been designed to compensate the 
Mediterranean non-member states for the potentially negative impact of the 
Iberian enlargement on their exports. The main argument that the Spanish 
negotiators used was the need to ensure that the producers of the Canary 
Islands (which were excluded from the CAP) would compete in European 
markets under better conditions than North African imports." Morocco 
expressed its intention to link the renewal of the fisheries agreement to the 
adoption of the EC Mediterranean Policy (El Pais, 24 July 1986) in order to 
pressure Spain, but to little effect.
It would again be France that would take on the defence of Moroccan interests 
and pressure Spain. In the French-Spanish summit of Zaragoza held in October 
1986 the two countries made a deal that ensured French co-operation in several 
projects of importance to Spain and the respect of some Spanish claims (in 
particular in relation to the agriculture of the Canaries) in exchange for Spanish 
support of the EC Mediterranean policy (Perez 1987). The Secretary of State 
for Relations with the EC, Pedro Solbes, admitted that in the summit he and 
Carlos Romero, Minister of Agriculture, had some ‘differences’ in their 
approach to the question (El Pais, 22 October 1986), and the tension between 
the Ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Affairs was unofficially admitted to 
the press. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was thinking in global, strategic 
terms both in relation to the EC and France, and in relation to the bilateral 
relations with Morocco, which were strained because of the Spanish attitude 
towards Moroccan exports to the EC.
99 The Canary Islands had been excluded from the CAP at Spanish request. The fact that they 
are situated at the same latitude as some of the Moroccan producer areas, combined with the
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The Spanish government finally removed one of the most disturbing elements 
of its relationship with Morocco when it announced its compromise, so as to 
support the EC Mediterranean policy on 16 October 1986. Only five days later 
the Mediterranean policy was approved together with a series of accompanying 
measures that granted a favourable treatment of Spanish (and in particular 
Canarian) products. The policy only granted to the Mediterranean non-member 
countries conditions that would, at best, maintain their exports at similar levels 
as those registered in the years before the enlargement. It had been so hard to 
reach that Commissioner Cheysson could only present it to the Mediterranean 
non-member countries as a ‘take it or leave it’ deal, with no possibility of re­
negotiating.
It is an indication of the way in which the policy in relation to external 
agricultural matters was conducted at the time that the very concrete interest of 
improving the conditions of market access for the agricultural products of the 
Canary Islands led to a situation of tension with Morocco, to the point that 
claims were made that ‘Spain’s actions were aimed at increasing instability in 
northern Africa’ (quoted in Tovias 1995: 102). Also indicative is the fact that 
the Spanish veto could only be removed under strong French pressure, with 
significant concessions (some of which directly affected agriculture and 
fisheries matters) and after a considerable row between the ministries of 
agriculture and foreign affairs. It is reasonable to object that similar 
concessions could probably have been obtained without harming so directly the 
relations with Morocco.
Morocco was the non-Mediterranean member country which complained with 
most intensity about the EC Mediterranean policy. An official newspaper 
declared before the agreement was actually signed that it ‘brought nothing new 
but a consolidation of Spanish interests’ and that the Alawi kingdom deserved 
a tailored treatment because its relations with the EC had ‘nothing to do’ with 
those of other Mediterranean countries (Le Matin, 20 October 1986). It did not 
sign the agreement before the end of the year, as all other countries except for
similar level of transportation costs, makes the agriculture in the islands particularly sensitive 
to any increase in Moroccan imports. See Caceres Hernandez 2000.
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Yugoslavia had done, but waited for the forthcoming fisheries negotiations as 
an opportunity to obtain a better deal.100
In 1987 there would still be some tension between Spain and Morocco because 
of competition in the field of agriculture. Before accession Spain had been 
denying to the Moroccan exporters the right to use its territory to send their 
products to the European markets, forcing them to use the slower, less flexible 
and unreliable maritime route. The entry in the EC should have put an end to 
this practice, but in fact it did not: under the strong pressure of the very well 
organised Valencian citrus fruit producers,101 the Spanish government 
maintained its restrictions. Contacts were maintained from 1986, but a 
definitive solution to the question (which could be delayed, but not avoided by 
Spain) only came with the signature of the 1988 Fisheries agreement: the final 
agreement on transit rights was signed in Rabat on 31 March 1988, only a
109month after the new fisheries agreement entered into force.
4.2 The new bilateral economic policy 
Global policy and stability in Morocco
If Spain was perceived at times as a fierce competitor of Morocco because of 
its positions in the negotiations within the EC about agricultural trade, the 
Spanish government also had the clear understanding since the beginning of 
the 1980s that economic relations should be a field of co-operation, not 
conflict, with Morocco. As we saw in chapter 2, when the Socialists first came 
to power in 1982 they tried to escape the permanent conflicts with the southern 
neighbours with a new ‘global policy’ towards the Maghreb. This policy was 
global in two senses: in scope and in content. In scope the policy targeted all 
the countries at the same time, abandoning the tactics of alternative alignment 
(‘policy of equilibrium’) with Morocco and Algeria for a regional approach. In
100 See Chapter 3, section 3.2.
101 Their main argument was that it was unfair that Moroccan citrus fruit, with lower 
production costs because of cheap labour, only paid a 4% tax whereas Spanish exports to the 
EC paid 12%. (Perez 1987)
102 Boletin Oficial del Estado num. 92, 16 April 1988. See also chapter 3, section 3.2
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content, the policy wanted to frame the difficult territorial questions in a wider 
web of economic, social and cultural relationships to make the relations with 
the southern neighbours more manageable (Dezcallar 1992).
In its official definition, Spanish policy towards the Maghreb would have two 
objectives: ‘the defence and promotion of Spanish interests in the region’ and 
‘the promotion of economic prosperity and political and social stability of all 
states in the region’ (Dezcallar 1992: 37). The interests in the first objective 
include political relations, security, economic elements (energy, the 
phosphates, fisheries and trade) and socio-cultural links (Spanish language, 
intercultural dialogue, etc.). Secondly, in the words of one of the designers of 
the Spanish policy towards the Mediterranean, ‘Spain wants a politically stable, 
economically prosperous and socially developed Maghreb’(Moratinos 1991). 
In the case of Morocco there was a need to go round the difficult questions 
affecting territorial issues (Ceuta and Melilla, Western Sahara) and, to a lesser 
extent, fisheries, the will to enlarge the relations to other fields where mutual 
interests could be defined and the resolve to avoid being caught again in the 
dynamics of inter-Maghreb quarrels.
Spain was attempting to define its national interests in new and broader terms. 
Thus, Spanish diplomacy came up with the concept of a ‘buffer’ (colchon) or a 
‘web’ (entramado) of common interests: Spain had to create a number of links 
and common interests with its Southern neighbour that would tie the two 
countries together in several fields, so that any crisis in some concrete aspect of 
the relations between the two countries would not evolve into a fully fledged 
bilateral crisis. The unspoken assumption was that this web of interests would 
somehow finally dissolve the territorial claims and Moroccan irredentism, or at 
least keep them at a secondary level. The contribution to the development of 
the southern neighbour was a longer term objective, which depended on many 
factors beyond Spanish control. When events (migration from Morocco, the 
Algerian crisis and the Islamist threat, riots in Casablanca, the reactions to the 
Gulf War) demonstrated the need to address the question of stability in north 
Africa, Spain had to look for new, more effective multilateral instruments, as 
we shall see further in this chapter.
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For the policy to work it was not enough to change the actions that Spain 
undertook in relation to Morocco. Almost as important was the perception of 
Spain amongst the Moroccan elite - particularly the people linked to the crown 
and the political parties - as a partner, not a competitor. Accession to the 
European Community had a negative impact in the field of agricultural trade, 
which needed to be redressed. But it also brought a positive change in the 
perception of Spain, no longer the backwards, isolated country in southern 
Europe of 1956. The Moroccan elite valued Spain’s peaceful political 
transition, its rapid modernisation and economic development, and its new 
capacity to shape European affairs (Hernando de Larramendi 1997: 417). In 
that sense, accession had strengthened the Spanish position vis-a-vis Morocco 
and had given its government the opportunity to play a new role in relation to 
the North African kingdom.
Weaving a net of common interests
The most obvious starting point in the search for common interests is, of 
course, geographical proximity. Spain and Morocco link Europe with Africa, 
and the 14 km -wide Strait of Gibraltar is a relatively short distance that large 
infrastructure projects could overcome. The oldest project (first discussed in 
1979/80) is a fixed link to unite the two shores by rail and/or road; this project 
has never been a high priority for Spanish governments, which they have 
revitalised only when they wanted to show good will to their counterpart 
(Hernando de Larramendi 1997: 401-403).103 Its construction has not actually 
taken off because of the huge costs of a tunnel, the best option from the 
technical point of view. Other trans-Strait infrastructure projects include the 
Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which brings gas from the Algerian Sahara through 
Morocco to Spain and Portugal - not, strictly speaking, a bilateral project, but 
one that benefits Morocco and Spain, and largely built with Spanish public 
money - and the interconnection between the Moroccan and Spanish electricity
103 For example, in 1985 the Spanish government tried to counter the negative perception of its 
accession to the EU amongst Moroccan authorities by sending the Transport Minister, Enrique
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grids by means of an underwater cable finalised in 1997. Spain has also been 
involved in big Moroccan infrastructure projects, both through financial and 
technical co-operation and through Spanish firms, which have won substantial 
contracts.
For the ‘web of interests’ in construction to acquire some consistency, both 
economies needed to become intertwined in a stream of trade, investment, 
tourism, etc. The resources generated by the high growth rate of the Spanish 
economy and the new tendency of large Spanish firms to internationalise could 
sustain an intensification of trade and investment, and thus contribute to 
Morocco’s economic development. Spain and Morocco signed in 1988 the 
‘Framework Agreement on Economic and Financial Co-operation’104 which 
signals the start of a new era in Spanish-Moroccan economic relations: in four 
years, 125,000 million ptas were to be made available to Morocco as loans,105 
which went to joint development projects but also to finance the acquisition of 
Spanish goods (tied aid). The agreement was renewed subsequently until 1996 
and then until 2001, with the addition in 1996 of a credit line to encourage 
Spanish small and medium enterprises to enter the Moroccan market.
In order to encourage further Spanish investment in Morocco both countries 
signed an ‘Agreement for the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments’ 
in September 1989, coinciding with the start of a process of liberalisation and 
privatisation in Morocco. Financial co-operation also had to tackle the problem 
of debt, a heavy burden for the Moroccan economy. Spain tried for the first 
time with Morocco the formula of debt conversion. In 1996 an agreement for 
conversion of debt into private investments was signed. The mechanism was to 
allow Spain to recover part of the debt and Morocco to reduce its burden, 
support Spanish investors in Morocco (because it made the conversion of debt 
conditional on the realisation of private projects) and thus contribute to 
Moroccan development (Rato 1996: 37). The programme was successful and,
Baron, to Rabat in January 1985 in order to re-activate the project as a way to ‘establish closer 
links and create situations of economic interdependency’ (ABC, 17 January 1985).
104 Boletin Oficial del Estado n° 290, 3 December 1988.
105 This quantity was increased up to 150,000 million during the visit o f the King of Spain to 
Rabat in 1991.
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despite the increase of the quantity initially foreseen, it was completely used up 
by private firms within two years (Ramos Mesa 2000).
Since 1977 Spain had been offering to developing countries the loans of the 
Fondo de Ayuda al Desarrollo (FAD), a form of tied aid106 in which money is 
lent under favourable conditions with the condition that it has to be used by the 
recipient to purchase goods and services from the donor country.107 Morocco 
became one of the main beneficiaries of those loans: in the 1982-1992 period, 
it absorbed 10.1% of the total FAD loans.108 The loans were, to a large extent, 
directed to infrastructure (35.5%), to the modernisation of the productive 
sectors (34,5%), mainly industry, and to the defence industry (14%). More 
often than not they were used to favour the penetration of the Moroccan market 
by Spanish firms, rather than addressing problems of Moroccan development. 
They were also used as an element for bargaining in the fisheries negotiations 
(Gomez Gil 1996: 40-41).
As Spain became a richer country and the growth of the economy made more 
resources available to the government, development co-operation, and more 
specifically direct official aid, became a tool of Spanish foreign policy. Spanish 
development co-operation was initially mostly based on loans, and direct 
grants grew very slowly, and remained modest compared to those of the EC, 
France and the USA (see Table 4.2 below). Cultural co-operation with 
Morocco is of particular importance since Spanish policy makers feel that the 
heritage of the protectorate has been under-exploited: Spanish is still widely 
understood in the north of the country, where Spanish TV can be followed 
thanks to the equipment that ensures reception in Ceuta and Melilla, and 
interest for the language is alive in the whole country (Hernando de
106 Although the FAD loans are always mentioned when Spanish development policy is 
analysed, the analysis of both their legal framework and the way in which they have been used 
proves that they ‘were neither created nor thought as a part o f development co-operation, but as 
a part of commercial policy.’ (Schommel 1992: 171)
10 The use of FAD credits by the Spanish government has been severely criticised. Firstly, 
because of their nature of tied aid (which the OECD does not count as official development 
aid), and secondly, because it was often used for the purchase o f military equipment. This last 
point was particularly acute in the cases o f some Arab countries like Morocco and Egypt. For a 
detailed analysis o f Spanish development cooperation in the Maghreb see Gomez Gil 1996 and 
Hernando de Larramendi and Nunez Villaverde 1996
108 Source: Subdireccion General de Fomento Financiero a la Exportation in Gomez Gil 1996.
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Larramendi 1997: 433-434). The Spanish government encourages this interest 
by funding five schools and five cultural centres.109
Table 4.2 Official Direct Aid to Morocco: bilateral grants by donor (1986- 
2000) (in 1000 US$)
Year Spain
%*
France
%*
EC
%*
EC + EU MS 
%*
USA
%**
1986 0 0 70,600 72.4 11,200 11.5 97,500 100 31,000 31.8
1987 1,100 0.9 83,600 69.3 9,600 7.9 120,700 100 47,000 39.9
1988 1,400 1.1 88,300 71.1 2,800 2.2 124,200 100 46,000 37.0
1989 1,900 1.4 79,700 60.4 5,200 3.9 131,900 100 49,000 37.0
1990 2,000 0.9 111,400 54.6 26,800 13.1 203,800 100 32,000 15.7
1991 2,800 1.5 101,500 55.5 44,000 24.0 182,800 100 39,000 21.3
1992 2,800 1.1 113,600 46.8 47,300 19.5 242,600 100 20,000 8.2
1993 4,300 1.1 114,300 30.3 207,100 54.8 377,700 100 33,000 8.7
1994 2,600 1.4 101,900 29.0 180,500 51.4 351,300 100 26,000 7.4
1995 8,700 3.0 159,300 54.6 63,200 21.7 291,700 100 18,000 6.2
1996 14,900 2.9 252,000 48.5 198,100 38.1 519,300 100 35,000 6.7
1997 21,200 5.0 151,700 36.0 199,100 47.2 421,800 100 13,000 3.1
1998 44,400 8.8 186,300 36.9 210,100 41.6 504,600 100 31,100 6.2
1999 21,600 4.5 185,200 38.7 209,300 43.7 478,900 100 25,600 5.3
2000 56,300 18.9 134,700 45.2 58,200 19.5 298,200 100 37,200 12.5
* After the discontinuous line, comparison with the sum o f grants given by the European 
Commission and the EU member states.
** The USA is included for comparison sake only.Percentage is compared to the EU total(EU 
+ MS).
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Edition 2002 and author’s calculations.
Finally, the web of interests had another important component: military co­
operation. If since the transition the Spanish army had viewed Morocco as the 
most likely enemy in the case of a bilateral armed conflict (Alonso Baquer 
1988: chapter IX), it may seem paradoxical that Spain also became one of the
109 Four of the five schools (Tanger, Tetuan, Nador and A1 Hoceima) and two o f the cultural 
centres (Tanger and Tetuan) are in the north, wheras the rest are in the big cities (Casablanca,
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main suppliers of military equipment to the Moroccan army and that the two 
armies started a series of joint programmes and manoeuvres. It is not: beyond 
the merely economic interest of arms sales to a country with rocketing military 
budgets, providing the Moroccan army with equipment of which the Spanish 
army knew not only the technical characteristics but even the secret codes 
reassured Madrid about its superiority in the event of conflict. Evidence that 
the weapons were used in the Sahara War did not seem to disturb the Spanish 
Ministry of Defence, which had one of the friendliest relationships with its 
Moroccan counterpart amongst the Spanish government ministries, particularly 
in the second half of the 1980s.
For the ‘web of common interest* to acquire the consistency that the Spanish 
government expected, official actions were not enough. Once a framework for 
co-operation and good neighbourliness was put in place, the private sector 
needed to follow up and give substance to all the agreements. This meant 
exporting to and importing from Morocco, and investing in the North African 
country. The process was favoured from the Moroccan side with a series of 
economic reforms that started in 1983 and continued into the next decade. With 
a large potential for growth of the bilateral trade and financial exchanges 
(Tovias and Bacaria 1999: 6, 7), and with official support from both sides of 
the Strait, economic relations started to intensify at the end of the 1980s.
Rabat and Fez).
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Table 4.3 Spam’s imports from and exports to Morocco (1986-2002) (in 
Million US$)
Year Imports from 
Morocco %*
Total
Imports
Exports to 
Morocco %**
Total
Exports
1986 14.491 0.50 2910.164 25.338 1.12 2261.257
1987 18.156 0.45 4053.944 37.631 1.33 2831.552
1988 23.389 0.58 4028.402 40.970 1.22 3352.579
1989 25.700 0.43 5954.361 37.097 1.00 3701.167
1990 35.481 0.49 7288.007 54.360 1.18 4613.112
1991 35.373 0.46 7756.714 51.417 1.03 4992.762
1992 39.134 0.50 8313.132 58.142 1.08 5361.172
1993 35.248 0.51 6920.164 60.601 1.15 5252.392
1994 42.675 0.55 7708.991 57.210 0.94 6108.182
1995 48.603 0.51 9569.302 64.770 0.85 7634.374
1996 52.223 0.51 10155.47 69.722 0.82 8507.583
1997 55.784 0.54 10225.85 73.378 0.84 8689.788
1998 62.619 0.65 11079.99 87.773 0.96 9098.125
1999 62.962 0.51 12330.40 97.838 1.05 9297.824
2000 73.988 0.58 12739.18 104.871 1.11 9443.743
* Percentage o f imports from Morocco over total Spanish imports
** Percentage o f exports to Morocco over total Spanish exports
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium, Edition 2002 and author’s calculations
Spanish investment in Morocco started to grow in 1986, and the tendency 
accelerated after the signature in 1988 of the Framework Agreement on 
Economic and Financial Co-operation and the new Moroccan legal framework 
for foreign investment put into place that same year. Soon Spain became an 
important investor in Morocco). Financial institutions, mining, agriculture, 
textile, chemical industry, mechanical industry, public works and 
telecommunications were the sectors that attracted most Spanish investors. 
Those include some of the largest firms with extensive international presence, 
but also a large number of small and medium enterprises.
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All these Spanish efforts did not go unnoticed in Morocco, but the Spanish 
attitude in relation to the vital issue of Moroccan agricultural exports to the EC 
affected the image of the country to a larger extent. Within the Spanish 
government the attitude towards Morocco was not uniform: while the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs developed the doctrine of the ‘buffer of common interests’, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had no problem in opposing 
any concession to what it saw as a dangerous competitor. Agricultural lobbies’ 
claims, as happened with fisheries, met with sympathy in the press and public 
opinion, in particular after the tough conditions imposed upon them in the 
accession process. This was seen in Rabat as a sign that Spain was not a 
reliable partner, in particular when it acted within the EC, despite the 
improvement in bilateral relations. This contradictory policy in economic 
issues -  bilaterally friendly, multilaterally hostile -  could not contribute to the 
solution of political differences in the way that the Foreign Ministry had hoped.
4.3 From competitor to advocate
By the second half of the 1980s, Spanish policy-makers were well aware that 
the solution of some of the problems that Morocco suffered and which had 
negative repercussions for Spain, like uncontrolled migration, was well beyond 
Spanish means. Bilateral efforts could attract the goodwill of an otherwise 
difficult neighbour, and have considerable beneficial effects for Morocco itself, 
but they would never be able to stop the divergence that grew bigger between 
the two sides of the Strait (see figure 2.1 in chapter 2). While Spain progressed 
in its successful industrialisation and normalised its international situation as it 
became a full member of the European Community, with growing levels of 
welfare, Morocco entered a deep economic crisis and proved unable to face the 
challenges of modernisation, democratisation, massive urbanisation and 
demographic growth (see table 2.5 in chapter 2).
EC membership provided a new opportunity to mobilise much more substantial 
resources towards Morocco, which could have a considerably higher impact 
than Spanish bilateral actions. The ‘Moroccan problem’ of the last third of the 
twentieth century, might need a ‘European solution’, just like the ‘Spanish
158
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 4
problem’ of the first third of the century was supposed to have needed.110 
Spanish governments would seek to use the opportunities provided by the EU 
in order to solve some of the problems of the relations between Spain and its 
southern neighbours. That needed a complete change of Spain’s role within the 
EC, from the worst enemy of the economic interest of the Mediterranean non­
member countries into the champion of that same interest.
The first Presidency and the early 1990s
The first opportunity to demonstrate the new Spanish attitude within the 
European Community was the Presidency of the EC, which Spain took over for 
the first time in January 1989. This came at a particularly good moment since 
some of the most delicate controversies had been solved at the beginning of 
1988: the new fisheries agreement was signed in February, and with it came, 
after a two-year delay, the commercial and financial protocols to the 1976 
Morocco-EC Co-operation Agreement that served as a compensation for the 
Iberian enlargement; the bilateral agreement for the transit of Moroccan 
products came only a month later; and shortly afterwards the ‘Spain-Morocco 
Framework Agreement on Economic and Financial Co-operation’. After 
blocking, for the first two years of its EC membership, European initiatives that 
would favour Morocco, Spain proved in early 1989 that its attitude had 
changed.
This change in attitude was not only the result of the pressures in the fisheries 
negotiations, nor was it simply a projection of the bilateral ‘global policy’. In 
Spain the late 1980s brought the realisation of a new phenomenon: Moroccan 
migrants no longer saw Spain just as a transit country, but instead as a 
destination in its own right. This fact was crucial in the change of the Spanish 
attitude, as we will see in chapter 5. The economic situation of Morocco 
became a direct concern for Spanish policy makers, aware that only prosperity 
in Morocco could stop the increasing flow and foster social and political
110 The philosopher Ortega y Gasset’s famous sentence ‘Spain is the problem, Europe is the 
solution’ had an influence throughout the twentieth century on Spanish intellectuals and
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stability in the southern neighbour. The good performance of the very sectors 
in Spain that were supposedly most threatened by the concessions to Morocco 
was also important, as it reduced some pressure on the government (see table 
4.4).
Table 4.4 Exports of citrus fruit from the main Mediterranean producers 
(yearly average)
Country
1984-88 1994-98
1000 TM %* 1000 TM %*
Greece 255 5.4 434 8.3
Italy 266 5.6 179 3.4
Spain 2,006 42.6 2,725 52.5
Morocco 585
'
12.4 559 10.8
Egypt 153 3.2 269 5.2
Israel 589 12.5 336 6.5
Turkey 222 4.7 344 6.6
Mediterranean 4,704 100.0 5,194 100.0
*Percentage over total Mediterranean exports 
Source: Ahmed El Kamel (2000) based on FAO statistics.
In i988, some of the obstacles and added difficulties that had emerged for 
Morocco as a result of Spanish EC membership had been removed. But it was 
also the year in which Morocco would acknowledge a new interest in a 
partnership with Spain, which became its second trading partner that year and 
whose firms started to show an interest in investment in Morocco. The 1989 
EC presidency would be the opportunity for the Spanish government to prove 
that it was not a rival, but an ally for Morocco within the EC, a role which 
France had been playing almost exclusively ever since the Community was 
created. Spain also had to prove that the concessions made in 1988 were the
policy-makers.
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sign of a new attitude rather than just the consequence of Moroccan pressure 
during the fisheries negotiations.
The context in North Africa was also favourable. After years of rivalry and 
changing alliances, the double detente (Algeria-Morocco, Libya-Tunisia) that 
started in 1987 made possible a process which culminated in the creation of the 
Union of the Arab Maghreb on 17 February 1989.111 This was warmly 
welcomed by the EC, and in particular by the Spanish presidency. Spanish 
diplomacy used the Presidency as an opportunity to re-launch the Co-operation 
Councils with the Maghreb countries, which had been postponed for years. 
That was a crucial gesture towards Morocco, which was still sore about the 
refusal of its application for membership in 1987 and sought to establish a 
privileged political link with the EC.
An extra asset only partly in the hands of the Spanish government was the fact 
that two Spanish commissioners were put in charge of two crucial portfolios in 
the EC-Morocco relations: the Socialist Manuel Marin became responsible for 
Fisheries and Development Co-operation, and the Conservative Abel Matutes 
for Mediterranean Relations, North-South Relations and Latin America. In 
1992 Manuel Marin would substitute Matutes as the Commissioner responsible 
for Mediterranean Relations, and his position would be strengthened by his 
new foreign policy responsibilities. The Spanish presence in Brussels was 
further reinforced by the election of Enrique Baron, a Spanish Socialist, as the 
Chairman of the European Parliament in 1989.
Finally, 1989 saw the birth of new co-operation between France and Spain on 
the situation in the Western Mediterranean, an area of crucial interest for both 
countries. Northwest Africa had been traditionally considered as an area of 
French influence, and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reluctant to 
discuss it, in particular with Spain, with whom France had important 
disagreements. However, the French socialist government through Foreign 
Minister Dumas, started a new attitude of consultation and co-operation with 
Spain and Italy, considering that an Arab policy based on Gaullist principles 
was a fallacy, and that interests and stability in the Mediterranean could only
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be preserved through co-operation among the European allies (Baixeras 1996: 
150-151). Co-operation with France was particularly important because France 
would follow Spain in the Presidency of the EC. That meant that a co-ordinated 
strategy in favour of the southern countries would allow for more significant 
results. Co-operation with Italy had always been easier, and it was also crucial 
in many of the initiatives for the Mediterranean. Moreover, Italy would hold 
the Presidency in the second half of 1990, half a year after the French 
Presidency.
The Spanish government shared with the European Commission, other member 
states and the Mediterranean third countries the perception that the Global 
Mediterranean Policy designed in the 1970s had been a failure. The countries 
of the southern Mediterranean had failed to develop and fallen into deep 
economic crises, which resulted in dangerous effects: riots and instability, the 
growing Islamist threat, illegal drugs trade, and immigration northwards. 
However, the Spanish government wanted to reform this policy in a very 
concrete direction. Far from the proposals to liberalise further the trade in the 
most competitive products of the Mediterranean non-member countries, a 
policy which would concentrate the costs on Spain and other southern 
European countries, it preferred an approach based on generous financial aid, 
distributed the burden proportionally amongst member states according to the 
size of their economies.
The Spanish presidency was the start of an important cycle of changes in the 
Mediterranean policy of the European Union, but during the Presidency itself 
few concrete steps were undertaken. The events that changed the EC context 
completely came mainly during the French presidency in the second half of 
1989: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the changes in Central and Eastern 
Europe. This contributed to a clear definition of Spanish interests within 
European Political Co-operation, to include the Mediterranean and Latin 
America as the main areas of concern, in contrast with Central and Eastern 
Europe, which had become the priority for the Twelve (Barbe 1996: 16-17). 
This also created a concern amongst the big Mediterranean EC member states
111 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.
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that the priority given to Eastern Europe went against European involvement in 
the Southern Mediterranean.
119In the following years France, Spain and Italy launched a series of bilateral 
initiatives towards the region, especially towards the Western Mediterranean: 
the Italian-Spanish proposal for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
the Mediterranean, the five-plus-five initiative in the Western Mediterranean, 
the French-Egyptian proposal for a Mediterranean Forum. At the same time 
they worked within the European Community to ensure that the Mediterranean 
non-member countries would not be'the main losers of the re-orientation of the 
EC foreign policy priorities. In the European Commission the work of Abel 
Matutes, EC Commissioner in charge of the Mediterranean, and his team was 
also important for the definition of a new policy.
The new policy was finally approved in December 1990, at the end of the 
Italian Presidency, and was called the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. If the 
third financial protocol had been approved as a compensation for the Iberian 
enlargement and its negative consequences for the Mediterranean non member 
countries, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy and the fourth financial 
protocol were largely a compensation for the new links of the EC with Central 
and Eastern Europe and the relative loss of ranking within the EC external 
trade pyramid for the southern Mediterranean countries.
The main feature of the new policy was the increase on the aid package, which 
for 1992-1996 was three times the amount of the third protocol. Morocco 
benefited from this increase, although the increase was proportionally smaller, 
35%, due to the already generous amount it had obtained with the third 
financial protocol (see table 4.5). Trade concessions were considerably less 
significant, the most relevant change being the new deadline for the elimination 
of duties on traditional amounts of agricultural exports, brought forward by 
three years. This change was simply the result of the same change in the 
transition period for Spanish products. In the words of an analyst: ‘The
112 Portugal, which is technically not a Mediterranean country, was later on associated with 
most o f the initiatives. The other Mediterranean member state, Greece, never performed a 
distinctly Mediterranean role within the EC. The reasons for this are discussed in Ioakimidis 
1996.
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Renovated Mediterranean Policy can be characterized as a minor victory 
obtained by southern European states over their northern neighbours in that 
more aid was to be distributed from Brussels without any changes being made 
to the international division of labour around the Mediterranean -  a taboo 
subject.’ (Tovias 1996: 14) That describes accurately the Spanish strategy 
towards the region marked by the double concern about the need to ensure 
economic development for the southern neighbours and about their competitive 
challenge, to which the Spanish economy was particularly sensitive.
Table 4.5 EC aid to Morocco in the financial protocols 1978-1996 (in 
MECU)
First (1978-81)
" ' v ’r > •  v  !v
56 74 130 -
Second (1982-86) 90 109 199 53%
Third (1987-1991) 151 173 324 63%
Fourth (1992-96)
- • - '*■ ’ ‘ ’1
218 220 438 35%
Source: Institut MEDEA -  European Commission (www.medea.be)
The run up to Barcelona
The facts would soon prove that the Renovated Mediterranean Policy was 
simply not sufficient to deal with the huge problems that the Mediterranean 
region faced at economic, let alone political, level. Northern European 
reluctance had thwarted some financial initiatives, like the creation of a 
Development Bank for the Mediterranean similar to EBRD for Eastern Europe, 
and southern European opposition had prevented any significant trade 
concessions in crucial fields like agriculture or textiles. As a result, the 
Renovated Mediterranean Policy was clearly insufficient for the needs of the
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Arab countries. It failed to address the crucial economic questions of unequal 
trade liberalisation, growing foreign debt, excessive dependency and the 
erosion of the trading preferential status of the Mediterranean non member 
countries. The amount of aid was still low: the quantity that would go from the 
EC to the 12 Mediterranean non-member countries in the 1992-1996 period 
(1,075 MECU) was about a half of what Israel alone received from the United 
States in one year (Khader 1991: 142).
Spain very soon realised the need to go far beyond that stage. In the autumn of 
1990 social riots in Morocco resulting from the economic crises were followed 
by massive demonstrations in support of the Iraqi regime at the time of the 
Gulf war. Morocco was the only country in the Maghreb which joined the 
international coalition against the Baghdad regime, and Spain was aware of the 
political costs of such an option and the need to offer concrete compensation 
from the European side. This time Spain could count less on Italy, which was 
absorbed internally by its the deepest political crisis since WWII and externally 
by worrying events in the former Yugoslavia, and on France, which was in a 
moment of sour relations with Rabat and wary of Spanish growing 
protagonism in its former chasse gar dee (Gillespie 2000: 149).
In this context, in January 1992 the European Parliament did not ratify the 
1992-1996 financial protocol for Morocco, as a response to Moroccan failure 
to comply with UN resolutions on Western Sahara and to its poor human rights 
record, triggering an outraged Moroccan reaction. This happened in the middle 
of the negotiations to renew the fisheries agreement, and Spain was thus the
in
main victim of the Moroccan reaction. Spanish officials were increasingly 
concerned with events in the Maghreb, and became the main advocate of the 
need for the EC to take significant steps in favour of Morocco. This Spanish 
attitude was recognised by the Moroccan authorities, who accepted to go back 
to the negotiation table to discuss fisheries aware that the lack of agreement 
penalised Spain, ‘whose support for Moroccan claims was constant’, according 
to crown prince Mohammed Ben el Hassan (Alaoui 1994: 48). But Morocco 
made the signature of the new fisheries agreement conditional on the
113 See chapter 3, section 3.2.
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implementation of a new framework of relationships (Nunez Villaverde 1996: 
54).
The initial reaction from Madrid was to propose the establishment of a free 
trade area between Morocco and the EC,114 but Spain soon adopted an 
approach dealing with the whole Maghreb. In the Council Foreign Minister 
Fernandez Ordonez insisted on the need to deal with the explosive North 
African situation. On 17 February 1992 the Council asked the Spanish Foreign 
Minister to present a political report, and the Commissioner responsible for the 
Mediterranean to draft a report on the economic situation. The Spanish Foreign 
Minister’s report, ‘Europe facing the Maghreb’,115 called for immediate action 
in the Maghreb. A week later Commissioner Matutes presented his own report 
on the economic aspects of the relationship. On 6 April 1992 the Council held 
a debate on EC relations with the Maghreb, and asked the Commission to draft 
a project based upon four pillars: political dialogue, economic, scientific and 
cultural co-operation, financial assistance and a free trade area (Marquina 
1995: 33).
The Commission adopted the Matutes proposal on 29 April 1992.116 The 
document targeted the whole of the Maghreb, and not only Morocco, but it also 
signalled the return to a bilateral approach rather than a sub-regional one, in 
line with the Moroccan preference (Marquina 1995: 33-34). The proposal was 
well received in Rabat, and the fisheries agreement was signed two days after 
its adoption at the Commission. Soon afterwards the European Parliament 
finally gave the green light to the fourth financial protocols for Morocco. The 
idea of a partnership between the European Union and the Maghreb countries 
coincided with the approach that Spain was frying to consolidate in its relations 
with Morocco, which found its clearest expression in the 1991 bilateral Treaty 
of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation. Thus, Spain was trying
1,4 In a time in which Europe was still officially supporting the Arab Maghreb Union, this 
meant going along with the Moroccan Government, which considered that the Union was not 
working and went back to the idea of a privileged partnership with Europe (Marquina 1995: 
33). The Spanish Prime Minister had already given his support to this proposal in his visit to 
Rabat in July 1991 (Nunez Villaverde 1996: 61).
115 Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores Actividades 1992, pages 877-891. The report was dated 21 
February 1992, and was prepared by Jorge Dezcallar, the Spanish General Director for Africa 
and the Middle East.
116 SEC(92) 401, sent to the Council and to the European Parliament in June 1992.
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to upload to the European level an approach that would make it appear as a 
partner, not a rival, of Morocco, and that stressed the common interests over 
the competition elements.
The new EC approach was announced in the Declaration on Euro-Maghrebi
1 17Relations at the Lisbon European Council in June 1992. The declaration, 
drafted by the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry (Marquina 2000:524), 
reflected a compromise between the northern and southern EC member 
countries. The need to create a zone of stability and prosperity around the 
Mediterranean was acknowledged, but Community preference and the 
agricultural and industrial production of the southern member states would not 
be endangered. In exchange, the partnership would include political aspects 
like respect for human and minority rights, respect for democracy and a 
commitment to international law, all of which the northern countries wanted to 
include but the southern member states would have preferred to leave aside.
In Spain, the proposal of a free trade area and the new agreement with 
Morocco was seen as an opportunity for Spanish firms to develop their exports, 
but not as a reason to make substantial sacrifices (Gillespie 2000: 150). Some 
northern countries would have preferred a more substantial liberalisation of the 
agriculture exchanges, whereby Morocco could export more Mediterranean 
products but would also buy more Atlantic products, which the EC produced in 
excess (milk, cereals, beef, etc.). The southern member states, and in particular 
Spain, opposed this strategy and opted for financial compensation that would 
allow Morocco and the other Maghreb countries to increase their self- 
sufficiency in food production (Marquina 1995: 36). This Spanish position was 
contained in a document presented to the Council in September 1993, and its 
acceptance by the European side triggered a Moroccan reaction a month later 
calling for a full liberalisation for its agricultural exports. As a result during 
1994 only two rounds of negotiation were held, with no positive results (Nunez 
Villaverde 1996: 55).
1,7 See the conclusions of the European Council in ‘Consejo Europeo (Lisboa, 26 y 27 de junio 
de 1992)’, Revista de Instituciones Europeas, no.19 (1992-2), pp 729-777, in particular p. 744.
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Nevertheless, Spain would continue with the policy of trying to direct the EC’s 
attention towards the Mediterranean after the Lisbon European Council. The 
improvement of bilateral relations with France played an important role in that 
effort (Gillespie 2000: 152). Only a joint Spanish-French effort with Italian and 
Portuguese support could generate the needed changes in EC external policies. 
All these countries had a much clearer interest in the Western Mediterranean, 
and given the extremely difficult situation in Algeria and Libya, their main 
interests were in Morocco and Tunisia. But the relatively good prospects of the 
Middle East Peace Process and especially the need to get the other EC member 
countries involved made them opt for an all-inclusive approach, which 
eventually left only Libya out of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.118
The permanent pressure of the southern EC member countries succeeded in 
keeping the Mediterranean at the top of the EU agenda in the following two 
years. In Corfu, at the end of the Greek presidency (24 and 25 June 1994) the 
idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Conference was agreed upon, and half a year 
later the Essen European Council (9 and 10 December 1994) decided to hold a 
Euro-Mediterranean Conference in November 1995 in Barcelona under the 
Spanish presidency. The Cannes European Council (26 and 27 June 1995) was 
crucial because it liberated the funds that would be needed for the Euro- 
Mediterranean partnership to work. Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez 
successfully convinced German Chancellor Kohl of the importance of the 
Mediterranean for the EC (Baixeras 1996: 158). The Commission officials in 
charge of the dossier were aware of the need to get the northern EU member 
states interested in the partnership, and thus opted for an emphasis on free trade 
and consulted large European firms when drawing of the proposals. As a result 
of those efforts German support was finally obtained and the final quantity of 
aid promised in Cannes, 4.685 MECU for the 1996-99 period, more than 
doubled the previous financial protocols.
118 12 Mediterranean non member countries took part in the Barcelona conference: Mauritania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Malta, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, Cyprus and Turkey.
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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Euro- 
Mediterranean Association Agreement
The efforts to organise the Barcelona Conference started long before the 
Spanish presidency itself. Commissioner Marin’s team in Brussels was in 
permanent contact with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the two 
years before the Conference (Baixeras 1996: 159). The compromise of 
including all Mediterranean member states, except Libya, caused difficulties 
for Spanish diplomacy. Despite the fact that Spain’s main interest was in the 
Western Mediterranean, in order to ensure the political success of the 
Conference most diplomatic efforts focused on the Mashrek, and in particular 
on Syria and Lebanon, whose participation was deemed crucial by Spain, the 
rest of the member states and the Commission.
The run up to the Conference was particularly complicated in terms of relations 
with Morocco. While important sections of the foreign ministry were busy 
preparing the guidelines of the Conference and discussing with all the countries 
involved, two crucial negotiations between the EU and Morocco were taking 
place: one on the fisheries agreement and the one on the new association 
agreement. Success in both before the start of the Conference was crucial both 
for Spain and for Morocco. Spain did not want internal unrest which could 
hamper the smooth development of the Conference at a time when the eyes of 
the whole region would be focused on Barcelona. Morocco could not afford to 
arrive at the Conference in a situation of conflict with the EU and without an 
agreement that Israel and Tunisia had already signed, if it wanted to maintain 
the discourse of its privileged relationship with Europe.
The negotiation of the association agreement, and in particular its agricultural 
chapter, would be a crucial test of the extent to which Spain had changed its 
role within the EC in relation to Morocco. Spain and other southern countries 
had been pressuring the Commission in the initial talks during 1993 and 1994 
in order to avoid concessions in crucial imports, like tomatoes (Marquina 1995: 
38-40). But in 1995, during the last stages of the negotiation, and unlike in 
1986, Spain was not the country blocking the agreement for its narrow
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interests. Instead, two northern countries took most of the blame at the last 
moment: the Netherlands and Germany.119 If in general the concessions made 
to Morocco were considerably lower than Rabat expected, the French 
permanent representative to the EU, Pierre de Boissieu, commented that ‘ 
Spain has paid a particularly high bilateral price for this agreement’ (El Pais, 
26 October 1995). Indeed, the representatives of the producers of the products 
affected (mainly tomatoes, citrus fruit and some fresh vegetables like 
cucumbers and courgettes) protested vehemently in Andalusia and the 
Canaries, and even in Barcelona during the Conference, against the conditions 
of the agreement.
What had changed since the early years of membership to explain this 
approach? The situation was different both at the EU level and at the domestic 
level. At EU level extremely tough negotiations for a new fisheries agreement 
were running in parallel and explicitly linked by both sides. Morocco used the 
fisheries dossier to obtain some advantages for its agriculture, and Spain, as the 
main beneficiary of the fisheries agreement, had a reason (and an alibi) to make 
concessions. Although Luis Atienza, Agriculture and Fisheries Minister at the 
time, denied at the time that there was an exchange of ‘fish for tomatoes’ (El 
Pais, 23 October 1995), the perception of the farmers was that their interests 
were sacrificed to those of the more radically mobilised fishermen. At the same 
time, Spain was holding the EU presidency, with the Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference in Barcelona as the star project. This meant that the pressure to 
solve all difficulties with a crucial Mediterranean third country like Morocco 
was very high.
119 Many EU countries had something to lose from the concessions to the Moroccans, 
depending on the product: Portugal with canned sardines, Greece with citrus fruits, France and 
Ireland with potatoes and tomatoes, Spain and Italy with almost every product. However, all of 
them gave a higher priority to the agreement with Morocco. Only the Netherlands and 
Germany, and to a lesser extent Belgium, blocked the agreement for some time to defend their 
agricultural interests in the tomato (Belgium and the Netherlands) and cut flower (Germany 
and the Netherlands) sectors, attracting criticism from other member states. According to the 
Commission, the potential loss of the German cut flower sector was estimated at about 270,000 
ecus, 0.01% of the 2,770 million ecu in EU exports to Morocco in 1994, which were expected 
to rise exponentially with the Association Agreement (Vidal-Folch 1995). One of the 
Moroccan interviewees interpreted this German attitude as a warning sign to Spain, the 
member country which had most interest in the Agreement, that it should make more 
concessions, rather than showing an attitude driven by self-interest.
170
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 4
During the Presidency the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a position of 
strength vis-a-vis the domestic ministries and could shape the policy more 
intensively than in other periods. A skilful use of the Presidency combined 
with a good understanding with the Commission also allowed for a new 
distribution of the costs of trade concessions to Mediterranean non-member 
states, which started to be shared by non-Mediterranean northern member 
states, showing that lack of solidarity with the Mediterranean was not 
necessarily an inherently southern European (or Spanish) characteristic. In the 
domestic sphere, the EU Presidency was also crucial in a context of strong 
internal pressures on the government. Agricultural producers in Andalusia, 
Valencia and the Canary Islands started mobilising relatively late, compared to 
the fishermen. Their claims got wide coverage in the press, although this time 
some writers started to challenge the terrible consequences forecast if the
190agreement were to be signed.
On 8 October 1995 the Spanish Parliament, under the influence of fishermen 
and farmers organisations, refused unanimously to accept the draft Association 
Agreement which was being discussed in the Council at the time because of its 
potentially harmful effects. But, despite the negative vote in the Parliament, the 
agreement was approved with hardly any change by the Spanish government in 
a classic case of the use of EU politics (and in particular of the Presidency) as a 
means of overcoming parliamentary scrutiny.
The final result was that Spain made concessions that were politically difficult 
in the domestic arena, although economically not very relevant (as proved by 
the evolution of the fruit and vegetable markets in the following years), and, 
more importantly, this time it did not appear to be the only obstacle to the 
realisation of Moroccan interests. This was crucial for the credibility of the 
new, self-assigned, role of advocate of the interests of the Mediterranean non­
member countries that Spain sought to play at that time. This does not mean 
that the Moroccan interest was better preserved: the constraints on Moroccan
120 After all the gloomy predictions in 1986, in ten years Spanish agricultural family income 
had gone from 87 to 121% of the EU average (Vidal-Folch 1995); Spanish tomato exports to 
the rest of the EU had doubled in the period 1991-1994 and were growing at a 20% yearly rate 
despite the concessions to Morocco (Commission 1996), and Moroccan citrus fruit exports had 
stayed at similar levels since the early 1970s (Bataller Martin and Jordan Galduf 1996: 143).
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agricultural exports remained, by and large, the same and they ‘will continue to 
pose serious disadvantages for Morocco as it tries to export its agricultural 
products to the EU Market’ (Damis 1998a: 108).
The Euro-Mediterranean Conference took place in Barcelona in November 
1995, bringing together the political leaders from the 15 EU member states and 
12 Mediterranean non-member countries. The general political difficulties that 
threatened the success of the Conference, in particular those linked to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, had been skilfully managed, and the two negotiations with 
Morocco on fisheries and on the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement 
had finished in agreement two weeks before the start of the Conference. The 
summit launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, an ambitious EU 
initiative towards the Mediterranean that was bom with the intention to 
develop political and security, economic and social/cultural dimensions of co­
operation, linking them in one single process.
Politically, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference was considered a success for 
Spanish diplomacy, and it was presented as such to Spanish public opinion by 
the government. Certainly it did represent the most significant improvement in 
the Mediterranean policy of the EC/EU’s history since 1957, and represented a 
crucial step in overcoming the level of rhetoric in the EU policy towards the 
Mediterranean, thanks to the Cannes financial package. Spain and the other 
southern member states had succeeded in launching a major initiative that was 
likely to address their security concerns in relation to the Mediterranean while 
preserving their sensitive sectors from the competition of the non- 
Mediterranean member countries.
But it was not clear whether or not the economic decline of the Mediterranean 
non-member countries would be stopped and a real area of stability and 
prosperity would emerge. Trade barriers to some of the most competitive 
exports from the Mediterranean, particularly agriculture, the feared effects of a 
trade liberalisation on their industries and the difficult adjustments and reforms 
demanded by the Europeans represented a considerable challenge for those 
countries.
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In the case of Morocco the effort demanded by the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreement121 could hardly be compensated by the new financial 
instruments like the MEDA programme. The exclusion of agricultural products 
from the liberalisation of trade meant that liberalisation would be in fact an 
opening of the Moroccan market to European industrial exports (Aghrout and 
Alexander 1997; Zaim and Jaidi 1997), since Moroccan industrial exports 
entered the EU, by and large, without duties already. It also entailed the 
progressive elimination of duties until 2009, which would reduce the income of 
the Moroccan government considerably.122 In agriculture, some minor 
improvements in the access conditions for Moroccan products (mainly an 
extension of the duty free quotas) could not hide the fact that the growth of the 
Moroccan agriculture exports to the EC was severely limited, at least until the 
distant prospect of liberalisation in 2012. However, a revision of the 
agricultural chapter was foreseen for 2000, giving some room for hope on the 
Moroccan side.
After the conference Spanish diplomacy hoped to ensure that the western 
Mediterranean countries, and in particular Morocco, would receive the largest 
amount of support. It also expected other EC countries to take a more active 
engagement in the project (Baixeras 1996: 160-161). This second objective 
proved hard to achieve, especially as the Mediterranean countries competed for 
EU funds and attention with Central and Eastern Europe and the northern 
member states started to press for their own priorities. The MEDA 
programme,123 the main financial instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, proved difficult to implement. At the end of the first period, 1995- 
1999, only one third of the total MEDA funds had been used, which forced 
progressive reforms on the system to reinforce strategic programming and 
simplify the procedures (Bataller Martin and Jordan Galduf 2000: 173). The 
MEDA II programme had a new, simplified regulation,124 the 2000-2006 
funds, approved by the Nice European Council (7, 8 and 9 December 2000),
121 Official Journal o f the EC L70, 18 March 2000.
122 In the early 1990s import duties represented around 25% of Moroccco’s budgetary income 
(Zaun and Jaidi 1997: 58).
123 Official Journal o f the EC LI 89, 30 July 1996.
124 Official Journal o f the EC L311, 12 December 2000.
173
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 4
reached 5.350 MEUR, and the question of implementation was largely 
improved.125
Table 4.5 MEDA funds engagements (1995-2002) (in MEUR)
Programme 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total %
Algeria 41 95 28 30.2 60 50 254.2 6.17*
Egypt 75 203 397 11 12.7 78 698.7 17.0*
Jordan 7 100 10 8 129 15 20 92 289 7.0*
Lebanon 10 86 86 12 182 4.5*
Morocco 30 235 219 172 140.6 120 122 916.6 22.2*
Syria 13 42 44 38 8 36 145 3.5*
Tunisia 20 120 138 19 131 75.7 90 92.2 593.7 14.4*
Turkey 33 70 132 140 310.4 147 20 832.4 20.2*
West Bank/Gaza 3 20 41 5 42 96.7 100 207.7 5.0*
Total bilateral 60 371 866 875 783 719.3 445 602.2 4119.3 81.2+
Regional 113 32 93 46 133 159.8 228.3 18.6 806.1 15.9+
Technical assist. 22 20 21 84.1 11.8 146.1 2.9+
Total 173 404 981 941 937 879.1 757.4 632.6 5071.5 100.0
* Percentage o f the total bilateral aid + Percentage o f Total MEDA (bilateral and 
multilateral) in the region.
Source: European Commission ‘Le Partenariat Euro-mediterraneen et les activites regionales 
MEDA’ Notes d’Information Euromed. May 2003.
125 The implementation ratio doubled the average o f the 1995-1999 period in 2001. Source:
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The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Morocco took a long 
time to ratify: it only entered into force on 1 March 2000. This also delayed the 
revision of the agriculture chapter, foreseen for 2000 and still ongoing at the 
time of writing. The run-up to the negotiations on agriculture was marked by 
tense yearly bargaining on the quota for Moroccan tomato imports. Spain and 
the European Commission tried to distribute the costs of concessions to 
Morocco amongst member states,126 but the Moroccan initial negotiating 
strategy aimed directly at creating a division of interests within the EC: 
Morocco offered to improve the market access for high value added products in 
which the EC has a surplus, like cereals, beef or milk in exchange for an almost 
completely open access for its tomatoes (El Pais, 7 May 2002). The main 
beneficiaries of this would be France, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, whereas Spain would be the biggest loser. This shows how in 
economic terms, and when it comes to agricultural imports, Spain still is the 
main obstacle for Moroccan interests, despite its political will.
Despite those disagreements, Spain had not lost its global Mediterranean 
interest, as it proved during its third Presidency of the EU in the first half of 
2004. On 22 and 23 April 2002 Valencia hosted the Fifth Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference of Foreign Ministers in a difficult context due to de derailment of 
the Middle East Peace Process. In that occasion Morocco saw how its regional 
rival, Algeria, signed an Association Agreement with the EU, and how in 
general its position as a privileged partner eroded progressively. That was the 
first EMP meeting after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA and 
topics of fight against terrorism, immigration control and the crisis in Palestine 
took priority in the agenda over trade and economic issues.
First Mediterranean
126 Mainly by modifiying the calendar for Moroccan imports in order to allow Moroccan 
producers to export in April and May, competing directly with early production in France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, instead o f November and December, when they compete with 
Canarian and Andalusian production.
175
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 4
The impact of EC membership
At this point, we should go back to the original question of the thesis and ask 
where in the economic and trade policy towards Morocco has the impact of EC 
membership been most clearly felt, and how. For this purpose we will go back 
to the four themes of Europeanisation that we proposed in the first chapter.
In the balance between new constraints and new instruments for Spanish 
foreign policy, the first theme, we must first note that, despite the fact that 
trade policy and common agricultural policy are common policies just like 
fisheries, with accession to the EC Spain did not lose much autonomy. The 
reason is simple: Moroccan exports to Spain were hardly the issue at stake; the 
bilateral issue was about Moroccan exports to the rest of the EC. And in that 
sense Spain did gain leverage with very little loss. The Spanish government 
had access to new European instruments, in particular financial ones, and they 
were particularly skilled in shaping those instruments and using them to serve 
Spanish interests.
A major success of Spanish policy was to attract EC/EU attention towards the 
Mediterranean, and in particular towards Morocco, but making sure that the 
solutions proposed by the EC/EU would not go against Spanish interests. The 
policy of ‘aid, not trade’ can be counted as a success owing not only to the 
negotiating skills of the southern member countries led by Spain, but also of 
the decision making structure of the EC and in particular the strength and 
relative autonomy of the Common Agricultural Policy. In other areas of 
economic policy, like financial relations, trade and investment promotion or 
development co-operation, Spain retained a very large degree of autonomy 
from the European level, and its governments used that autonomy profusely in 
bilateral relations.
Probably the most salient theme of Europeanisation that we have observed in 
this chapter is the second one, changes in identity and the definition o f interest. 
Here we include this tension between the roles of a competitor and an advocate 
of Moroccan interest. Rather than a complete transformation of the role, we
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have witnessed first how the role of an advocate of Moroccan interest was bom 
after accession, and how since then both roles have been present in one form or 
another in the bilateral relationship. However the fact that Spain, and in 
particular its government and diplomatic service, has consciously attributed to 
itself a role which was the exact contrary of the initial Spanish attitude towards 
Morocco within the EC is in itself a remarkable impact of EC membership.
The transformation did have many sources, but the impact of EC membership 
was decisive. The bilateral policy already in place in economic issues, the so 
called ‘global policy’ towards the Maghreb, that advocated friendly relations 
with Morocco, was one important source. External events, like the appearance 
of the phenomenon of immigration and the convulsions in the Arab World also 
played a role. But EC membership itself was a decisive factor: sitting in the 
Council not only gave Spain new opportunities; it also changed its own 
perception of what it could achieve for other countries.
There were some events that did not really change the self-perception of Spain, 
but did alter the priorities and facilitate some Spanish concessions: the fisheries 
negotiations and the pressures of France in the late 1980s are the clearest 
examples. But the two Spanish presidencies of the EU were crucial turning 
points. Also two events contributed to the genesis of the role of advocate of 
Moroccan interests: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the risk of relegation for the 
Mediterranean region, and EC/Morocco crisis caused by the failure of the 
European Parliament to approve the fourth financial protocol for Morocco in 
1992. Those were moments that put in danger Morocco’s privileged 
partnership with the EC/EU, which was in itself detrimental to Spain’s interest, 
and the Spanish government seized the opportunity to redefine its role within 
the EC in relation to its southern neighbours. That was not just an act of policy 
towards Morocco and the Maghreb: it gave Spain the opportunity to enhance 
its own profile within the EU and on the international scene (Barbe 2000: 46- 
47).
The new role as an advocate of Moroccan interests only made sense in an EU 
context, and although it emerged as a natural continuation of the ‘global 
policy’ towards the Maghreb developed by Spanish policy makers since the
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early 1980s, it was shaped by the opportunities, constraints and structures of 
the EC/EU. It was, indeed, strongly influenced by the values and beliefs that 
were at the core of the EC/EU approach to external relations: the importance of 
trade and economic co-operation to overcome rivalries, the search for 
multilateral and comprehensive strategies rather than ad-hoc solutions, an 
extended concept of security that includes military, political, economic and 
social aspects.
Decision making, the third theme of the thesis, changed relatively little because 
of the impact of membership. In agricultural matters the Ministry of 
Agriculture did acquire more independence and influence, as had happened 
with fisheries policy, but the existence of a clear blueprint for Spanish policy 
towards the region and the support of the prime minister’s office, in particular 
during the two presidencies, preserved a large role for ministries with a greater 
strategic vision: Foreign Affairs and Economy. Those two ministries were also 
very active at the bilateral level with relatively little influence from the 
European level.
Europeanisation through the domestic context and actors, the fourth theme, has 
played a limited role. The most remarkable feature is the mobilisation of 
agricultural lobbies during the pre-accession process that continued and grew 
with accession to the EC/EU with its Common Agricultural Policy. Unlike 
fishermen, Spanish fruit and vegetable producers did not have to worry about 
Morocco before accession, but seized the opportunity to try to limit direct 
competition as soon as Spain became a member state. The citrus fruit 
producers in the 1980s and the tomato producers in the 1990s have been 
particularly active in the regional capitals, as in Madrid and Brussels, to limit 
Moroccan imports.
In the field of economic and commercial relations we have witnessed an impact 
of Europeanisation that has more to do with projection, that is adapting the 
policy to take advantage of the new opportunities, than with reception from the 
EC/EU level. EC/EU membership has been the catalyst for a change in the self­
attributed identity of Spain in relation to Morocco, and that has affected the 
definition of Spanish interests in relation to the North African neighbour. The
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other themes of Europeanisation, and in particular the appearance of new 
constraints, the changes in policy-making and Europeanisation via the domestic 
arena have been relatively less important in this area.
4.4 Conclusions
Before accession to the European Community the trade and economic links 
between Spain and Morocco were a relatively small part of their bilateral 
relations. Spanish accession to the EC changed the situation as it threatened 
directly an important part of Moroccan exports to the Community. It was an 
unprecedented challenge for the Moroccan economy and thus, indirectly, for its 
social and political stability: ‘the Southern Enlargement of the EC implied that 
the stabilization of three new northern Mediterranean democracies (namely 
Spain, Portugal and Greece) had been obtained partially at the expense of the 
economic stability of southern and eastern Mediterranean non-members’ 
(Tovias 1996:19). In the mid-1980s, Spain and Morocco saw each other as 
competitors in EC markets, in particular for agricultural products. In the first 
two years of membership, Spanish activities in the EC confirmed Moroccan 
fears, as Spanish negotiators in the EC tried to avoid any concession to the 
North African country.
But the Spanish economic potential grew considerably after accession to the 
EC. The Spanish government started to implement the policy of the ‘buffer of 
interests’, a web of common interests that was designed to prevent bilateral 
conflicts with Morocco in the future. Political, cultural and defence co­
operation were important parts of it. But the main substance of the policy was 
the economic agreements, which allowed for an increase in trade, official 
development aid, and direct investments. Moreover, Spain changed its attitude 
in the EC and started to advocate the allocation of EC funds to the development 
of the southern Mediterranean, and especially Morocco. Spain adopted a role 
of defender of the interest of the southern Mediterranean member countries in 
the face of a concentration of EC efforts on Central and Eastern Europe.
The EU seems to be better suited than Spain alone to conduct a policy towards 
Morocco for several reasons. It does not have the negative background of
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direct confrontation and post-colonial quarrels that have overshadowed 
Spanish-Moroccan relations. It has considerably higher amounts of money to 
contribute to Moroccan development. And it is in a strong position in trade 
terms: whereas 56% of Moroccan imports come from and 62% of Moroccan 
exports go to the European Union, Morocco only represents 0.87% of the EU 
exports and 0.72% of its imports (Eurostat 1999). Morocco is extremely 
dependent on the EU, and thus in a weak position in bilateral negotiations.
Spain has played, in relation to Morocco, a contradictory role: sometimes the 
toughest competitor, sometimes the main advocate. Spanish actions in the 
European Union have often been contradictory with the official rhetoric of 
friendship and partnership with Morocco. The contradiction between a long 
term general interest in the development of Morocco and short term 
considerations about specific sectors of the Spanish economy has hindered the 
credibility of the Spanish policy towards the southern neighbour. But how do 
we explain the permanence of this contradiction?
Firstly, we have already mentioned the particular decision-making structures of 
the agriculture sector. As in the fisheries sector, despite the existence of official 
co-ordination mechanisms, the influence of the EU institutional structure on 
the distribution of responsibilities between ministries reinforces the role of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. In the domestic sphere, despite the general agreement 
on the need to have good relations with Morocco, the existence of powerful 
agriculture lobbies with strong regional bases contrasted with the absence of 
visible lobbies for the improvement of economic relations with Morocco. 
Firms with interests in Morocco either lobbied the government individually and 
directly or had been attracted to that market precisely by the government itself 
with its measures (tied loans, debt conversion, etc.). However, a small group of 
Spanish diplomats followed tenaciously the line of cultivating good relations 
with Morocco, and at times (the first and second presidencies, the European 
Parliament/ Morocco crisis in 1992, the preparation of the Barcelona 
conference) they enjoyed the highest political support, including of the Prime 
Minister and his office.
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The Spanish government tried to export the contradictions between short and 
long term interests to the European level instead of making the choices at 
home. This is a common practice in the European Union. But the practice of 
the last 15 years has shown that uploading the contradictions to the European 
level makes the EC policy contradictory, and does not solve the bilateral 
difficulties. In that sense, the European Union could not provide a satisfactory 
solution to the ‘Moroccan problem* in economic terms because Spain itself had 
not even decided what a satisfactory solution would be. In the words of Alfred 
Tovias, Spain wants to achieve stability in the Mediterranean but it is not 
willing to ‘pay the price’ that this would involve: ‘a totally different 
international division of labour around the Mediterranean, whereby France, 
Italy, Greece and Spain would let Mediterranean non member countries (except 
for the special case of Israel) specialize in those products in which they have 
the largest comparative advantage, that is, in Mediterranean agriculture and 
petrochemicals.’(Tovias 1996: 21)
Another explanation of the partial failure of the Spanish efforts can be the fact 
that the Spanish government chose instruments that were not suitable for the 
objectives it sought. Thus, it used economic and cultural ties to try to overcome 
some issues which were political in nature. It also tried to modify the economic 
situation in Morocco with instruments which were just not efficient enough: 
the Spanish capacity to shape the Moroccan economy and social conditions has 
proved to be very limited.
An additional weakness of the Spanish strategy was the fact that Morocco 
never displayed a clear wish to have Spain as a privileged partner at any price. 
France had been an advocate of Moroccan interests ever since Moroccan 
independence, it has been and still is Morocco’s main trade partner and foreign 
investor. It has a considerably bigger influence in the EC. In view of the 
Spanish positions in areas like agricultural exports or fisheries negotiations, 
Moroccans had little doubt about who represented better their interest within 
the European Union. Morocco is extremely dependent on the European Union, 
but its interdependence with Spain, despite its growth as a result of Spanish 
efforts, is still limited. Moreover, interdependence with Spain is often felt more
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in its negative aspects (smuggling, fisheries, agriculture competition) than in its 
positive ones.
Spain sought to project actively its economic policy towards Morocco onto the 
European level, but it lacked the internal coherence and a clear project. As a 
result, and despite the official rhetoric and efforts of Spanish foreign policy 
makers, trade and financial aspects of the relations did not always contribute to 
an improvement of relations between Spain and Morocco. Europeanisation 
provided opportunities for both hostile and friendly actions towards Morocco 
in the EC context. It also allowed Spanish foreign policy makers to frame their 
activities in the larger context of the Mediterranean policy. But it could not 
solve internal contradictions which were a matter of making difficult choices.
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Chapter 5: Immigration matters
Compared with the other salient issues in Spanish policy towards Morocco, 
immigration is a relatively new problem. It started to become a matter of 
concern for Spanish policy makers just as Spain entered the European Union, 
and there was no previous significant record of negotiations or conflicts with 
Morocco over the issue. In 16 years, immigration has become one of, if not 
the, main priorities of the Spanish government in relation to its southern 
neighbour.
5.1 The rise of immigration matters on the political 
agenda
In the second half of the 1980s three parallel phenomena took place. In the EC 
the member states enlarged their new co-operation in internal security affairs 
to immigration issues, a topic which soon became of great concern to some of 
the most influential member states. Spain became a member of the European 
Community and, for this reason, elaborated a law on foreign residents, 
regulated immigration and improved the control of its borders. Just at the 
same time, and partly as a result of the implementation of its new aliens law, 
Spain began to come to terms with its new reality as a target country for 
Moroccan immigration, not just a transit state; this immigration started to 
grow in that period and continued throughout the 1990s into the 21st Century. 
These three phenomena contributed to placing immigration in the centre of the 
European and Spanish political arenas.
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European Co-operation in immigration policy
European co-operation in Justice and Home, Affairs, a relatively new topic of 
co-operation in EC/EU history, has progressed from the periphery of the 
integration process to its core at an unprecedented speed, from an area which 
was virtually absent from the treaties at the beginning of the 1990s to ‘one of 
the most dynamic and expansionist areas of EU development in terms of 
generating new policy initiatives, institutional structures and its impact on 
European and national actors’(Monar 2001: 748) ten years later.
Because of its fundamentally intergovernmental decision-making process, 
carefully preserved not only with the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty, 
but even in the process of ‘cautious communitarisation’ (Geddes 2001: 24) 
that started with the Amsterdam Treaty, co-operation in Justice and Home 
Affairs, and in the concrete domain of migration control, remains ‘an emblem 
of national sovereignty’ (Guiraudon 2000: 251). Immigration control is 
decided upon in relatively closed structures which have acquired a remarkable 
autonomy from other institutions at European (European Parliament, 
European Court of Justice) and national (parliament, courts) levels. The 
common agenda and most actions tend to be decided upon by a relatively 
closed group of officials in the Ministries of Interior and Justice in a secretive 
way that leaves little room for external influence even from other parts of the 
national governments (den Boer 1995; Guiraudon 2000; Geddes 2001; Monar 
2001).
This policy style can partly be explained by the way in which this co­
operation started. The idea of co-operation in migration issues was bom in the 
EC context as an extension of the activities of groups devoted to co-operation 
in fighting criminal activities, including terrorism and international illegal 
drug traffic, like Trevi, the Club of Bern and the STAR group.127 These
127 Trevi was created in 1975 as part of European Political Co-operation mainly dealing with 
the fight against terrorism and extremist violence. The Club of Bern involved the EC and 
Switzerland and focused on anti-terrorism. STAR (Standige Arbeitsgruppe Rauschgift) 
brought together Austria, Denmark France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland to fight against drug trafficking (Bigo 1996).
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groups involved police officers and civil servants who created a special style 
of relatively opaque co-operation. The style was the one which prevailed 
when in 1985 France, Germany and the Benelux countries signed the 
Schengen agreement (Bigo 1996).128 Immigration soon became one of the 
most important issues for the Schengen group, which only included some of 
the member states, but the Trevi group also moved into the area of border 
control and immigration. All of this was happening, paradoxically, in one of 
the lowest points in the flows of legal migration (1982-1985) (Guiraudon 
2000: 254).
The main reason behind this move towards matters of border controls is to be
found in the single market project, intended to open the internal borders of the
1 00EC, allowing for a freer movement of people and goods. This was an EC 
project, and all member states would be affected. An Ad Hoc Group on 
Immigration bringing together the EC interior ministers with a permanent 
secretariat attached to the Council of Ministers was created in 1986. 
Meanwhile the Schengen agreement served as a sort of ‘laboratory* in which 
some willing countries could go beyond the lowest common denominator in 
the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The bases of this co-operation were 
established at the level of content, but also of style, in the work of Schengen 
and other groups, in particular Trevi (Monar 2001).
Europeanisation had the effect of allowing a logic of confidentiality to 
come to the forefront. It meant that administrations and experts from 
each country had to confront each other, but it also allowed them to 
avoid dialogues with other sectors in their own society. Not only were 
associations excluded from the game, but so were local actors and 
parliamentarians (Bigo 2000: 183).
128 On 14 July 1985 France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed in 
the town of Schengen (Luxembourg) an agreement to abolish the internal borders of the 
signatory states and to create a single external border managed in accordance with a single set 
of rules. The membership of the group grew until the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the 
decisions taken since 1985 by Schengen group members and the associated working 
structures into EU law on 1 May 1999 (Source: European Commission web site 
http://europa.eu.int).
129 This is made explicit, for instance, in art. 7 of the Schengen convention, that calls for a co­
ordination of the visa policies ‘in order to avoid the negative consequences in the field of 
immigration and security that may result from a reduction in the control o f common borders.’
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The area of Justice and Home Affairs entered the fundamental texts with the 
signature of the Treaty of Maastricht, which created a ‘third pillar’, relatively 
independent from the European Community and largely in the hands of 
member states. The Treaty of Amsterdam brought many of the areas of the 
third pillar into the EC Treaty with the inclusion of a new Title about “Visas, 
asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of 
persons”. This would bring those areas into the first pillar five years after the 
entry into force of the Treaty. During those five years, they were treated in a 
similar way as other third pillar matters: the Commission shared its right of 
initiative with the member states, Council decisions had to be unanimous and 
the European Parliament was simply consulted, with no power to decide.
Very soon co-operation in immigration matters at European level had
acquired some unique characteristics: a closeness and secrecy of the working
groups and meetings, a higher degree of autonomy of the policy-makers, and a
leading role of the ministries of interior and justice; the ‘ad hoc’ and
exceptional character of many of its measures and structures, often taken as a
reaction to ‘crisis’ situations; an almost invariable preference for exclusive
1 10rather than inclusive approaches; and a ‘pass-the-parcel’ philosophy, by 
which responsibility and costs of fighting illegal immigration were delegated
1 ^ 1
whenever possible to carriers and to third countries (den Boer 1995: 94-95). 
All of these characteristics would be replicated in the new style of Spanish 
immigration policy making.
Therefore co-operation in immigration matters had an important impact in 
terms of organisation. But it also consolidated a convergence in ideological 
terms. The trend towards a restrictive vision of immigration had started with 
the oil crisis of the early 1970s, but the main changes in government
130 This preference for exclusive approaches is very clear in measures dealing with asylum: 
the list o f prosecution-free countries, allowing asylum-seekers to request asylum in one EU 
country only, the proposal to introduce maximum quota, etc. all go in the direction of 
reducing the number of people that can seek asylum in the EU(den Boer 1995: 95).
131 There are several examples of this latter point: 1) the carrier sanction liability (Directive 
2001/51) delegated costs and responsibilities to airlines, land and sea carriers, 2) the 
preparations for EU enlargement transferred many of the costs of controlling illegal 
immigration to the Central European candidate countries; and 3) die neighbourhood policy 
both in the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe is also using the same strategy (den Boer 
1995: 95).
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perceptions only came in the 1980s. Those changes were more accentuated in 
the industrialised countries (Appleyard 2001: 10-11). In Western Europe, as in 
other parts of the industrialised world, the restrictive view came with a 
‘securitisation of immigration’, as it coincided with a new conceptualisation 
of security (Bigo 2000; Huysmans 2000b).
The Copenhagen school of International Relations has devoted its attention to 
the evolution of the concept of security. The new security agenda extends far 
beyond its military conception: there are military, economic, political, 
environmental and societal concepts of security. ‘The security of a society’, 
according to Buzan, ‘can be threatened by whatever puts its “we” identity into 
jeopardy’(Buzan 1993: 42). Immigration as such does not necessarily 
constitute a threat to the identity of the receiving society, but it is enough for it 
to be perceived as a threat: ‘perceived threats may not be real, and yet still 
have real effects’ (Buzan 1993: 43). The extent to which immigration will be 
perceived as a threat, and the extent to which it becomes a political issue will 
depend on the conditions of the society.
The securitisation of immigration, that is the inclusion of immigration in the 
security agenda of a country, is to a large extent the result of a political 
strategy. ‘By saying “security” a state-representative moves the particular case 
into a specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to 
block this development’.132 An official attitude that links migration to internal 
security (whether it is for political convenience, bureaucratic inertia, or both) 
can therefore contribute to the social perception of immigration as a threat. ‘In 
Western Europe migration is increasingly presented as a danger to public 
order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability; it has been 
securitized’ (Huysmans 2000b: 752). It is crucial to bear in mind this process 
and to study the ‘securitisation/insecuritisation practices which run through 
the internal sphere as much as the external sphere’ (Bigo 2000: 178).
132 Ole Waever ‘Security, the speech act: analysing the politics of a word’, unpublished 
second draft, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, 1989. Quoted in Buzan 
1991: 17.
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The securitisation of immigration has partly been the result of internal 
processes of politicisation both in the member states and in the European 
Union. This process accelerated with the exponential growth of the number of 
refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants that arrived in Western Europe in 
the 1989-1993 period with the convulsions in the southeast and east of the 
continent.
Yet securitisation was also the result of the way in which European co­
operation in immigration has developed from a culture of internal security and 
police co-operation. The regulation of migration is dealt with in the EU in a 
conceptual framework created by police and home affairs officials whose 
professional disposition is to define a policy concern in security terms. A good 
example of this is the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement, 
which locates the regulation of migration and asylum in the same institutional 
framework that deals with terrorism, transnational crime and border control 
(Huysmans 2000a: 756-757). Therefore, Europeanisation in the field of 
immigration is closely linked to the securitisation of migration.
The growth of migration from Morocco to Spain
Compared with most of its Western European partners, Spain is a relatively 
new country of immigration. Until the 1970s Spain was in fact a country of 
emigration, and still nowadays large numbers of Spanish nationals live in 
countries such as France, Germany or Argentina, similar to what happened 
with other southern European countries such as Italy or Greece, or with 
Ireland. Moroccan immigration to Spain started shortly after Moroccan 
independence in 1956, but did not acquire large dimensions until the 1980s, 
and in particular after 1985, as Spain joined the European Community. In 
those years Spain ceased to be a mere country of transit towards the final 
target areas of western Europe and became a place where Moroccan migrants 
wanted to settle (Pumares Fernandez 1993; Lopez Garcia 1994).
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Morocco has become crucial for Spanish immigration policy for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is the country of origin of the largest foreign community in Spain, 
and its nationals still try to emigrate in large numbers. Secondly, it is a 
country of transit for potential foreign immigrants to Spain from other 
Maghrebian (Algeria, Mauritania), African (Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
etc.) and even Asian (China, Pakistan, Iraq, etc.) countries.
According to the National Statistics Institute (Institute Nacional de 
Estadistica) based on the local registers (padron municipal) on 1 January 
2002, 307,458 Moroccan citizens were legally registered as living in Spain.133 
They represented 15.5% of the total foreign residents and almost one in five 
non-EU residents. Other sources challenge that estimate, but all of them agree 
that Moroccans are the largest foreign community in Spain (see Table 5.1 
below). From being a relatively small part of the legal residents in Spain in 
1985 (2.14%), they became the largest foreign community in the country. In 
the 1992-2001 period the number of Moroccans living legally in Spain grew 
at an average rate close to 15% (see Table 5.2).
133 There is no agreement amongst social scientists about how accurate this figure is. The 
local registers are not checked against duplication, and therefore there is the possibility that 
some of the foreigners may be registered in more than one place, be it because of some 
expected benefit, or just because they do not bother to check out from their former place of 
residence when they move; moreover, registration is voluntary and not enforced, so many 
more people could be living in Spain and not be registered. The alternative ways to count the 
number of Moroccan are the national census (more accurate than the local registers in 
avoiding repetition, but only updated every ten years) and die Ministry of Interior records 
(which only contain legal residents).
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Table 5.1 Different estimates of the Moroccan Population living in Spain
Source and date Local registers 
(01-01-2002)*
National Census 
(01-11-2001)**
Ministry of Interior 
(31-12-2002 )***
Total number of Moroccans 307,458 247,872 282,674
% of Moroccans amongst 
all foreigners
15.54 15.77 21.35
% of Moroccans amongst 
non-EU foreigners
20.66 n.a. n.a.
Total number of foreigners 
in Spain
1,977,944 1,572,017 1,324,001
% of foreigners of total 
Spanish population
4.73 3.85 3.24
Sources: * Instituto Nacional de Estadistica ‘Explotacion Estadistica del Padron a 1
de enero de 2002 Notas de Prensa. 5 August 2003 (Madrid: INE).
** Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2003 Censos de Poblacion v Viviendas 
2001. Resultados (Madrid: INE).
*** Ministerio del Interior 2003 Anuario Estadistico de Extranieria 2002 
(Madrid: Ministerio del Interior).
Table 5.2 Yearly growth of the number of Moroccan living legally in 
Spain (1992-2002)
Year Number of legal Moroccan residents Increase from previous year %
1992 54,105
1993 61,303 11.7
1994 63,939 4.1
1995 74,866 14.6
1996 77,189 3.0
1997 111,100 30.5
1998 140,896 21.2
1999 161,870 13.0
2000 199,782 19.0
2001 234,937 15.0
2002 282,674 16.9
Source: Author’s calculations from Ministry o f Interior data (Interior 2002).
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Data for illegal immigration are, for obvious reasons, more difficult to 
establish. The fact that many Moroccans lived illegally in Spain was exposed 
by the regularisation processes undertaken in 1985, 1996 and 2000. The last 
of these processes only regularised the situation of half of the Moroccans that 
applied (Interior 2002). Estimates in 2001 calculated that more than a third 
(38%) of the total illegal migrants living in Spain were Moroccans.134 The 
only estimate that can be made with official figures is the difference between 
the Ministry of Interior register of legal Moroccan residents and the local 
registers. That difference in 1 January 2002 was 234,937 Moroccan legal 
residents compared to 307,458 Moroccans locally registered. That is, one in
1 35four Moroccan locally registered m Spam would be an illegal immigrant.
Throughout the 1990s academics and other experts pointed to the fact that 
migration to Spain, however new and broadly publicised a phenomenon, was 
relatively small in terms of the ratio of immigrants per total population; but 
after a steady growth in the 1990s, and if we take the local registers as a 
reference, four regions are already above the 5% threshold (INE 2003). 
Migration in general, and Moroccan migration in particular, have become a 
matter of social and political concern. In opinion polls conducted in 2002, 
28% of respondents mentioned immigration as one of the main problems for 
Spain, after only ETA/terrorism and unemployment (CIS 2002).
This can partly be explained because Moroccan immigrants concentrate in 
some areas of Spain, and in particular the provinces of the Mediterranean 
littoral, from Cadiz to Girona, in the archipelagos and in Madrid.136 In some 
agricultural areas and in many towns, Moroccans have become the image of 
the immigrant. Moroccans are also the foreign group which has attracted most 
adverse reactions. Public opinion polls have consistently revealed that they are 
the least preferred group of foreigners amongst Spaniards (Diez Nicolas 1999;
134 Source: El Pais, Temas, Inmigracion en Espana. http://www.elpais.es/temas/inmigracion
135 Data about illegal immigration should be considered as estimates only, for obvious 
reasons.
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CIS 2002). Political and media discourse, bilateral disagreements with 
Morocco, international incidents involving Arab and/or Islamic countries (like 
the Gulf War, or the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA and 
those of 11 March 2004 in Madrid), the historical background, etc. all have 
played against the image of Moroccans in Spain.
The land border with Morocco around the cities of Ceuta and Melilla was, in 
the 1990s, an important means by which Moroccan, but also other African and 
even Asian migrants, could penetrate the weak Moroccan border controls. 
Simultaneously, the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar and of the Atlantic 
between Western Sahara and South Morocco and the Canaries started to be 
sailed by an increasing number of precarious boats loaded with immigrants 
from Africa and Asia who wanted to enter Spain (and the EU) illegally.
Their numbers grow year by year. According to the Spanish police, in the year 
2000 alone 177 of those boats were stopped in the Canaries, 527 in Andalusia 
and 76 in Ceuta and Melilla; at least another 30 boats sank. A total of 14,863 
immigrants were arrested (four times more than in 1999), 55 corpses were 
recovered and at least 47 people disappeared. The constant increase since the 
late 1980s reached its peak in 2001, when 18,517 people were arrested in the 
Spanish coasts. In 2002 the amount was slightly lower, with 16,504 people 
arrested.137
The permanent arrival of immigrants has produced not only technical 
difficulties (accommodation, transport, repatriation), but also passionate 
political debates. The dangerous conditions in which immigrants travel have 
outraged political and social groups in Spain and Morocco, although the
I  O Qproposed solutions differ radically. The capacity of Spain to act as the 
external border of an ever more closed European Union is permanently put in
136 In 31 December 1999,38 % of legal Moroccan residents lived in Catalonia, 16.4% in 
Madrid, 14.8% in Andalusia, 5.2% in the Valencian region, 4.9% in Murcia and 20.6% in 
other regions (Interior 2002).
137 The data come from a Ministry of Interior press conference as reported by El Dia (El Dla,
4 January 2003).
138 An estimated 2000 people died between 1990 and 1998 trying to cross the Straits (The 
Guardian, 29 June 1998).
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doubt by the images of exhausted immigrants landing from pateras139 on an 
almost daily basis summer after summer. And the questions of integration and 
social tensions are affecting all levels of government and civil society.
It is important to show that both pateras and the land borders of Ceuta and 
Melilla have been only one of the ways by which foreign migrants have 
reached Spain. By far the most common situation is not that of immigrants 
entering Spain illegally, but that of migrants entering legally and overstaying. 
In that sense the airports of Barcelona and Madrid and the borders with other 
EU countries have been the main routes of access for most immigrants. They 
do not have, however, the media impact of the pateras.
Immigration from Morocco does not only involve Moroccans: out of 31,739 
stopped by the Moroccan authorities when they were trying to emigrate to 
Europe in 2002,16,141 (51%) were Moroccan, 1,445 (4.5%) Algerian, 13,424 
(42%) subsaharan Africans and 729 (2%) Asian.140 The country, a traditional 
land of emigration, has also become a country of transit as EU visa 
requirements make it increasingly difficult for African and Asian migrants to 
access their target directly by legal means. Some of these immigrants enter 
Morocco legally without needing a visa,141 and attempt to cross to Spain from 
there. Others enter the country illegally by sea, air or land. While the 
Mauritanian border is relatively under control because of the walls built to 
fight the Polisario front during the war, it is the 1500 km-long border with 
Algeria that Moroccan authorities have most difficulties controlling.142
139 Pateras originally denominates small wooden boats, mainly used in inshore fishing 
activities, which are very poorly equipped to sail the dangerous waters of the Strait of 
Gibraltar or the open waters of the Atlantic. The use of the term has been generalised to all 
sorts of small boats, often heavily overloaded, that attempt to smuggle immigrants into Spain.
140 Those data were made public by Larbi Messari, former cabinet minister of Morocco and a 
prominent member of the Istiqlal party, and were the first yearly account ever offered by the 
Moroccan authorities, who until that moment only had given partial figures {El Pais, 29 July 
2003).
141 At the moment (November 2002) citizens from Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea (Conakry), 
Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Tunisia do not need visas to enter Morocco, just 
a valid passport. However, out of these nationalities only Mahans are frequently amongst 
illegal immigrants stopped trying to cross from Morocco to the EU.
142 In 1999, 12,499 illegal immigrants were stopped at the Moroccan-Algerian border, of 
which 2,072 were Algerian citizens and 10,094 came from Subsaharan Africa; at that time, 
three to four migrants per arrested immigrant were estimated to be crossing the border 
successfully. Data published in As-Sabah, (12 January 2001), a Moroccan newspaper, quoting
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The appearance of immigration in the Spanish political arena
In 1985 Spain prepared the legislative framework for dealing with the arrival 
of migrants through the approval of an Aliens Law.143 In the absence of an 
important flow of immigrants or any agreed EC policy, the new law was seen 
as a part of the modernisation programme (Baldwin-Edwards 1997: 507; 
Santamaria 2002: 68). The law was the first serious attempt to regulate 
extensively the situation of foreigners in Spain, still a new and minority 
phenomenon at that time, in the run-up for EC membership. It was drafted 
taking into account the existing legislation in some EC member states, such as 
France or Belgium, which had started restricting access to the same sort of 
economic migrants that they had welcomed in the previous decades. Indeed, 
Spanish law was remarkably restrictive for a country in which less than 0.2% 
of the population were foreigners (and most of them were European citizens), 
and where immigrants were starting to fulfil an important economic function 
(Santamaria 2002: 68).
The new Spanish law affected Moroccans negatively in three ways. Firstly, 
the implementation of the law made manifest the existence of large numbers 
of illegal Moroccan residents in Spain, and the need to regulate their situation. 
Secondly, the law excluded Moroccans and Western Saharans from the 
preferential treatment reserved to Latin Americans, Filipinos, Andorrans, 
Equatorial Guineans, Sephardic Jews and Gibraltarians, i.e. all other nationals 
of territories which had colonial or historical links with Spain. Finally, it 
ignored the situation of thousands of Muslim citizens who lived in Ceuta and 
Melilla without Spanish documents, and put them at risk of expulsion. The 
assumption was that their lack of documents meant that they were foreigners, 
even though many of them had lived in the city for generations.
The latter point generated a strong reaction amongst the Muslim population of 
the North African cities, in particular in Melilla. Tension between the Muslim 
and Christian communities in Melilla lasted until 1987, and Morocco used the
a yearly report of the Foreigners Service at the Regional Security Direction in Uxda (east 
Morocco). A detailed survey about the role of Morocco as a transit country for subsaharan 
migrants can be found in BIT 2002.
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occasion to revamp its long-standing claim over the two cities.144 That episode 
made Spanish foreign policy makers aware of the importance of immigration 
in bilateral relations with Morocco, as a factor which could be 
instrumentalised by the North African kingdom in its relations with Spain.
From 1988 the Spanish media started reporting regularly on the arrival of 
pateras at the Andalusian and Canarian coasts, smuggling illegal immigrants 
onto Spanish soil. In parallel, Ceuta and Melilla, with the only land border 
between the EU and Africa, became ‘magnets for would-be illegal migrants to 
continental Europe from all over the African continent’ (Gold 2000: 120). 
Media coverage of that situation remained extensive throughout the following 
years, contributing to its increased political relevance. As the numbers of 
arrested illegal immigrants rose, problems with accommodation, transport and 
repatriation acquired a political dimension, causing tensions between public 
administrations (local authorities, regional and central governments). The 
overcrowding of provisional detention facilities in non-peninsular locations 
(in Ceuta, Melilla and, some years later, the eastern Canary Islands) became a 
major political issue in the local and regional contexts.145
In Ceuta and Melilla the issue of non-Moroccan refugees came to the public 
debate in July 1992, after Morocco refused to accept 72 sub-Saharan Africans 
that had entered Melilla despite the readmission agreement signed six months 
earlier (see below). This first crisis was resolved in about one month after 
strong pressure and bargaining, but the situation tended to worsen, not 
improve. Between early 1993 and 1995 more and more immigrants entered 
the enclaves. In October 1995 Ceuta, which was struggling to house and 
process the administrative situation of about 300 Africans, saw the arrival of 
60 Kurdish would-be refugees. The immediate transfer of the latter to the 
peninsula outraged the African applicants, some of which had spent two years 
in the city, and triggered a riot that ended up in violent clashes between them 
and the police and some members of the Spanish community.
143 Organic Law 7/1985, about Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain. BOE 158/1985 of 
3 March 1985.
144 See Chapter 6, section 6.2.
145 The situation is similar to the one experienced in Italy in areas such as Puglia and in 
particular in the islands of Sicily and Lampedusa.
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The attitude adopted by the local authorities, the police and many of Ceuta’s 
citizens has been described as openly racist in a city where other racist 
incidents, mainly involving military personnel, were not new (Carr 1997). In 
June 1996 a similar outbreak erupted in Melilla. The repatriations that 
followed attracted criticism of the central government’s methods which 
reportedly included deporting without any court order, ignoring at least four 
asylum claims, sedating the deportees without informing the police officers in 
charge, and sending them to four countries despite the fact that they came 
from fourteen, with 50 of them ending up in prison in Guinea-Bissau {El Pais, 
29 September 1996). Interior Minister Jaime Mayor Oreja admitted that the 
action had not been ‘a model’, but justified it in order to deter future would-be 
migrants {El Pais, 30 July 1996). Prime Minister Aznar was more explicit: 
‘there was a problem and it was dealt with’ {El Pais, 30 July 1996).
However the issue of repatriation and readmission of non-Moroccans became 
a priority. After the situation in Ceuta and Melilla stabilised with the 
construction of EU-fimded fences in the late 1990s,146 the issue kept being 
relevant in other areas, in particular in Fuerteventura, the most eastern of the 
Canary Islands, from 2000.
Another element which enhanced the debate about immigration was the start, 
in 1992, of violence against immigrants inside Spain. If the very first victim, 
Lucrecia Perez (killed in February 1992 by a group of skinheads) was 
Dominican, a majority of subsequent incidents of violence involved 
Moroccans.147 In 1999 and 2000 two important outbreaks of violence took 
place in Terrassa (Catalonia, July 1999) and El Ejido (Andalusia, January 
2000) with large segments of the local population rioting and targeting the 
Moroccan communities and their property. All those events, extensively 
reported in the Spanish and Moroccan media, caused immediate political 
reactions and placed the question of immigration at the centre of the Spanish 
political arena.
146 See Chapter 6, section 6.3
147 Of the 13 major violent incidents to hit the Spanish media in the 1992-2000 period, 10 
involved Moroccan immigrants. According to the Association of Moroccan Immigrant 
Workers in Spain (ATIME), 23 immigrants lost their lives between 1992 and 2000 because of 
racist attacks.
196
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 5
By the time the Spanish Parliament undertook the reform of the Aliens Law in 
1999, immigration had become one of the most political issues in Spain. The 
reform was an initiative of some opposition parties who considered that the 
1985 law was too restrictive and only focused on the control aspects of the 
issue, overlooking important questions such as the need to integrate 
immigrants into Spanish society. It was therefore seen as not adequate to the 
new realities of Spain as a country of immigration.148
The ruling Partido Popular initially accepted important aspects of the 
proposal, but changed its position during the debate and eventually negotiated 
changes with the Catalan and Canarian nationalists, which made the law 
considerably more restrictive.149 The law was approved shortly before the 
2000 elections.150 After its clear victory in those elections, the Partido 
Popular, who had successfully advocated a tougher position on immigration 
matters, used its newly acquired absolute majority to approve a new, even 
more restrictive text that was opposed by all opposition parties, immigrant 
associations and trade unions. The text was restrictive in allowing people to 
migrate to Spain, but it did at the same time give legal immigrants a number 
of new rights and better access to social services, so their situation actually 
improved -  this was, after all, the spirit of the first proposal. Migration was by 
that time one of the most controversial and most salient political issues in the 
Spanish political landscape.151
The policy of progressively trying to seal the EC borders against illegal 
immigrants meant an increased responsibility for Spain, which became an 
important entry route of immigrants from Latin America and especially from
148 The initial proposals presented were in 1998 by Izquierda Unida, a leftist party, 
Convergencia i Unio, the Catalan nationalist coalition that ruled Catalonia at the time, and by 
the mixed group. The main oposition party, the PSOE, participated actively in the works to 
unify the three proposals in a joint one.
149 Two positions within the government were represented by Interior Minister Jaime Mayor 
Oreja, who advocated a very restrictive law, and Labour and Social Affairs Minister, Manuel 
Pimentel, who wanted a more open approach. The dispute was settled inside the government 
in favour of the former, triggering the resignation of Mr. Pimentel shortly before the general 
elections. Immediately afterwards the Partido Popular presented a battery of restrictive 
measures in the Senate, where it had a majority (Perez-Diaz, Alvarez-Miranda et al. 2001: 
104-108).
150 Ley Organica 4/2000. Boletin Oficial del Estado, 11 January 2000.
151 Ley Organica 8/2000. Boletin Oficial del Estado, 23 December 2000. For a detailed 
comparison of the two texts see (Perez-Diaz, Alvarez-Miranda et al. 2001: chapter III).
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Africa via Morocco. Spain, with so little experience in receiving migrants, 
could hardly contribute much to the birth of European co-operation in 
immigration matters. Conversely, dissent from the Schengen and other 
agreements from Spain was exceptional and Spanish immigration policy 
coincided, by and large, with the general trends in the EC (Baldwin-Edwards 
1997).
Spain joined the Schengen agreement on 25 June 1991. The implementation 
of the Schengen agreement impinged very directly on relations with Morocco. 
First, the inclusion of Ceuta and Melilla in the Schengen territory meant that 
measures had to be put in place to seal the then extremely porous land border 
with Morocco. The subsequent construction of fences around the cities as well 
as the surveillance systems in the Strait of Gibraltar can be considered 
‘compensatory measures’ in the sense of the Schengen convention, that is 
measures to compensate for the weakening of the control in the borders 
between EC member states. The imposition of visas on Moroccan citizens, as 
well as the signature of the 1992 readmission agreement (see below), were 
also direct consequences of the Schengen dispositions (Barros 2002: 112).
We should not think that the keen Spanish acquisition of the ideological and 
organisational characteristics of EC co-operation was a case of simple 
adaptation out of a ‘Europeanist’ faith. There was a convergence of interests 
between officials in the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the new groups that 
were being created in the European context. In particular, the leading position 
of the Ministry of Interior in immigration matters was reinforced by the fact 
that it was the one responsible for Spanish participation in the discussions 
about immigration at EC level. This could have worked against the role of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose actions in relation to Morocco sought to 
create the closest and friendliest possible relations.
Convergence with Europe became an important alibi for the Spanish 
government. The discourse of Spain as the door of Europe and of the Spanish 
obligations within the Common Market and, later on, in the Schengen space 
was useful to justify the restrictive measures before parliament, public opinion 
and the Moroccan authorities. In the Spanish case European integration is
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both the source and a legitimising factor of the securitisation of the 
discussions about migration and of a restrictive policy towards non-EU 
immigration in general.
This securitisation operates in two directions: domestic and external. At the 
internal level, the securitisation of immigration is apparent in the association 
of immigration with crime, social conflicts and poverty. At the external level, 
it has to do with defining immigration as an international security issue that 
endangers the sovereignty and stability of a member state (Weiner 1992).
Both internal and external securitisation are relevant in the case of Moroccan 
immigration. The images of the daily landings of pateras and the news about 
Moroccans being smuggled in inhuman conditions across the country in 
lorries (with subsequent deaths) in the media, conveniently magnified,
contribute to presenting Spain as a ‘containment wall’ against the flood of
1African immigration into the European Community. The frequent tragedies 
at sea and on land served as the justification to intensify co-operation in 
fighting illegal immigration, and to demand Moroccan co-operation. Social 
peace is portrayed to be at risk; in the words of Spanish Minister of Interior, 
Jaime Mayor Oreja, ‘Spaniards should know that this issue is the most 
important challenge to a smooth living together in Spain over future decades’ 
(Canarias, 20 July 1999).
But justification sometimes comes from abroad: in Spain the political 
discourse about ‘non-EU immigration’ (immigration no comunitaria) was 
largely built by importing political and socio-cognitive categories from the 
EU political arenas, particularly the European Parliament and France, in 
problematic terms (Santamaria 2002a: 67-69). In a largely pro-European 
country where Europe has symbolised democracy for a long time, the 
reference to EU agreements and other EU member states policies constitutes a 
powerful factor of legitimisation. Also, the rise of the anti-immigrant extreme 
right in EC countries like Austria, France and the Netherlands is presented as
152 The discourse on non-EU migration is full o f negative metaphors like the ‘containment 
wall’, ‘wave’, ‘tide’, ‘invasion’, ‘illegals’, ‘demographic time bomb’, etc. Enrique Santamaria 
devotes to these metaphors a whole chapter of his book Santamaria 2002b.
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proof of what could happen if Spain does not control the arrival of
153immigrants.
In the absence of a virulently anti-immigrant extreme right party in Spain, the 
Popular Party and its government’s discourse about immigration was the most 
restrictive amongst the main political players in Spain (political parties, trade 
unions, business federations, etc.). This has been particularly true since the 
government’s change of position (immediately replicated by that of the 
Popular Party group in Parliament) in November 1999, in the middle of 
debating the reform of the Aliens Law. In order to respond to the accusations 
of ‘alarmism’ made by the opposition, the government resorted to the EU 
connection in its claim to be displaying ‘sense, maturity and prudence’ (Perez- 
Diaz, Alvarez-Miranda et al. 2001: 107). Thus, the Interior Minister defended 
the second, restrictive reform of the Aliens Law claiming that the then 
existing law would not be deemed acceptable in any other EU member state 
(El Mundo, 18 November 1999). The possibility of expelling foreigners was 
present in many EU member states, and there was ‘no reason for Spain not to 
have the same legal instrument that the other EU member states have’ (DSCD 
2000: 1427). But probably the best example of the securitisation of migration 
by the Spanish government is the inclusion of ‘extraordinary and uncontrolled 
migratory movements’ as a risk to Spanish security in the Strategic Defence 
Review (Revision Estrategica de la Defensa), the document that outlines the 
main priorities of Spanish defence policy until 2015 (Defensa 2002: 150- 
151).'54
153 This has been an argument used in particular by the Popular Party in power and its 
ministers. For an example of this discourse see the interview with Foreign Affairs Minister 
Ana Palacio in La Vanguardia/Magazine (8 September 2002) or Interior Minister Jaime 
Mayor Oreja defence of the Aliens Law reform in the Spanish Parliament in DSCD 2000: 
1424.
154 The section devoted to migration in this document uses many of the characteristic 
expressions of a securitising language: ‘the fight for survival o f the masses’, ‘gigantic 
migratory movements’, ‘demographic explosion’, etc. (Defensa 2002: 150-152). The 
inclusion of those references to immigration was criticised by several associations and trade 
unions as sending a racist and xenophobeicmessage (El Pals, 19 November 2002).
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5.2 Immigration and foreign policy
Co-operation in immigration matters has moved rapidly from the periphery to 
the centre of EU activity, acquiring more and more relevance and influencing 
other parts of EU policy-making, and in particular external relations. This 
influence has also been felt in the member states, which in turn have 
influenced and shaped European co-operation in migration affairs according 
to their priorities and preferences. Spain was no exception: with immigration, 
and in particular immigration from Morocco, ranking increasingly high as a 
concern for Spanish governments, it is no surprise that it also became a crucial 
element in the complex bilateral relationship between Morocco and Spain.
The interconnections between immigration and foreign policy in Western 
Europe remained a relatively unexplored territory until the last decade 
(Pastore 2000: 30), although immigration control is a policy area with crucial 
repercussions in the bilateral relations between sending and receiving 
countries. Scholars specialising in the EU have often chosen to focus on one 
of the three ‘pillars’, establishing a clear distinction between the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (and later the European Security and Defence 
Policy), the policies of the European Community, and Co-operation in Justice 
and Home Affairs. Even though the Amsterdam Intergovernmental 
Conference of 1996 contributed partially to the blurring of the limits between 
the last two, both in political and in academic terms, there is still a lot of 
theoretical and empirical work to be done in establishing the links between 
co-operation in immigration issues and European foreign policy; it is striking 
how relatively little attention the issue has attracted (Smith 2003a: 240).
In this section we will explore the ways in which migration has become an 
issue of foreign policy both in Spain and the EU in relation to Morocco. The 
main assumption is not that any policy related to immigration is by nature 
foreign policy, but that immigration policy does have some aspects which 
impinge directly on policy towards third countries.
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Immigration enters the bilateral agenda
As immigration became a hot political topic, Spanish foreign policy makers 
identified it as one of the main factors in the complex equation of bilateral 
relations with Morocco. The ‘buffer of common interests’ that was supposed 
to prevent bilateral tensions from escalating into full-fledged crises was not 
the only reason to increase economic interaction with Morocco. When it 
became clear that Morocco was becoming one of the main sources of Third 
World migration towards Spain, prosperity for the Alawi kingdom was seen 
as crucial to stop the ever growing influx of people. Thus, beyond the political 
motivations, security considerations (which now included not only stability, 
but also immigration) inspired the new Spanish attitude of economic co­
operation with Morocco. Immigration became securitised not only in the 
internal sphere, but also in the external relations of the country.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Spanish policy makers realised that 
the size of the Spanish economy and the means at their disposal were not 
enough to produce in Morocco transformations of the scope that were needed 
to stop the migratory flux. From the late 1980s they turned increasingly to the 
EC in order to mobilise European resources to improve the economic situation 
in Morocco. The change of Spanish attitudes within the EC in relation to 
Morocco and other Maghreb countries was closely related to the realisation of 
the importance of immigration (Moratinos 1991; Ibanez 1995; Tovias 1995).
Tackling the basic causes of migration seems the best way of addressing the 
question, and there is a basic consensus about this among European 
governments, but it has two obvious disadvantages: results are uncertain and 
depend on a number of variables which the Spanish government or the 
European Union cannot control, and will come to fruition, in any case, in the 
mid to long term. Spanish authorities, and in particular those in the Ministry 
of Interior in charge of immigration control, were not ready to wait that long. 
Negotiations with Morocco on migration had started in 1984, but it was not 
until 1988 that a joint Spanish-Moroccan commission was created to debate 
the matter. In the second meeting of this commission, in 1990, Spain
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conveyed to Morocco the intention to ask all Maghreban citizens for a visa as 
a result of its commitment to fulfil the requisites of the Schengen group. The 
fact that Morocco did not react negatively to this, as was feared, could have 
derived from Spain’s unconditional support for the Moroccan government 
symbolised by Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez’s visit in a moment of acute 
internal unrest and riots (Ibanez 1995: 99-100). At the same time accession to 
the Schengen group was an excellent alibi for a measure that the Spanish, in 
the face of growing immigration from Morocco, would probably have wanted 
to implement anyway.
The imposition of visa requirements for Moroccans was only a first step in the 
Spanish attempt to control immigration from Morocco. A second was the 
signature of an agreement on the crucial issue of the readmission of illegal 
immigrants from third countries reaching Spain via Morocco.155 This 
agreement was similar to the sort of bilateral agreements that other Schengen 
countries had signed with third countries, as well as to the ‘multi-bilateral’ 
agreement signed between the Schengen states and Poland (Barros 2002: 
112). Satisfaction for this success of Spanish diplomacy would not last long: 
Morocco delayed the ratification of the agreement because of the vote of the 
European Parliament against the ratification of the fourth EC-Morocco 
financial protocol in January 1992.156 During the summer the first so-called 
‘pateras crisis’ took place, with an estimated 10,000 Moroccans crossing the 
straits illegally (Ibanez 1995: 100), and the application of the agreement 
proved enormously difficult as the Moroccan administration used technical 
grounds to make the readmission of nationals of third countries almost 
impossible.157 Ten years later, the only repatriations that Morocco accepted 
regularly were those of its own nationals.
155 Acuerdo de 13 de Febrero de 1992 entre el Reino de Espana y  el Reino de Marruecos 
relativo a la circulacion de personas, el transito y  la readmision de extranjeros entrados 
ilegalmente. (Madrid, 13 February 1992).
156 See previous chapters.
157 Article 2 of the agreement requires ‘proof that the foreigner comes from a country which 
makes re-admission possible. Since it was difficult to prove with documents either that the 
pateras had left from Moroccan territory or that the third country nationals had been in 
Morocco just before they attempted entry into Spain, Morocco refused almost every re­
admission. Moroccan Foreign Minister Benaissa complained years later that ‘not all illegal 
African immigrants used Morocco to reach Europe’ {Arabic News, 6 August 2000).
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In 1998 the perimeters of Ceuta and Melilla were considerably reinforced,
while 25 billion pesetas were allocated to strengthen the protection of the
1southern coastline in the following five years. So far the most noticeable 
effect has been an increase in arrivals to the Canary Islands once the control 
system was put into place in the Strait (see Table 5.3 below).159 Without the 
political will of Rabat, containing the smuggling of people into Spain would 
be a very hard task, much as the perimeters of Ceuta and Melilla and the naval 
vigilance mechanisms in the Straits and around the Canaries may be 
reinforced. Indeed, even if Rabat were ready to co-operate, it is hard to 
imagine that it could bear the enormous financial cost of controlling the whole 
o f its 3,500 km long coast, sealing its border with Algeria, repatriating the 
immigrants caught in illegal transit towards Europe, etc. as well as the 
political cost of antagonising other, mainly African governments,160 without 
very substantial compensation and financial aid.
Table 5.3 Percentage of illegal immigrants arrested in the Spanish coast 
in 2001-2002 by area of detention
Strait of Gibraltar 78% 59%
Canary Islands 22% 41%
Source: Ministry of Interior, Press Conference of the Minister of Interior {El Dia, 4 January 
2003).
The Spanish government continued to make efforts to increase bilateral co­
operation with Morocco on the immigration issue. Two agreements
158 Including radar installations, night vision equipment, heat detector systems, helicopters, 
etc. in a complex system called SIVE- Sistema Integral de Vigilancia del Estrecho, i.e. 
Integral System for the Monitoring of the Strait (Gepts 1999).
159 A patera-crossing to the islands is now considered to be cheaper and less risky (Gepts 
1999).
160 In the context of the Western Sahara dispute, Morocco pays great attention to relations 
with the countries of Subsaharan Africa, where support for the Polisario theses and 
recognition of the SADR are widespread.
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concerning residence and work permits161 and temporary workers162 were 
signed in 1996 and 1999 respectively. The implementation of the new Aliens 
Law approved in December 2000 meant that, after the regularisation process, 
immigration to Spain could only be achieved legally by way of quotas that the 
Spanish governments negotiates with the sending countries. Morocco was 
initially picked as one of the countries that was to be allocated a yearly 
contingent of legal immigrants.
In January 2001, days after the new Aliens Law was voted in Parliament, 
Interior Minister Mayor Oreja travelled to Rabat to offer the signature of an 
agreement to regulate the migratory fluxes, but got a cold reception. The offer 
was also made to Ecuador and Poland in subsequent days, and Spain signed 
the first of those agreements with Ecuador.163 It was soon clear that the 
agreement was very problematic to implement,164 confirming Moroccan 
objections to the methods proposed by Spain (Anuario CIDOB 2001: 58). The 
summer of that year the arrival of pateras reached unprecedented levels: 
18,517 immigrants were arrested, 30% more than in 2000.165 In a context of 
soured relationships because of the failure of the fisheries negotiations,166 
senior members of the Spanish government and administration complained 
repeatedly about the lack of Moroccan co-operation. The relations worsened 
to the point of crisis in October when the Moroccan ambassador to Madrid 
was withdrawn, precluding any hope that a mixed commission would be 
created to establish a quota for legal immigration in 2002.167
161 Acuerdo en Materia de Permisos de Residencia y  Trabajo entre el Reino de Espana y  el 
Reino deMarruecos (Rabat, 6 February 1996)
162 Acuerdo Administrativo entre Espana y  Marruecos relativo a los trabajadores de 
temporada (Madrid, 30 September 1999)
163 Acuerdo entre la Republica de Ecuador y  el Reino de Espana realtivo a la Regulacion y  
Ordenacion de los Flujos Migratorios signed in Quito on 31 January 2001.
164 The agreement foresaw that all illegal Ecuadorian immigrants should fly back to Ecuador, 
ask for a work permit, and then come back to Spain. The operation would have been very 
expensive and it provoked such opposition both in Ecuador and Spain that the system had to 
be modified. Two years later the failure of the agreement was quite apparent: if  the Spanish 
government had estimated in 2000 that 30,000 Ecuatorians would benefit from it every year, 
in 2002 only 80 people were expected to migrate legally under the terms of the agreement (El 
Pais, 12 November, 2002).
165 Ministry of Interior, Press Conference of the Minister of Interior (El Dia, 4 January 2003).
166 See chapter 3.
167 The consequences for Moroccan workers of the lack of agreement were deeply felt in 
2002. For example, the lack o f co-operation between the authorities meant that the number of
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The arrival of illegal immigrants via Morocco had been continuously growing 
in the the 1990s. By the end of the decade Spanish authorities and media had 
grown convinced of the complicity, at least by lack of action, of the Moroccan 
authorities. The first demand of the Spanish government to Morocco was that 
it should increase its efforts in fighting the illegal emigration both of its own 
nationals and of nationals of other countries transiting through its territory. 
This would involve more control of the arrivals in Morocco (for instance, by 
imposing visas on many African nationals that did not need them) and also 
more control on the Moroccan coasts to prevent pateras from leaving towards 
Spain.
The second demand was the readmission of non-Moroccan illegal immigrants 
that had reached Spain through Morocco. Despite the signature of an 
agreement that granted that readmission in 1992, Morocco did not apply it. 
The third controversial issue was the repatriation of under-age Moroccans. 
They could not just be abandoned at the border like adults: the law requires 
that their family take care of them. In practice, this has proved almost 
impossible in most cases. Since they are not of penal age, those minors are put 
in children’s homes from which they often escape in search of some way to 
earn money to send back to their families, causing considerable trouble to the 
Spanish authorities.168 The last point in which Spain demanded Moroccan co­
operation was the regulation of a legal way for Moroccans to migrate to 
Spain.
But the Spanish government had relatively few instruments available to 
induce the Moroccan government to co-operate. Thus, policy-makers dealing 
with immigration matters in Madrid saw the need to turn to the European 
Union to find mechanisms to force the Rabat government to contribute to
Moroccan workers that could get temporary permits to work in agriculture in 2002 was a 
tenth of the previous year’s figure. {El Pais, 11 November, 2002)
168 According data from die Delegation del Gobiemo para la Extranjeria y  la Immigration, 
in 2002 4,738 Moroccan citizens under 18 were sent to those children’s homes, representing 
75% of all the foreign minors that entered those institutions. This figure represented an 86% 
increase in relation to 2001. Source: Fiscal General del Estado ‘Sobre la prodecencia del 
retomo de extranjeros menores que pretendan entrar ilegalmente en Espana y en quienes no 
concurra la situation juridica de desamparo’ Instruction 3/2003
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stopping the flow of illegal immigrants and to co-operate in the regulation of 
migration flows.
Looking for a European solution I: the carrot
The question of immigration from Morocco could not only be dealt with from 
the point of view of border control. In the Spanish government, and in 
particular in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the awareness that the only 
solution (in the mid to long term) to avoid a permanent and ever growing flow 
of immigrants from Morocco is prosperity, has long been established. This is 
not easy, in particular since Morocco has been severely hit by economic crises 
since the start of the 1980s and some of its economic indicators have 
worsened in the 1990s.
Migration concerns, together with the search for a buffer of common interests, 
were behind Spanish attempts to divert EC/EU attention (and money) towards 
Morocco and the Mediterranean in general from the late 1980s. These 
initiatives produced significant achievements, like the agreement on the 
Cannes financial package, the Barcelona Conference in 1995 which launched 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the EC/Morocco Association 
Agreement. The importance of migration concerns in convincing other 
European partners should not be underestimated. But the effects of such 
initiatives in terms of increasing prosperity in the sending countries like 
Morocco would in any case only come years later.
The difficult implementation of the new programmes, in particular MEDA I, 
the political troubles in the Middle East that brought the process to an almost 
complete stop, and the poor performance of the southern Mediterranean 
economies soon undermined the confidence in the capacity of the Euro- 
Mediterranean partnership and the new Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with 
Morocco to change the situation in the mid-term. Moreover, the number of 
immigrants arriving every year in Spain from Morocco, far from decreasing, 
was growing rapidly in the second half of the 1990s (see Table 5.2 above).
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Less than six months after the Barcelona Conference, elections gave Jose 
Maria Aznar’s Popular Party a relative majority. Immigration policy in Spain 
would change considerably with the new government, but only after some 
time, and in particular during the second mandate, obtained in 2000, where the 
Popular Party got an absolute majority in parliament. The change in the 
Spanish political landscape was reflected in Spain’s positions in the EU. 
Aznar’s governments gave great importance to Justice and Home Affairs 
issues, such as the fight against ETA terrorism or the control of illegal 
immigration.
At the European level, negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty gave to Justice 
and Home Affairs an unprecedented importance within the EU. Justice and 
Home Affairs would be the main topic of the European Councils of Dublin, 
Tampere (October 1999) and Sevilla (June 2002). The Spanish government 
made an effort to upload to the EU level some of its main internal priorities, 
and met with an increasingly favourable European context. Some of the pillars 
of Aznar’s European policy like the co-operation in the fight against terrorism 
and the European contribution to Spain’s efforts to stop illegal immigration 
were precisely the areas in which the EU member states were more willing to 
integrate further at the turn of the 21st century. The international context was 
also favourable, in particular after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
in the USA that put terrorism at the top of the list of priorities of the main 
international actors.
The failure of the repeated bilateral efforts during the years from 1990 to 2001 
to obtain further Moroccan co-operation in issues like the readmission of third 
country nationals, the regulation of legal migration or the control of the illegal 
sea crossings, caused frustration in Madrid. And this despite the fact that the 
terms of co-operation had mostly been defined by the Spanish government 
unilaterally, and with no substantial compensation on offer. In a context of 
worsening relations with the Alawi kingdom, and in the absence of either a 
credible carrot (i.e. a substantial compensation in political or economic terms) 
or a strong enough stick (i.e. the threat of some credible retaliation that had 
effect on the Rabat authorities) Spanish policy makers turned to Brussels.
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The first good occasion to put pressure on Morocco in order to get its 
collaboration in the immigration issue was the negotiations for the signature 
o f a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement. Spain was not the only EU 
member country with a high number of Moroccan migrants: Moroccans were 
also numerous in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Germany (see 
Table 5.4 below). The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement169 contains 
a few provisions on immigration, in particular referring to the rights of 
Moroccan workers in EU member states (arts. 64 and 65) and the 
establishment of a dialogue in immigration matters (art. 69.3). More 
importantly, it includes a joint declaration on re-admission: the parties agree 
to adopt provisions and measures for the re-admission of their own nationals 
bilaterally. But the crucial issue of re-admission of non-Moroccans that had 
transited via Morocco is not mentioned.
Table 5.4 Number of Moroccans living legally in the European Union by 
country (1999)
France 459,788 28.7
Spain 140,896
oo 
oo
Belgium 137,520 8.6
Netherlands
r j g «
Italy
Germany
£:V v
135,721
120,531
72,147
8.5
7.5
4.5
Other
. ■ y;*'-.v;J&U*v‘. £ n.a. 33.4
Total (aprox.) 1,600,000 100.0
* Percentage of Moroccans in the country over the estimated amount of Moroccans living in 
theEU.
Source: Action Plan for Morocco Council document number 11426/99 Limite JAI 75 AG 30
169 Official Journal o f the EC L 70, 18 March 2000.
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The creation of the High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration in 
December 1998 opened a new window of opportunity for the Spanish 
government. The group was to prepare cross-pillar action plans for the 
countries of origin and transit of asylum seekers and migrants. The General 
Affairs Council on 25 and 26 January 1999 approved the group’s proposal to 
prepare Action Plans for Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, Morocco, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Iraq and Albania and its neighbouring region. Spain, 
which had been actively promoting the creation of the working group and the 
idea of the action plans, was designated as the co-ordinator for Morocco. The 
Action Plan for Morocco was approved by the General Affairs Council on 11 
October 1999 for submission to the Tampere European Council of October
199917°
The Action Plan for Morocco puts an emphasis on Morocco both as a sending 
country and a transit country. It makes specific reference to the particular 
importance of emigration from Morocco for Spain (points 22 a/d/f, 27) . The 
fact that Morocco did not require visas from the nationals of many West 
African countries, together with the Algerian civil unrest and the Moroccan 
denial of re-admission demands, are mentioned in the plan as amounting to a 
serious challenge (point 63). The Action Plan foresees co-operative measures 
(dialogue, an information campaign to warn against illegal migration, the fight 
against criminal networks) but also measures to enforce the existing 
readmission agreements, in particular for third country nationals and stateless 
persons, and the adoption of visa requirements by Morocco for nationals of 
the West African region (Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, etc.). Measures to 
improve economic conditions in Morocco in order to stop the flow of 
Moroccan migrants are also included.
The Plan outlines the financial resources that will be made available, largely 
through the MEDA II programme. The MEDA 13 programme 2002-2004 
reflects those concerns and allocates money to improve border controls (40 
MEUR), create a Moroccan governmental structure to deal with legal 
emigration (5 MEUR) and assist the development of the Northern provinces
170 Council document number 11426/99 Limite JAI 75 AG 30
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(70 MEUR), the source of about 40% of the total migration to the EU.171 In 
this way, the MEDA programme, which was initially a response to the 
immigration challenge by creating prosperity in the sending countries, focused 
also on the border control dimension, in line with the change in European 
policy on the question of illegal immigration.
The Conclusions of the European Council at Tampere (15 and 16 October 
1999), where the Action Plan was approved, are the clearest indication of that 
shift in the EU approach to migration. Despite some lip service paid to the 
idea to promote co-development and protect human and minority rights in the 
sending country (point 11), it is significant that each point devoted to the 
‘management of migration fluxes’ (points 22 to 27) mentions the fight against 
illegal immigration and/or readmission except one,172 whereas the regulation 
of legal immigration is only mentioned secondarily in one point.173 The two 
reforms of the Spanish Aliens Law in 2000 and the immigration policy since 
then have coincided largely with the ‘spirit of Tampere*.
Looking for a European solution II: the stick
The Action Plan was adopted unilaterally by the European Union, despite the 
fact that there had been some EU-Morocco dialogue on migration issues 
before. This was an uncomfortable situation for the Moroccan side, but not as 
disappointing as being included in the same group as Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Somalia and Albania. The Moroccan government officials, who see their
171 European Commission MEDA II: Programme Indicatif National 2002-2004 Maroc . In 
http://www.delmar.cec.eu.int/fir/ue_maroc/medaiib.htm. In the 1990s Moroccan and Spanish 
politicians assumed that the Rif was the main source of the emigration going to Spain. 
Although this was disproved by a poll conducted in late 2001 {El Pais, 2 October 2001), it is 
likely that this image was in the mind of those drafting the programme.
172 Point 25, devoted to the need of the candidates for enlargement to implement the 
Schengen ‘acquis’.
173 Point 22, and only mentioning ‘information campaigns about the real possibilities of legal 
immigration’ in the sending countries.
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country as having a special relationship with the EC/EU since its very start 
and as one of its closest partners, felt deeply unhappy about the plan.174
The consecutive presidencies and the Commission made efforts to convince 
Morocco to collaborate in migration matters. In September 2000 the Council 
authorised the Commission to negotiate a Community readmission agreement 
with Morocco (together with 3 other countries), but by May 2002 Morocco 
had not yet agreed to launch formal negotiations. A framework more suitable 
for the dialogue was created during the French presidency in 2001 by the EU- 
Morocco Association Council decision to establish a working party for social 
affairs and immigration, as foreseen in article 73 of the Association 
Agreement.175 The Action Plan was quietly put aside, and the bases for a more 
balanced co-operation were established. Meanwhile, bilateral relations 
between Spain and Morocco worsened, and reached the crisis stage in October 
2001 following a summer of bitter declarations exchanged across the strait on 
the issue of illegal immigration from Morocco.
Frustrated with the failure of all attempts to end the bilateral crisis illustrated
i
by the withdrawal of the Moroccan ambassador to Madrid, the Aznar 
government tried to go one step beyond, and obtain not only co-operative 
measures, financial assistance and dialogue, but also the threat of effective 
European sanctions against the Moroccan government if it refused to co­
operate in the control of migration flows. The opportunity arrived with the 
third Spanish presidency of the EU, in the first half of 2002. In the run-up to 
the Seville summit in June 2002, with the bilateral crisis still unsolved and the 
Moroccan ambassador back in Rabat, the governments of Spain and the 
United Kingdom started to draw up a proposal to use the EU’s ‘financial and 
economic clout* against countries that did not co-operate in the fight against 
illegal immigration, including a linkage between that co-operation and EU aid 
and even the threat of suspension of agreements with that country (The 
Guardian, 24 June 2002).
174 This is an observation that I heard not only in the interviews with Moroccan officials, but 
also with their European counterparts.
175 Decision No 1/2001 of die EU-Morocco Association Council o f 4 April 2001 (Official 
Journal o f the EC LI 12/14,21 April 2001)
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The proposal, contained in points 11 and 13 of the Spanish Presidency 
proposal to the General Affairs Council on ‘Co-operation with third countries
1 Hfkof origin and transit to jointly combat illegal immigration’, could not be 
agreed upon despite German and Italian support because of the opposition of 
France, Sweden and some other smaller member countries. In the Spanish 
press it was interpreted as an action directly targeting Morocco {El Pais, 24 
June 2002), although the idea was not entirely new nor Spanish.177 But it 
certainly constitutes another example of the Spanish attempts to use EU 
leverage for bilateral relations with Morocco in immigration issues.
In the end the conclusions of the Presidency after the Seville summit included 
four points (33 to 36) on the integration of immigration policy into the 
external relations of the EU. The European Council agreed that a clause on 
readmission (explicitly including readmission of non-nationals that have 
transited through the country) should be included in every future co-operation 
or association agreement, relations with non-co-operating countries should be 
systematically reassessed and EU should consider taking some ‘measure or 
position in the framework of the CFSP and other policies of the EU, within 
the respect of the compromises acquired by the EU’ against non-co-operating 
countries (point 36). This threat is considerably less concrete than the Spanish 
and British proposal.
The idea of ‘punishing’ Morocco for its failure to co-operate in the fight 
against illegal immigration from its territory lost momentum after Seville, and 
the Commission, in narrow co-operation with national experts and officials, 
including Spaniards, worked to redress relations with Morocco while 
addressing the widespread concern with illegal immigration amongst most 
member states’ governments. This was part of a larger trend in immigration 
policy, in which the Commission adopted a new, more proactive role in the
1 7fiintegration of immigration concerns into European foreign policy. In
176 Council 9917/3/02 REV 3 Limite JA I135, RELEX 118, MIGR 55
177 Austria proposed for the first time the idea to use negative action against the third 
countries that did not co-operate in the fight against illegal migration at the start of its 
Presidency in 1998, but the proposal was shortly withdrawn in the face of a lack of support 
from other member states.
178 The role of the European Commission started to grow after the Amsterdam Treaty went 
into effect but a whole policy to integrate co-operation in immigration issues with other EU
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December 2002 the Commission presented a report asking for a substantial 
increase in EU funding for the regulation of migration.179 The largest amount 
for the 2000-2004 period programmed by the EU for an individual country 
was for Morocco (see Table 5.6 below).
Table 5.5 Financial resources programmed for external aid 2000-2006 
and linked to the migration issue for Morocco
Concept Amount (in euros) Time period
Support for economic development at regions with high emigration 
such as Province du Nord, support for reintegration.
70,000,000 2002-2004
Organisation of legal emigration via creation of a migration centre 5,000,000 2002-2004
Fight against illegal immigration by supporting improvement of 
management of border controls
40,000,000 2002-2004
CGED-DPG (Spain): technical equipment and training for border 
control, fighting illegal immigration and detection o f falsified 
documents
376,276 2001
AFD (France): development o f the country of origin by Moroccans 
residing in France and through rural tourism and the creation of 
SME
1,500,000 2001
Int Ent (Netherlands): support to entrepreneurs of Moroccan origin 
residing in Europe in setting up economic activities in Morocco.
450,241 2001
French National Police: financial and technical assistance for 
combating illegal migration
665,980 2001
IOM- socio economic development of migration prone areas 1,056,315 2002
COOPI (Italy): the Moroccan immigrant in Italy as an agent in 
development co-operation
889,316 2002
Total amount for Morocco 119,938,128 2000-2006
Total amount for the whole world 934,468,288 2000-2006
Percentage attributed to Morocco in the world total (excluding 
multilateral programmes)
12.8 % 2000-2006
Source: ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Integrating Migration issues in the European Union’s Relations with third countries.’ COM 
(2002) 703 final Brussels, 5 December 2002 (pp. 57-58)
policies was not outlined until the ‘Communication on a common policy of illegal 
immigration’, adopted on 15 November 2001 (COM (20021) 672). The Council approved the 
comprehensive plan proposed in the communication on 28 February 2002.
179 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Integrating Migration issues in the European Union’s Relations with third countries.’ COM 
(2002) 703 final Brussels, 5 December 2002
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5.3 The expressions of Europeanisation
Chapter 5
Throughout this chapter it has been evident that the growth of immigration 
from Morocco to Spain, the creation of a Spanish migration policy and the 
beginning of a European co-operation in migration issues have coincided in 
time. Moreover, those processes have had an influence on each other in 
general, but also in the particular case of relations with Morocco. We now 
devote this third section to the study of the interrelation between Spanish 
foreign policy towards Morocco and European co-operation in migration 
affairs, and the different expressions of this relation. We will do so by 
analysing the four themes of Europeanisation in relation to immigration.
In the balance between new constraints and new instruments, the first theme 
of Europeanisation, it is important to remark that, unlike trade, fisheries and 
agriculture, immigration is not a common policy. Member states keep a large 
degree of autonomy in their immigration policies. That is not to say that there 
are no constraints at all: for example, since its accession to the Schengen 
group in 1991 Spain has a special responsibility as the south western gate to 
the Schengen space of the free movement of people, in particular because of 
the geographical proximity of Morocco. The relative ease of movement within 
Schengenland means that Spain has become a much coveted target for would- 
be immigrants and it has to concentrate much more effort at controlling its 
southern boundaries. In other issues, such as deciding whom it will ask for a 
visa, Spain has also lost some autonomy.
European measures, however, represent relatively weak constraints on 
Spanish policy. In exchange, Spain has gained access to EC/EU instruments. 
Indeed, it has worked towards the creation of new instruments. The first way 
in which Spanish governments have acted has been the launching of major 
European foreign policy initiatives that target the Mediterranean and, with 
particular intensity, Morocco, in order to create prosperity there, and thus 
remove the incentive to emigrate. We should not underestimate the role that
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migration concerns played in initiatives such as the 1995 Barcelona 
Conference, that gave birth to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
As we have seen in the previous section, Spain also tried to use European 
instruments in order to strengthen the control over its own borders. The 
clearest expressions of it are the use of European funds to pay for such 
projects as the fences built around the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and the 
surveillance system in the Strait of Gibraltar. Another example is the way in 
which Spain has pushed within European co-operation in immigration affairs 
to use the leverage that the EU has to force Morocco to co-operate in 
migration issues on the terms decided by Spain: see for instance the drafting 
of the Action Plan for Morocco or the proposals on the integration of 
immigration policy in EU external relations at the Seville summit.
One caveat about these European instruments is the fact that Spanish 
governments have not always been successful in their attempts (the Action 
Plan and the Seville proposals were after all failures). Nor is it clear that the 
instruments will have a real impact on actual immigration from Morocco, or 
that the impact will be the one foreseen by Spanish governments. For 
example, reinforced controls in the Strait, Ceuta and Melilla paid for with EU 
money have not reduced the total number of immigrants; they have just 
diverted the flow towards the Canaries and eastern Andalusia. We can state, 
however, that in general the advantages of being an EC/EU member have 
been exploited by the Spanish governments, and have been more relevant than 
the constraints. More often than not, Schengen and the later EU requirements 
(in particular, since Schengen was incorporated to the EU acquis in 1999 by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam) have been more an alibi than an uncomfortable 
imposition on Spanish governments.
The issue of interest and identity, the second theme of this thesis, has changed 
considerably, the main difference being the transformation of Spain into a 
country of immigration. As immigration has become a crucial issue in the 
political arena, it has also entered the list of priorities of the Spanish 
government in relation to Morocco. Nevertheless, those changes cannot be
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directly attributed to Europeanisation: the relative prosperity of Spain and the 
economic failure of Morocco are more relevant. The one aspect in which 
Spain did change its own perception as an international actor as a direct result 
of being a member is its role as the guardian of Europe’s south western 
entrance, which is at the same time the limit with the poorest continent, 
Africa. Spanish government have used this claim to get resources from the 
EU, and also to justify their actions in front of Parliament and public opinion. 
But we believe that their actions prove that the definition of interests and the 
international identity of Spain have also genuinely changed as a direct result 
of Europeanisation in the immigration field. Finally, it is important to 
remember in this respect that the role of Spain as an advocate of Moroccan 
interests as described in chapter 4 was partly a result of immigration concerns.
Probably the aspect in which we have observed a most notable impact of EU 
membership is the third theme of Europeanisation, changes in decision­
making. We have seen how the leading role of the Ministry of Interior in that 
field reflects to a large extent the configuration at EC/EU level, in which 
interior and justice ministries have managed to monopolise the main decision 
bodies that deal with immigration, often with strong support from their prime 
ministers (as was the case in Spain). In a mostly Europeanist country like 
Spain, where control of European affairs is relatively underdeveloped, the 
Ministry of the Interior could affirm that autonomy in its participation in 
European co-operation in migration issues. To gain legitimacy and maintain 
influence within the government structure Spanish diplomats had to adopt the 
discourse on immigration; the weak position of the foreign ministers of the 
Aznar governments after 2000 contrasted vividly with the interior minister, 
always one of the strongest figures of the government.180
Having said that, we must add that after 2000 the hard line on immigration has 
not been exclusive to the Ministry of the Interior, and other ministries like 
Defence or Foreign Affairs, plus the Prime Minister himself, have had similar
180 Josep Pique and Ana Palacio became foreign ministers without previous diplomatic 
experience and without a network of contacts within the Ministry. In addition neither had a 
predominant role in the Popular Party or a regional power base.
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positions. The main publicly known tensions on the migration dossier 
happened in late 1999 between the Minister of Interior Jaime Mayor Oreja 
and the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Manuel Pimentel, during the 
discussion about the Immigration Law, and were eventually solved with the 
arbitration of Prime Minister Aznar in favour of the former (Perez-Diaz, 
Alvarez-Miranda et al. 2001: 104-108).
In the Morocco dossier we have found that the initiatives that initially came 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in relation to emigration were more 
related to the causes of emigration than to the argument over immigration, 
whereas those inspired by the Ministry of the Interior or the European co­
operation in immigration affairs concentrated on fighting illegal immigration. 
But the former adopted as priority objectives issues related to the control of 
illegal immigration (readmission of non-nationals, readmission of minors, co­
operation in fighting illegal migration), and we have found no evidence that 
this process involved a direct confrontation between ministries. By the start of 
the 21st Century, Spanish foreign policy had adopted the fight against illegal 
immigration as a priority, just as the EU had done.
Finally, we have seen how the effects of Europeanisation have also been 
important in the domestic arena, the fourth theme of this thesis. Europe has 
been at the same time the source of and the excuse for the securitisation of 
immigration in the Spanish political agenda. The socialisation of government 
officials in the European context was only one of the ways in which the 
concepts were transmitted. Politicians, the media and some academics 
borrowed ideas and categories, mainly from France and the EC/EU discourse, 
to describe and analyse the new phenomenon of immigration (Santamaria 
2002b). The Spanish public has become aware of its new condition as a host 
country and instinctively has compared its situation to that of its neighbours. 
The rise of radical anti-immigrant parties in many EU countries (France, 
Belgium, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands) did have a mobilising effect in 
the media, associations and parties and created an awareness of the issue that 
was disproportionate to the dimension of the phenomenon. In that respect,
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immigration is an issue in which Europeanisation has had a notable impact on 
the domestic political dimension.
5.4 Conclusions
Spanish accession to the European Union coincided in time with three 
important processes. The first of them was the modernisation of the Spanish 
legislation about foreign residents and the adoption of a legislative framework
101
inspired by those of the Western European countries. The second important 
process was a steady increase of migration from Morocco to Spain, both of 
Moroccan nationals and of nationals of other countries that used Morocco as a 
transit country. Finally, it coincided with the creation of the Schengen group 
and the first steps towards EC co-operation in matters of asylum and 
migration.
In this chapter we have analysed how these three processes have interacted 
with each other. In the area of immigration, which formally remained by and 
large in the hands of the Spanish government and not EU institutions, the 
influence of Europeanisation is still deeply felt. Rather than constraining the 
Spanish capacity to take decisions because of a transfer of competencies, this 
influence is felt more in terms of providing the ideological framework for the 
formulation of the Spanish migration policy and its effects on the foreign 
policy towards Morocco. In parallel, the European Union also provides a new 
arena in which Spanish governments can seek to use more efficient 
instruments in their relationship with Morocco.
We have attributed to Europeanisation changes not only in the balance 
between instruments and constraints, but also in the interests and identity of 
Spain in relation to immigration, in the decision-making process and in the 
domestic political arena.182 The fact that Spanish immigration policy, and in
181 When we talk about modernisation here we are referring to the adoption of a 
comprehensive normative framework together with the technological means necessary for its 
management. Before 1985 Spain did not have the instruments to control the foreign 
population that lived in the country or their legal condition. But a ‘modem’ law did not have 
to be as restrictive as the one approved: that was a matter o f political choice.
182 When we refer here to the interests and identity o f Spain, the assumption is that those 
interest and identities are the ones defended by the government. To be fair we should mention
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particular immigration as a foreign policy issue towards Morocco developed 
just as Spain became a member of the EC/EU can explain the importance of 
Europeanisation in this issue.
The choices made by Spain in its immigration policy have been strongly 
influenced by the approaches adopted by other countries, such as France. 
Thus, for example, the government has applied most policing efforts to 
stopping the migrants from entering the country rather than monitoring their 
irregular employment. Spain, like Italy, has an important ‘black’ economy that 
generates demand for illegal immigration. But both countries have opted for a 
tough approach towards illegal immigration, and in particular towards the 
sending countries, rather than a tough approach to regulating their informal 
economies and fraudulent employment (Barros 2002: 124).
Spain has made explicit efforts to tackle the causes of immigration in the 
sending countries, and in particular in Morocco, but not the causes in its own 
territory. The only instance in which the Spanish government claimed to 
tackle the issue of Spanish conditions that favoured illegal immigration was 
the reform of the Aliens’ Law in order to avoid a so-called ‘pull effect’ (efecto 
Uamada) by which a permissive law would be an invitation to illegal 
immigrants. After the implementation of the new law, however, the number of 
illegal immigrants has continued to grow.
In the area of migration the Spanish government has tried to implement a 
‘pass-the-parcel’ philosophy and to get Morocco to share the burden of 
controlling irregular immigration. Indeed, Morocco is expected to act as the 
real ‘policeman’ of the Southern border in a similar way as the Central and 
Eastern European candidates have become, by and large, in the East (Barros 
2002: 124). But Spain lacks the incentives to engage Morocco in an issue that 
is of very low priority for its government. By uploading this approach onto the 
European level, the Spanish government is slowly obtaining some successes, 
since good relations with the European Union are a high priority for the Rabat 
government. But the deepest causes of migration in the sending countries
that important sections of the civil society and some political parties did not share that 
understanding of Spain’s role.
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(poverty, lack of economic perspectives, political unrest, etc.) and in Spain 
itself (large irregular economy, weak demographic growth, unwillingness of 
the local workforce to engage in certain jobs, etc.) will remain even if 
Morocco co-operates fully, and it is thus likely that the issue will continue to 
be contentious between the two countries for some time. As other issues like 
fisheries have become less important, immigration has gained its own place as 
one of the most controversial issues in the bilateral agenda.
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Chapter 6: Territorial and post-colonial disputes
No single issue has caused as much controversy between Spain and Morocco 
as the territorial issues that arose after Moroccan independence in 1956. There 
is a strong feeling in the North African country that Spain represents the main 
obstacle to the realisation of the territorial integrity of which Morocco was 
deprived by colonialism. At the same time, Spanish military planners, but also 
its public opinion, have identified Morocco as the most likely source of a 
military threat to Spain (Hernando de Larramendi 1992: 154-155). Two issues 
have been prominent in bilateral relations: the conflict over Western Sahara 
and the sovereignty over Ceuta, Melilla and the lesser Spanish possessions off 
the Moroccan Mediterranean coast.183
The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, despite its 
name, is not a ‘common* policy of the EU in the sense that states have 
transferred their competence to the EC in the way that they have done, for 
example, with fisheries or trade. Foreign policy is indeed one of the fields in 
which member states have kept most control. This is particularly true as far as 
issues that have to do with colonial history are concerned. In this context, 
Europeanisation is unlikely to have had a similar impact than in the cases we 
have been studying so far. In this chapter we will study three particular 
aspects of the territorial issues between Morocco and Spain, as a way to 
identify whether or not membership in the EC/EU has had an effect on 
Spanish foreign policy, and how the impact has changed among issues. The 
three issues that we will study are those related to the Western Sahara, Ceuta 
and Melilla, and one concrete incident, the occupations of the Leila/Parsley 
island in summer 2002.
183 Some Spanish authors would not define Ceuta and Melilla as a foreign policy issue. Here 
we take the view that this issue is perceived as an international dispute, and this international 
dimension puts the issue in the realm of foreign policy. There are numerous examples in 
which countries would not accept a topic to be an international dispute but only an 
international solution has solved the issue: Portugal with its overseas territories (1960-1974), 
Indonesia with East Timor (1975-1998), etc. (Goijao 2002: 146).
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6.1. The Western Sahara
The connection between European integration and other large trends and 
phenomena in International Relations, such as Franco-German rapprochement 
or the Cold War, has been extensively dealt with in the specialised 
scholarship. It is, however, striking how little attention has been devoted to 
the relationship between colonialism and de-colonisation and European 
integration, despite the fact that they have coincided in time and that the 
former still plays an important role in Europe’s contemporary politics, in 
particular in its foreign policy (Hansen 2002). The European states have 
brought in their colonial historical baggage as they have acceded to the 
EC/EU, and this has had an impact both on their post-colonial policies and on 
the EC/EU relations with the rest of the world.
In the case of Spain the traumatic and incomplete de-colonisation of Western 
Sahara was a heavy burden for democratic Spain to inherit. Unlike in 
Portugal, the end of the dictatorial regime in Spain had little, if anything at all, 
to do with the troubled colonial situation in Africa. However, like its 
Portuguese counterpart, the transitional regime after the dictatorship had to 
deal with a poisoned situation in a climate of internal uncertainty and of the 
complete re-definition of external priorities. The unsatisfactory outcome and 
the humiliation suffered at the hands of Morocco with the Green March,184 the 
continuing links between the Spanish population and the Sahrawi refugees, 
and the political support enjoyed by the latter within the Spanish party system 
kept the issue alive up to the time Spain became an EC member.
Democratic Spain and the Western Sahara
When the last Franco government signed the secret Madrid Agreements in 
1975, a large section of the political class and the public opinion felt a deep 
frustration at the way in which Spain had yielded to the Moroccan pressure 
exerted by the Green March. Most democratic opposition leaders thought that 
the normalisation of Spain’s international status would entail the annulment of
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the Madrid Agreement. The transition governments hoped that the cession of 
the Western Sahara would start a ‘silver age’ in relations with Morocco 
(Ballesteros 1998: 257), but none of the old problems (fisheries, Moroccan 
claim to Ceuta and Melilla) improved significantly.
The first political transition government’s foreign minister, Jose Maria 
Areilza, defined the official position towards Western Sahara as one of 
‘cautious distance, but not indifference’(Cistero Bahima and Freixes Sanjuan 
1987:27).185 The opposition parties, in particular those of the left, completely 
embraced the Sahrawi cause, and an ‘Association of Friends of the Sahara’ 
was created as early as January 1976. That same year leaders of Spain’s 
largest Socialist party, the PSOE, including Felipe Gonzalez, visited the 
refugee camps to show their solidarity with the Polisario front, which they 
recognised as the only legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people, and six 
months later six opposition parties signed a public declaration asking the 
government to denounce the agreement.
In face of this strong pressure, the first elected governments of the Union del 
Centro Democratico (UCD) started to rectify the official position. The 
government not only declared its support for the self-determination of the 
Sahrawi people, but undertook some significant steps. In September 1978, 
after several visits to Algiers, Javier Ruperez, representing the UCD, attended 
a Polisario conference and signed a joint communique whereby that party 
recognised the Polisario as the only representative of the ‘Sahrawi people in 
the fight’ for their liberty.187 Although this was only a party position, the 
effects in terms of, for example, Polisario guerrillas not assaulting Canarian 
fishing boats were felt for the next year and a half. The government also 
resumed its relations with Algeria and improved them with a visit to Algiers
184 For a summary of the main events see Chapter 2, in particular section 2.1.
185 In Spanish ‘prudente alejamiento aunque no indiferencia'.
186 Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), Spanish Comunist Party (PCE), People’s 
Socialist Party (PSP), Carlist Party, Spanish Labour Party and Communist Movement.
187 The formula is slightly more restrictive than the one used by the PSOE and other leftist 
parties because of the addition of ‘in the fight’ after mentioning the Sahrawi people. This 
formula does not preclude the existence o f other representatives o f the Sahrawi people 
(Barbier 1982: 304).
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by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez in April 1979 which included an interview 
with the General Secretary of the Polisario Front.
As we saw in Chapter two, the UCD policy of compensatory gestures towards 
Morocco and Algeria only served to make Spanish foreign policy a hostage to 
the pressures from both countries in the decade 1975-1985. The arrival of the 
Socialists into power in 1982, preceded by the short lived period of clear pro- 
Moroccan alignment of the Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo government, was strongly 
feared in Rabat, in particular because of the firmly established support for the 
Sahrawi cause within the Socialist party. The Spanish left had presented the 
denunciation of the Madrid Agreement as a condition for the full 
normalisation of the foreign policy of Spain as a democratic country.
However, the election of the PSOE to government with an absolute majority 
in Parliament did not substantially modify the official position. The Spanish 
position was to support the exercise of the right to self-determination in 
accordance with UN and OAU declarations. Support for the efforts of 
international organisations became a constant of Spanish foreign policy, so as 
to avoid a bilateralisation of the issue. In open contradiction with their 
previous demands, the Socialists decided not to denounce the 1975 Madrid 
Agreement, considering that ‘the historical evolution has led to the de facto 
superseding of those agreements’ and that denouncing them ‘would constitute 
a futile act that would probably just cause confusion among the parties 
involved in the conflict’(OID 1983: 839).
Under the Socialist government the Ministry of Foreign Affairs designed a 
new, global strategy towards the Maghreb in which good relations with all 
actors, and in particular with Morocco and Algeria, became a priority. But 
relations with the Polisario Front, which had seen the hopes of change in the 
Spanish position in their favour vanish with the pragmatic approach adopted 
by the Socialists, became strained. The Polisario Front protested against the 
1983 fisheries agreement between Spain and Morocco, the first fruit of co­
188 For an official account of the Spanish official position see the written answer to a 
parliamentarian question in OLD 1983.
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operation under the Socialist government, and threatened the Spanish fishing 
boats that would operate in Saharan waters.
Captures and acts of aggression by the Polisario Front worsened the relations 
with the Socialist government. The most serious incident, in September 1985, 
was the attack on a Spanish fishing boat (named ‘Junquito’) and on the 
Spanish army patrol that went to its rescue. This triggered a firm reaction, 
including the expulsion from Spanish territory of all Polisario representatives 
and the closure of its information offices. Nonetheless, and in line with the 
idea of having a stable and coherent policy towards the region, Spain did not 
modify its support for the self-determination of the Western Saharans within 
the United Nations and voted in favour of an Algerian resolution asking for 
direct talks between Morocco and the Polisario Front and supporting the right 
to self determination on 12 November 1985.
By the time Spain became a member of the European Community in 1986, the 
policy towards Western Sahara had acquired a clear profile. The Spanish 
government would play a role of neutral engagement. The temptation to 
support openly one of the parties to the dispute had been resisted despite 
intense pressure from Morocco, and the permanent pro-Sahrawi mobilisation 
of public opinion. Support for multilateral initiatives, and in particular the UN 
efforts to solve the conflict, was complemented by a strengthening of the links 
with Morocco and with the Saharan refugees through aid and technical co­
operation. Spanish governments were still exposed to pressures from both 
directions, but at least a clear position had emerged, which could be 
legitimated with reference to multilateral declarations. The Western Sahara, if 
still prominent, was not in the first line of issues in the bilateral relationship 
with Morocco.
The EC/EU and the conflict in Western Sahara
Accession to the European Community presented the Spanish executive, but 
also other national political actors, with the opportunity to upload the difficult 
issue of Western Sahara to the European level in order to obtain more 
leverage over Morocco while at the same time deflecting tensions from the
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bilateral relationship. But first the Spanish executive had to work to put the 
issue on the EC agenda: until accession the profile of the EC in the issue had 
been very low. When war broke out the Nine declared their neutrality in a 
conflict that they defined as African,189 and by and large kept on ignoring the 
question for the following ten years.190 At the UN their vote was split, with 
Ireland and Greece (like Spain) voting in favour of the resolutions that 
asserted the Western Saharans’ right to self-determination, and the rest of 
member states abstaining (Koulaimah 1995: 104).
Spanish membership contributed to the inclusion of the issue of Western 
Sahara in the EC agenda even before the Spanish executive tried to obtain a 
declaration from the Council. The changes came first in the European 
Parliament, where the arrival of 60 Spanish MEPs informed about the issue, 
combined with a Socialist majority after the 1984 elections, created a 
momentum that the national committees of support to the Sahrawi cause in the 
member states could not miss. In 1985, following the creation of all- 
parliamentary groups in several member states’ national parliaments, the 
European Parliament witnessed the birth of the ‘Peace for the Sahara’ 
intergroup. This intergroup meets monthly and has been since 1985 a crucial 
element of mobilisation for the Sahrawi cause in the Parliament.
A European Parliament with a conservative majority had approved in 1981 the 
‘Lalor report’ that assumed some of the main Moroccan thesis, and in 
particular the idea that the conflict was a bilateral issue between Morocco and 
Algeria, after a bitter debate and with the opposition of the whole left.191 After 
1986 the position changed. Western Sahara started to feature in resolutions 
about the Mediterranean, aid to refugees and expatriates in developing 
countries, arbitrary detentions in the Western Sahara and ACP-CE joint 
assembly sessions, as well as in a growing number of parliamentary questions 
(Urruela 1995: 114-115).
189 See Official Journal o f the EC C 276, 22 November 1976.
190 For example in 1976 in a declaration about Africa and the OAU the Nine reaffirmed the 
right o f the Namibian and Rhodesian peoples to self-determination, ignoring the open conflict 
in the Western Sahara. Bulletin EC, 2-1976, pp. 85-86
191 Official Journal o f the EC. Annex: Debates o f the EP 1980-1981 session. Report of 
Proceedings from 10 to 13 March 1981, 12 March 1981 (pages 167-178). See also in the same 
publication the Proceedings from 9-13 February 1981.
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A second consequence of Spanish membership was the need to negotiate the 
1988 EEC-Morocco fisheries agreement,192 which included the waters of 
Western Sahara. The Twelve wanted to avoid formally recognising the 
Moroccan annexation of the territory by the back door, which was an 
objective of Moroccan diplomacy, while keeping the fishing possibilities 
open. Eventually the agreement used the expression ‘waters subject to 
sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco’, by which the
iCommission hoped to avoid the issue. The Moroccan authorities made the 
opposite interpretation: ‘This distinction between jurisdiction and sovereignty 
amounts to a recognition de facto but also de iure of the Moroccan 
sovereignty over the whole of the waters from Tanger to Lagouira’ (Alaoui 
1994: 71).194 The division into zones contained in the annexes made it clear 
that the agreement did affect Western Saharan waters (Juste Ruiz 1988: 753- 
755) and the European Commission had to face considerable criticism in 
Parliament. If there still was any doubt, the following agreement, signed in 
1992,195 included in the annexes a reference to the Western Saharan port of 
Dakhla as ‘one of the Moroccan ports’ that would receive technical visits.
Despite the fact that the European Commission was negotiating under the 
strict supervision of the Council, and in particular under strong pressure from 
the Spanish executive, the government in Madrid seized the opportunity 
domestically to try and de-couple the fisheries issue from its position on 
Western Sahara. Thus, in a written answer to a parliamentary question the 
government claimed that: ‘From the moment of Spanish accession to the EC 
the negotiation and signature of fisheries agreements with third countries is a 
competence of the Community. There is, therefore, no direct relation between
192 Official Journal o f the EC L 181/1,12 July 1988. See chapter 3.
193 When asked in the European Parliament, Fisheries Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha 
claimed that the fisheries agreement was not about establishing territorial limits and that ‘the 
Commission does not question International Law’. See: Official Journal o f the EC. Annex: 
Debates o f  the EP Session 1987-1988, Report of Proceedings from 13 to 17 June 1988. See 
also answer by Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha on 1 April 1987 to the written question 
1914/86 by Mrs Barbara Simmons of 21 November 1986 in Official Journal o f the EC C226, 
24 August 1987.
194 Lagouira is the southernmost point of Western Sahara. The quotation comes from the PhD 
thesis written by Crown Prince Mohammed Ben A1 Hassan Alaoui, now King Mohammed VI 
(Alaoui 1994).
195 Official Journal o f the EC L 407, 31 December 1992.
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the fisheries agreement that links Morocco and the EC and our country’s 
policy towards Western Sahara’(OK) 1988: 558-559).
In 1988, Morocco and the Polisario Front reached for the first time an 
agreement on the Perez de Cuellar plan in the United Nations. The emergence 
of a UN consensus that coincided with the Spanish position (search for a 
solution agreed by both parts that ensured the exercise of self-determination 
by the Sahrawis) provided the background for a Spanish initiative to obtain a 
common declaration. In September 1988 the Twelve expressed their 
determination to support the UN’s efforts to hold a referendum and called on 
the parties to contribute to a ‘just and lasting peace in the region’.196 This was 
a significant change given the fact that only Spain, Greece and Ireland had 
voted in favour of the referendum in the UN.
The UN consensus was also the basis for a ‘Resolution on the political 
situation in Western Sahara’ approved by the European Parliament in March 
1989.197 This time the European Parliament defined the issue as a problem of 
decolonisation, which ought to be solved respecting the right of the Saharan 
people to self-determination. It urged the member states and EPC to use their 
influence in order to implement a referendum and to encourage Morocco and 
the Polisario Front to enter into direct negotiations, and called on the 
European Commission to increase its humanitarian aid to the refugees. The 
European Commission reacted and started providing an increasing amount of 
humanitarian assistance to the Western Saharan refugees in Algeria until it 
became, at the turn of the millennium, the main donor and guarantor of their 
food security.
The Spanish government was the main promoter of declarations on the 
Western Sahara from the Twelve in the late 1980s.198 The common European 
position became a foreign policy reference in the same way that UN positions 
already were in terms of justifying Spanish positions both before public 
opinion and to Morocco. The Socialist governments continued with their
196 Bulletin EC, 9-1988, point 2.4.1., p. 60
197 Texts adopted by the European Parliament, March 1989, Doc.A2-374/88 of 15 March 
1989, pp. 20-22.
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strategy of referring to multilateral declarations and initiatives instead of 
defending a distinct national position that might arouse Moroccan hostility. In 
that sense it became highly functional for Spanish foreign policy purposes that 
the European Parliament had made itself the advocate of the Sahrawi cause 
within the EC/EU, while other pro-Sahrawi member states (Ireland, Sweden, 
etc.) contributed to keeping the issue alive within the Council.
For Spain the ideal situation is to see its position defended within the EU 
while keeping the lowest possible profile, in order to avoid antagonising 
Morocco. Spain does, however, contribute to keeping the debate active. 
Within the European Union this is more or less possible, as CFSP negotiations 
are conducted behind closed doors and other member states are anyway ready 
to come forward to defend the Sahrawi cause. However, it is interesting to see 
how Spain did not use the Western Sahara issue to enhance its profile within 
the EC/EU in a similar way as it had done with the Mediterranean policy, nor 
did it present itself to the public opinion as the champion of the Sahrawi cause 
in the EC/EU in the way that Portugal did with the Timor issue, for example.
The Western Sahara has not disappeared from the bilateral relationship 
between Morocco and Spain, despite the Spanish attempts to upload its 
position to the European level, for several reasons. The first reason is that the 
EU position can only be very cautious. One member state, France, has been 
the strongest western ally of Morocco in this issue, from the start of the war, 
in which French troops took part to support the Mauritanian occupation 
against Polisario resistance (November 1977- June 1978) and provided 
weapons and training to the Moroccan army, until 2001 when President 
Jacques Chirac referred in Rabat to the Western Sahara as the ‘provinces of 
south Morocco* (BBC News Online, 3 December 2001). Other member states 
have kept a very low profile, tom between committed parliamentarians and 
political activists that defend the Sahrawi cause and the will to keep friendly 
relations with Morocco. In the CFSP context the decided support of some 
openly pro-Sahrawi member countries (Ireland, Sweden, Greece) does not 
compensate for the reticence of the rest.
198 For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernandez Ordonez confirmed the Spanish 
initiative behind the Madrid declaration o f 23 February 1989 in an intervention in the Spanish
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Another reason that keeps the issue alive is that it is still being discussed in 
the UN, and in that forum Morocco monitors very closely any Spanish action. 
The UN is the only multilateral framework where the issue can be dealt with, 
since the Arab League and the African Union are too divided, and seen as not 
neutral by the contenders, and the Arab Maghreb Union does not carry the 
necessary political weight. The UN is therefore the target of both the Polisario 
and Moroccan diplomatic manoeuvres. Spain is too committed on the issue (if 
nothing else, because it still is, in UN terms, the administering colonial power, 
as Moroccan annexation has not been recognised) to keep a low profile there, 
and is therefore subject to permanent Moroccan pressure.
Finally, a crucial element that maintains the Western Sahara as an 
unavoidable priority for Spanish foreign policy makers is the high degree of 
awareness and mobilisation of the Spanish civil society, reflected also in the 
political parties and among local, regional, national and even European MPs. 
The Polisario Front has been particularly successful in shaping the perception 
of Spanish NGOs, public opinion and the press on the issue, to the point that 
the Moroccan arguments are virtually absent from the political debate in 
Spain.199 The already difficult situation of Spanish diplomacy in relation to 
Morocco is further complicated by the initiatives of Spanish associations, 
sometimes with the support of local and regional authorities, such as the 
symbolic ‘referendum’ (9-21 October 2001) organised by a group of NGOs, 
in which Andalusians were asked whether or not the government of Spain 
should unequivocally support the celebration of a self-determination 
referendum in Western Sahara and whether or not the Spanish government 
should recognise the Polisario Front as the sole legitimate representative of
parliament (ODD 1989: 387).
199 In other words, those who defend the need to be more understanding with the Moroccan 
position in the Spanish press usually do not defend it in terms of the Moroccan historical 
rights to the land (the main Moroccan argument), but considering the importance of good 
bilateral relations, or criticising the Polisario marxist ideology and organisation. The failure of 
the Moroccan government to explain its case in the Western Sahara issue to Spanish public 
opinion was signalled in many of the interviews conducted with journalists, academics and 
European diplomats.
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the Sahrawi people. About 97% of the roughly 125,000 ballots cast answered 
positively {El Pais, 29 October 2001).200
6.2. Ceuta and Melilla
If the study of the relation between colonialism and European integration is 
relatively underdeveloped, there is a particular aspect which is even less 
studied than the rest: that of the remnants of the European empires, that 
‘confetti of empire* (Groom 1997: 21) that some member states still keep. 
This mainly includes two types of territories: the extra-European territories 
that are considered an integral part of European member countries201 and the 
‘Overseas Countries and Territories’ (OCTs), 20 territories scattered around 
the globe and under the sovereignty of four member states.202 There is still 
one more exception, that of Gibraltar, that ‘pebble in the EU’s shoe’ (Groom 
1997) that constitutes the oddity of the last colony in Europe, belonging to one 
member state and claimed by another member state.
Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish North African cities, became an integral 
part of the EC/EU by virtue of Spanish accession in 1986. Remarkably 
enough, one year afterwards Morocco’s application to EC membership ‘was 
dealt with in no uncertain terms, Rabat was told that the organization was 
open only to Europeans, and that was that’ (Neumann 1998: 400). The 
Spanishness of the two cities, and by extension its Europeanness, was to be 
consolidated by Spanish accession to the EC, so that the European Flag would 
fly ‘in the very same region which the EU itself has defined as non-European’ 
(Hansen 2002: 490).
200 Although the referendum had no official validity whatsoever, nor any backing of the 
central government, the initiative did gamer much coverage in the Spanish press. Some of the 
polling stations were located in public buildings, including one in the regional parliament 
main building in Seville. In parallel 150 Andalusian local governments made institutional 
declarations and the regional Parliament voted a resolution. All this caused outrage in 
Morocco, where the press accused not only the Andalusian government but also the Madrid 
government o f being behind the whole event.
201 This first category includes the four overseas departments (DOM) of France (Reunion, 
Guadeloupe, Guiana and Martinique) and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla.
202 There are 11 British OCTs (Anguilla, Montserrat, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands, Saint 
Helena and dependencies, British Antarctic Territories, British Indian Ocean Territories and 
Pitcairn), 7 French OCTs, known as TOM (Mayotte, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, St. 
Pierre and Miquelon, Southern and Antarctic Territories, Wallis and Futuna islands), 2 Dutch 
(Aruba and the Dutch Antilles) and 1 Danish (Greenland). (European Commission 1999)
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Ceuta and Melilla as an integral part of democratic Spain
Ceuta (72,000 inhabitants, 19.5 km2) and Melilla (62,000 inhabitants, 12.5 
km2) are two towns, 250 km apart, that, together with the lesser enclaves, 
‘constitute the total of Spain’s remaining possession in North Africa’ 
(Marquina 1987:114), totalling 33 square kilometers. The two cities have been 
in Iberian hands since the fifteenth century, when the peninsular kingdoms 
completed the Reconquista with the creation of an advanced line of defence in 
North Africa; the other enclaves (the island of Alhucemas, the Rock of Velez 
de la Gomera, and the Chafarinas Islands) are nowadays only occupied by 
military staff, and their original function was to ensure communication 
between the cities and their defence (Marquina 1987).
The terms of the dispute are well known. For Spain Ceuta and Melilla, unlike 
its other African possessions, never were considered a colony or a part of the 
Protectorate. The cities were incorporated to the Spanish crown when Spain 
was already a national state and Morocco could not be considered a unified 
political entity. Moreover, in several treaties signed with the Moroccan sultans 
since the 18th century the latter acknowledged Spanish sovereignty over the 
cities. Morocco argues the contrary: even though Spanish presence dates from 
a very long time ago, the cities were Moroccan when they were taken by the 
Portuguese (who took Ceuta in 1415) and Spaniards (Melilla, 1497). The 
sultans may have included Ceuta and Melilla in some treaties but certainly the 
history of both cities is one of regular sieges and attempts to expel the 
European from North African soil, which was achieved in all other Iberian 
possessions. Morocco’s territory will not be complete until those two cities 
are united with the Alawi Kingdom.203
It is not our intention here to make a historical survey of the issue of the two 
cities. But the arguments above show a fundamental clash between Spanish 
and Moroccan definitions of their status. The Moroccan claim is not linked to
203 There are numerous texts published in order to defend one position or the other, and their 
analysis is beyond the scope of this work. For a general exposition of the arguments see del 
Pino 1983. For a detailed exposition of the Spanish position presented by a Spanish diplomat 
see Ballesteros 1998.
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a particular situation or negotiating strategy; it has been voiced ever since 
Moroccan independence in 1956 and is likely to continue for a long time. It is 
based on the principle of territorial integrity and geographical contiguity, very 
much like the Spanish claim on Gibraltar, even though their situation from the 
international law point of view is different.
In her work about irredentist disputes, Karin Von Hippel (1996) studied the 
case of Ceuta and Melilla. She identified one major domestic factor, the army, 
as the most important element of the explanation for the Spanish decision not 
to negotiate the status of the city and to defend sovereignty over the cities 
with all available means, including force. Under Franco the army had a 
particular fondness of the cities: the General launched the failed coup that led 
to the Spanish Civil War from North Africa, and during his regime ‘Spain 
adamantly defended its position in the two cities, primarily because of the 
power and influence wielded by the army in domestic politics’ (von Hippel 
1996: 159). Von Hippel considers that the conservative elements of the army 
were responsible for Spain’s inflexibility as far as the sovereignty over the 
cities was regarded and quoted the increases in defence expenditure in the 
1980s and the large amounts of soldiers stationed in the cities204 as examples 
of the army’s influential role in Spanish politics.
However, we have found no indication that other actors in the democratic 
Spanish political scene are less attached to the defence of the sovereignty over 
the two cities. The diplomatic service, the main political parties and leaders 
(with the temporary exception of the Communist party), and the Parliament, 
have not been less resolute in their defence of Spanish sovereignty. Certainly 
the situation of the two cities needed to be consolidated when democracy 
arrived, both in order to overcome the military predominance in the 
discussions about them and in view of the events in Western Sahara. And a 
role had to be found for those two cities in a new, decentralised and 
democratic Spain.
204 According to her own calculations, between 7 and 10 per cent of all the army was stationed 
in the two cities between 1971and 1995, with two peaks in 1981 and 1991 (von Hippel 1996: 
165).
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The occasion came with the drafting of the Spanish Constitution in 1978. The 
Constitution stipulates that the Spanish nation is indivisible (art. 2), and that 
the army is the guarantor of Spain’s territorial integrity (art. 8.1). But, as it is 
often the case in modem constitutions, the exact territory of that Spanish 
nation is not directly defined. However, in two articles about the Parliament 
and the Senate and their composition (62.2 and 69.4 respectively) the cities 
are directly mentioned. Any proposal to change the status of the two cities 
would therefore entail a reform of the Constitution, which would need a 3/5 
majority in both chambers, and arguably even a nation wide referendum.205 
The young Spanish democracy fully embraced the argument that both cities 
were as Spanish as any other and acted in consequence.
The issues related to Ceuta and Melilla are therefore considered internal 
politics, and the official position of the Spanish government is that there is 
nothing to be negotiated with Morocco inasmuch as the sovereignty issue is 
concerned. In the first years of Socialist government the right wing opposition 
demanded a more energetic defence of the Spanishness of the two cities and 
the extreme left asked for a cession to Morocco; the government had to face 
some doubts within the PSOE itself (Garcia Flores 1998: 29-30). However, 
the Spanish foreign service remained vigilant and made all efforts to avoid an 
internationalisation of the issue. In their first period the Socialists in power 
finally embraced without reservations the idea that Ceuta and Melilla were 
and should remain Spanish cities with their full rights. This confirmation was 
exactly what Morocco did not want and it undertook several initiatives to 
pressure Spain during the 1980s.206
The Spanish government worked to consolidate the situation in several ways. 
It kept a strong military presence in the two cities, a gesture of a more
205 The Spanish Constitution has been modified to adopt some of the dispositions of the 
Maastricht Treaty withouth a popular referendum, so it is not unthinkable that this 
requirement could be skipped.
206 For example the presentation by the Moroccan Progress of Socialism Party of a resolution 
to the meeting of Mediterranean leftist political parties in Belgrade in July 1984 (which the 
PSOE delegates were able to abort, with the help of other European parties and the Polisario 
Front), Ghadaffi’s declarations about a hypothetical Libyan intervention in case of a Spanish- 
Moroccan conflict in a time o f Libyan-Moroccan alliance (El Pais, 22 December 1984), or a 
resolution o f the Libyan-Moroccan Union Parliament calling for the ‘liberation of the 
Moroccan lands of Ceuta and Melilla’ (Garcia Flores 1998: 32-34)
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symbolic than strategic meaning, since their territory is too vulnerable for 
territorial defence. Moreover, the army was reorganised to face an attack from 
the south. Spain made no secret of its purchases of sophisticated equipment 
that would serve as a deterrent of any possible Moroccan aggression. To those 
somewhat threatening strategies was added a new set of initiatives of military 
co-operation with Morocco, including arms sales, joint exercises and 
information exchange. This co-operation was reassuring to the Spanish 
military in that they would know in advance the equipment and tactics of the 
Moroccan army.
The preparations for accession to the European Community brought 
unexpectedly into the light the internal situation of the two cities. As we have 
seen in chapter 5, in 1985 the ‘Alien’s Law’ {Ley de Extranjena) was 
approved in order to bring Spanish immigration regulations up to European 
standards, and it was focused on dealing with non-EU nationals already in 
Spain rather than improving border controls (Gold 2000: 93). The law had an 
unforeseen effect in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and in the relations 
between their communities. According to the new law, 10,170 (83.6%) of the 
Muslims of Ceuta and 14,049 (82.5%) of those of Melilla were foreigners 
(INE 1987), even though many of them had been bom in the cities. The 
Muslim communities of both cities, 23% and 34% of the total populations of 
Ceuta and Melilla, respectively (Carabaza and de Santos 1992: 94), started to 
mobilise in order to avoid becoming illegal and thus subject to possible 
deportation; soon thereafter the Christian population of the cities 
demonstrated for a strict application of the law. A tense period of communal 
tensions between 1985 and 1987 witnessed some of the worst intercommunal 
disputes in those cities that are in themselves a micro-cosmos of the 
Mediterranean diversity (Driessen 1992: 189).
As tensions grew and violent incidents with the police attracted media 
attention, the Istiqlal party in Morocco led the mobilisation in solidarity with 
the ‘oppressed brothers’ in the enclaves and compared Spanish policy with
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those of Israel and South Africa (El Pais, 10 February 1986).207 The Moroccan 
government kept a relatively low profile in the issue in order to maintain good 
relations with Spain, but they did support two Muslim leaders from Melilla 
who went from claiming equal rights for Muslims to advocating the Moroccan 
character of the city. The relative moderation of the Moroccan government 
was in part the result of the policy of friendship and co-operation pursued by 
the Spanish government since 1982. It was also a proof of the instrumental 
use that the regime made of the claim, a secondary cause in comparison with 
other issues, in particular Western Sahara. Finally, it reflected the new 
situation created by Spanish accession to the European Union, which provided 
new incentives for Morocco to co-operate with Spain.
The Spanish government treated the issue mostly as a matter of law and order, 
and eventually also as one of unequal rights, but always as a strictly internal 
question. The initiatives taken in relation to the crisis came almost invariably 
from the Ministry of Interior, and despite the evident risk to Spain’s 
international image and stance, very little influence seems to have been
• a * 7 0 8  a aexerted by the Foreign Ministry. The solutions for the short term (special 
regulations for the residence issue, reestablishment of public order) and the 
longer term (infrastructures and investment, approval of the Statues of 
Autonomy) did not involve an international or bilateral dimension in any 
sense (OID 1987: 221).209 Accession to the European Community had thus its 
first impact on the situation in the cities, but the Spanish position hardly 
changed in relation to the main issue, that of sovereignty.
207 Rachid el Houda'igui describes Moroccan political parties as being marginalised in the 
decision-making process of Moroccan foreign policy. For that reason they have sometimes 
tried to act as a counter-balance but by the 1980s King Hassan II had established such firm 
control over foreign policy that it is unthinkable that any major initiative in that field could be 
sustained for long without at least his acquiescence (El Houda’igui 2003: chapter 1).
208 In December 1986 an editorial in the newspaper El Pais, close to the Socialist party, 
complained about the lack of a global policy towards Morocco and the lack of consideration 
of the Ministry of Interior for global foreign policy, mainly referring to events in Melilla (El 
Pais, 15 December 1986).
209 By contrast, in a survey carried out in February 1987 the perception of a relative majority 
of Spanish public opinion (44%) was that the turmoil in Melilla had to do with demands for 
independence, and only a minority (25%) thought they were concerned with equal rights for 
the Muslims (Lopez Garcia 1992: 151)
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Outposts of Europe
Accession negotiations to the EC provided the opportunity to correct a failure 
of Spanish diplomacy in the early 1980s in relation with Ceuta and Melilla: 
the exclusion of the cities from NATO. ‘Accession to NATO in 1982 -  in the 
hope of a part of Spanish public opinion -  should help Spain recover 
Gibraltar, reinforce the Spanish character of Ceuta and Melilla and would 
definitely dispel the threat of “africanisation” of the Canary Islands’ 
(Hernando de Larramendi 1992: 154). But as the UCD governments hastily 
negotiated accession to NATO they failed to obtain a specific coverage under 
the organisation for the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. According to article 6 of 
the Washington treaty, all the Spanish territory on the peninsula as well as the 
Balearic and Canary Islands were covered, the Canary Islands being well 
north of the Tropic of Cancer, that marks the line between islands covered by 
the treaty and those excluded. However, Ceuta and Melilla are on mainland
*) i nAfrica, and therefore excluded from coverage. That failure stood in stark 
contrast with the special dispositions obtained by France in 1949 in relation to 
Algeria and by Turkey in 1951 for its mainland Asian territory.
This failure is in part the result of the haste with which the negotiations were 
conducted: the UCD government, sensing that it would not win the elections, 
wanted to agree on the conditions of accession before the end of its mandate. 
Morocco exerted pressure on the United States, with whom important defence 
contracts had just been signed, and the latter did not want to find itself in
it
opposition to Morocco in case of a conflict. The other allies also preferred 
to exclude the cities. After accession Spanish diplomats exerted pressure in 
Brussels to obtain some political guarantees but only obtained an 
unambiguous declaration from Joseph Luns, then NATO secretary general, 
that Ceuta and Melilla were not part of NATO (Garcia Flores 1998: 56-57).
210 Paradoxically the lesser enclaves, which are islands, are technically covered by NATO.
211 The arrival of Ronald Reagan in the US Presidency signalled the start of one of the 
warmest periods of the historically friendly American-Moroccan relations. The American 
ambassador to Morocco singled out Morocco as ‘the primary example of how America 
supported a proven ally and friend’ {The New York Times, 1 February 1983). This support was 
particularly obvious in the Western Sahara conflict, but also extended to a certain degree to 
relations with Spain, as the American-Moroccan manoeuvres in Al-Hoceima showed at the 
start of the socialist period (Zunes 1998).
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Exclusion from NATO had more political than strategic relevance. Any attack 
on a Spanish ship or plane, or on the lesser enclaves, just off the cities would 
be enough for Spain to deserve NATO assistance. Moreover, NATO 
membership has brought a modernisation of Spanish troops, and permanent 
contact with other allies, that have thus become aware of the issue and have 
been exposed to the Spanish point of view. Politically, however, the fact that 
the two cities are not a part of NATO gives exactly the sort of message of 
exceptionality that Spanish government wants to avoid.
Thus, negotiations for accession to the European Community provided the 
opportunity for Spain to get some sort of further ‘international certification, of 
its sovereignty over the two cities. A second and contradictory concern was to 
maintain a relatively low profile for this issue to avoid a Moroccan negative
“5 1 0reaction and adverse publicity. Finally, the main concern in the negotiations 
was the preservation of the special economic status of the enclaves that, like 
the Canary Islands, enjoyed a very generous fiscal regime in order to 
compensate their economies for the difficulties imposed by their geography.
The second protocol of the Treaty of Accession of Spain to the EC ensured 
that the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, like the Canary Islands, would get a 
special treatment, and in particular they would not be part of the EC customs 
union, although their products would be exempted from the common custom 
tax, subject to a series of rules of origin, when entering the EU. The main 
differences with the rest of the EC territory include the free movement of 
goods, the exemption from VAT, trade policy (the common external tax does 
not apply for goods entering the cities) and Common Agriculture and 
Fisheries Policies (Planet Contreras 1998).
All the exemptions, combined with the generous national and local tax
91 ^provisions for the cities, could not avoid the progressive decline of the two
212 The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs made that clear in front o f the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Spanish Parliament when he explained that the government was working to 
establish a link between the situation in the Canaries and that in Ceuta and Melilla. ‘If 
technically this is possible’, he said, ‘politically we are not doing it very openly for a reason 
that everyone can understand.’ (OID 1985: 318)
213 The cities are not only exempted from VAT, but also from special alcohol and petrol taxes. 
They also enjoy a 50% reduction of personal taxes over profit obtained on the cities by 
residents or non-residents, a 50% reduction o f taxes over any profit obtained by residents that
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cities’ economies. The cities have often had the dubious honour of having the 
highest unemployment rates in the whole European Community, well above 
both the EC and the Spanish average. In 1999 the official unemployment rate 
in both cities was 27.3% in Ceuta and 22% in Melilla.214 The difficult 
economic situation made the cities qualify for the maximum level of regional 
aid from the EC, being considered ‘Objective 1’ regions.
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) has invested generously 
in the cities (see Table 6.1 below), and to its investment we must add part of 
the 101,3 MECU of the Interreg 2 programme for transborder co-operation 
between Spain and Morocco, a substantial part of which went to the two 
cities. The EC is therefore an important economic agent in the efforts to 
address the specific economic challenges that characterise the two cities 
(geographical isolation, lack of land and natural resources, excessive 
concentration on the services sector, deficient infrastructure, poorly trained 
workers, etc.) and that add to their vulnerability.
Table 6.1 European Regional Development Fund investment in Ceuta 
and Melilla (in MECU/MEUR)
Period 1989-1993 (MECU) 1995-1999 (MECU) 2000-2006 (MEUR)
Ceuta 49.2 47.4 77.1
Melilla 72.1 42.1 58.4
Sources:
For the 1989-1993: European Commission, Representation in Spain 1995 Ceuta v la 
Union Europea. Madrid and European Commission, Representation in Spain 1995 
Melilla v la Union Europea. Madrid.
For the 1995-1999 period: European Commission 1994 INFOREGIO Sheets N° 
94.11.09.012 and 94.11.09.013.
For the 2000-2006 period: European Commission Objective 1 Programme for Ceuta and 
Objective 1 Programme for Melilla in the EC website (http://europa.eu.int)
have more than a third of their patrimony in the cities and also a 50% reduction of the 
Societies tax. Those national benefits are complemented by ones offered by the local 
authorities.
214 As calculated by the National Statistics Institute (INE) on the basis of an employment 
survey (EPA) rather than on the basis o f unemployed people inscribed in job centers (INEM).
215 INFOREGIO Sheet N° 94.00.10.002.
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It is interesting to see that the EC/EU has not hesitated to embrace Ceuta and 
Melilla as its own territory despite the fact that the political sensitivity of the 
issue is well know to all member states. Whereas most extra-European 
territories of member states are not considered part of the EU (European 
Commission 1999), Spain has opted for a model which until its accession only 
the French overseas departments had: Ceuta and Melilla are considered an 
integral part of the EU. This is partly in contradiction with all the exemptions 
that Spain negotiated for them. Its significance is however both economic 
(structural funds are only available to EU territory, not to OTCs) and political: 
unlike NATO, the EU makes no exception of Ceuta and Melilla. The absence 
of controversy around this issue in the EC has a double explanation: the 
presence of a pre-existing model of extra-European EC territories (the French 
DOM) and the fact that the main advocate of Moroccan interest within the 
EC, France, was precisely the member state with least interest in opening a 
debate about non-European territories. The EC/EU does therefore provide the 
extra legitimacy to Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla that Spain 
failed to obtain from NATO.
The fact that the EC/EU defined Ceuta and Melilla as a part of its territory did 
not modify substantially the bilateral situation. Morocco still considered that 
Spain should enter into a bilateral negotiation, or at least some sort of 
dialogue about the sovereignty over the two cities; it never considered this 
issue to be a topic to be negotiated directly with the EC/EU. Equally, the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the other member states 
never considered that the dispute about the sovereignty of the two cities was a 
matter that should feature in any way in the EU/Morocco relationship. 
Despite the strong symbolic and economic backing that represented the 
EC/EU presence in Ceuta and Melilla, the underlying dispute remained an 
issue between Morocco and Spain.
This was made clear by Morocco’s reactions and pressure during the process 
that would give to the two cities their own statute as autonomous cities
241
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 6
(iciudades autonomas) in the early 1990s. During the negotiation between 
political parties in Spain, and in particular in its late phase in 1994, Morocco 
increased the pressure fearing that the consolidation of a territorial model for 
the cities would strengthen their attachment to Spain. The statutes of 
autonomy give the cities less powers than those enjoyed by the autonomous 
communities (regional governments). In particular they do not grant their 
assemblies legislative powers. Both statutes start with an unequivocal 
statement: ‘Ceuta (Melilla), as an integral part of the Spanish Nation and 
within its indissoluble unity, accedes to its self-government regime (...)’. 
Their approval in February 1995 completed the constitutional organisation of 
the Spanish territory and reduced the exceptionality of the cities within the 
Spanish regional structure.
The fact that Morocco did not provoke a major crisis when the statutes were 
approved had to do with secret bilateral agreements and generally good 
mutual relations,217 but also with the delicate moment for the Moroccan 
government, which was simultaneously negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association agreement and the fisheries agreement with the EC (Garcia 
Flores 1998: 46-47; Gold 2000: 50). Even though the issue remained in the 
bilateral sphere, the Moroccan government could not ignore the added 
leverage that Spain now had because of its membership in the EU.
In conclusion, with accession to the European Community new opportunities 
opened for Spanish diplomacy to reduce the tensions caused by the issues of 
the Western Sahara and of Ceuta and Melilla in the bilateral relationship, 
while at the same time reinforcing Spain’s firm stance on the issues. While the 
general framework of relations improved considerably with enhanced co­
operation and the adoption of a role of advocate of Moroccan interest in the
216 Estatuto de Autonomia de Ceuta, art. 1, and Estatuto de Autonomia de Melilla, art. 1. The 
reference to the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’, which refers to art. 2 o f the 
Spanish Constitution, can be found in the Autonomy Statute o f 6 o f the 17 autonomous 
communities (Andalucia, Murcia, Extremadura, Castilla la Mancha, Comunidad Valenciana 
and the Canary Islands).
217 The daily newspaper ‘El Mundo’ reported in September 1994 a secret deal between the 
Spanish Foreign Minister Solana and the Moroccan Prime Minister Filali to prepare a 
lukewarm Moroccan response to the statutes {El Mundo, 21 September 1994).
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EC by the Spanish executive, Spain consolidated the position of Ceuta and 
Melilla in its own internal structure as well as in the EC/EU.
6.3 The Parsley island incident
The CFSP and its predecessor, the EPC, have been widely criticised because 
of their limitations. The CFSP in particular, because of its promise of a 
common foreign policy, created a wave of disappointment resulting from the 
gap between the expectations it arose and the capabilities it actually had to 
achieve a real impact, in particular in the convulsed Balkans of the early 
1990s (Hill 1993). The Parsley island incident of 2002 further put in question 
two crucial issues within CFSP: solidarity and leadership (Monar 2002). The 
incident took place in July 2002, when Moroccan policemen set foot on a tiny 
deserted islet that both Morocco and Spain considered their own, and raised 
the Moroccan flag. This triggered a major reaction from Spain, including a 
military operation that brought to Spain’s occupation of the island. The 
incident only concluded after Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, 
brokered a deal that allowed lead to Spain’s withdrawal and the return to the 
status quo ante.
Despite its very limited military extent, the incident became a major 
diplomatic issue. The situation of a member country involved in an 
international crisis because of its extra-European territories had been faced 
before in the EC, for example with France in Algeria and Britain in the 
Falklands. But the Parsley island crisi was a crucial test for the CFSP and its 
revamped institutional structure at the start of the new millennium.
Spain expected and demanded unreserved suppot from its European allies, and 
it mostly found it, in particular as long as it could portray Morocco as the 
aggressor and the one who had broken the status quo. Its position became 
harder to defend when Aznar’s government took the offensive; some actors, 
such as France or the European Commission, were not ready to back that 
move unreservedly. This, and the fact that the final solution could only be 
found with a mediation from Washington, cast serious doubts about CFSP’s 
ability to deal with international crises.
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From the Spanish policy point of view the Parsley island incident was part of 
a wider bilateral crisis that extended from autumn 2001 to January 2003. This 
crisis dispelled many illusions about the state of relations with Morocco, and 
in particular about the effects of Europeanisation on those relations. It tested 
both dimensions of Europeanisation: projection, i.e. the degree to which Spain 
could use EU instruments to defend its own instruments, and reception, i.e. 
the degree to which membership in the EU had changed Spanish perceptions, 
decision-making mechanisms and the definition of its interests.
The end of an illusion
The signature of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co­
operation in 1991 seemed to promise the start of a period of particularly 
friendly relations with Morocco, but issues like the Moroccan campaign 
against the statutes of autonomy and the eruption of migration issues in the 
bilateral agenda partly dispelled that hope. That would be the case again after 
the Barcelona process. Three texts were signed in November 1995: the EC- 
Morocco Fisheries agreement, the EU-Morocco Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement and the Barcelona Declaration. In principle those three texts 
should have provided the framework at the heart of which should stand a 
strong link between Spain and Morocco. But slowly old and new problems 
started to surface and illustrated the contradictions inherent in the relationship.
The Socialist team that had built, with mixed success, the foreign policy of a 
democratic and European Spain left government in March 1996, six months 
after the Barcelona Conference. The arrival of the Popular Party (PP) in power 
did not seem to presage major changes, although the party had taken a harder 
line on the issue of Ceuta and Melilla. Prime Minister Aznar, just like Felipe 
Gonzalez, chose Rabat for his first visit abroad, the agreements were ratified 
and co-operation with Morocco seemed to be finally on track. But the 
environment changed gradually, partly as a result of a certain ‘neglect’ by the 
PP government (Gillespie 2004: 2): Abel Matutes, Aznar’s first foreign 
minister, stopped over in Rabat just once, compared to his predecessors one or 
two visits a year (El Pais, 15 November 1999).
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One of the first issues to worsen the climate between the two partners was that 
of immigration. The continuous arrival of immigrants with the 
accommodation, human rights, and public order concerns that arose created a 
sense of resentment in the enclaves against what was seen as the Moroccan 
government’s lack of interest in stopping illegal migration. As we saw in the 
last chapter, the Spanish government made that latter point a priority in its 
dealings with Morocco. Meanwhile it resorted to a solution that the PP, now 
in government, had been advocating since the early 1990s: an upgrading of 
the border fences from the ineffective wire fence put in place in 1986 to a 
fully fledged system of control, largely paid for with EC funds (Gold 2000: 
130-131).
Very little consideration seems to have been given by the Spanish government 
to the psychological effect of such an endeavour on the Moroccan side. An 
observer noted that, as outposts of the Schengen space, ‘Ceuta and Melilla 
have once again reverted to their original strategic roles, as a cordon sanitaire 
against a new “invasion” from Africa, this time from impoverished migrant 
workers’ (Carr 1997: 64). Migration did not stop, and although a police report
91 Rin June 2000 confirmed a massive reduction of entrances in the two cities, 
evidence showed that migration routes had simply changed, now favouring 
sea entry to the enclaves, the Canary Islands and Andalusia. In this context 
migration continued to be a factor causing tension between Spain and 
Morocco, with Spanish officials becoming more strident in their demands on 
Morocco, from 2000 onwards. Tension was further heightened by Aznar’s 
visit to Ceuta and Melilla in January 2000 and the unseating of Mustafa 
Aberchan, Melilla’s first Muslim mayor, in July 2000, one year after his 
accession to the post.
In 2001 the elements of conflict in the bilateral relationship started to 
converge. In the Sahara issue the UN special envoy, James Baker, presented a 
new plan that favoured Moroccan aspirations: a plan which proposed a period 
of 4 to 5 years of limited autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty followed by 
a referendum with an enlarged census to confirm the final status of the
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territory. The plan was endorsed by France, which was no surprise, but also 
by the United States and the United Kingdom, despite the fact that the 
Polisario Front rejected it. In this context Morocco perceived Spain as one of 
the last obstacles to the approval of the plan, which Rabat saw as the way to 
an international confirmation of its sovereignty over the disputed territory.
In April 2001 the break-up of negotiations for a new EC-Morocco fisheries 
agreement triggered a series of threatening declarations by cabinet members, 
including Prime Minister Aznar. During the summer senior officials from the 
Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministries issued ever more hostile declarations 
about the immigration issue in the face of the largest wave of pateras landings 
on the Spanish coast ever. Meanwhile, in the EC, Spanish officials pressed for 
a restrictive interpretation of the agreement that allows Morocco to export 
limited amounts of tomatoes to EC member states, and showed no sign of 
relaxing its position in the face of the upcoming revision of the agriculture 
chapter of the Association Agreement due that same year. During the summer 
the leading Spanish newspapers published several articles indicating 
disappointment with the new King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, for his failure 
to reform, including fostering the democratic process and the freedom of 
press.
The first warning sign from Morocco came on 4 September 2001: King 
Mohammed VI, in an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro, 
contested vigorously the criticism that officials from the Spanish ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Interior had been voicing,219 and pointed to Spain as 
being partly responsible for both illegal immigration and drugs smuggling.220 
He rejected all parallels between his own role in Morocco and that of King 
Juan Carlos in Spain,221 and made it clear that reforms in Morocco would
218 From around 50 entries per day for each enclave in 1999, the average went down to less 
than one per day one year later (Gold 2000: 131).
219 ‘We don’t accept that Madrid says that all the difficulties faced by Spain originate in 
Morocco’ {Le Figaro, 4 September 2001).
220 ‘The responsibility (for drugs smuggling and international migration) is shared. But from 
the Moroccan side, it is mainly a question of lack of means.’ (ibid.)
221 ‘The Spanish monarchy has nothing to do with the Moroccan monarchy. Moroccans never 
were like anyone else, and they do not ask anyone else to be like them.’ (ibid.)
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proceed ‘at a Moroccan pace’. Indeed, he explicitly named France as the 
advocate of Moroccan interest within the EU, with no mention of Spain.
On 28 October 2001 the Moroccan government recalled its ambassador to 
Madrid for consultations, making official the start of the worst bilateral crisis 
since the Green March of 1975. The Ambassador was to remain in Rabat until 
January 2003. Although no official explanation was given for the gesture, the 
Spanish declarations after the end of the fisheries negotiations, the position on 
the Western Sahara issue, the immigration crisis and a general upset mood 
about the state of bilateral relations were considered the main factors behind 
the Moroccan gesture. In particular, the fact that Spain sustained that any 
solution to the issue should be approved by both sides, when not only France 
but even the USA and the UK seemed ready to support Morocco, was thought 
to be the main cause for the withdrawal, to days before King Mohammed Vi’s 
first visit to the Western Sahara. Spanish attitude in the UN as well as in the 
EU, where it thwarted a French attempt to move European policy on the 
Sahara towards the ‘autonomy’ solution proposed in the Baker plan, seems to 
have been one of the triggers of the crisis (La Vanguardia, 29 October 2001).
The Spanish government considered that the Moroccan government had 
started the crisis and did not feel the need to change policy. The crisis was 
further aggravated with the visit in December 2001 of the head of the 
opposition, PSOE leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, to Rabat, which 
attracted criticism from the Spanish government, and by the false information 
(initially confirmed by the Spanish government) that Felipe Gonzalez, the 
former Prime Minister, had met secretly the Moroccan Prime Minister and 
King Mohammed VI without informing the government {El Mundo, 25 
February 2002).
The Parsley Island crisis
On 11 July 2002, while the Kingdom of Morocco celebrated the wedding of 
its new King, twelve Moroccan gendarmes landed on a tiny rocky islet 300 
metres off the Moroccan coast, 11 km west of the centre of Ceuta, and raised
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the Moroccan flag. The island, known as Layla in Berber, Toura in Arabic, 
and Perejil (Parsley) or Coral in Spanish, had remained for a long time in 
relative obscurity, and it was mentioned in very few texts because of its 
minute size and lack of population or strategic relevance.222 The ‘occupation’ 
raised alarms in Madrid, where the government was afraid of a precedent 
being set for the other Spanish North African enclaves. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs demanded in a note verbale that the status quo ante be 
immediately restored by Morocco on the very day of the Moroccan landing. 
Within three days five warships, two submarines, surveillance planes and 
assault helicopters had been deployed and the defences of all the North 
African enclaves reinforced.223
Initially Spain had hoped for a bilateral solution, and it asked the EU not to 
intervene. Thus, the first reactions of the European Commission and the 
Council Secretary General, Javier Solana, on 12 July were relatively mild, 
hoping for a bilateral solution based on dialogue. But as Morocco made clear 
that it had no intention of leaving the island, the Spanish executive changed its 
tactics and asked the Danish Presidency for open support (El Pais, 15 July 
2002). The declaration issued by the Presidency expressed its total solidarity 
with Spain,224 demanded Morocco’s immediate withdrawal and pointed to the 
North African country as the initiator of the crisis. Romano Prodi, President of 
the European Commission, contacted the Moroccan Prime Minister by phone 
and reminded him that ‘Europe contributes in a decisive manner to the 
economic development of Morocco’ (El Pais, 15 July 2002). Similarly 
NATO, which on 12 July had declared the conflict to be a ‘strictly bilateral 
problem’, reacted to the new Spanish request by describing the Moroccan
222 Notably the Hispano-French Treaty of 1912 that marked the limits o f the Spanish 
Protectorate did not mention the island. Morocco considered that it became Moroccan 
territory in 1956, whereas Spain seemed to consider it its own, albeit inconsistently: military 
maps and official atlases included or excluded it in different occasions.(Egurbide and 
Rodriguez 2002; Gonzalez 2002).
223 Including, significantly, those islands that did not have a permanent military presence like 
some of the Chafarinas Islands.
224 The Danish Presidency consulted some member states about the issue, in particular Great 
Britain, which was deemed to have a direct interest in the issue because of the proximity to 
Gibraltar. However France was not consulted, which triggered a protest by the French 
government afterwards (Yamoz 2002). Declaration in: OID Declaration de la Presidencia de 
la UE n°9116, Brussels, 14 July 2002.
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occupation as an ‘unfriendly gesture’ and demanded the immediate restitution 
of the status quo (El Pais, 16 July 2002).
After an initial hesitation, Spain, in parallel with the bilateral contacts, had 
opted for a display of military and diplomatic strength, and had achieved the 
backing of its allies. On 16 July the Moroccan government, surprised by the 
firmness of the Spanish and European reaction, issued an official declaration 
in a defiant tone, calling Ceuta and Melilla ‘occupied cities’ and Parsley 
Island a ‘liberated’ territory (El Pais, 17 July 2002).225 The same day the 
Spanish ambassador to Rabat was called back to Madrid. Negotiations were 
not interrupted, and the United States was asked by Spain to act as a mediator. 
Thus, while official declarations remained confrontational, an agreement 
seemed at hand on the evening of Tuesday, 16 July: Morocco would withdraw 
from the island on the condition that Spain would not re-occupy it; afterwards 
a dialogue including this and other problems would be opened (El Pais, 18 
July 2002).
The day after (i.e. 17 July, six days after the Moroccan landing) Spain 
surprised not only its southern neighbour but all of the international 
community by sending 28 soldiers in three helicopters to occupy the island. In 
less than an hour the Spanish flag had replaced that of Morocco and the 
operation had been completed without any casualties. The Moroccan 
authorities were surprised and outraged by the gesture, that amounted to a 
‘declaration of war’,227 especially as they had assumed that the issue would 
have been solved by that same morning.228
225 If that language may be common in international fora like the United Nations, it was new 
in a bilateral framework (Sanz 2002).
226 The six Moroccan soldiers that had replaced the gendarmes who had initially taken the 
island presented no resistance, were captured and sent back to Morocco via Ceuta less than 
four hours after the assault of the islet.
227 The Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister declared that ‘The Spanish occupation constitutes 
a blatant violation of the 1991 Hispano-Moroccan Treaty of Friendship, Good 
Neighbourliness and Co-operation and a denial of international legality; it constitutes a 
despisable act and amounts to a declaration of war.’ (El Pais, 18 July 2002).
228 According to the Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa an agreement had been 
reached with Foreign Minister Ana Palacio on that night and witnessed by the American 
ambassador to Rabat. The only disagreement was that the Spanish Foreign Minister 
demanded that the agreement be ratified by the Moroccan King by 4 AM, Rabat time. But at
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External support for Spain was to be tested again. The executive told its 
European partners about the actions almost immediately, and got expressions 
of solidarity from almost all of them. However in the Political and Security 
Committee the French representative opposed the publishing of a declaration 
in order to preserve good relations with Rabat, and the Italian representative 
supported him in general terms. The European Commission reacted through a 
declaration of its President that had been previously agreed with Prime 
Minister Aznar: the Commission was still worried about the situation, wanted 
a return to the status quo and a dialogue between Spain and Morocco, and 
showed its disposition to contribute to this dialogue. By contrast the NATO 
spokesman expressed satisfaction with the fact that status quo had been 
restored and the Danish ambassador to NATO pointed out that his country had 
demanded the Moroccan withdrawal.
The same two actors, France and the European Commission, insisted that 
Spain should withdraw from Parsley Island, and on the need for bilateral talks, 
although they expressed their solidarity with Spain (El Pais, 19 July 2002). In 
view of this, Spain did not seek any further declarations or support from the 
EU and turned again to American mediation. The United States had been 
cautious not to condemn either occupation of the island, and had kept its 
options for a mediation open. A new agreement was reached on 20 July 2002 
thanks to the direct intervention of the American Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell. So much was the agreement the product of American diplomacy that 
it was announced in Washington by the Department of State.229 That same 
evening the Spanish troops withdrew from the islet and two days later the 
Spanish foreign minister visited Rabat in order to discuss the issue bilaterally 
with her Moroccan colleague.
The bilateral crisis did not end immediately after the episode. In September 
the two foreign ministers were supposed to meet again, but the meeting was
that time o f night it was not possible to get the royal confirmation (El Pais, 19 July 2002). At 
4:21 AM, Rabat time, the Spanish helicopters reached Parsley island and started the assault.
229 The joint statement issued by the Spanish and Moroccan Foreign Ministers two days later 
made direct reference to the intervention of Colin Powell in the agreement: ‘The Ministers 
[...] have formally confirmed the agreement [...] as interpreted by the Secretary of State of 
the United States of America, Mr Colin Powell, on 20 July 2002.’ ODD Comunicado n° 9120, 
Madrid, 22 July 2002.
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cancelled; in October a Hispano-Algerian rapprochement was met with 
suspicion in Rabat, which saw it as a warning sign from Madrid. But after 
October 2002 relations went progressively back on track. On 11 December 
2002 the foreign ministers met in Madrid and paved the way for a 
normalisation with the creation of working groups and a restoration of the 
level of co-operation provided for by the Treaty of Friendship, Good 
Neighbourliness and Co-operation. Three days later King Mohammed VI 
offered some of the fishing vessels affected by a massive oil spill off the 
Galician coast the possibility to fish in Moroccan waters with no 
compensation, as a gesture of solidarity with Spain. The initiative signalled a 
clear will to end the crisis and both diplomacies reacted accordingly. 
Normalisation was made official on 30 January 2003 when King Mohammed 
VI announced the return of the Moroccan Ambassador to Spain after a 15 
months absence, a measure immediately reciprocated by Spain. The crisis was 
officially over.
What were the reactions to the crisis within Spain? On the domestic sphere the 
management of the crisis initially attracted criticism from opposition, and in 
particular from the second largest parliamentary group, the Socialists, which 
blamed Aznar’s government for the deterioration of a crucial relationship that 
it had inherited in a very good state. But the government’s reaction to the 
Moroccan landing on the island was not controversial. Domestically, it was 
not a question of everyone being completely sure about Spain’s claim to the 
island; what was at stake was something different: how determined was the 
government to protect its Northern African territories in the face of Moroccan 
aggression?
The answer to this question was of crucial relevance to the citizens of Ceuta 
and Melilla and to those of the Canary Islands. Hence the first reaction of the 
government: to increase military presence and readiness in the North African 
enclaves, in the Eastern Canary Islands and in the south of the Peninsula. 
Should there be a second Green March, the government would not abandon 
them as had happened in Western Sahara. In Parliament the major political
230 OID Comunicado Conjunto Espana Marruecos n° 9221, Madrid, 11 December 2002.
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parties of the opposition shared this interpretation with the exception of 
Izquierda Unida (post-Communist left) and the Basque Nationalist Party, 
although there were complaints about the way in which the government had 
chosen to act without consulting Parliament (DSCD 2002)231. The government 
was criticised more for having allowed the crisis to happen than for its 
management, to which it replied by blaming the Moroccans for being solely 
responsible for the crisis (DSCD 2002).
Public opinion by and large approved the action of the government: according 
to a survey conducted days after the Parsley island episode 73.5% of 
Spaniards had a good or very good opinion of the military intervention and 
only 11.4% had a bad or very bad opinion (CIS 2002). In Ceuta and Melilla 
the perception was even more positive. The Popular Party TV spot for the 
2003 regional elections in Ceuta ended with an image of the Spanish soldiers 
raising the Spanish flag over Parsley Island: in those elections the Popular 
Party won a landslide victory, obtaining absolute majorities in both cities.232
6.4 Europeanisation and the territorial issues
The analysis of these three territorial issues shows that the impact of EC/EU 
membership has been very limited. The issues have by and large remained at 
the bilateral level and the principles of Spanish policy in the issues of Western 
Sahara and Ceuta and Melilla have stayed the same over time. In the Parsley 
island incident the European element was a lot less important than the national 
elements of explanation, and even a third actor, the USA, had more impact 
than the EU in the final solution. A brief overview at the four themes of 
Europeanisation that we are analysing in this thesis confirms this impression.
231: In fact the Parliament was consulted over the Parsley island crisis, but in a manipulative 
way: Aznar secured parliamentary approval for his policy by giving the impression that a 
diplomatic solution was still being pursued—yet this was just horns before the special forces 
were sent in.
232 Asked during the campaign about the possible impact o f the episode, the President of 
Ceuta and PP candidate for re-election answered: ‘I do not know what impact the Parsley 
island issue will have on the elections. What I do know for sure is that the citizens of Ceuta 
are fully satisfied with the determination, firmness and the treatment given by the government 
to the issue.’ {El Pais, 3 May 2003)
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The first theme is the balance between new constraints and new instruments. 
The constraints on Spanish foreign policy on the territorial issues mainly 
come from its interest in Morocco and its internal public opinion, rather than 
from the European sphere. The EU has not challenged Spanish positions on 
the Western Sahara, and even in the case of Ceuta and Melilla, in which the 
EU is directly affected since they have become part of its territory, Spain 
could make its own interpretation prevail. Conversely, the instruments 
obtained have not made a big difference for Spain either. Firstly, because the 
sort of instruments that the EC/EU has are more adequate to negotiations in 
technical issues, such as trade or fisheries, than to highly sensitive political 
questions. And secondly, because the use that Spain could make of European 
instruments is severely restricted by the presence of France, who in the issue 
of Western Sahara is clearly pro-Moroccan and in other issues, like the 
Parsley island incident, has been at least ambiguous. The partial exception to 
this remark is the case of the humanitarian aid provided by the European 
Commission to the Western Saharan refugees, but this aid was a result of the 
European Parliament’s pressure, rather than the Spanish executive’s.
The issues of identity and interest have remained almost completely 
untouched by Europeanisation. Membership in the EC/EU has not altered the 
position that was defined in the first years of democracy, between 1976 and 
1984, in either the Western Sahara or the North African Spanish territories. 
For the Western Sahara issue the key element in Spain’s self-perception is the 
role as the former metropolis, responsible for a failed decolonisation that 
caused a long war; accession to the EC would not alter this identity. The 
‘Europeanness’ of Ceuta and Melilla, rather than creating a new identity for 
the cities, represents an international confirmation of their belonging to Spain. 
Once again, the identity and definition of Spanish interest remained relatively 
stable after accession.
The decision-making processes, the third of the themes of Europeanisation, 
has not changed significantly either. Ceuta and Melilla were treated as an 
issue of internal politics in Spain before 1986 and became the subject of 
internal EC policies with accession: just like Spanish policy, EU policy
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ignores the international dispute about the city and deals with them in the 
same way as any other EU territory. The Western Sahara is treated as foreign 
policy and dealt with within the appropriate frameworks, mainly the CFSP 
and humanitarian aid policy, and the adaptation pressures on the Spanish 
foreign ministry are very weak when compared with other policy areas. 
Nevertheless, the appearance of some European actors that played a role in the 
conflict, such as the European Commission or the European Parliament, did 
deflect to some extent pressure on Spain from both sides, in particular from 
the Polisario Front.
Finally, the fourth theme, Europeanisation through the domestic context, is 
mostly absent in this chapter: we have found no evidence of impact of EC 
membership upon the positions of social actors, political parties or local and 
regional powers. But we have observed that the EC/EU, like the UN, has 
served as a cover for the Spanish government’s relatively neutral position in 
the Western Sahara issue, where it faces an openly pro-Sahrawi public 
opinion, in which some sectors demand a clear backing from Spain to the 
Polisario Front. Such move could worsen the relations with Morocco to an 
unpredictable extent. The EC/EU, as well as the UN, have provided with their 
joint declarations a valuable legitimising tool that has helped the Spanish 
government to resist the unrelenting pressure, both from home and from 
Rabat. However, the EU policy is far from being clear and determined enough 
to allow Spain to hide completely behind it.
In all four themes we have witnessed a low impact of EU membership. The 
first explanation to this weak impact of Europeanisation is that the CFSP, 
unlike the policies studied in previous chapter, is still largely in the hands of 
member states. There is no common policy or a cession of sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter One, there is still a case for arguing that 
Europeanisation also acts within CFSP. But there are particular factors in each 
of the three territorial disputes that we are studying that make an impact of 
EC/EU policy on Spanish foreign policy particularly unlikely.
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The Spanish involvement in the Western Sahara conflict was a priority of 
Spanish foreign policy long before accession. Both the reaction to the crisis 
caused by the 1975 Green March and the reformulation of the Western Sahara 
policy within the foreign policy of a democratic Spain had already taken place 
before accession. As a member state Spain sought to upload the issue to the 
EC/EU level, and succeeded to a certain extent: the EC/EU has a policy 
towards the Western Sahara, albeit a timid one, which involves the member 
states as a group (for example, with their yearly joint statement at the UN), the 
Commission (mainly with humanitarian aid) and the European Parliament.
Two factors have limited Spanish success in the EU context. The first one is 
the presence of a diffuse resistance of some member states and the 
Commission to antagonising Morocco on an extremely sensitive issue for that 
country, while, crucially, there is also an open strategic rivalry with one 
member state, France (Koulaimah 1995: 104-105). The fundamentally 
different understanding of the issue by the two main EU players explains the 
very low profile kept by the EU in a conflict which takes place in its near 
abroad, so different from its role in places like the Western Balkans, Cyprus 
or even the Middle East. The second factor is the UN involvement in the 
issue, and in particular the fact that every important decision about it is taken 
by the UN Security Council, of which Spain is not a permanent member, and 
where the EU voice would anyway suffer from the problem of divergence 
with France. As a result, there is no EU Western Sahara policy articulated 
enough for Spanish governments to hide behind, and the issue is still troubling 
the bilateral relationship.
Ceuta and Melilla have not become a subject of CFSP not because Spain 
treated them as their chasse gardee in the way that, for example, France 
treated the Chad issue, but simply because they are not considered a matter of 
foreign policy at all. Peo Hansen signals the extent to which the academic 
literature about European identity has overlooked the issue of the non- 
European parts of the EU (Hansen 2002: 488-490); we must add our surprise 
over how the literature about foreign policy -  unlike that about agriculture,
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trade and development policies - has left unexplored the consequences of the 
existence of such territories for EU external relations.
We have found no evidence that other member states challenged the Spanish 
assertion that Ceuta and Melilla are undisputed parts of the national territory; 
this is no exception to the general rule that applies within the EU when it 
comes to non-European territories under the sovereignty of a member state. 
Europeanisation in the case of the Spanish North African possessions was 
almost completely absent because the substance of the foreign policy issue 
was simply not on the EU agenda; there was no pressure for Spanish 
adaptation or change of position because the Spanish position -  that the cities 
are an integral part of Spain -  is simply adopted by the EU.233
In the case of the Parsley Island crisis the first impression is that Spain acted 
unilaterally, by and large sidelining the European framework and opting 
instead for American mediation. This needs to be qualified after a careful 
examination of the sequence of events. In the very first moment Spain hoped 
to keep the issue within the bilateral framework and asked the EU actors to 
keep a low profile. But after two days it did request full support from its allies 
in order to induce Morocco to withdraw from the islet. Jorg Monar’s (2002) 
interpretation is that the response of the allies, including the Commission, was 
too timid and hesitant: ‘It is quite possible that if the EU had come out with a 
strong show of solidarity with Spain against Morocco on the day of the 
“invasion”, including the threat of sanctions, that Spain would not have taken 
military action in order not to endanger a common front which Morocco 
would have found difficult to resist* (Monar 2002: 254).
Our interpretation is different: there was a general feeling of satisfaction in 
Madrid about the response of the allies (with the partial exception of France, 
who had been excluded by the Danish presidency from the consultations); 
indeed, by 17 July (around 4am) an agreement had been reached, with
233 This is in open contrast with the EU policy on Gibraltar. In the case of Gibraltar, Britain 
has faced a permanent challenge to its sovereignty by another member state, Spain, and this 
has made the situation of Gibraltar within the EU very uncomfortable and unstable, a source 
of trouble for European integration at large (Groom 1997). The most obvious reason that 
explains that difference is that Morocco is not a member state that can challenge Spain on the 
Ceuta and Melilla issue within the EU in the way that Spain does with Gibraltar. On the other 
side is the case of the French DOMs, which is more similar to that of Ceuta and Melilla.
256
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 6
American mediation, between the Spanish and Moroccan ministers of Foreign 
Affairs. Yet the invasion proceeded nonetheless two hours afterwards, mainly 
for bilateral and internal reasons: the Aznar government was determined to 
prove it would not tolerate any violent pressure from Morocco.234 But where 
our analysis coincides with Jorg Monar’s is in the Spanish government’s utter 
disappointment at the French reaction (behind which some other member 
states hid) and in particular with the Commission’s offer for mediation 
between the two parts and their call for a rapid Spanish withdrawal after the 
Spanish military operation.
To a certain extent, the conclusions about the Parsley Island incident seem to 
contradict those about Ceuta and Melilla: the EU did not accept Spain’s 
understanding of the situation as the only valid explanation, and even the 
European Commission in time of crisis preferred to safeguard a strategic 
partnership with Morocco than to show an indivisible EU solidarity. But 
perhaps one attitude, the uncritical EU acceptance of the Spanish definition of 
its North African possessions, is at the root of the other: when faced with a 
crisis and difficult choices, the other EU member states and the Commission 
did not feel committed to an issue which they had not properly agreed upon. 
We can find at least two precedents of the Parsley island crisis in EC history: 
the French war in Algeria (1954-1962) at a time when Algeria, from 1957, 
was supposed to be EC territory ‘just as much as (...) Brittany’(Hansen 2002: 
487); and the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands in 1982. Those happened 
in very different European institutional frameworks: during the war in Algeria 
there was not even an institutionalised political dialogue; during the Falklands 
war foreign policy was a matter dealt with by the European Political Co­
operation. In both cases the events proved that the unspoken issue of the 
colonial legacy, which was apparently accepted by all member states, did not 
translate into an automatic and unconditional solidarity in times of crisis 
(Stavridis and Hill 1996; Hansen 2002).
234 The study of this decision, and the extent to which it was taken by Aznar himself and his 
Defence minister while the Minister of Foreign Affairs was negotiating, and whether or not 
she knew that the agreement she just obtained would not stop the military action are open for 
future researchers to study. At the moment the documents publicly available do not confirm 
those details.
257
Spanish policy towards Morocco Chapter 6
6.5 Conclusions
Territorial issues have been at the heart of Spanish policy towards Morocco 
ever since the latter’s independence. They were still highly relevant just 
before accession to the EC in 1986 and they remained so 16 years later. In all 
this time the Spanish and Moroccan differences over the status of Ceuta, 
Melilla and the lesser enclaves have remained intact, as have their 
disagreements over Western Sahara, with two new territorial conflicts, one 
about the sovereignty over Parsley Island and one about the delimitation of 
maritime waters, resurfacing. Such complete lack of political progress 
stands in stark contrast with the considerable achievements in technical areas 
such as trade, investment, finance, cultural co-operation, infrastructure 
projects or development aid, but also in political dialogue and bilateral 
partnership.
How can we explain this contrast? First of all, territorial issues are notoriously 
intractable in the realm of international relations and diplomacy. Spanish 
foreign policy makers in the successive PSOE and PP governments were 
profoundly marked by the negative experience of the Green March and the 
difficulties experienced by the first democratic governments of the UCD in 
their dealings with the Maghreb. The conflict over the Western Sahara and the 
regional rivalry in the Maghreb with which it became associated showed a 
potential to poison the whole bilateral relationship. On the issue of Ceuta and 
Melilla no compromise seems at hand other than avoiding Moroccan 
references to the enclaves, so far as possible.
The way in which the two issues were addressed was twofold: bilaterally, the 
goal was to try keep the issues off the agenda and avoid open and public 
negotiation with Morocco; multilaterally, Spanish governments tried to find as
235 The lack o f an agreed delimitation o f the Atlantic waters between Morocco and the Canary 
Islands was the framework for disagreement when in autumn 2001 Spain decided to allow oil 
prospections on waters that it considered its own, triggering Moroccan protests. It is not clear 
how important this was in the 2001-2002 crisis, but it could have had some significance given 
the competition between French, American and Spanish companies for the prospections. 
Results so far have however been disappointing. For a full discussion o f the issue see Inigo 
More (2002) ‘Petroleo^el proximo conflicto hispanomarroqul?’ Analisis del Real Instituto 
Elcano 49/2002, 13 September 2002.
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much support as possible for their position, in particular from their European 
allies, in order both to have more leverage over Morocco and to justify their 
own positions with reference to multilateral decisions. Both strategies 
succeeded to a certain extent in avoiding an open conflict for a while, but their 
limitations were made obvious by the Parsley Island episode.
Spanish insistence in refusing to talk about the sovereignty of Ceuta and 
Melilla is well grounded in international law and it is generally accepted by 
most of the main players in the domestic political arena; indeed, a departure 
from that line would entail a serious division in the political system and would 
certainly attract criticism in the national arena, let alone in the enclaves 
themselves. The Constitution would be quoted as an obstacle to even talking 
about the issue. Politically, however, the refusal to open a dialogue creates 
huge frustration in Morocco and does very little service to Spain’s 
international image on that issue.236 If international law and 18th century 
treaties do not sustain comparisons between the status of Gibraltar and that of 
the two cities, it seems harder to assume that geography is all they have in 
common in the world of international relations.
But much more frustration and resentment from the Moroccan side is caused 
by the Spanish position on the issue of Western Sahara. From the position of 
‘cautious distance, but not indifference’ defined by Foreign Minister Areilza 
in 1978, to the ‘constructive neutrality’ defined by Minister Palacio 25 years 
later,237 Spanish governments have been struggling to maintain a balanced 
position. On the one hand they had Morocco, whose number one foreign 
policy objective was the consolidation of its rule over Western Sahara (Damis 
1987); on the other, was Spanish public opinion, with NGOs, press, opinion 
leaders and many politicians being largely sympathetic to the Sahrawi cause 
(de Saint Maurice 2000: 143-144). On the bilateral front Spanish governments
236 One o f the Moroccan interviewees pointed to the fact that Spanish governments try to 
monopolise the agenda of bilateral negotiations so that only the issues that interest them 
(fisheries in the past, immigration now) figure in the top positions.
237‘Neutrality means thus that the only Spanish interest in the conflict is that its solution be in 
accordance with international legality and guarantee the stability o f the region. Constructive, 
because our attitude must also be to stimulate the parts, with which we keep a very special 
relationship, to negotiate a consensual solution. And also active because Spain does not want 
that this conflict ends up being forgotten’ (DSS 2003).
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have completely failed to transmit an image of neutrality to Morocco: in the 
best case their position is seen as unreliable, at worst as an unconditional 
support for the Polisario Front.
The multilateral answers to the territorial issues were partly more successful. 
The ‘European panacea’ (Hernando de Larramendi 1992: 153) to the 
Moroccan question could also be applied to Ceuta and Melilla: integrating 
them in the EC/EU would provide a political cover but also a crucial 
economic support to ensure the viability of the enclaves. But there were also 
limits to the allies’ solidarity, in particular with two of them: France and the 
United States. The United States’ refusal to grant NATO coverage to Ceuta 
and Melilla was a serious blow to Spanish aspirations. France, within the EU, 
did not allow Spain to transform it into a more active player in the Western 
Sahara issue, largely neutralising the Spanish possibilities to play a more 
active role under EU cover. In the Parsley Island dispute France showed 
solidarity with Spain but partly blocked EU support; the United States, rather 
than acting as an ally, became a mediator between Spain and Morocco. Even 
the European Commission proved an unreliable ally when it offered its 
mediation rather than its solidarity after Spain’s reoccupation of Parsley 
island.
The Socialist governments followed a line on the territorial issues based on 
pragmatism, the construction of a network of interests and a political dialogue 
to prevent disagreements from escalating into crises. The search for 
multilateral support for Spanish positions and the reinforcement of the 
Spanish position via the consolidation of the economic, legal and political 
status of Ceuta and Melilla and their inhabitants were also important. Actions 
in relation to the enclaves were taken in anticipation of the possible Moroccan 
reactions: the reorganisation of the army to face the ‘threat from the South’ 
was coupled with bilateral military co-operation; the measures that could 
cause a negative Moroccan perception (introduction of the visas, approval of 
the statutes of autonomy) were discussed bilaterally beforehand, sometimes in 
secret.
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This strategy was not modified initially by the PP government after it came to 
power in 1996, but it soon revealed its weaknesses: Spain was left in a 
reactive position, the Moroccan stance was not modified or weakened in any 
of the territorial issues, the demands in other areas (fisheries, agricultural 
imports into the EC, etc.) continued to grow and new issues, in particular 
immigration, emerged as conflictual. The PP government shifted towards a 
new strategy combining enhanced military strength (and a clear indication of 
the resolve to resort to force if necessary), a more assertive policy towards 
Morocco -  without fear of antagonising it, a higher priority on the domestic 
agenda (including party competition) over the bilateral relationship, an 
opening towards Algeria, less emphasis on European solutions and a closer 
alignment to the US. This strategy was representative of the new foreign 
policy style of the second Aznar government,238 of which the Parsley Island 
crisis was one turning point.
Spanish positions and actions in relation to the territorial disagreements with 
Morocco are firmly grounded in the domestic arena. The Spanish 
governments have not kept the issues of Ceuta and Melilla and Western 
Sahara as their own ‘chasse gardee’, but have tried to get the European Union, 
NATO and Spain’s bilateral partners involved in support of the Spanish 
stance. Nonetheless, given the limits of solidarity within both organisations, 
they have worked to build a network of political and economic links with 
Morocco in order to make pressure on the territorial issues less attractive and 
more costly Rabat. And, aware of the fragility of those links in relation to the 
strength of the Moroccan territorial claims, the Spanish governments have 
made no secret of their ultimate willingness to resort to military strength to 
defend the territory.
EU membership has made little difference to this fundamental stance. None of 
the four themes of Europeanisation identified in this thesis has been prominent 
in any of the disputes that we have studied, although there has been some 
degree of Europeanisation, as we have seen. The main reason for this weak 
impact is the nature of CFSP, with a low degree of institutionalisation that has
238 After the March 2001 elections, which gave the PP an absolute majority in both chambers.
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preserved the member states’ freedom of independent action to a very large 
degree. But there are also specific characteristics of the disputes studied in this 
chapter that explain this low impact: the particularly intractable nature of 
territorial issues, which imply very powerful domestic and international 
constraints; the problematic link between the remnants of colonisation and 
European foreign policy; and the existence of a strategic rivalry with another 
member state, France, in some of the issues.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions. Europeanisation and its 
limits
The thesis has thus far focused on separate issue areas of Spain’s policy 
towards Morocco. Now we need to bring together the four studies and then 
establish the limits of Europeanisation in our case study, contrasting 
Europeanisation with other possible causes for change in the policy that we 
are studying. We will then be in a position to see what contribution this thesis 
makes to the study of Spanish policy towards Morocco, to the analysis of 
EU’s policy towards Morocco and to the use of the concept of 
Europeanisation in the study of European foreign policy.
7.1 The conclusions from the four case studies 
The four themes of Europeanisation
Chapter One proposed four themes of Europeanisation, that is four areas in 
which policy change might be at least in part explained by the impact of 
membership in the EC/EU. We have found that there is a considerable 
variation amongst the four case studies in each of themes. There are however 
some general trends that can be witnessed across the whole spectrum of issues 
in Spanish policy towards Morocco.
The first theme we identified was the balance between new constraints and 
new instruments, which seems an obvious way of assessing Europeanisation. 
Have Spanish governments lost autonomy and therefore the capacity to 
defend the ‘national interests’ as they define them because of membership in 
the EC/EU? Or have they profited from EC/EU membership to advance their 
goals at relatively low cost in terms of autonomy? The answer to this question 
is not the same for all areas of the policy towards Morocco.
In the territorial disputes the situation has not been significantly altered by 
membership. The Spanish strategy of uploading to the EC/EU level the 
Western Sahara issue and to gain legitimacy and economic support for its 
sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla showed its limits with the 2001-2002
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bilateral crisis; the use of EC/EU instruments has thus been very limited. On 
the other hand, there is little evidence of Spain having felt constrained to 
change its policy on territorial issues because of being an EC/EU member. 
The migration issue is another example in which constraints derived from the 
EC/EU level have been of relatively little relevance, but in this case Spain has 
been able to make some use of European instruments in its own favour. The 
most important difference between those two cases is that the Spanish 
executive had to overcome diffuse resistance from some member states and a 
clear strategic rivalry with France in the territorial issues, whereas in the 
immigration issue its objectives were shared by other member states 
(including the largest ones). But even on this issue, when Spanish strategy 
became too threatening for Morocco in the 2002 Seville summit, France was a 
key element in blocking the Spanish proposals.
The issue of new constraints versus new instruments is more present in the 
study of fisheries, trade and agriculture policy, all of them common policies at 
EC level, in which Spain has lost a certain degree of autonomy. In those areas, 
unlike in the CFSP, Spain can be outvoted and, even more importantly, it is 
not directly the Spanish executive negotiating with Morocco, but the EC. The 
evidence found in the research shows, however, that in practice the Spanish 
executive has by and large been able to ensure that the concrete interests of 
Spanish fishermen, farmers and industry prevail over the objective of 
contributing to Morocco’s development. Moreover, the EC/EU has provided 
Spain with the economic support to compensate for the losses in negotiations 
with Morocco, particularly in the fisheries issue.
In terms of identity and interest, EC membership has been felt more in the 
global context of policy towards Morocco than in the concrete areas of study 
within this policy. This has been particularly true for those issues where there 
was a long tradition, a heavy weight of history and a well established concept
239 Technically the difference between unanimity and majority voting might be considered 
essential. In practice the fact that the conflict o f interest on those issues is largely with 
Morocco rather than amongst member states, and the particular sensitivity o f the fisheries and 
agriculture issue for some Spanish regions has been the background of a situation in which 
the risk to Spanish interest has been more the indifference of other member states and the 
lack of conviction in the Commission than the actual bargaining. This was confirmed by the 
interviewees, in particular for the fisheries dossier.
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of what the ‘national interest* was. Fisheries and the territorial issues are the 
cases in point, both of which had been consolidated in the years before 
membership. In those two issues the Spanish definition of the national interest 
has remained remarkably stable and Spain’s perception of its own rights and 
responsibilities has changed very little.
Despite Spain’s integration in the EC/EU, Spanish diplomats and politicians 
have retained a self image of a country that has unique problems, not 
comparable to any other. Comparisons of Spain’s territorial disagreements 
with Morocco with other similar issues have been rejected from the start, in 
particular for the Ceuta and Melilla issue: Gibraltar,240 the Falklands, French 
Guyana, or any other extra-European EU territory is deemed not to be 
comparable by Spanish diplomacy.241 Also comparisons between the Spanish 
position on the Western Sahara issue and other cases, such as Portugal with 
East Timor, have not been publicly made by successive Spanish executives or 
the Spanish diplomatic service.
On the issues in which Spain had less previous experience, or where the 
context changed noticeably, the impact of membership has been more evident. 
In the economic relationship, the combination of accelerated economic 
development and its new position as an EC member allowed Spain to change 
its attitude towards Morocco. Thus, the EC/EU framework allowed Spain to 
complement its policy of creating economic links with Morocco with a new 
identity as the advocate of Moroccan interests within the EC/EU. On the 
immigration issue Spain became aware of its own transformation, from a 
country of emigration, then transit, then a target for immigrants. The new self- 
perception of Spain emerged as the country became an EC member state and 
became established, as we saw in chapter 5, under the influence of the new 
European approach to migration issues.
240 The comparison with Gibraltar, and in particular with Spain’s claim to the Rock, has been 
an important part of the Moroccan argument to recover the city. For obvious reasons, it has 
always been contested by Spanish diplomacy. See the main arguments against this 
comparison in Ballesteros 1998: 400-415; Garcia Flores 1998: 22-24.
241 The only comparison that has been acceptable to Spanish diplomats and some academics is 
the one with European Turkey: borders that have moved between one side and the other of a 
Strait between two continents and have eventually stabilised in the current configuration.
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Changes in decision-making processes are often the main focus of studies of 
Europeanisation. We have found that, in three of the four cases, those changes 
were relevant not just in organisational terms, but also for the final policy 
outcomes. In the negotiations of fisheries agreements the transfer of the 
competence to negotiate international agreements changed the rules and 
relegated bilateral contacts with Morocco to a secondary place in the 
negotiations. The fisheries administration within the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, and that very ministry itself were reinforced within the 
Spanish context as they were the ones representing the Spanish views in the 
EC/EU meetings where a common position was agreed upon. A similar 
phenomenon happened with the Ministry of Agriculture on the issue of 
Moroccan imports of fruits and vegetables, and with the Ministry of Interior in 
the immigration dossier.
We have found that those changes in the relative weights of some ministerial 
departments as a result of the organisation of tasks within the EU (including 
the different compositions of the Council and the structure in three pillars) 
have been the most noticeable impact on decision-making. Other phenomena 
like socialisation have only been obvious in areas in which Spanish decision­
makers were less familiar with the issues, in particular in immigration. 
Immigration is also the exception in the general rule that the more a policy 
area is still at the hands of the state in formal terms, and the less the EC/EU 
level has institutionalised it, the weaker the impact will be. The territorial 
conflicts, the issue of agricultural imports and the fisheries dossier all confirm 
this tendency: the very institutionalised CAP and CFP have impacted more on 
decision-making in Spain than the CFSP.
Finally, the last theme of Europeanisation, the impact through the domestic 
context and actors, has been the least important in all four cases. The contact 
and links with EC/EU institutions and with their equals in other member states 
does not seem to have changed the basic views of the domestic actors 
(political parties, regional governments, pressure groups, etc.) on relations 
with Morocco even though they have adapted their strategies to participate in 
the multi-level decision game established in areas such as agriculture and
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fisheries. The same is true for the media and public opinion at large, whose 
perceptions of Spain and Morocco and their relationships do not appear to 
have changed significantly with accession or afterwards as a result of 
membership.
The main difficulty in assessing changes in Spanish public opinion is the lack 
of data that are comparable throughout time. There are three main sources of 
information that cover parts of the period we are studying. The first one is the 
monthly barometer of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, which 
sometimes includes questions about foreign policy. These barometers have 
been conducted regularly since 1982, but they only include very concrete 
questions dealing with hot topics of foreign policy and international affairs 
rather than data that can be compared over time. The most useful source for 
the 1986-2002 period are the four studies conducted by the INCIPE under the 
direction of Salustiano del Campo in 1991, 1992, 1995 and 1997. They asked 
the same questions to a sample of the general population and a sample of 
‘opinion leaders’ about their views on international affairs and Spanish 
foreign policy. The Real Instituto Elcano de Relaciones Intemacionales 
started its own foreign policy barometer in November 2002, and it is therefore 
of little use to follow the evolution of Spanish public opinion between 1986 
and 2002.
The INCIPE surveys of the 1990s show that Spanish public opinion and its 
leaders are deeply suspicious of Morocco. Most of the respondents that 
identify a direct threat to Spain’s security point to Morocco as the most likely 
source of conflict (see table 7.1). And this happened at a time, the early and 
mid-1990s, when the bilateral relationship was at its best level and Algeria, 
the other southern neighbour, was in the middle of a civil war. Morocco, as a 
country, attracts very little sympahty amongst the general Spanish population, 
although it does have a considerably more positive perception amongst 
opinion leaders (see table 7.2). When asked about what should be done with 
development aid to a fist of 17 countries (increase it, maintain it or reduce it), 
Morocco was the one which, together with Algeria, was given a lowest 
increase.
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Table 7.1 What country causes a serious threat to Spain’s peace?*
General population Opinion Leaders
Year 1991 1992 1995 1997 1991 1992 1995 1997
Morocco 42.4 39.9 36.5 32.5 85.7 66.7 100 50
Others** 
and n.a.
57.6 60.1 63.5 67.5 14.3 33.3 0 50
* That question was asked to those that answered that there was one country that posed a 
serious threat to Spain’s peace. Amongst the general population they were 14.4 in 1991, 14.4 
in 1992, 14.2 in 1995 and 10.2 in 1997; amongst opinion leaders they were 7.1 in 1991, 8.7 in 
1992, 10.1 in 1995 and 11.8 in 1997.
* * Those include the USA, Algeria, Libya and other Arab states. None of them has been 
quoted by more than 25% of the respondents in any of the surveys.
Source: Del Campo, Salustiano 1998 La Opinion Publica Espanola v  la Politica Exterior. 
Madrid, INCIPE
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Table 7.2 Sympathy for foreign countries in Spanish public opinion 
(1997)
10 indicates maximum sympathy, 1 minimum sympathy
General population Opinion Leaders
Germany 6.30 Germany 7.39
Switzerland 6.12 Portugal 7.23
Sweden 5.82 Italy 7.11
Canada 5.78 France 7.00
Italy 5.70 UK 6.96
Japan 5.59 USA 6.94
USA 5.48 Mexico 6.51
Portugal 5.42 Sweden 6.28
UK 5.33 Argentina 6.20
France 5.29 Japan 6.20
Mexico 5.22 Switzerland 6.15
Brasil 5.19 Canada 6.01
Argentina 5.17 Brasil 6.00
Nicaragua 4.88 South Africa 5.95
South Africa 4.80 Nicaragua 5.77
Cuba 4.72 Russia 5.60
Russia 4.58 Cuba 5.57
China 4.41 Morocco 5.39
Egypt 4.39 Israel 5.17
Saudi Arabia 4.01 China 5.09
Israel 3.62 Egypt 4.97
Morocco 3.40 Saudi Arabia 4.09
Algeria 2.94 Algeria 3.72
Libya 2.89 Iran 3.46
Iran 2.59 Irak 3.35
Irak 2.58 Libya 3.09
Source: Del Campo, Salustiano 1998 La Opinion Publica Espanola v la Politica Exterior. 
Madrid, INCIPE
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Conclusions
Therefore, there is no available evidence of a change in public opinion as a 
direct result of EU membership when it comes to relations with Morocco. 
This is mainly due to the lack of data which are comparable throughout time. 
The trend seems to be, however, stability, and indeed perceptions about 
Morocco are assumed to be mostly stable by Spanish academics. That might 
reflect the fact that Morocco and EU membership are perceived as separate, 
rather than interlinked, topics.
There is, however, one effect that we have identified in all four chapter: the 
instrumental use of the EC/EU framework by the executive as an alibi, a cover 
for policy shifts, or an excuse not just towards Morocco but also in the 
domestic context. Moreover, the mainly positive perceptions of the European 
integration process on the part of the majority of Spanish population 
throughout the period studied (1986-2002) have favoured the use of the 
European context as a legitimising factor. That confirms the predictions of 
those authors that argue that European integration in general and European 
foreign policy in particular have reinforced the position of the executives of 
the member states in their domestic arenas (Wallace 1983: 10; Moravcsik 
1994a; Hill and Wallace 1996: 6-8).
Explaining variation between issue areas
The impact of EC/EU membership has been unequal, as we have seen. In the 
previous section we have advanced some possible explanations for this 
variation. Those explanations could be combined to try and have a more 
general framework to explain on which areas Europeanisation is likely to have 
a stronger impact. The first two factors are the degree of institutionalisation of 
the policy area at EU level, and the novelty of the issue, i.e. the existence or 
absence of a historical weight and a previous record of relations with Morocco 
on that concrete issue. The hypothesis about the first factor is that the more 
institutionalised the policy area, the more impact of Europeanisation; and 
vice-versa. The hypothesis about the second factor is that the more historical 
weight exists, the less Europeanisation will be evident.
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Figure 7.1 Likelihood of Europeanisation
High degree of 
institutionalisation
Low degree of 
institutionalisation
New issue 1 3
Weight of history 2 4
According to the hypotheses just presented, the matrix works as follows. Case 
1, a new issue in an area which is highly institutionalised, would be the one in 
which Europeanisation would be strongest. Conversely, the least impact 
would be in case 4, an issue weakly institutionalised and with a large 
historical record. None of the cases we have studied fits perfectly in case 1, 
but the economic relations are the one which comes closest to it: two highly 
institutionalised EC policies (Common Agricultural Policy, trade policy) are 
the framework for a topic which had not featured prominently in the bilateral 
relations before 1986. Case 4 could be associated with the territorial issues, an 
old issue dealt with within the lowly institutionalised CFSP. Cases 2 and 3 are 
the middle ones, where Europeanisation is likely to have a role, but not to be 
completely decisive. Case 2 would be the case of fisheries in this study: the 
CFP is highly institutionalised, and there was a long record of Spanish- 
Moroccan fisheries relations at the moment of accession. Case 3 could be the 
case of immigration, a new issue in a lowly institutionalised framework 
(although this framework changed considerably towards the end of the 1986- 
2002 period).
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This first explanation of the extent to which the impact will be felt in a 
concrete area is only concerned about one aspect of Europeanisation, namely 
that of reception, or the top-down dimension. But we have incorporated in this 
thesis a second dimension, that is projection, the capacity of a member state, 
in this case Spain, to upload its own preferences to the EU level. There are 
many conditions for this uploading to succeed which have to do with the 
internal organisation of the EU system, but also with the concrete context, 
both within the EC/EU and internationally. We have tried to specify those 
conditions in the preceding chapters for the four issues we have studied.
The conditions include the attitudes of the main actors at EU level. Those 
attitudes do not explain per se the successes and the failures of Spanish 
executives to upload their preferences, but they do help us identify in which 
areas this has been more difficult. In the following figure we have tried to 
summarise the attitudes of Spain’s partners within the EU, selecting three 
important issues in each of the areas that we have studied: fisheries (a,b and 
c), economic exchanges (d,e and f), immigration (g,h and i) and territorial 
issues (j,k and 1).
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Figure 7.2 Attitudes of Spain’s partners on some issues of the policy 
towards Morocco
^ Vv-\A ttitu des
Situations
Converging
interest
Solidarity
Indifference/
Neutrality
Rivalry/
Opposition
a. Fisheries 
negotiations 1988
Portugal Southern MS Northern MS, 
Commission
b. Fisheries 
negotiations 1995
Portugal Southern MS, 
Commission
Northern MS
c. Fisheries 
negotiations 2001
Southern MS, 
Commission
Northern MS
d. Agricultural 
imports (1980s)
Southern MS Northern MS France,
Commission
e. Barcelona 
Conference
France, Italy, 
Commission
Rest of MS,
European
Parliament
f. Association 
agreement
Most MS, 
Commission
Belgium, Germany, 
Netherlands
g. Re-admission of 
illegal immigrants
Most MS Rest of MS, 
Commission
h. Joint control of 
the Strait
Italy Rest of MS, 
Commission
i. Sanctions for 
non-co-operation 
on immigration
United Kingdom Italy, Germany, 
Denmark, Austria
Most member 
states
France, Sweden
j. Western Sahara European 
Parliament, Pro- 
Sahrawi MS
Moderate MS France
k. Ceuta and 
Melilla
All MS, 
Commission
1. Parsley Island Most MS France,
Commission
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The figure above shows how France has been the one actor that has been most 
often at odds or at least lukewarm towards Spanish aspirations, although this 
has been more true in political questions than in those more economic in 
nature. The French position goes a long way in explaining the failure of the 
Spanish attempts to upload positions on the Western Sahara, to obtain 
unconditional support in the Parsley Island crisis and to approve concrete 
mechanisms to force Rabat to co-operate in the immigration dossier at the 
Seville summit. However France has been a relatively sympathetic partner in 
the fisheries issue and a valuable ally in the Spanish advocacy of the 
Mediterranean in general and of preferential treatment for Morocco in 
particular, for example in the negotiations of the Association Agreement. 
Disagreements with France have to do with a certain strategic rivalry, but also 
with the fact that France and Spain are much more interested in Morocco than 
is any other member state. For the majority of member countries, Morocco 
has been a very secondary concern.
This French factor in the Spanish policy towards Morocco is not a novelty 
introduced with Spain’s membership in the EC. As we saw in Chapter Two, 
the whole history of Spain’s colonisation and de-colonisation of Morocco was 
largely influenced by the paradoxical combination of strategic rivalry with 
and military dependency on France in the difficult moments (the Rif war, 
post-independence turmoil). The issues linked with de-colonisation and 
territorial disputes (Tarfaya, Sidi Ifni, Ceuta and Melilla, Western Sahara, 
Parsley island) have poisoned Spain’s relations with Morocco, while France 
could build a new relationship with Morocco from the start. Moreover, France 
succeeded in maintaining Morocco’s economic dependency, bom in colonial 
times, almost intact for a long time, and only partly transformed (mainly on 
the trade aspects) into dependency on the EC. France has kept the position as 
the main foreign investor, with a vast influence over a large majority of the 
Moroccan elite (politicians, businessmen, military, cultural elite), and its 
largest community abroad living in Morocco.
The failure to find a common approach to Morocco with France is one of the 
reasons for the difficulties of Spanish policies towards Morocco. Spain found
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in France the most valuable partner when it concentrated its efforts within the 
EC to create a new approach to the whole Mediterranean region in the early 
1990s. But it never undertook an open bilateral dialogue on the crucial 
bilateral relations with Morocco (or Algeria or Mauritania, for that matter) 
and, as a result, an underlying mutual suspicion weakened the EU’s political 
cohesion on crucial issues of the policy towards the Maghreb, most notably 
the Western Sahara conflict. France’s treatment of the Maghreb as its own 
chasse gardee is to be blamed for this as much as Spain’s insistence on the 
uniqueness and exceptionality of its relations with Morocco, and its utter 
rejection to even discuss such crucial issues as the status of Ceuta and Melilla 
or the long term perspective of its fisheries policy.
We have been talking about some areas in which Europeanisation has been 
more intense, and others in which it has been less intense, but without 
specifying the degree, nor indeed the quality of those changes. Charles F. 
Hermann (1990), in his study of foreign policy change, suggests that there are 
at least four graduated levels of change: adjustment changes, programme 
changes, problem/goal changes and international orientation changes. 
Adjustment changes affect only the level of effort and/or scope of the 
recipients; programme changes are those affecting the instruments of foreign 
policy but not the goals; problem/goal changes include a re-definition of the 
situation and of the purposes of the political action; international orientation 
changes involve ‘the redirection of the actor’s entire orientation towards 
world affairs.’(Hermann 1990)
Taking into account the definition of international orientation changes, we 
can see how this could not apply to Morocco, as the nature of Spain’s foreign 
policy has not been altered to such an extent since the end of the Franco 
regime. But if we apply the other three categories of Hermann’s typology to 
the changes produced by the impact of EC/EU membership in each of the 
areas that we have studied we can find the three types.
In territorial issues, the changes derived from EC/EU membership have 
mostly been adjustment changes: neither the definition of the problems, nor 
the ultimate goals and even most of the basic instruments (including the
275
Spanish policy towards Morocco Conclusions
military option) have changed substantially after accession. Spain has adapted 
its discourse and tried to take advantage of its membership of the EC/EU 
while refusing to reassess any of its main positions. There have been 
programme changes both in the fisheries and economic exchanges areas: the 
objectives have not been assessed (fishing as much as possible in the most 
profitable conditions, protecting Spain’s agricultural productions), although 
some new objectives have appeared (for example, promoting Morocco’s 
prosperity), but the strategies and policies have changed considerably because 
of accession. Finally, we have witnessed a problem change in the issue of 
immigration, the only one in which the ultimate goals are new. This novelty is 
partly a result of the new realities (immigration to Spain only took off around 
1986) but also of the European influence, as we saw in Chapter Five. We 
could argue that the programme change in the relation to economic relations 
and territorial issues had already started to take place during the first years of 
democracy in Spain, preceding accession. Thus, in terms of the quality of 
change, Europeanisation has been most relevant in the immigration issue.
The policy as a whole
So far the analysis has concentrated on four areas of Spanish policy towards 
Morocco and has compared the findings in those four areas. In the course of 
the thesis some of the linkages between issues have already been spelt out. It 
is now time to analyse the impact of EC/EU membership on the whole of the 
policy towards Morocco.
First of all, if we apply to the overall policy the same criteria as those we have 
applied to its components, we could place Spanish policy towards Morocco in 
between cases 2 and 4 of the Figure 7.1 (see above). That is, the historical 
legacy previous to accession is very important, and the degree of 
institutionalisation is somewhat in the middle: high for economic issues, low 
for political ones. On this basis, we would predict a low to middle impact 
overall for Europeanisation. In Hermann’s terms we can state than the 
changes in Spanish policy towards Morocco correspond to the level that he
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defines as programme change, that is, the main goals of the policy have 
remained stable but Europeanisation has brought new means and strategies.
More concretely, one theme that we have analysed in depth is the way in 
which Europeanisation has reinforced a tendency in which the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has lost some influence in the issues that we have analysed, 
whereas other ministerial departments and the prime minister’s office have 
gained influence. This is a general trend in Spanish foreign policy, with the 
partial exception of its strictly European policy (Molina 2002). But what have 
been its concrete consequences in terms of policy?
In the 1986-2002 period Spain has conducted a somewhat contradictory 
policy towards its southern neighbour. On the one hand it has designed a 
policy of good neighbourliness that has extended into the European level in 
the form of a role of advocacy of Moroccan interests within the EU; in the 
name of this policy some fundamental disagreements with Morocco 
(sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, situation in Western Sahara, concerns for 
democracy and human rights) have been treated discreetly by Spanish 
diplomacy. On the other hand, and simultaneously, Spanish governments have 
defended some very concrete domestic interests (fisheries, tomato markets, 
readmission of immigrants) in an open manner, sometimes using overtly 
hostile language towards the southern neighbour, in stark contrast with their 
discreet manners in political matters.
The most obvious explanation for this contradiction is the popularity and 
direct relevance of the second group of issues (fisheries, migration, 
agriculture) for Spanish public opinion, and its electoral relevance, in 
particular in Andalusia, Galicia and the Canary Islands. By contrast, in other 
issues, for example over democratisation in Morocco, the potential for support 
of government action is diffuse and weakly organised.
Yet, as we have seen, the analysis of policy-making also helps us understand 
this contradiction. We could define the Spanish activity within the EC/EU in 
relation to Morocco as the uploading of internal contradictions. Some Spanish 
preferences are in open contradiction with each other. For example: Spain
277
Spanish policy towards Morocco Conclusions
would like to see a prosperous and stable Morocco; it believes that Moroccan 
prosperity will be achieved through close association with the EU. But when 
Morocco tries to exploit its economic comparative advantages in relation to 
the EU market, it threatens Spain’s model of development, in particular in 
some of Spain’s poorest regions, such as Andalusia or the Canaries. This is an 
uncomfortable internal contradiction that is usually solved with short term 
calculations of political costs.
European integration has created a system where different parts of the national 
administrations meet their European counterparts in Brussels and create, 
together with the experts from the European Commission and the lobby 
groups of their area of activity, policy communities that reinforce their 
autonomy within the governments of their own country. In practice, for 
Spanish policy towards Morocco this has meant that the different ministries 
have had an opportunity to upload their visions directly onto the European 
level with less mediation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than used to be 
the case before accession. The clearest examples of this tendency have been, 
as we saw in Chapters Three and Five, fisheries and immigration.
As a result, rather than contributing to a more homogeneous policy, 
Europeanisation has allowed different sections of the Spanish executive to 
defend positions that were in essence contradictory. Uploading contradictions 
to the EU level rather than resolving them in the country itself is by no means 
a characteristic exclusive to the policy towards Morocco, nor even to the 
Spanish government. In any case, the result of this policy is not the solution of 
the contradiction, but the emergence of a contradictory European foreign 
policy. Thus, for example, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is largely 
influenced by the Southern European concept of ‘aid, not trade’, which has so 
far proved unable not only to reduce the economic differences between the 
two shores of the Mediterranean, but even to prevent the gap from widening 
still further. Another example is the European strategies to control massive 
migration to the southern Mediterranean countries, focusing on border control 
rather than on controlling illegal employment in the large ‘black economies’ 
of those countries.
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These considerations explain why Spain is still seen as a competitor and a 
threat in Rabat at times, despite the official discourse of goodwill and 
partnership. But they do not explain why Spain put in place some initiatives at 
the bilateral and EU level that, despite the underlying contradiction, were 
clearly strategic and the product of much leadership on the part of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In particular they do not explain the initiatives 
undertaken between the first and second Spanish presidencies of the EC/EU 
(1989-1995) in the area of the Mediterranean policy, which were to a large 
extent linked to the Moroccan policy.
To answer those questions we will apply Roger Kingdon’s concept of 
‘windows of opportunity’: those moments of opportunity that an actor, the 
policy entrepreneur, who is strongly committed to some form of policy 
change, can use for introducing a reform. (Kingdon 1984: 174-178; 
Gustavsson 1998: 34-35). We consider a relatively small group of Spanish 
diplomats that designed the renovated policy of Spain towards Morocco and 
the Mediterranean as the policy entrepreneurs who wanted to reform the 
policy towards Morocco. The EC/EU provided them with three clear windows 
of opportunity. Two of them were relatively foreseeable and embedded in the 
institutional system: the first two Spanish presidencies. The second one was 
an unexpected crisis, more a challenge than an opportunity: the crisis that 
flowed from the failure of the European Parliament to approve the fourth 
Morocco-EC financial protocols in January 1992.
In those three cases, the relative weight of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and its capacity to lead Spanish policy were considerably increased as 
a direct result of Spain’s membership in the EC/EU. In the presidencies, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a leading role and could impose its views on 
those of other ministries to a large extent. In the 1992 crisis the Moroccan 
pressure which affected particular areas such as the fisheries negotiations and 
the agreement for the readmission of immigrants urged Spain to take an 
initiative in the EC framework which was lead again by Foreign Affairs. 
Moreover, in the 1989-1995 period the context was also favourable to Spain 
as the Commissioners in charge of relations with the Mediterranean (Abel
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Matutes and, from 1992, Manuel Marin) and important members of their 
teams were Spaniards and had close links with the Spanish diplomatic service. 
This favourable situation explains why, despite its contradictions and the 
relative pre-eminence of socio-economic short term interests, Spain’s policy 
towards Morocco did have a certain strategic vision and contributed to the 
emergence of a mid- to long-term partnership strategy across the 
Mediterranean.
7.2 The limits of Europeanisation
Chapter One stressed the importance of clearly defining the limits of the 
concept of Europeanisation. The concern is not to attribute automatically any 
observed change to Europeanisation: we need to be relatively parsimonious in 
the use of the term if we want it to retain some meaning. Chapter One 
attempted to establish those limits in three directions: qualitatively, that is, 
assessing the extent and quality of the changes observed; causally, that is, 
trying to establish the causal link between pressure for adaptation/ new 
opportunities and actual policy change; and comparatively, i.e. testing the 
explanatory power of the Europeanisation thesis against other possible 
explanations.
We have tried to establish the causal links between European integration and 
Spanish foreign policy change throughout the four case studies. In the first 
section of this chapter we also introduced Hermann’s typology of foreign 
policy change and applied it to Spain’s policy towards Morocco in order to 
assess the scope and quality of the changes. This second section attempts to 
establish the limits in the third direction, that is comparatively. Our goal here 
is to identify what changes are best explained by Europeanisation and what 
other changes could be explained by other phenomena.
Foreign policy change and Europeanisation
The main difficulty of establishing Europeanisation as some sort of 
independent variable that can be contrasted with other independent variables 
is the difficulty of isolating the EU-effect from the other possible causes of
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change (Buhner and Lequesne 2002: 18). In addition, European integration is 
at the same time the context of the changes that have operated in Spain’s 
foreign policy since 1986, and a possible cause of these changes. To solve 
these difficulties we will resort to some of the concepts in the growing 
literature on foreign policy change within Foreign Policy Analysis.
The idea of foreign policy change is based on the assumption that ‘there are 
patterns in the foreign policy of a government, and not just single 
acts.’(Goldmann 1982: 230). The pattern, i.e. the policy of an actor, should 
help us both explain and predict future actions; a great amount of Foreign 
Policy Analysis literature has focused on explaining the causes and 
consequences of a policy, and is based on the idea of stability and continuity. 
The study of foreign policy change focuses precisely on the exception, which 
is the moments when those predictable patterns change.
Many of the authors that have written about foreign policy change have 
proposed their own models to facilitate empirical investigations. Jakob 
Gustavsson (1998) proposes a model based on three steps. The first step is the 
identification of a number of sources, then the study of the individual 
decision-makers that mediate them, and the last step is the study of the 
decision-making process. The result of the three factors is change in foreign 
policy. Gustavsson’s model distinguishes two broad categories of sources, 
following as we do in this thesis the distinction between international and 
domestic factors. His model can be visualised in the following figure:
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Figure 7.3 The causal dynamics of foreign policy change according to
Gustavssoi
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Adjustment change
Programme change
Problem/goal 
 ►change
^'""^International
orientation change
Individual
decision­
maker
Decision­
making process
Domestic
factors:
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International
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Political, economic
Feedback
Source: Gustavsson, Jakob 1998 The Politics of Foreign Policy Change. Explaining the 
Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership , Lund: Lund University Press, page 25.
Gustavsson’s model is useful in that it identifies sources of change, and those, 
once identified, could be contrasted with Europeanisation. Yet, the problem 
with this model for our purpose is that the model would not take into account 
the fact that Europeanisation also impinges directly on the decision-making 
process, apart from its impact on individual decision-makers. However, for 
the specific purpose of establishing the limits of Europeanisation in the 
transformation of Spanish policy towards Morocco by comparison with other 
possible explanations this model can be useful. In the next two sections we 
will therefore proceed, as suggested in the first chapter, to compare and 
contrast the impact of other domestic and international sources of change on 
the policy towards Morocco with that of Europeanisation.
Domestic factors for change
The main reorientation of Spanish foreign policy took place before Spain 
became a member state. The arrival of the Socialist party in power and the
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implementation of a new approach towards the Maghreb - and in particular 
towards Morocco - has been identified as the most relevant event in this 
policy both by some of the people that participated directly in the policy 
(Moran 1990; Moratinos 1991; Dezcallar 1992; Vinas 1999) and by 
academics that have studied it in depth (Hernando de Larramendi and Nunez 
Villaverde 1996; Gillespie 2000; Marquina 2000; Lemus de la Iglesia 2003). 
For this reason, the role of Europeanisation could only be relatively modest. 
However, the reorientation of the policy was not something that happened at 
once; it was a gradual process that was influenced by prospective and actual 
membership in the EC/EU. Moreover, despite continuity in the rhetorical level 
and the use of the same concepts (global policy, buffer of interests), the policy 
has undoubtedly changed since it was first formulated in the early 1980s.
Uxia Lemus de la Iglesia (2003) identifies three main sources of the change 
in the Spanish strategy towards Morocco during the 1980s. The first one is 
changes in the basic structural conditions of Spain, and in particular its 
accessions to NATO and the EC. The second source of change was the 
political leadership that the new government, with its successive absolute 
majorities, could use to implement an innovative political programme. 
Finally, the continual tensions with Morocco in the period were also a source 
of the change. All three sources were mediated by a relatively small group of 
diplomats formed under Foreign Minister Fernando Moran. This group 
gradually came up with the concept of a ‘global policy’, that it implemented 
with strong and continued support from the successors of Moran in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as from Prime Minister Gonzalez and his 
advisors.
The first step of the design of a comprehensive strategy towards Morocco, the 
Maghreb and the Mediterranean was not directly affected by the EC 
framework. The second step, the uploading of Spanish concerns to European 
level and the preference for a multilateral approach, was a direct result of 
membership. From 1988-89 we cannot de-couple Spain’s bilateral actions 
towards Morocco from its positions towards issues that affect Morocco within 
the EC/EU. Althought that might seem a truism, we should not forget that the
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European foreign policy system contains a number of special relationships, 
sensitive issues and chasses gardees in which member states have tried to 
avoid any EC/EU interference.
The partisan dimension is one of the domestic sources of change in Spanish 
policy towards Morocco. We have signalled that there is a wide agreement 
that the accession of the Socialist party to power in 1982 is a key element to 
understanding the transformation of policy before accession. After accession 
the party remained in power until 1996, when it lost the government to the 
Popular Party (PP). During the first four years thereafter, when the PP 
governed with the support of peripheral nationalist parties (the Canarians of 
CC, the Catalans of CiU and the Basques of EAJ-PNV), the line followed in 
the policy towards Morocco was relatively similar to previous years, although 
the profile was lowered. But after 2000, when the PP got an absolute majority, 
the effects of a change of government were felt more clearly, in particular in 
the migration issue. The difficult negotiations in the fisheries and the tomatoes 
issues in 1999-2000 contributed to the tensions, and the open hostility after 
the breakdown of fisheries negotiations in April 2001 and the following 
summer are at the root of the 2001-2002 open crisis.
It is not our intention here to construct hypotheses about whether the crisis 
would have happened at all with the Socialists in power, or whether the 
management of the Parsley Island incident would have been different. The 
analysis of what is now publicly known about the decision to intervene 
militarily in that island points to a decision at the centre of the executive 
involving Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and Defence Minister Frederico 
Trillo, but an accurate account would need more information. In any case, the 
second period of PP rule does clearly witness important changes in the foreign 
policy orientation of the government,242 and those changes include the policy 
towards Morocco.243 The partisan factor is therefore important in studying 
Spanish policy towards Morocco, and the explanatory power of the
242 This period witnessed a change in the relationship with the US, a new strategy and the 
search for new allies within the EU and Spain’s open alignment with the coalition that 
occupied Iraq in 2003.
243 The Moroccan interviewees have been unanimous in signalling the responsibility of the 
Aznar government and the change in style compared with the socialist governments.
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Europeanisation thesis is certainly limited compared to the party dimension in 
issues such as immigration or the 2001-2002 crisis.
In decision-making, on the contrary, we have found that Europeanisation has 
been an important factor for change. The changes in the distribution of weight 
in the formulation of the policy towards Morocco had to do with political 
priorities, but were also influenced by EC/EU structures, as we saw in the 
previous chapters. In particular for fisheries, agriculture and immigration the 
specialised ministries saw their influence reinforced within the executives in 
relation to issues affecting relations with Morocco. Europeanisation has had a 
much more noticeable impact on the policy towards Morocco than a new 
factor: the emergence of the regional dimension in Spanish foreign policy. 
Although we have seen that it did have some relevance in the issues studied in 
the thesis, for example in fisheries, we have found that despite the novelty of 
the presence of regional governments and the emergence of regionally based 
policy communities that aim to influence the foreign policy of Spain, their 
activity has acted more as a stabiliser and a resistance to change, in particular 
in regard to socio-economic interests, than a source of foreign policy 
readjustment.
Finally, we have signalled in the previous section that Europeanisation has 
played a role in the relations between Spanish governments and their public 
opinion, acting sometimes as a legitimising factor, an excuse, an alibi or a 
cover for changes in the policy. This should not lead us to forget that Spanish 
public opinion about Morocco appears stable, showing little sign of a direct 
impact of EC/EU membership. Europeanisation has been observed in 
operation via the instrumental use of the EC framework, but it has only really 
shaped public opinion to a certain extent on the migration issue. And even on 
that issue the growing number of immigrants, the media coverage and the 
political debate around the issue of the pateras have had a much clearer 
impact than EU membership.
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External factors for change
What about external factors for change? Has there been any factor(s) that 
explain the changes in Spanish policy towards Morocco other than the impact 
of its membership in the EC/EU? Those factors could come basically from 
two directions: the regional and global context, or Morocco itself.
In the global context the main change has been the end of the bipolar system. 
The events that between 1989 and 1991 transformed the world had a 
comparatively small effect on Spanish-Moroccan relations. This bilateral 
relationship had never been subject to Cold War logic, and the Soviet threat 
had always been diffuse in the area of the Strait. As a result, the disappearance 
of the Soviet bloc did not affect the bilateral relationship in a significant way. 
The most noticeable effect came precisely because of Spain’s membership in 
the EC: as Europe turned its attention to the East, Spain and Morocco had to 
struggle to attract the EC’s attention towards its southern neighbours.
Chapter Two outlines the main changes in the regional context of the Western 
Mediterranean. Certainly the intra-Maghreb detente of the late 1980s, that led 
to the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union contributed to the consolidation of 
Spain’s global approach towards the Maghreb. Other factors raised Spanish 
anxiety about the possibility of a negative evolution in Morocco, in particular 
the first Gulf War and the Algerian crisis in the 1990s. Those regional factors 
did contribute powerfully to the upgrading of relations with Morocco and in 
particular to the uploading of Spain’s concerns to the EC level.
Spain’s accession and membership in NATO had, as we saw in Chapter Six, 
little effect on bilateral relations with Morocco. This is particularly true 
because of the exclusion of Ceuta and Melilla from NATO coverage. The 
strategic partnership between Morocco and the USA was a counterweight to 
Spain’s accession to NATO. As a result, the NATO factor has been of 
relatively limited importance in the bilateral relationship and in Spanish 
policy towards Morocco.
Morocco’s foreign policy has been generally stable throughout the studied 
period. The country has not suffered any major internal convulsion or regime
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change. Morocco started a process of economic liberalisation in the 1980s 
followed by a timid political liberalisation in the 1990s, in particular after 
1998 with the arrival of a Socialist Prime Minister, Abderrahman Yussufi, to 
power. In this context the most noticeable novelty was the death of Hassan II 
and his substitution by his son, now King Mohammed VI, in 1999.
This change, and the renewed impulse to democratisation that it brought 
about, were welcome by Spanish governments, but they did not produce a 
qualitative change in the Spanish policy. Indeed, the worst bilateral crisis 
happened precisely in this period. The Parsley Island incident could represent, 
at first sight, a radical change of strategy in the Moroccan side. There are two 
alternative interpretations: the high profile of the incident was clearly a 
function of the importance that Spanish media and the Madrid government 
gave to it from the very start, and Morocco could have been trapped in an 
unexpected military crisis.
Another explanation could have to do with a change in the global context: that 
caused by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA. Both Morocco 
and Spain showed signs of feeling that their strategic importance had 
increased as a result of those attacks, and that they could count on increased 
American backing for that reason. Even Algeria seemed to feel that its new, 
friendlier relations with the USA now that they both were in the same side of 
the ‘war against terror’, would give it a greater leverage over the American 
giant. Paradoxically, this parallel assumption did not bring Spain and 
Morocco closer, but might have prompted them to enter on a more direct 
confrontation assuming that their ally would back them (Gillespie 2004: 8-9).
In conclusion, EC/EU accession and membership was the main external 
source of change in Spanish foreign policy, and the one which can explain the 
most transformations in Spanish policy in 1986-2002. This explanation should 
be combined with one important domestic factor, the change of party in power 
in 1996 and the subsequent change of attitude and in the importance that the 
Popular Party gave to good relations with Rabat in contrast with the Socialist 
period. Europeanisation and party politics are, in our opinion, the most 
relevant explanations for change, and explain the evolution of Spanish policy
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better than domestic Spanish factors, such as the rise of the regional 
dimension or the evolution of public opinion, or other international changes 
such as the end of the Cold War, changes in Moroccan politics or the impact 
of 11 September 2001.
In general continuity, and not change, has been the main characteristic of 
Spanish policy towards Morocco. The main transformation of Spanish policy 
towards Morocco happened before 1986. After that date, the fundamental 
principles of the policy have remained by and large stable. Only 
Europeanisation and the change of party in power had some significant role in 
bringing about change. But the issues included in the policy did not stay 
identical. Continuity in Spain’s policy and strategy could not stop the 
evolution of some of the issues: the fisheries situation became unsustainable, 
immigration grew and its socio-economic roots worsened, the avoidance of 
territorial issues did not solve them and caused frustration in Morocco. The 
combination of all those factors converged in 2001 and caused a crisis, which 
was the result of an accumulation of tensions rather than a major shock in 
either of the sides or the regional context.
7.3 The contributions of the thesis
This thesis started from a very general theoretical concern, assessing the 
impact of EC/EU membership on a member state’s foreign policy. At the 
same time the research has focused on the highly specific case of Spanish 
policy towards Morocco in the period 1986-2002, with the aim of bringing a 
new perspective to analysing this policy. Finally, and as a result of the focus 
on the interrelation between national foreign policy and European foreign 
policy, the thesis allows us also to draw some conclusions about EU policy 
towards Morocco.
Understanding Spain’s policy towards Morocco
The literature about Spanish policy towards Morocco is abundant, in 
particular in Spanish, and there is no lack of studies devoted to it. The 
historical background and the weight of history play an important role in
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many of the accounts of Spanish policy towards Morocco. This includes in 
particular the consequences of the colonial experience and the difficult de­
colonisation. History, but also education, is the reason for the existence of a 
number of ‘misunderstandings’ and prejudices that weight heavily on the 
bilateral relations. A large number of studies devote preferential attention to 
those cultural and subjective factors in the policy, including their influence on 
public opinion (Hernando de Larramendi 1992; Lopez Garcia 1992; Larbi 
Messari 1996; Sehimi 1996; Miguez 1999).
Another larger part of the literature on Spanish policy towards Morocco has 
significant normative content. The high political sensitivity of the Moroccan 
issue in Spain has been the background for a great number of publications 
written either by external observers in order to criticise the policy and/or 
suggest a new approach (Moha 1992; Ghiles 1997; del Pino 2002; Obiols and 
Solanilla 2002), or by the people that designed and conducted the policy 
themselves (or people very close to them), and to a certain extent justify it 
(Moran 1990; Moratinos 1991; Dezcallar 1994; Baixeras 1996; Matutes 
1997). This literature is useful because the writers often have a deep 
knowledge of the area and the empirical details.
Finally, a third bloc of literature focuses on very concrete aspects of the 
Spanish-Moroccan relationship. By far the most studied aspect from several 
perspectives is the issue of Ceuta and Melilla (del Pino 1983b; Marquina 
1987; Lena y Ortiz de Saracho 1991; Carabaza and de Santos 1992; 
Ballesteros 1998; Garcia Flores 1998; Planet Contreras 1998; Gold 2000). 
Other studies have focused on other, more technical, areas of the Spanish 
policy towards Morocco: fisheries (Juste Ruiz 1988; Manteca Valdelande 
1990; Jones 2000), immigration (Ibanez 1995), agriculture and trade (Bataller 
Martin and Jordan Galduf 1996) and development co-operation (Gomez Gil 
1996, Alonso et al. 2003). Those studies tease out the technical complexities 
of the different areas, which sometimes can be very specific.
In addition to this breadth of literature focusing directly on Morocco, there are 
a number of texts that deal with Spain’s policy towards the Maghreb. Those 
have the virtue of putting this policy in a regional context, and to give some
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comparative perspective which is useful, because Morocco tends to be treated 
in Spain as a completely exceptional case. Some works in this group, 
moreover, succeed in finding a good balance between an in depth analysis of 
the technical issues and a global vision of the whole policy towards Morocco 
in context (Hernando de Larramendi and Nunez Villaverde 1996; Gillespie 
2000; Marquina 2000).
What are the contributions of this thesis to this already rich literature? The 
first contribution is the use of a comprehensive concept of foreign policy. The 
global analysis of foreign policy towards Morocco needs to be complemented 
by a critical and accurate analysis of the technical issues at stake. The study of 
some of these issues after 1986 cannot be undertaken without reference to the 
EC framework; but the technical nature of some of the policies (like fisheries), 
or the particular institutional set-up of other (like immigration) should not 
make us forget that they are as much foreign policy as the ‘high politics’ 
issues like Western Sahara. Indeed, we have seen how particular interests in 
some of the technical areas have had an impact on the whole policy which is 
disproportionate to their economic relevance.
A second contribution of the thesis is a direct result of this analysis. Spanish 
policy towards Morocco contains some internal contradictions that seriously 
hinder the possibility of success for any strategic design. Those contradictions 
are rooted in a decision-making system where well-organised, regionally- 
based concrete interests acquire more weight than general strategic 
considerations. This imbalance is reinforced by membership in the EC/EU, 
with its relatively decentralised decision-making pattern that favours these 
narrow interests even more than the Spanish national arena.
A third contribution is the analysis of Spain’s role within Europe beyond the 
role it played in the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Despite 
the fact that Moroccan diplomats and academics, and some other scholars 
(Tovias 1995), have always pointed to Spain’s ambiguous role in the EC/EU, 
with a negative impact on trade terms for Moroccan interests, the Spanish 
literature has often concentrated exclusively on the diplomatic successes of 
the 1992-1995 period, when Spain led the EU towards a new approach to the
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Mediterranean region. A detailed study of the relations between Spanish and 
EU policies, however, shows that the contradictions mentioned in the previous 
paragraph have been uploaded by Spanish executives to the EU arena.
This latter point bring us to the final contribution of this thesis to the study of 
Spanish policy towards Morocco: the limits of the myth of a European 
solution to the Moroccan problem, an ‘EC panacea’ (Hernando de Larramendi 
1992: 153). The EU offers excellent opportunities to Spanish governments to 
conduct successfully its policy towards Morocco. But when choices need to 
be made within Spain, the EU framework per se cannot be the solution; 
moreover, on some issues, such as the dispute about the sovereignty over 
Ceuta and Melilla, the solution can only be bilateral. The new EU instruments 
can be a useful tool for protecting Spanish interests, but they cannot substitute 
a strategic approach, especially if it implies domestic political costs in the 
relationship with Morocco.
The EC/EU and Morocco
The study of European policy towards Morocco is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Nonetheless, some of the findings of our research are useful for an 
understanding of the policy that the European Union has conducted towards 
Morocco in the 1986-2002 period, and indeed of its future prospects. This 
comes, firstly, via a better understanding of Spanish policy and the 
motivations and expectations of Spanish executives when they act within the 
European foreign policy system. But there are also some conclusions that are 
useful to the understanding of the whole policy towards Morocco beyond the 
‘Spanish factor’.
Spain’s contribution to the European policy towards Morocco has been mixed. 
Morocco was a privileged partner of the EC before Spanish accession largely 
because of its special relationship with France. Spanish accession brought in 
the first instance elements of tension, in particular in the areas of agricultural 
imports and fisheries. Those elements did not disappear, but were partly
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compensated from 1989 as Spain assumed the advocacy of the interests of the 
Mediterranean countries within the EC/EU. In 1992, when the crisis between 
the European Parliament and Morocco peaked in the middle of the 
negotiations for a fisheries agreement, Spain was particularly active in 
supporting its southern neighbour. From that moment until 1995 it exerted a 
joint leadership in the making of the Mediterranean policy together with the 
Commission and, to a lesser extent, France and Italy. But after 1996 the 
Spanish role became less visible, and by the late 1990s Spain was 
permanently pressing to include immigration as a priority in the bilateral 
Morocco-EU agenda, leaving other issues in a secondary place.
The record of Spain’s activity within the EC/EU in relation to Morocco is 
therefore mixed. It has contributed to an increase in tension and to 
highlighting topics that put Morocco in a weaker position vis-a-vis the EU. At 
the same time, it has contributed to the emergence of a strategic vision and a 
partnership in which Morocco plays a key role. But in either case Spain’s 
impact has been significant.
Very few of the interests that were defined by Spain were seriously 
challenged by other member states. In this way the EC/EU has not contributed 
to the solution of the dilemmas of Spain’s policy towards Morocco. The 
exceptions are the issues in which Spanish interest directly confronted that of 
the other member state with a strong interest in Morocco: France. The lack of 
agreement between Spain and France goes a long way in explaining the EU’s 
discreet role in the Western Sahara conflict or its failure to come up with a co­
ordinated response to the Parsley Island crisis. But the joint efforts of both 
countries are also important for understanding the privileged attention that 
Morocco gets in the Mediterranean context.
Beyond the study of the Spanish position, this thesis also points to the issue of 
the multiplicity of multi-level arenas in which policy towards Morocco is 
decided upon in the EU context. The relevance of the CFSP is partly 
questioned when we see how other policies of the European Union have 
managed to retain a large degree of autonomy in deciding about issues of 
direct relevance to the relations with third countries. The clearest example of
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this in our thesis has been the issue of fisheries. The Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership and the Association Agreement went a long way in aligning the 
economic and political strategies of the EU towards Morocco, but still some 
areas like immigration policy and agriculture keep a large degree of 
autonomy. Indeed, co-operation in immigration matters has been successfully 
taking over part of the EU’s foreign policy agenda: this issue is becoming the 
main European concern in some relationships, including that with Morocco. 
The EU’s contradictions challenge the effectiveness of its approach to 
Morocco, and highlight the problem of a decentralised and loosely articulated 
foreign policy system like the EU’s.
This thesis also contributes a warning call for the study of EU policy towards 
Morocco. The European Union has integrated the colonial heritage of its 
member states with very little questioning. Thus, it has found itself with EU 
territories in South America, the West Indies or North Africa. In the case of 
Spain, it has integrated Ceuta and Melilla as full EU territories without any 
questioning of their sovereignty despite the well known and constant 
Moroccan claim to the cities. Neither Morocco nor the EU have wanted this 
issue to figure in their bilateral dealings since 1986, nor are they likely to want 
it to do so in the near future. But this dormant conflict should not be ignored 
forever. If tensions rise between Spain and Morocco, the EU-Morocco 
partnership will necessarily be affected. Neutrality or mediation cannot be 
options, as the Parsley Island conflict showed, if a foreign policy of the EU, 
embodying the interests of its member states, has to have any credibility 
(Monar 2002). But the failures to address the Ceuta and Melilla issue and to 
contribute to the solution of the Western Sahara weaken the EU role in its 
near abroad and preserve a continuing role for the USA in the region.
Europeanisation and foreign policy
This thesis has been written in the midst of a sustained growth in the interest 
in Europeanisation, with an ever larger amount of texts written about this 
subject, including a number of excellent treatments of the theoretical 
dimension of the concept and its empirical implications (Boerzel 2002; 
Bulmer and Lequesne 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). Some of the
293
Spanish policy towards Morocco Conclusions
texts deal with foreign policy, and the concern about the effects of the 
European foreign policy system on national foreign policies seem well 
established.
In this context our definition of Europeanisation of a foreign policy as the 
process o f foreign policy change at the national level originated by the 
adaptation pressures and the new opportunities generated by the European 
integration process contains an important element, the inclusion of two 
dimensions of Europeanisation: reception (top-down, downloading) and 
projection (bottom-up, uploading). The research has shown how the impact of 
EC/EU membership on a policy cannot be assessed only by focusing on 
pressure for adaptation; it has to be complemented by the study of the way in 
which the policy is shaped by the new opportunities arising from membership. 
The conclusions we have just outlined about the EU’s policy towards 
Morocco show that the study of Europeanisation is not only useful in 
understanding the policy of a member state, but also in analysing the whole of 
Europe’s foreign policy system.
In this study we made the choice to consider under the heading of forein 
policy technical issues that are not part of the CFSP, but that have an 
important role both for a particular member state and for the EU. The need to 
analyse the effects on the national policies of the complex EU system, with its 
semi-autonomous policy communities in the different areas of EU activity, is 
highlighted by this research. The consequences of the three-pillar structure 
and the selective cross-pillarisation, in which some policy areas extend 
beyond their original scope into policy areas of another EU pillar (for 
example, JHA issues concerning immigration penetrate the CFSP) is another 
issue that should be included in the studies about the impact of EU 
membership.
Another important conclusion is the fact that Europeanisation happens to a 
large extent before the actual moment of accession. Indeed, we argue that the 
pressure for adaptation is stronger before accession than once a country is a 
member state. The evolution of the foreign policies of the candidates for the 
next enlargement of the EU confirms this tendency (Vaquer i Fanes 2003).
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The impact, as we suggested in the first section of this chapter, will be more 
strongly felt the less historical weight the country has in the area towards 
which the policy is directed, and the more institutionalised the policy is at EU 
level.
Finally, we have seen how most changes associated with Europeanisation 
have to do with the institutional framework, with its limiting effects but also 
with the new opportunities it offers to member states. Yet, we have observed 
very little actual convergence between the member states, which confirms the 
need to clearly distinguish between Europeanisation and concepts such as 
harmonisation and convergence. A lack of does not mean that the positions of 
other member states is unimportant: as the role of France in this case has 
shown, disagreements and diverging points of view limit the scope of 
Europeanisation, in that they block the adoption of joint institutionalised 
arrangements, or joint foreign policy actions.
7.4 Final observations
Europeanisation has been a major source of transformation of Spanish foreign 
policy since 1986. The impact of EC/EU membership has been felt at all 
levels of policy: from identity and the definition of interest, to the decision­
making process; from the domestic political context and public opinion, to 
concrete policy decisions. Its impact has been most noticeable in those areas 
of foreign policy in which Spain did not have a previous record of links or a 
tradition of relations, or in areas where the context is completely new, such as 
the former Soviet bloc.
That was certainly not the case with the Spanish policy towards Morocco. The 
bilateral relationship was crucial for Spain well before it became an EC 
member, and the impact of EC/EU membership has been less marked here 
than in many other areas of Spanish foreign policy. Continuity and the 
persistence of old problems at the centre of the bilateral agenda have been the 
most remarkable characteristics of this policy. Indeed, if there was any doubt 
about the importance of the classical themes in bilateral relations (fisheries,
295
Spanish policy towards Morocco Conclusions
Spain’s possessions in North Africa, the Western Sahara), the 2001-2002 
crisis exemplified the limits of the transformation of the Spanish policy.
The main conclusion of this thesis is therefore paradoxical. Europeanisation 
has been, together with the change of the party in power, a major motor of 
change of Spanish policy towards Morocco after 1986. But at the same time, 
membership of the EC/EU has allowed Spanish policy makers to delay or to 
avoid some basic dilemmas of the policy towards Morocco. It has done so by 
providing new resources that have temporarily strengthened Spain’s position 
on some issues (fisheries, Ceuta and Melilla) without altering the nature of the 
fundamental disagreements with Morocco. Another way in which the crucial 
arbitration between conflicting interests has been delayed is by uploading 
contradictory strategies that the decentralised and complex EU system has 
incorporated without much difficulty.
Concretely, Europeanisation has been a source of adjustment changes and 
programme changes, which have more often resulted from the will to profit 
from the new opportunities than from the adaptation pressures from the 
EC/EU level. But Europeanisation has acted as a stabiliser when it comes to 
problem/goal changes; rather than challenging Spanish definition of problems 
in its relations with Morocco, the effect of EC/EU membership has been to 
delay the process of facing up to the contradictions involved in the definition 
of Spain’s interests in relation to Morocco.
The decentralised nature of EU decision-making has allowed different parts of 
the Spanish executive to upload contradictory interests to the EU. This has 
removed the need to arbitrate within Spain between those interests to a certain 
extent, but has not solved the dilemmas, of which the Moroccan side is clearly 
aware. And it has contributed to a contradictory European policy, in which the 
EU declares its willingness to contribute to Moroccan development and to 
have a close partnership but still hinders the development of the areas in 
which Morocco is most competitive, while avoiding dialogue about the 
territorial issues that dominate Moroccan foreign policy.
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Any observer with a good knowledge of European foreign policy may argue 
that the findings of this thesis are by no means exceptional in the EU context. 
If anything, they are typical of the way in which the EU system deals with 
foreign policy issues. Uploading contradictions, avoiding dilemmas at home, 
using the EU framework as an alibi for national policies, all of these are 
witnessed across the whole spectrum of EU members in all sorts of subjects. 
The impact of EC/EU membership on Spanish policy towards Morocco is 
only one example of some of the least studied aspects of Europeanisation.
Indeed, the largely paradoxical nature of Spain’s policy towards Morocco is 
by no means an exception in the global context of relations between 
developed and developing countries. Spain’s fisheries relations with third 
world countries can be perfectly compared to the Japan’s; its position on 
agricultural products is closely similar to that of other EU members or even 
the USA; nor is its immigration policy exceptional. The analysis of the 
contradictions and the ‘exceptional’ situations in this policy benefits therefore 
from being analysed in the wider framework of international relations, as well 
as from comparisons with cases that present some analogies.
This study ends, therefore, by stressing exactly the contrary of its initial 
remarks. The Introduction to this thesis outlined the very special 
characteristics of the Spanish-Moroccan relationship. But, as the Conclusions 
have underlined, despite its very particular features, Spain’s position on 
Morocco is better understood in terms of normality in the European, and 
indeed the international, context than as a unique, sui generis policy.
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